

MAHĀYĀNASAMĠGRAHA

(La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga)

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Volume II

Translation and Commentary

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List of Abbreviations

- B Chinese translation of the Saṃgraha by Buddhaśānta (Taishō 1592)
- P Chin. transl. of the Saṃgraha by Paramārtha (Taishō 1593)
- Dh Chin. transl. of the Saṃgraha by Dharmagupta (Taishō 1596)
- H Chin. transl. of the Saṃgraha by Hiuan-tsang (Taishō 1594)
- Bh Chin. transl. of the Bhāṣya by Hiuan-tsang (Taishō 1597)
- U Chin. transl. of the Upanibandhana by Hiuan-tsang (Taishō 1598)
- T Tibetan transl. of the Saṃgraha (Mdo ḥgrel LVI, fol. 1-51a2)
- bh Tib. transl. of the Bhāṣya (Mdo ḥgrel LVI, fol. 141b2-232b5)
- u Tib. transl. of the Upanibandhana (Mdo ḥgrel, LVI fol. 232b5-396b7)

Foreword

Published in the north-west of India in the 4th century C.E., the *Mahāyānasamgraha* which constitutes the charter of Idealist Buddhism (*vijñānvāda*) professed by the Mahāyāna school of the Yogācāra, is the work of Asaṅga, the son of a brahmin of Puruṣapura (Peshawar), who was a monk in the Sarvāstivādin order before going over to the Mahāyāna.

This work, of which Vasubandhu, Asaṅga's brother, obtained a copy, has not come down to us in the original Indian, but has been transmitted in a number of Chinese and Tibetan versions.¹ I (Lamotte) was inspired to attempt a French translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* which appeared towards the end of 1939. Most of it perished because of the war beginning in 1939. The *Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain* decided to reproduce my translation together with the commentary and accompanying notes by means of an anastatic process. I thank them for this mark of confidence which honors me greatly, not without confessing my anxiety at seeing a thirty-three year-old work reproduced unchanged.

Today we have working tools far superior to those of the past. Publications in the process of being completed, such as the *Index to the Taishō Tripitika*² and the *Pāli Tipiṭikam Concordance*³ open up almost infinite perspectives of information. The updating of original documents, duly edited and translated by Eastern and Western scholars, has allowed a mass of Chinese and Tibetan versions to be substituted by first-hand texts.

Idealist Buddhism has benefited greatly from the progress achieved lately by heurism and critique. An important lot of Indian manuscripts discovered in 1934 in Tibet by Rāhula

¹ See foreword to Vol. I of the present work.

² Published in Tokyo under the direction of Taizo Ishizaka and Shoson Miyamoto by the Foundation for the Advancement of Buddhist Academic Studies and the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

³ In the course of publication by the Pali Text Society.

Sāṃkṛityāyana and deposited in the *Jayaswal Research Institute* in Patna⁴ has given us access to many Vijñānavāda treatises, and some day we will read in their original wording Maitreya's five śāstras claimed by the Yogācāra:

1. *Yogācārabhūmi* "Levels of the Practice of Yoga", just now in the course of publication⁵

2. *Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantra* "Highest Doctrine of the Great Vehicle analyzing the precious spiritual lineages"⁶.

3. *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* "Ornament of the Sūtras of the Great Vehicle", edited and translated by Sylvain Lévi in the years 1907 to 1911.

4. *Madhyāntavibhāga* "Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes" which has just been enriched by a new manuscript of the *kārikās* and the *bhāṣya*, the latter attributed to Vasubandhu⁷.

5. *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* "Analysis of the Nature of Phenomena", of which the original Sanskrit has been found in Tibet and awaits publication⁸.

Asaṅga himself is held to be the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* "Summary of Scholasticism" and of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* "General Survey of the Great Vehicle".

⁴ The list of these manuscripts will be found in R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana, *Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibet*, JBORS, XXI, 1935, p. 21-43; *Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibet*, ibid., XXIV, 1938, p. 137 et seq.

⁵ For these later publications relative to this voluminous work, see *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, vol. III, Louvain, 1970, p. LXVIII, and L. May, *La Philosophie bouddhique idéaliste*, Études Asiatiques, XXV, 1971, p. 280 n.

⁶ E.H. Johnston's edition of the Sanskrit text, Patna, 1950; English translation, introduction and commentary by Takasaki Jikido, Rome, 1966; a brilliant explanation of *La Théorie du Tathagata et du gotra*, by D. S. Ruegg, in Publications of BEFEO, LXX, Paris 1969.

⁷ Edited and indexed by Gadjin M. Nagao, *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya*, Tokyo, 1964.

⁸ A work widely studied in Japan but still not well known in the West. The Tibetan translation, followed by a short fragment of the original text, has been published by Nozawa Jōshō in *Recueil d'articles dédié au professeur Yamaguchi*, Kyoto, 1955, p. 11-49.

Lengthy fragments of the former work have been published⁹ and the complete work has had an excellent translation into French by Rev. Rāhula¹⁰. The *Mahāyānasamgraha* has not been benefited in quite as favorable a way.

Finally for the record we will mention the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi* where Vasubandhu "shows, in twenty and in thirty strophes respectively, the nature of things is an activity -- (p. VII)....", according to the translation proposed by J. May. These two main works, remarkable for their conciseness and clarity, were discovered in 1932 in Nepal by Sylvain Lévi who then edited and translated them in the appropriate style¹¹.

The study of these various documents raises the problem of authenticity and chronology which Professor E. Frauwallner has brought up and discussed on the basis of an abundance of documentation. His initiative has set in motion a whole series of research¹².

Are the first Idealist śāstras, which tradition and legend assign to Asaṅga or Maitreya-nātha, the work of an historical individual or are they the work of the philosopher Asaṅga writing under the inspiration of the great Bodhisattva Maitreya dwelling in the Tuṣita heaven? Or again, are they the work of several different authors each claiming to have been inspired by the same bodhisattva? Actually it seems difficult to attribute them as a group to one and the same author because these śāstras, Idealist though they are, present important doctrinal divergences and different philosophical concerns. Thus the *Ratnagoṭravibhāgha* proposes as its main heading a doctrine of 'the

⁹ These fragments were published for the first time by V.V. Gokhale, *Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga*, Journal of the Bombay Branch R.A.S., n.s. XXIII, 1947, p. 13-38. They have been continued by P. Pradhan in his Sanskrit restoration of the complete text of the work:

Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga, Viśva-Bharati Studies 12, Santiniketan, 1950.

¹⁰ W. Rāhula, *Le Compendium de la Super-doctrine d'Asaṅga*, Publications of EFEO, LXXVIII, Paris, 1971.

¹¹ S. Lévi, *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi, Deux traités de Vasubandhu*, Paris, 1925; *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñāptimātra*, Paris, 1932.

¹² See E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin, 1956, p. 264-350; P. Demiéville, *La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṃgharakṣa*, BEFEO, XLIV, 1954, p. 381, n. 4, p. 434, n. 4; L. Schmithausen, *Zur Literaturgeschichte der Alteren Yogācāra-Schule*, Sonderdruck, ZDMG, Wiesbaden, 1969, p. 811-823.

Embryo of the Tathagata' in terms of which the Buddhanature is virtually inherent in all living beings. Furthermore, the intervention of many hands has been detected in one of these śāstras, the voluminous *Yogācārabūmi*, so much so that, at least in certain sections, it appears to be a conglomerate of heterogeneous material rather than a unitary work.

Whether supplied by the Indian, Chinese or Tibetan traditions, information concerning the great scholars of the School is full of obscurities and incoherences, so much so that one may wonder if the famous name of Vasubandhu does not apply to two distinct individuals¹³: a Vasubandhu of the 4th century, the brother of Asaṅga and author of numerous commentaries on the Idealist sūtras and śāstras, and a Vasubandhu of the 5th century who, after having published the *Abhidharmakośa* where he explained the system of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhaṣika, was converted to the Idealist Mahāyāna to which he dedicated his well-known *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*. These, as we know, were successful: in India itself; the latter was commented upon no less than ten times and, in various forms, was taught during the 6th century by eminent masters including Sthiramati at the University of Valabhi at Kāṭiāvār, Dharmapāla and his pupil Śīlabhadra who made famous the seat of Nālandā in the state of Bihar. It was at Nālandā when he arrived in the year 633 that the Chinese master Hiuan-tsang found the information on the Vijñānavāda that he was seeking, and on the basis of this, when he returned to China, he composed his *Ch'eng wei che louen*¹⁴ which became, in the Far East and for centuries, the map *par excellence* of Idealism. The detailed history of this movement of ideas has yet to be written. Paul Demiéville¹⁵ comments that the adherents of the school entitled "Idealist" Vijñānavāda also bear the name Yogācāra "Practitioners of (mental) effort". They are regarded as successors to the refined Yoga taught in the meditation manuals compiled in Kashmir in the second century of our era for the use of those specializing in dhyāna. These manuals, published under the name *Yogācārabhūmi*¹⁶, had been developed in

¹³ On the problem of the two Vasubandhus, cf. E. Frauwallner, *On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu*, Rome, 1951; *Philosophie des Buddhismus*, p. 76, 350; *Landmarks in the history of Indian Logic*, WZKSO, V, p. 129-132. - P. S. Jaini, *On the theory of the two Vasubandhus*, BSOAS, XXI, 1958, p. 48-53.

¹⁴ Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annotée*, 3 vol., Paris, 1928-48.

¹⁵ In *l'Inde Classique*, II, Paris, 1953, p. 449.

¹⁶ One of these manuals is the *Yogācārabūmi* of Saṃgharakṣa mentioned above, n. 12.

Sarvāstivādin milieus, but some Mahāyāna practitioners did not delay in picking them up, not without some retouching, and it is not unreasonable that the most monumental production of the Idealist School bears, as well, the name *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.

Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Vijñānavādin literature is very deeply rooted in the old canonical sūtras of the Tripiṭika. The doctrine of a single mind and the psychology of the fundamental or store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) which explains it, should be studied in the light of the canonical texts dealing with *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*. Like the other four skandhas, *vijñāna* is produced and disappears in perpetual alternation in both day and night¹⁷, but nevertheless, according to the dependent production of phenomena (*pratityasamutpāda*), it is the condition for name and form (*nāmarūpa*), i.e. the psycho-physical phenomena of existence. In other respects, so the old texts tell us, the world (of beings) is led by the mind, is manouevered by the mind: everything obeys this single dharma, the mind¹⁸; the mind is luminous, but sometimes it is defiled by the adventitious passions and sometimes it is free of the adventitious passions¹⁹; by the defilement of the mind, beings are defiled; by the purification of the mind they are purified²⁰; just as the dyer or the painter paints human shapes by mixing colors, so the mind makes future births²¹. Therefore, if there is "a great deal of Mādhyamika philosophy in the Canon" (L. de La Vallée Poussin), it is also true that in the same Canon there is a large portion of Vijñānavāda.

The mind also plays a large rôle in the Mahāyānasūtras, but for the earliest and notably for the Prajñāpāramitā, it is a matter of "mind no-mind" (*cittam acittam*), and the true nature of everything (*dharmāṇaṃ dharmatā*) is precisely the absence of mind (*acittatā*)²². Idealist Buddhism obviously cannot claim it. But there exists a second wave of Mahāyānasūtras for which "the threefold world is nothing but mind" (*cittāmatram idaṃ vad yad idaṃ traidhātkam*)²³ and which the Vijñānavāda will not fail to take into

¹⁷ Saṃyutta, II, p.95.

¹⁸ Saṃyutta, I, p. 39; Anguttara, II, p. 177; passage cited in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 151.

¹⁹ Anguttara, I, p. 10.

²⁰ Saṃyutta, III, p. 151, 152.

²¹ Saṃyutta, II, p. 101-102; III, p. 152.

²² For this subject, see my Introduction to *l'Enseignement de Vimalakirti*, Louvain, 1962, p. 56-60.

²³ Daśabhūmika, ed. Rahder, p.49.

account. These are, for example, the *Daśabhūmīka*, the *Samdhinirmocana*, the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the *Ghanavyūha*, the *Buddhabhūmi*, the *Akṣayamatīrdeśa* and the *Śrīmālādevisiṃhanāda*.

In conclusion, I (E. L.) make the wish that the study of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* will be taken up and pursued in the light of the considerable progress marked by the documentation and criticism in the course of these last thirty years. The assessment of present knowledge on the Vijñānavāda has just been presented by Jacques May in his article *La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste* (Revue de la Société Suisse d'Etudes Asiatiques, XXV, 1971, p. 265-323). I refer the reader to this clear, precise and complete study.

E. Lamotte

Louvain, June 10, 1973.

In Sanskrit: *mahāyānasamgraha*; in Tibetan: *theg pa chen po bsdus pa*.

- Homage to the Royal Prince Mañjuśrī.

PRASTĀVANĀ

(INTRODUCTION)

1. In the Abhidharmamahāyānasūtra, in the presence of the Bhagavat, in order to show the greatness (*mahattva*) of the Great Vehicle, the bodhisattva, Greatly Practiced in the Great Vehicle (*Mahāyānasuprapratipanna*), said: In relation to (*ārabhya*) to the Great Vehicle, the speech (*vāc*) of the Buddha Bhagavats is distinguished (*viśiṣṭa*) by ten superiorities (*daśavidha viśeṣa*). [132c22].

1. Comm. Bh 322b9-19, bh 144b4-145a1, U 380a29-380c10, u232b5-233b5.

This paragraph has been translated according to H; the versions differ slightly. According to P: "The Mahāyānasamgraha is the doctrine of the Abhidharma and the Mahāyānasūtras. In the presence of the Bhagavat, in order to show that the Great Vehicle possesses excellent qualities (*guṇa*) and concerning the Great Vehicle, the Bodhisattva-mahasattva [called] Practiced in the Texts (*pada*) and Meaning (*artha*) of the Great Vehicle, said: 'The Buddha Bhagavats possess ten superiorities (*viśeṣa*): their speech (*vāc*) is unequalled (*asama*) and surpasses the other doctrines.' Bh is close to H.

In the presence of the Bhagavat : this epithet designates the venerability [of the Buddha]; for that reason there is no other name. '*Having specialized in the Great Vehicle*'. Because he has attained excellent qualities (*guṇa*), dhāraṇī, etc., this Bodhisattva is able to comprehend and teach the doctrine (*artha*) and the texts (*pada*) of the Great Vehicle perfectly. Such is the name of this Bodhisattva. For what purpose does he teach? *In order to show the greatness of the Great Vehicle: to show*, means to bring to light (*prakāś-*) ... *In relation to the Great Vehicle: ārabhya* (*brtsams nas*) means *uddiśya* (*ched du bya ba*), or *adhikṛtya* (*dbañ du byas nas*). (Bh)

Bh prefaces its commentary by a general consideration of the canonical literature (Bh 321c14-322b8, bh143a2-144b4), taken from the commentary on the Sūtrālaṅkāra XI, 1-3. A new translation of this would be useful.

The three baskets (*piṭakatraya*) are Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma. These three baskets, divided into the Lesser Vehicle (*hīnayāna*) and the Greater Vehicle (*agrayāna*), which make up the basket of the Śrāvaka (*Śrāvapiṭaka*) and the basket of the Bodhisattva (*Bodhisattvapiṭaka*). Regardless of whether they are three or two, why are they called baskets? Because they contain (*saṃgrahataḥ*): it should be understood that they contain everything to be understood (*sarvajñeyārtha*).

Why are there three baskets? For nine reasons:

- i. The Sūtra is remedy (*pratipakṣa*) for perplexity or doubt (*vicikitsā*). Wherever there is a doubt about something, the Sūtra supplies a precise solution (*niścayārtha*). The Vinaya is antidote to habitual tendencies that constitute the two extremes (*antadvayānuyoga*). By prohibiting culpable pleasures (*sāvadyaparibhoga*), it remedies loose habitual patterns (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*); by authorizing (*anujñāna*) innocent pleasures (*anavadyaparibhoga*); it remedies austerity (*ātmaklamathānuyoga*)²⁴. The Abhidharma is remedy for heretical views (*svayamdr̥ṣṭiparamārṣa*), because it clarifies (*dyotana*) the true nature of dharmas (*aviparītadharmalakṣaṇa*).
- ii. Furthermore, the Sūtra teaches the three trainings (*śikṣātraya*)²⁵; the Vinaya executes (*sampādana*) the first two, i.e. higher morality (*adhīśīla*) and higher mind (*adhicitta*), because the ethical person (*śīlavat*), going beyond regret (*vipratīsarātīkrameṇa*)²⁶, attains meditative stabilization (*samādhi*). The Abhidharma executes the third, i.e., higher wisdom (*adhiprajñā*), because it analyzes (*pravicya*) true things (*aviparītārtha*).

²⁴ For the two extremes condemned by the Buddha, *kāmasukhallikānuyoga* and *ātmaklamathānuyoga* (Pāli: *attakilamatha*), cf. Vinaya, I, p.10; Dīgha, III, p.113; Majjhima, III, p. 230; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 330; V, p. 421; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 110; Visuddhimagga, p. 5, 32; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 185(5), 187(11).

²⁵ Cf. Atthasālinī, p. 21 (= Sumaṅgalavilāsini): *Tīsu pi ca etesu tisso sikkhā tīṇi pahānāni catubbhido gambhīrabhāvo vedītabbo. Tathā hi Vinayapiṭaka visisena adhiśīlasikkhā vuttā, Suttantapiṭake adhicittasikkhā, Abhidhammapiṭake adhipaññāsikkhā.*

²⁶ The manuscripts of the Sūtrālaṅkāra have '*vipratīsarādinemaṇa*': S. Lévi, in his edition, p. 54, corrects this as '*vipratīsarād avipratīsarēṇa*', and in his translation, as '*vipratīsarādīkrameṇa*'. But here, according to *hyod pa la rab tu ḥdas pas*, it should be read as *vipratīsarātīkrameṇa*.

iii. Finally, the Sūtra teaches the texts (*dharmā*) and theses (*artha*)²⁷. The Vinaya accomplishes (*niṣpatti*) the texts and theses, because the person who has disciplined their afflictions (*kleśavinayasamyukta*) penetrates (*pravedha*) the former and the latter. The Abhidharma excels in cutting through arguments (*saṃkathyaviniścayakauśalya*) about the texts and theses. For these nine reasons, they are enumerated as three baskets. Furthermore, they have, as their purpose, liberation (*vimocana*) from saṃsāra.

How then do they liberate? They liberate by predisposition (*vāsanā*), intellection (*bodhana*), pacification (*śamana*) and penetration (*praveda*). By hearing (*śruta*), the mind is predisposed; by reflection (*cintā*), one understands; by cultivating tranquility (*śamathabhāvanā*), one becomes peaceful; by discernment (*vipaśyana*), one penetrates.

Furthermore, in brief (*samāsataḥ*), Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma each has a fourfold etymology (*caturvidārtha*) by the understanding of which the bodhisattva acquires omniscience (*sarvajñātā*); as for the śrāvaka, by understanding the meaning of a simple stanza, he acquires the destruction of his defilements (*āsravaḥ*). In what way does each have a fourfold etymology?

1. The Sūtra is thus called because it tells us (*sūcana*) about the scene (*āśraya*), nature (*lakṣaṇa*), thing (*dharmā*) and purpose (*artha*). (i) The scene here means the place where the Sūtra has been preached, by whom and to whom. (ii) The nature is the nature of conventional reality (*saṃvṛtisatyalakṣaṇa*) and the nature of absolute truth (*paramārthasatyalakṣaṇa*). (iii) The entities are the aggregates (*skandha*), the bases (*āyatana*) of consciousness, the elements (*dhātu*), dependent origination (*pratīyasamutpāda*), sustenance (*āhāra*), the trances (*dhyāna*), the immeasurables (*apramāṇa*), the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the spheres of mastery (*abhibhvāyatana*), the spheres of totality (*krtsnāyatana*), the factors favorable to enlightenment (*bodhipakṣa*), the emancipated special knowledges (*pratisaṃvid*), etc.²⁸ (iv) The purpose is application (*anusamdhī*).

²⁷ The expression *dharmārtha* does not mean 'the meaning of the Ideal' (S. Lévi); it is a copulative compound. By *dharmā* is meant the sūtras; by *artha*, the theses taught in the sūtras. Cf. below, chap. III, paragraph 1.

²⁸ According to bh more complete than the Sūtrālaṃkāra: *chos ni phuñ po dan/ skye mche dan/ khams dan/ rten chin h̄brel par h̄byuñ ba dan/ zas sañ/ bsaṃ gtan dan/ tshad med pa dan/ rnam par thar pa brgyad dan/ zil pañi skye mched dan/ zad par gyi skye mched dan/ byañ chub kyi phyogs dan/ so so yan dag rig pa la sogs paño*. The detailed list of these various categories will be found in the Mahāvvyutpatti.

2. The Abhidharma is thus called because it comprises direction (*abhimukhatva*), repetition (*abhikṣṇatva*), mastery (*abhibhavana*) and access (*abhigamana*). (i) The Dharma that leads (*abhimukha dharma*)²⁹ to nirvāṇa is the Abhidharma, because it teaches the truths (*satya*), the factors favorable to enlightenment (*bodhipakṣa*), the doors of liberation (*vimokṣasamukha*), etc. (ii) The Dharma of repetition (*abhikṣṇaṃ dharmah*) is the Abhidharma because it supplies much detailed information for each dharma (*bahulanirdeśa*), e.g., etymology (*nirukti*), specific nature (*svalakṣaṇa*), shared nature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), etc.³⁰. (iii) It has supremacy, hence its name Abhidharma, because it triumphs over opposing theses (*parapravāda*) by treating controversial points. (iv) By means of it there is access to the meanings of the Sūtras (*abhiganyate sūtrārtha etena*), hence its name Abhidharma.

3. The Vinaya may be understood from the point of view of wrong-doing (*vipatti*), the cause of wrong-doing (*samutthāna*), the elimination of wrong-doing (*vyutthāna*) and liberation (*niḥsaraṇa*). (i) Wrong-doing consists of five categories (*āpattinikāya*)³¹. (ii) The cause of wrong-doing comes from ignorance (*ajñāna*) of the wrong-doings, lack of attention (*pramāda*), abundance of afflictive emotions (*kleśaprācurya*) and lack of respect (*anādara*). (iii) Elimination of wrong-doing comes from intention (*āśaya*), e.g., acceptance of a discipline (*saṃvarasamādāna*) and not of punishment (*daṇḍakarman*). (iv) There are seven ways of repairing wrong-doing: (i) confession (*pratideśanā*); (ii) acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of punishment: punishment of the postulant (*śikṣādattaka*), etc.; (iii) repeal (*samavaghāta*): when a rule has been promulgated (*prajñapte śikṣāpade*) by the Buddha and then repealed (*anujñāna*) by him at another place in the scriptures (*punaḥ paryāyeṇa*); (iv) remission (*praśrabdhi*): when the community allows the rule to be dropped unanimously (*pratiprasrambhaṇa*)³²; (v) transformation of the individual

²⁹ Cf. Atthasālinī, p. 19 (= Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, p. 18): *Yaṃ ettha vuḍḍhimato salakkhanā pūjītā paricchīnā/ vuttā adhikā ca dhammā Abhidhammo tena akkhāto.*

³⁰ According to bh: *chos re re ĕiṅ yaṅ nes paḥi tshig dan/ raṅ gi mtshan ñid dan/ spyiḥi mtshab ñid la sogs pa rab tu dbye ba maṅ pos ston paḥi phyir ro.* The Sūtrālamkāra differs: *ekaikasya dharmasya rūpyarūpisanidarśanādiprabhedena bahulanirdeśāt.*

³¹ There are five classes of wrong-doing recognized by all schools: *pārājika*, *saṅghādisesa*, *pācittiya*, *pātidesaṇīya*, *sekhiya* (cf. Davids-Stede, *Pali Dictionary*, s.v.) For the Sanskrit form *pārājayika*, U. Wogihara, *Lexicalisches aus d. Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 34.

³² According to Bh which corresponds exactly to the Sūtrālamkāra; bh differs notably: *nes par ḥbyuṅ ba ni rnam pa bdun te/ so sor ḥchags pa dan/ ltuṅ bar mthoṅ ba dan/ bslab pa sbyin pa la sogs paḥi chad paḥi las dan/ naṅ khrims kyis te/ bslab paḥi gnas bcas pa la rim gyis rjes su gnaṅ ba la brten nas dge*

(*āśrayaparāvṛtti*)³³ resulting from change in the male or female sex organs of a monk or nun (*vyāñjanaparivartana*); if there has been a wrong-doing not shared (*asādhāraṇa*) [by both sexes], it does not count³⁴; (vi) reflection on reality (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*): this is a special reflection having the aspect of summaries of the doctrine (*dharmoddāna*)³⁵; (vii) penetration of the nature of phenomena (*dharmatāpratīlambha*): when, by seeing the truths (*satyadarśana*), one escapes (*niḥsaraṇa*) from the lesser and the least wrong-doings (*kṣudrānuḥkṣudrāpatti*)³⁶. The Vinaya has four other meanings: (i) the individual (*pudgala*): the person for whom the rule has been promulgated [by the Buddha]; (ii) promulgation (*prajñapti*): when, having learned of an individual fault (*aparādha*), the Buddha, having called the community together, promulgated the rule; (iii) analysis (*pravibhāga*), i.e., the analysis of the wording of the rule (*uddeśa*) after its promulgation; (iv) discussion (*viniścaya*): this is establishing (*nir dhāraṇa*) in each case whether or not there is wrong-doing.

2. Indeed, the speech (*vāc*) of the Buddha Bhagavats is distinguished by the following superiorities (*viśeṣa*):

- i. the support of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*),**
- ii. the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*),**
- iii. entry into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa-praveśa*)**
- iv. the cause and result of this entry (*tatpraveśahetuphala*),**
- v. the various cultivations of the cause and result of this entry (*tadhetuphalabhāvanāprabheda*),**

ḥdun blo mthun pas rab tu bcas paḥi bslab paḥi gñi rjes su gbañ ba ñid dan. For the Śikṣādattaka, cf. S. Lévi, *Sūtrālamkāra*, transl. p. 199, n.4.

¹⁰ For *parāvṛtti* in general and *āśrayaparāvṛtti* in particular, see below 'Notes and References'.

³⁴ Case examined by the Pāli Vinaya in *Suttavibhaṅga*, I, 10, 6.

³⁵ In the expression *dharmodānākāraiḥ*, the word *ākāra*, which does not appear in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the *Sūtrālamkāra*, does appear in the Bh and bh: *chos kyi skye mos tshal gyi nram pas*. According to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, p. 277 (5), there are four *dharmodāna* which the Buddhas and bodhisattvas teach for the purification of beings: *anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārah*, *duḥkaḥsarvasaṃskārāḥ*, *anātmānaḥ sarvadarāḥ*, *śāntaṃ nirvāṇam*. Cf. the Pāli scriptures which deal with the *sankhāra* as *aniccā*, *vayadhammā*, *anattā*, *dukkhā*, etc. (cf. Davids-Stede, s.v. *sankhāra*).

³⁶ According to bh: *chos ñid rab tu rtogs pas bden pa mthonba ñid kyis ltuñ ba phra ĕin phra ba dag las ñes par ḥbyuñ ño*.

- vi. the superior discipline (*adhiśīla*) contained in these various cultivations,
- vii. the superior mind (*adhicitta*) contained in these various cultivations,
- viii. the superior wisdom (*adhiprajñā*) contained in these various cultivations,
- ix. the cessation which is the result (*phalaprahāṇa*) of these three trainings,
- x. the knowledge of the result (*phalajñāna*) of these three trainings.

This passage of the sūtra shows that the Great Vehicle is the speech of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*). [133a4]

2. Comm Bh 322b29-322c24, bh 145a1-145b5, U 380c20-381a6, u 233b5-234b3.

i. *The support of the knowable*: that which can be known is called the knowable, namely, the defiled (*sāṃkleśika*) dharmas and the pure dharmas (*vaiyavadānika*); also, the three natures (*svabhāvatraya*). *Support* has the meaning of cause (*hetu*) This support is the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).

ii. *The natures of the knowable*: namely, the three natures, imaginary (*parikalpita*), dependent (*paratantra*) and absolute (*pariniṣpanna*).

iii. *Entry into the natures of the knowable*: this is the way (*ji ltaṛ*) or the means (*gaṇ giṣ*) of entering, namely, Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātratā*)

iv. *The cause and fruition of this entry*: entry into Concept-Only has as cause, at the time of preparation (*prayoga*), the mundane virtues of generosity, etc. (*laukikā dānādīpāramitā*); as fruition, it has, at the time of realization (*abhisamaya*), the supramundane virtues of generosity, etc. (*lokottarā dānādīpāramitā*).

v. *The various cultivations of the cause and fruition of this entry*: cause and fruition consist of different cultivations (*bhāvanāprabheda*). *Cultivation* is repeated practice. This ongoing repeated practice being perfected in the stages (*bhūmi*), one speaks of various cultivations: these are the ten stages.

vi. *Superior discipline contained in these various cultivations*: in the ten stages, training (*śikṣā*) in the matter of discipline (*śīla*) is called higher discipline; this is the discipline (*saṃvara*) of the bodhisattvas who have not even a thought of wrong-doing.

vii. *Superior mind*: the concentration of the mind or observance in the matter of mind is called superior mind: these are the concentrations (*samādhi*).

viii. *Superior wisdom*: the practice of full understanding (*abhisamaya*) or observance in the matter of wisdom is called superior wisdom: this is nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*).

ix-x. bh comments as follows: *spaṅs paḥi khyad par ĕes bya ba la/ khyad par du ḥpags paḥam/ rab tu dbye bas sam/ so so raṅ go rig pas ṅon moṅs pa daṅ/ śes byaḥi sgrib pa spaṅs pa ste/ de yaṅ mi gnas paḥi mya ṅan las ḥdas paḥo// ye śes kyi khad par...ni sgrib pa daṅ bral baḥi ye śes te/ de yaṅ rnam par mi rtog paḥi ye śes rjes su mthun paḥo// saṅs rgyas kyi ye śes ni sgrib pa thams cad kyi bag chags spaṅs pa ste/ ḥdi ni rnam par mi rtog paḥi ye śes daṅ/ ye śes kyi khyad par ro/* : "Superiority of cessation: superiority (*viśeṣa*), classification (*prabheda*) or intuition (*pratyātmagati*) cut off the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*): this is the nonabiding nirvāṇa (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*, cf. chap. IX). Superiority of knowledge: knowledge without obstacle (*vinīvaraṇajñāna*); this is consonant (*ānulomika*) with nonconceptual knowledge. The Buddha's knowledge is free of any trace (*vāsanā*) of obstacle. It is a nonconceptual knowledge par excellence."

3. How is that shown? According to this passage, ten topics (*sthāna*) of which there is no mention in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas are treated in the Great Vehicle. These are:

i) The store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is called support of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*).

ii) The three natures (*svabhāva*): dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) and absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*), are the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*).

iii) Concept-Only (*vijñāptimātratā*) is the entry into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa*)

iv) The six virtues (*ṣaṭ pāramitā*) are the cause and the result of this entry (*praveśahetuphala*).

v) The ten stages of the bodhisattva (*dāśa bodhisattvabhūmi*) are the various cultivations of the cause and result of this entry (*hetuphala bhāvanāprabheda*).

vi) The discipline (*saṃvara*) of the bodhisattvas is the superior discipline (*adhiṣṭla*) contained in these various cultivations.

vii) The concentrations (*samādhi*) called 'Hero's walk' (*śūraṅgama*), 'Matrix of space' (*gaganagarbha*), etc., are the superior mind (*adhicitta*) contained in these various cultivations.

viii) Nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) is the superior wisdom (*adhiprajñā*) contained in these various disciplines.

ix) The nonabiding nirvāṇa (*apraṭiṣṭitanirvāṇa*) is the cessation which is the result (*phalaprahāṇa*) of these three observances.

x) The three bodies of the Buddha (*buddhakāya*), namely, essence body (*svābhāvikakāya*), enjoyment body (*saṃbhogakāya*) and apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*), are the knowledge of the result (*phalajñāna*) of these three trainings.

The ten topics (*sthāna*) mentioned here show that the Great Vehicle is distinct from the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas. Furthermore, they show the superiority (*agratā*) of the Great Vehicle. The Bhagavat reserves the preaching of it for bodhisattvas. Therefore, relative to the Great Vehicle alone, the speech (*vāc*) of the Buddha Bhagavats is distinguished (*viśiṣṭa*) by ten superiorities (*viśeṣa*). [133a18].

3. Comm. Bh 323a10-323b4, bh 145b5-146a8, U 381z20-382a3, u 234b4-237a2.

“iv) *The six virtues are the cause and the result of this entry*: when one has entered into the three natures by means of Concept-Only, the mundane virtues of generosity, etc., are called the cause of purity (*viśuddhihetu*) because they envisage (*ākṣip-*) the supramundane virtues. After having entered into the stages, these same virtues of generosity, etc., become supramundane and are called result of purity (*viśuddhiphala*).

v) *The ten stages of the Bodhisattva are the various cultivations of the cause and result of this entry*: the ten stages of the bodhisattva are the various cultivations of the two, i.e., of the cause and of the result, which are the aforementioned virtues.

viii) *Nonconceptual knowledge (literally, free of concept) is the higher wisdom*: for the śrāvaka, the absence of concept (*nirvikalpa*) consists of not conceiving of any of the four errors (*viparyāsa*); for the bodhisattva, the absence of concept consists of not conceiving of any dharma whatsoever; this is the difference between the two absences of concepts.

[For the four errors: taking what is impermanent to be permanent, (*anitye nityam iti*), etc., cf. *Ānguttara* II, p. 52; *Visuddhimagga*, II, p. 683; *Kośa* V, p. 21; *Samdhinir.*, p. 101; *Śikṣasam.*, p. 198].

ix) *The nonabiding nirvāṇa is the fruit of cessation*: this concerns the cessation which is the fruition of the three trainings (*śikṣā*), namely, the cessation (*prahāṇa*) of the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).

x) *The three bodies is the knowledge of the result*: this concerns the knowledge of the result of the three trainings. If there were no essence-body (*svābhāvīkākāya*), the Dharma body (*dharmakāya*) would not exist, as in the case of the eye (*caḥsurindriya*). If there were no Dharma body, the body of enjoyment (*saṃbhogakāya*) would not exist, as in the case of the visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*). Here the 'supporter' (*niśraya*) and the 'support' (*niśrita*) should be thought of as equal. If the enjoyment body did not exist, after having entered into the higher stages, the bodhisattvas would have no pleasure in enjoying (*saṃhuj-*) the Dharma. Without this pleasure, the accumulations (*saṃbhāra*) of enlightenment would not be complete (*paripūrṇa*), as in the case of color (*rūpa*). If there were no body of appearance (*nirmāṇakāya*), the bodhisattvas on the stage of application of faith (*adhimuktīcaryābhūmi*) and the śrāvakas of lesser faith (*hīnādhimuktika*) would fail in their undertaking (*ārambha*). That is why it is necessary (*avaśyam*) that there be three bodies. (Bh)

The ten subjects, etc.: This last line been translated according to H; the Tibetan is obscure. The ten topics mentioned here show that the Great Vehicle is distinct from the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, since they are not treated in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas.” (Bh)

4. Because the speech (*vāc*) of the Tathāgata is characterized (*viśiṣṭa*) by ten superiorities (*viśeṣa*), why is it asserted that the Great Vehicle is truly the speech of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*) and why is it denied that the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas is mingled with the Great Vehicle? Actually, the ten topics (*sthāna*) in question are not treated in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas but are dealt with in the Great Vehicle. These ten topics confirm great enlightenment (*mahābodhi*) and are fully justified by (*upapanna*), consonant with (*anukūla*) and non-contradictory to (*aviruddha*) the attainment of omniscience (*sarvajñājñāna*). Here are the verses (*gāthā*):

a) The support of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*), its characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), entry (*praveśa*) into its characteristics, the cause (*hetu*) and the result (*phala*) of this entry, their different cultivations (*prabheda*), the three trainings (*śikṣā*), the cessation which is the result (*phalaprahāṇa*), and the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the result: these are the superiorities (*viśeṣa*) of the Great Vehicle (*agrayāna*).

b) Such topics are not seen elsewhere. Because it is the cause of higher enlightenment (*agrabodhi*), the conclusion (*iṣ-*) is that the Great Vehicle is the word of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*). Because it explains the ten subjects, it is superior. (This last verse is translated according to H). [133a27]

4. Comm. Bh 323b15-323c4, bh 146a8-146b4, U 382a14-382b1, u 237a2-237b3.

"These ten topics assure great enlightenment: they are the cause capable of producing great enlightenment. They are fully justified for the attainment of omniscience: viewed according to correct proofs (*pramāṇa*), reasonings (*yukti*), etc., they show the marks (*nimitta*) of the path taught by the Buddha (*nāyakopadiṣṭamārga*); they are in conformity: in the course of the preparatory practice (*prayoga*), in view of full understanding (*abhisamaya*), they appear in a harmonious way (*ānulomika*): they conform to the direct path taught by the Buddha (*nāyaka*); they are without contradiction: in the levels (*bhūmi*), they do not constitute a cause of disturbance (*apakārahetu*); in the path taught by the Buddha, they do not bring the disturbances (*apakāra*) of thievery (*caura*), etc.; or again, they are not in variance with either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa." (Bh)

5. Why are the ten topics (*sthāna*) treated in this sequence (*krama*)?

i) From the very start (*prathamata eva*), by their skill (*kauśalyam niśritya*) in the cause of dharmas (*dharmahetu*), bodhisattvas must acquire skill in dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

ii) Next, in order to succeed in suppressing (*parihāṇi*) the extremes, which are the faults (*antadoṣa*) of superimposition (*samāropa*) and negation (*apavāda*), they must acquire skill in the natures (*lakṣaṇa*) of dependently produced dharmas (*pratītyasamutpanna*).

iii) Bodhisattvas trained in this way (*evamprayukta*) must penetrate (*pratividh-*) the natures that they have understood (*parigṛhīta*); in that way, they will liberate (*vimuc-*) their minds (*citta*) from obstacles (*āvaraṇa*).

iv) Next, after having understood the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*), and by depending on the six virtues (*ṣaṭ pāramitā*) previously practiced (*pūrvaprayoga*), they must acquire purity of the highest intention (*adhyāśayaviśuddhi*).

v) Next, having spread (*pratibhid-*) the six virtues contained (*parigṛhīta*) in the purity of highest intention over the ten levels (*bhūmi*), they must practice them for three incalculable periods (*kalpāsaṃkhyeya*).

vi-viii) Next, they must fulfill the three trainings (*śikṣā*) of the bodhisattva to perfection (*paripūr-*).

ix-x) Having fulfilled them, they must reach the nirvāṇa which is their result, and attain (*abhisambudh-*) complete and perfect enlightenment (*anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhiḥ*). That is why these ten topics are treated in this order. In this explanation, the entire Greater Vehicle is completed (*paripūrṇa*).

[133b10]

“ii) *They must acquire skill in the natures of dependently produced dharmas*: to wrongly (*abhiniviś-*) attribute existence (*bhava*) to the imaginary truly nonexistent (*abhūtaparikalpita*) is called '*superimposition*'. Then, because one has superimposed onto the nonexistent, to deny the absolute true nature (*bhūtapariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is called '*negation*'. Suppression of these two extreme defects (*antadvayoḥ*) constitutes skillfulness in the natures of the dharmas.

iii) Next, bodhisattvas must penetrate into the natures thus understood by means of Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātratā*) and thus escape from obstacles.

iv) Then, having entered into Concept-Only, they must bring to perfection (*paripūr-*) by way of the absolute (*paramārtha*) the six mundane conventional virtues and integrate them into the highest pure intention (*pariśuddhādhyāśaya*).

v) Then, in the ten levels (*bhūmi*) ... , they must practice these virtues for three incalculable great periods (*kalpāsamkhyeya*). This is different from the śrāvakas who practice the remedy (*pratipakṣa*) for three lifetimes (*janma*) and then arrive at deliverance [cf. *Sūtrālamkāra*, I, 10].

vi-viii) Then, in the course of this cultivation (*bhāvanā*), they must completely fulfill (*paripūr-*) the three trainings (*śikṣā*) of higher morality (*adhiśīla*), etc.

ix-x) Finally, they must realize nirvāṇa which is the fruit of the three trainings, the cessation of the afflictions, supreme perfect enlightenment and the three bodies of the Buddha." (Bh)

NOTES

§ 1-3. Superiority of the Mahāyāna over the Hīnayāna: Bodh. bhūmi, p. 297⁶ ; *Sūtrālamkāra*, I, 10; XIX, 59-60; *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, chap. V, *Yānānuttarya*, p. 199-262; N. Dutt, *Aspects...*, p. 46-90.

Mahāyāna scripture, *bodhisattvapīṭaka*, *dvādaśāṅgadharmaśāstra*, *dhāraṇī*: Siddhi, p. 614, which refers to Bodh. bhūmi, p. 96 (6), 160 (16), 272 (12). Add *Samdhinir.*, index, see under *bodhisattvapīṭaka*, *dhāraṇī*, *dharaprajñaptivyavasthāpana*; *Uttaratantra*, p. 227. Bu-ston, I, p. 34-38, drawn from the explanation in *Sūtrālamkāra*-

Samgraha; later, II, p. 101, he quotes some late sūtras and tantras on the compilation of Mahāyana scripture by Mañjuśrī-Maitreya-Vajrapāṇi. Another section of scriptures in 4, 9, and 29 categories of sūtra, 7 aspects of the Vinaya and 11 aspects of Mātṛkā: Samdhinir., X, v. 5-7.

§ 4. Authenticity of the Mahāyāna: Sūtrālamkāra, I 7; Hien yang cheng kiao louen song, Taishō 1603, p. 581b5-13; Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, 42; Siddhanta in Wassiliew, p. 289-290; Siddhi, p. 176-178.

§ 5. Compare the seven topics of the Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 6-9 with the ten topics of the Samgraha (Stcherbatsky, p. 10-15).

Chapter I

THE SUPPORT OF THE KNOWABLE

(*jñeyāśraya*)

1. First of all, (*atra tāvat*), at the very beginning (*prathamata eva*: cf. Prastāvanā, § 3), it was said that the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is the support of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*). The Bhagavat has spoken of the store-consciousness. Where did he speak of the store-consciousness? - In the Abhidharmasūtra (cf. Triṃśikā, p. 37; Siddhi, p. 169) Bhagavat spoke this verse:

anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ/

tasmin sati gatiḥsarvā nirvāṇādhigamo 'pi ca//

It is the beginningless element; it is the common support of all dharmas. Given this consciousness, there exists every destiny and entry into nirvāṇa. [133b16]

1. Comm. Bh 324a21-324b5, bh 147b5-8, U 383a4-15, u 238b8-239a6.

P: “At the beginning, it has been said that the support of the knowable is called store-consciousness. Where did the Bhagavat speak about this consciousness, and why did he call it 'store' consciousness?”

“*It is the beginningless element*: because there is no initial term (*pūrvakoṭi*). *Element*: cause (*hetu*) or seed (*bīja*). Of what is it the cause? Of dharmas, but only of afflicted (*sāṃkleśika*) dharmas and not of pure (*vaiyavadānika*) dharmas ... (For *śrutavāsanā*, the cause of pure dharmas, cf. below, § 45-49). This store-consciousness is also the *common basis of all dharmas*, in the capacity of support (*niśraya*) and not as cause. *Niśraya* is synonymous with *āśraya*, but cause (*hetu*) is not synonymous with support. Indeed, the support (*āśraya*) and the entity supported (*āśrita*) are two distinct things. Otherwise, if the words *cause* and *support* were synonymous, the author would not have mentioned *support* after having spoken about *cause*.” (U)

“Given this consciousness: Since there is a basis common to all dharmas, *there exists every destiny*: every destiny of saṃsāra; *destiny*, i.e., fruit of retribution (*vipakaphala*) ... There are no destinies that do not exist as its result; thanks to it, there is *access to nirvāṇa*: it is necessary that there be defilements (*sāṃkleśa*) in order that there be access to nirvāṇa.” (Bh) – In fact, “the definitive destruction (*nivṛtti*) of the defilements of existence and of birth (*bhavādiḥāyādisaṃkleśa*) is called nirvāṇa.” (U)

2. In the same sūtra (cf. Siddhi, p. 172), it is said: "The consciousness which, supplied with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*), underlies (*ālīyate*) every dharma, is called root, fundamental, receptacle store-(*ālaya*). I have revealed it to the virtuous ones." Such is the āgama. [133b19]

2. Comm. Bh 324b9-12, bh 147b8-148a1, U 383a20-28, u 239b6-240a1.

This verse has been translated according to H which brings out the meaning of *ālaya* better. *Ālaya* comes from the root *ālī*, *che ts'ang* in Chinese.

“The author quotes the words of the Buddha again in order to prove that the store-consciousness has the name 'root' or 'receptacle'. It *underlies every dharma*, whether in the nature of perfumed (*bhāvya*, *vāsyā*) or as perfumer (*bhāvaka*, *vāsaka*) ... It is consciousness *provided with all the seeds*, because it arises and perishes (*sahotpādanirodha*) with all the seeds. The store-consciousness and the active consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*) being mutual conditions (*anyonyapratyaya*), are lodged one within the other (*parasparam ālīyante*); cf. below, § 27. This is why we speak of the store-consciousness. Wishing to exclude nonvirtuous ones, the author adds: *I have revealed it to the virtuous ones*, i.e., to the great bodhisattvas. Capable of receiving this teaching, they are called *virtuous ones*; it is to them that this revelation is addressed and not to the nonvirtuous ones.” (U)

**3. Why is this consciousness called store-consciousness (all-basis consciousness)?
- It is a store- consciousness because all defiled (*sāṃkleśika*) dharmas of those who are born (*jātimat*) are lodged within it (*asminn ālīyante*) as fruit**

(*phalabhavana*), and it itself is lodged in the dharmas as cause (*hetubhāvena*). Or again (*athavā*), it is a store-consciousness because beings (*sattva*) are lodged in it as if in their self (*svātman*). [133b24]

3. Comm. Bh 324b121, bh 148a1-3, U 383b4-11, u 239a7-239b5.

Now the author explains the name 'store-' applied to this consciousness. *Those who are born:* (according to U, the *saṃskṛtas*). Defiled dharmas, in order to exclude pure dharmas (*vaiyavadānika*). *They are lodged in it:* they are present there (*pravartante*). Beings are lodged in this consciousness as if in their self: they wrongly consider (*parigrhṇanti*) it as their self. (Bh)

4. This consciousness is also called appropriating consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*). On this subject, an āgama, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, V, 7, says

ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo ogho tathā vartati sarvabījo /

bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi ma haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ //

Like a violent current, the profound and subtle store-consciousness proceeds with all its seeds. Fearing lest they would imagine it to be a self, I have not revealed it to fools. [133b28]

4. Comm. Bh 324b26-325a15, bh 148a3-150a1, U 383b16-24, u 240a1-5.

Bh reproduces Chapter V of the Saṃdhinirmocana in its entirety. There are a few variants. “*Profound*, because it is difficult to be probed (*duravagāha*) by the intellect (*mati*) of clear-sighted worldly people; *subtle*, because it is difficult to understand (*durvigāhya*) by the śrāvakas, etc. For this reason, the Budha does not reveal this consciousness to the śrāvakas, etc., because the latter do not aim at (*na paryeṣ-*) subtle omniscience (*sūkṣma sarvajñajñāna*) (cf. below, § 10). *Like a violent current, it proceeds along with all the seeds:* the series of its moments (*kṣaṇaprabandha*) is never interrupted (*samucchinna*); it is like the current of a river (*udakaugha*). *I have not revealed it to fools:* I have not revealed it to those who embrace the view of a self (*ātmadrṣṭi*), *fearing*

lest they imagine that it is a self. Why would they imagine that? Because this consciousness remains unchanged in its uniformity (*ekākāra*) until the end of *samsāra* (*āsamsārakoteḥ*).'' (U)

5. Why is it called the appropriating consciousness? - Because it appropriates (*upādadaṭī*) all the material organs (*rūpīndriya*) and because it is the support of the grasping (*upagrahāśraya*) of all the existences (*ātmabhāva*). Why is that? The material organs, appropriated (*upātta*) by this consciousness, do not perish (*vināś-*) as long as life (*āyus*) lasts. Furthermore, at the moment of reincarnation (*pratisaṃdhibandha*), because it grasps (*upagrḥṇāṭī*) their production (*tadabhinirvṛṭṭi*), this consciousness appropriates (*upādadaṭī*) the states of existence (*ātmabhāva*). That also is why it is called appropriating consciousness.

[133c4]

5. Comm. Bh 324b26-325a15, bh 148a3-150a1, U 383b16-24, u 240a1-5.

The version of H is the most satisfactory and that is the one I [Lamotte] translate. The Chinese versions differ from the Tibetan version more or less.

“*Because it appropriates all the material organs.* Why? The phrase *the material organs appropriated by it do not perish ...* gives the explanation. The material organs, the eye, etc., appropriated by the appropriating consciousness do not undergo the state of decomposition (*vinīlakādyavasthā*) of a corpse (*mṛtaśarīra*). But the moment of death (*marāṇakāla*) having come, this consciousness abandons (*tyajati*) them and thus these organs fall into decomposition. Therefore it is known with certainty that this consciousness appropriates the organs and, for this reason, until the end of life, they do not perish. (Bh) - It appropriates all the material organs, the eye, etc., in common safety and common risk (*ekayogakṣematvena*) which lasts for the entire lifespan; that is why it is called appropriating consciousness.” (U)

“*It is the support of grasping of all the states of existences.* The phrase ‘*furthermore, at the moment of reincarnation ...*’ gives the explanation. This consciousness is the series-consciousness (*saṃtānavijñāna*); this is why, at the moment of reincarnation, it grasps

(*grhṇāti*) the 'Cheng' (*abhinirvṛtti*). The states of existence of a given life-span (*ekāvadhyātmabhāva*), likewise, are grasped (*grhīta*) by this consciousness because the seeds (*vāsanā*) of these *ekāvadhyātmabhāva* reside in this appropriating consciousness ... That is why it appropriates (*upādadaṭi*) the states of existence." (Bh) – "All the states of existence are grasped by the store-consciousness which coagulates (*saṃmūrccita*) in the middle of the sperm and blood (*śukraśoṇita*)." (u)

6. This consciousness is also called mind (*citta*). Thus the Bhagavat said: "Mind (*citta*), manas and consciousness (*viññāna*)." Among these three, manas is twofold (*dvividha*):

i) Acting as immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) and forming support (*aśrayābhūta*), the consciousness that has just disappeared (*anantaraniruddha viññāna*) is the support for the birth (*utpattyaśraya*) of the mental consciousness (*manoviññāna*).

ii) The second is the afflicted manas (*kliṣṭamanas*), always associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the four afflictions (*kleśa*), i.e., wrong view of the self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), pride of the self (*asmimāna*), attachment to the self (*ātmasneha*) and ignorance (*avidyā*). It is the support of the defilements (*sāṃkleśa*) of the consciousnesses (*viññāna*).

The consciousnesses arise because of the first manas as support; the second one is defilement.

Because it cognizes the object (*viśayaviññapteḥ*), the manas is a consciousness; as antecedent (*samanantara*), as thinking (*manana*), the manas is of two kinds.

[133c11]

6. Comm. Bh 325b12-27, bh 150a8-150b8. U 383c16-29, u 240b1-241a2.

When the Buddha speaks of *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna* (cf. Dīgha, I, p. 21; Saṃyutta, II, p. 95), it is not a question of three synonyms as the Visuddhimagga has it, p. 452 (*viññānaṃ cittaṃ mano ti atthato ekaṃ*) and the Kośa, II, p. 176 (*cittaṃ mano 'tha viññānam ekārtham*), but rather of three distinct things (cf. H: *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna* are three).

Citta is the store-consciousness; manas is the twofold manas; vijñāna is the six active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*).

i) The first manas corresponds to the manas or, more precisely, to the *manodhātu*, *mana-āyatana*, *manaindriya* of the Vaibhāṣika; cf. Kośa, I, p. 31-33: ‘There is no manas distinct from the consciousnesses. That one of the six consciousnesses which has just disappeared is the manas (*ṣaṅṅām anantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ yad dhi tan manas*) ... The first five consciousnesses have the five material organs, eye, etc., as support; the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have a similar support. Consequently, with the view of attributing a support to this consciousness, *manas* or *manodhātu*, or again *mana-āyatana* and *manaindriya*, is called that which serves as support, i.e., one or another of the six consciousnesses.’ In relation to the mental consciousness which immediately follows it, the consciousness that has just passed is the *immediately preceding condition and support of arising*; it is called the first manas.

“ii) *The second is the afflicted manas*, because it is afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) by four passions ... First, *wrong view of the self* is erroneous clinging to 'me and mine' (*ātmātmīyābhiniveśa*). Under its influence there comes *pride of self*; when one depends on 'me and mine', one becomes proud (*garvāyate*). When these two afflictions exist, self-love (*ātmarati*) arises., i.e., *attachemnt to the self*. These three afflictions all have ignorance as cause. *Ignorance* is not-knowing (*ajñāna*), the opposite of knowingness (*vidyāvīpakṣa*).” (U) – “*It is the support of the defilement of the consciousnesses*, because in the wholesome states, etc., of concentration or non-concentration (*samāhitāsamāhitakuśalādyvasthā*), it is not suppressed (*viruddha*) and is always present” (U); “indeed, even in wholesome states of mind (*kuśalacitta*), there is belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*).” (Bh)

“*The consciousnesses arise because of the first manas as support ...*, because the consciousness that has just disappeared (*anantaraniruddha vijñāna*) and which is called manas, gives up its place (*avakāśaṃ dadāti*) to the consciousness that is about to arise (*utpitsu vijñāna*) and thus acts as support for its birth (*utpattyāśraya*)” (Bh) - “*The second one is defilement*; because it is a manas associated with the four afflictions; since it believes in a self, etc., it defiles (*saṃkleśa*).” (U)

“*Because it cognizes the object*: in the sense that it grasps (*grhṇāti*) the object and appears like the object. This justifies its name of *consciousness*. *As antecedent, as*

thinking, the manas is of two types: this justifies its name of Manas.” – “As it gives up its place to the mental consciousness, it is called the first manas; as it brings defilement through belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*), it is called the second manas.” (Bh)

7. How do we know (*kathaṃ gamyate*) the existence of the defiled manas (*kliṣṭamanas*)? - If it did not exist,

i) unmixed ignorance (*avidyā āveṇikī*) would not exist, and this would be a fault (*doṣa*).

ii) There would be no similarity between the mental consciousness] and the five [other consciousnesses (*pañcasādharmya*), and this would be a fault. Indeed, the five groups of consciousnesses (*pañca vijñānakāya*) have the eye, etc., for their simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya*); and the mental consciousness, likewise, must have a simultaneous support, which is the manas.

iii) The etymology (*nirukti*) of the word ‘manas’ would not be explainable, and that would be a fault.

iv) There would be no difference (*viśeṣa*) between the absorption of non-identification (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti*) and the absorption of cessation (*nīrodhasamāpatti*), and this would be a fault. Indeed, whereas the absorption of non-identification is characterized (*prabhāvita*) by a defiled manas, the absorption of cessation is not. Otherwise (*anyatra*), these two absorptions would not be different.

v) Among those beings without conceptuality (*āsaṃjñīka*), there would be neither belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*) nor pride in a self (*asmimāna*); for the entire duration of their nonconceptualizing existence, they would not be afflicted (*kliṣṭa*).

vi) Because in states of mind that are wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), we notice (*upalabhyate*) that belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*) is always (*sarvakāle*) present (*samudācāra*). Otherwise, if the defiled manas did not exist, the affliction called pride of self

(asmimānakleśa) would be present by association (*saṃprayogataḥ*) with unwholesome states of mind alone, whilst it would not exist in wholesome or indeterminate states. But since it is by co-existence (*sahabhāva*) with the manas that this affliction is present and not by association with unwholesome minds, these errors are avoided. Here are some stanzas:

(a) Unmixed ignorance, similarity with the five, difference between the concentrations and the etymology would be lacking, and this would be a fault.

(b) During nonconceptualizing existence, belief in a self would be absent, and this would be a fault. The presence of belief in a self in all types of states of mind (*sarvākāra*) would not be explained (*yuj-*).

(c) If the defiled manas did not exist, two things, unmixed ignorance and similarity with the five, would be lacking; and three things, etymology, difference between the concentrations and the presence of belief in a self among the nonconceptualizing beings would be incompatible (*viruddha*). If it did not exist, belief in a self would not be universal.

(d) The mind would attain the truth (*bhūtārtha*). But the unmixed ignorance, ever present, always creates an obstacle to the mind.

Being afflicted (*kliṣṭa*), the manas is defiled and indeterminate (*nivṛta-avyākṛta*); it is always associated (*saṃprayukta*) with four afflictions (*kleśa*). Like the afflictions of the material and nonmaterial domains (*rūpārūpyāvacara*), it is included in the defiled-indeterminate. On the one hand, the afflictions of the material and nonmaterial worlds are controlled (*ālīṅgita*) by tranquility (*śamatha*); on the other hand, this manas is always present. [134a6]

7. Comm. Bh 325c24-326a17, bh 151a5-152a2, U 384a25-385a7, u 241a2-243a6.

i) "If the existence of the defiled manas is denied, there would not be any unmixed ignorance. Let us define the nature (*lakṣaṇa*) of unmixed ignorance: it is a mistake (*moha*) which poses an obstacle (*āvṛṇoti*) to the birth of true knowledge

(*tattvajñāna*)."(U) - Unmixed ignorance cannot reside elsewhere than in the defiled Manas.

“It cannot be said that it resides in the five consciousnesses, because these places (*sthāna*) do not contain any remedy (*pratipakṣa*) for ignorance. Wherever there is a remedy, there is also that which is to be remedied (*vipakṣa*). But in the five consciousnesses there is no remedy for ignorance, because the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) does not arise in them.

Ignorance is not found in the nonafflicted mental consciousness (*akliṣṭamanovijñāna*), because the mental consciousness would be afflicted in its nature on account of this ignorance, [which would be absurd].

Neither does it reside in the afflicted mental consciousness (*kliṣṭamanovijñāna*), because ignorance there would be associated with the other afflictions and consequently would not merit its name of unmixed. If it is claimed that the mental consciousness is afflicted as a consequence of this affliction, which is ignorance, it must be accepted that it is absolutely afflicted in its nature, which is false. Generous states of mind, etc., (*dānādicitta*) would not be wholesome (*kuśala*) since they would be associated (*samprayukta*) with the nature of passion-ignorance.

If it is claimed that passion-ignorance exists with (*saha pravartate*) wholesome states of mind, it would necessarily (*ekāntena*) be associated with wholesome states of mind and the other states of mind would not exist. It is not possible that the afflicted mental consciousness would produce (*sākṣātkṛ-*) the remedy for the ignorance which renders it afflicted.

But if it is claimed that various wholesome states of mind, capable of bringing (*āvah-*) the remedy for ignorance, exist with the manas, if it is claimed that when the remedy arises, that which is remedied, i.e., the Manas and its ignorance, disappears, then the reasoning is correct.

Objection: If that is so, unmixed ignorance is not possible. Being always associated in the Manas with three other afflictions, wrong view of the self, etc., it is not unmixed].

Answer: Your objection is not pertinent. I do not say that ignorance is unmixed because it is not associated with the other passions. But I do say that it is called unmixed because it

exists nowhere else than in the Manas. It is like the eighteen special attributes of the Buddha (*āveṇikabuddhadharma*), so called because they exist only among the Buddhas. It is true that above I said that if it is associated with the other afflictions, the name 'unmixed' would not be justified, but there I had in view the thesis of my opponent the faults of which I was pointing out.

ii) “*There would be no similarity with the five and this would be a fault: this comes back to saying that the activity (pravṛtti) of the six consciousnesses (vijñāna) calls for six pairs of conditions (pratyaya). The similarity (sādharmya) between the five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., and the mental consciousness, i.e., that they arise from two conditions, would be contradicted (viruddha) if the afflicted manas did not exist, for the mental consciousness would not have an empowering condition (adhipatipratyaya) as simultaneous support (sahabhū-āśraya) from its own side. The two conditions belonging to each of the five] consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., constitute their nature of consciousness. These consciousnesses each have the eye, etc., as coexisting and specific support. These organs are their empowering condition (adhipatipratyaya) and not their causal condition (hetupratyaya) ... It is the same for the mental consciousness: it must have a support specific to its type. It is true that the store-consciousness is a simultaneous support for the mental consciousness; but it cannot be said that it is its specific support. Indeed, the store-consciousness is a support common to all the consciousnesses; it is a causal condition and not an empowering condition.*

According to a Sautrāntika theory [cf. the root-theory], form (*rūpa*) is the simultaneous and particular support of the mental consciousness. This theory is false and unacceptable. If that were so, the mental consciousness would always lack the two activities called *vikalpa*, namely, investigation (*nirūpanāvilakpa*) and memory (*anusmaraṇavikalpa*). [Cf. Kośa, I, p. 60: If the mental consciousness, like the first five consciousnesses, depend on a material organ, like the latter it would be without examination and memory.]

Thereby it is demonstrated that the theory proposed by other schools (cf. Notes), according to which a material substance localized in the heart (*hṛdayastharūpavastu*) would be the special support of the mental consciousness, is also wrong. Indeed, it also incurs the fault already pointed out above, and the mental consciousness resembles the other five consciousnesses which depend upon the material organs (*rūpīndriya*). (U)”

iii) “Because of the etymology. What is there to be said? It is said: *cogitat ergo vocatur cogitans (manyata iti manas)*; if the manas did not exist, to what would this etymology apply? Certainly not to the six consciousnesses. These six consciousnesses cannot be the support for the consciousness that follows them immediately, because they have already been destroyed (*viruddha*) when the former succeeds them.” (Bh)

iv) “There would be no difference between the absorption of nonidentification and the absorption of cessation, and this would be a fault: assuming acceptance of the existence of the defiled Manas, this Manas resides in the mental continuum of fools (*bālasaṃtāna*) and does not reside in the mental continuum of saints (*āryasaṃtāna*), and the two corresponding absorptions are different. In the opposing hypothesis, these two absorptions, which both involve the destruction of awareness and sensation (*saṃjñāveditanirodha*) and the cessation of the activity of the consciousnesses (*vijñānasamudācāra*), would not be different.

It is not possible to say that these two concentrations are different, because the levels (*bhūmi*) on which they are practiced - the fourth Dhyāna on the one hand, the Bhavāgra on the other hand - are different, or because the aims pursued (*iṣṭa*) - deliverance (*niḥsaranā*) on the one hand, tranquility (*śantavihāra*) on the other hand - are different (cf. Kośa, II, p. 210). Indeed, their self-natures (*svalakṣaṇa*) are identical since mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) have been destroyed (*niruddha*) in both.” (U)

The Upanibandhana is attacked here, not by the Vaibhāṣikas for whom the concentrations are entities in themselves (*dravyadharmā*), but by the Sautrāntikas for whom, according to Kośa, II, p. 214, the absorptions are simply an entity by designation (*prajñaptidharma*), the simple nonexistence of the mind for a time. The present reasoning (*nirṇaya*) is addressed to the Sautrāntikas, for both of us are quite close. This school, like us, denies that the non-associated factors (*viprayuktasaṃskāra*), of which the two absorptions are a part, (cf. Kośa, II, p. 178) are things in themselves (*dravyasat*). In this case, how could the two absorptions be substantially different, at least that they differ only by the presence or absence of the manas?” (U)

v) “Moreover among the gods having no conceptualizing (*asāmjñideva*), for the entire duration of an existence there would be no belief in a self ... When one is born among the gods having no concept, the mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) are destroyed. At the

very first moment of their reincarnation (*pratisaṃdhi*), there is the production of mind and mental factors. At the end of the duration of their existence, the mental series (*saṃtāna*) resumes (cf. Kośa, II, p. 199-200). If these gods did not have afflicted manas, they would be free of belief in a self during the course of their existence. But we have never seen that beings, burdened as they are with all the afflictions (*sakalakleśayukta*, cf. Kośa, II, p. 180), would be freed from belief in a self for the duration of a lifetime. This is why the Āryas are mistaken.

It is inadmissible to claim, with the Sarvāstivādins, that the mental consciousness present at the moment of the arising and support of belief in a self projects (*ākṣip-*) the latter, and that beings lacking awareness thus possess this belief in a self because it has not been cut off, is unacceptable ... Indeed, belief in a self perishes at the same time as its support, and its projection has no other support than the mental consciousness that appears at the moment of its arising. It is also impossible that - as the root-Sautrāntikas have it - the predispositions (*vāsanā*) of belief in a self reside in a bodily continuum (*kāyasaṃtāna*). Actually, material dharmas (*rūpadharma*) cannot undergo perfuming (*bhāvanā*); they are completely incapable of it. Moreover, the Sautrāntikas deny that matter (*rūpa*) is a mental factor (*caitta*) because it has no immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*). Now mind and mental factors require four conditions.

Those who say that there is, separately, a mind simultaneous (*sahabhū*) with belief in a self and support of this belief, avoid these faults. (U) This mind is the manas.

vi) “Without the manas, the persistence in all situations of the belief in a self could not be explained; if the existence of the manas is denied, the truth of the on-going persistence is no longer confirmed. Generosity and the other wholesome states (*kuśalāvasthā*) of mind are always accompanied by belief in a self, for one says: "It is I who am giving this gift", etc.

Belief in a self does not persist without ignorance. Without support, ignorance does not arise, for it is a mental factor (*caitta*). This support can be none other than the manas; wholesome thoughts cannot support ignorance. (U)

The last stanza is cited in Siddhi, p. 277. Unmixed ignorance poses an obstacle to seeing the truth (*tattvārthadarśana*). When the one exists, the other does not arise. It is *present at all times*: ever inherent (*anudaddha*) in all states of mind, wholesome, unwholesome,

indeterminate." (U) H translates: "present no matter what the nature of the state of mind is."

The commentaries do not explain the last line. For explanation, we refer to Siddhi, p. 265. The four afflictions associated with the manas constitute an obstacle on the the path; they are therefore defiled. On the other hand, they are indeterminate from the moral point of view, neither wholesome nor unwholesome, because the manas which supports them is subtle and their coming is spontaneous. They are comparable to the afflictions of the two higher realms which, enveloped by tranquility, are indeterminate (cf. Kośa, V, p. 40, 74, 93, 218).

8. There would be no (*nopalabhyate*) third category (*kāya*) called mind (*citta*) outside of the store-consciousness. Thus it is proved (*siddha*) that the store-consciousness is of the category 'mind'. The manas and the consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) arise from the mind provided with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*). [134a9]

8. Comm. Bh 326b21-24, bh 150b8-151a1, U 385a10-16, u 243a6-243b1.

In the saying of the Buddha *citta-mano-vijñāna*, "the word *manas* designates the afflicted manas (*kliṣṭa*) and the manas that has just disappeared (*anantaraniruddha*); the word *vijñāna* designates the six active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*). If the store-consciousness did not exist through lack of a third category, the word *citta* could designate only these two things, namely, the manas and the vijñānas. But on the one hand, there is no designation (*abhidāna*) without something designated (*abhidheya*) and, on the other hand, the words *manas* and *vijñāna* are not synonymous (*paryāya*) because the things that they designate (*abhidheya*) are distinct. By the word 'category' (*lus*, Chinese *t'i*) we understand the thing designated. *Thus it is proved that the store-consciousness ... the store-consciousness is, of course, the thing designated by the word citta.*" (U)

9. Why is the store-consciousness also called mind (*citta*)? - Because it is built up (*ācīta*) by the various predisposition-seeds (*vāsanābīja*) of dharmas. [134a10]

9. Comm. Bh 326b27-29, bh 151a1-3, U 385a18-21, u 243b1-3.

“*The various dharmas*: the dharmas that result (*saṃgrhīta*) from active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) of various categories. For our school, the dharmas are mixed up with the consciousnesses of which they are the subject (cf. below, II, § 11). The predisposition-seeds are the special potentialities (*śaktiviśeṣa*) belonging to the perfumed (*vāsyā*), to the store-consciousness perfumed by the active consciousnesses. The store-consciousness is *built up* by these predisposition-seeds: the mingled (*miśra*) and multiple (*bhinnākāra*) predispositions pile up in it. (U)

10. Why is this mind (*citta*) not called store-consciousness or appropriating consciousness in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas (*śrāvakayāna*)? - Because it pertains (*saṃgrhīta*) to the subtle object (*sūkṣmajñeya*): the śrāvakas are not instructed (*paryāpanna*) to recognize all phenomena (*sarvajñeya*). Although someone preaches the store-consciousness to them, they succeed (*prasidhyanti*) in knowledge (*jñāna*): that is why they are not taught the store-consciousness. But the bodhisattvas are instructed to recognize all phenomena: that is why the store-consciousness is taught to them. Without this knowledge, it would not be easy for them to acquire (*adhigam-*) omniscience (*sarvajñĀna*). [134a16]

10. Comm. Bh 327c7-13, bh 151a3-5, U 385a27-385c13, u 243b3-245a1.

The versions differ: H: “although they are not taught the store-consciousness, nevertheless they reach liberation (*vimukti*) by means of knowledge.”

“*Because it pertains to the subtle object*: this shows that the store-consciousness is at the same time profound and subtle (*gambhīra-sūkṣma*) and the object to be understood (*jñeyārtha*). Being profound and subtle, it is not preached to the śrāvakas. Since the latter are converted (*vinīta*) by grasping coarse objects (*sthūlajñeya*), they do not seek to understand the profound and subtle object *The śrāvakas are not instructed to recognize all phenomena*: they have neither the capacity (*sāmarthya*), nor the desire (*prārthana*), nor the competence (*adhikāra* ?) *Although someone preaches the store-consciousness to*

them ... although they are not taught the store-consciousness, they analyze (pratyavekṣaṇā) matter and other coarse objects (rūpādisthūla), the nature of suffering and its origin (duḥkasamudayādisvabhāva), impermanence and other aspects (anityādyākāra); by doing this, they cut off all the afflictions (kleśa). With this aim and in the presence of the Bhagavat, they practice (ācaranti) the religious life (brahmacarya). Coarse objects, because material dharmas (rūpadharma) have a nature and characteristics that are coarse; because feeling (vedanā) and the other dharmas are easily distinguished (paricchinna) in their object (ālambana) and in their aspect (ākāra) and are of coarse aspect. The store-consciousness is quite different (tadparīta) and is rightly called profound and subtle.

It is true that the Buddha said: 'I deny that it is possible to put an end to suffering if there were even a single dharma not understood or not known completely' (*nāham ehadharmam apy anabhijñāyāparijñāya duḥkhasyānatkriyāṃ vadāmi*, cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 4, § 16). But the Buddha means that if the afflictions are not cut one does not put an end to suffering. In different words (*viśiṣṭaśabda*), the Buddha deals with the same general subject: the afflictions are not cut each one separately. Or else the Buddha has in mind the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), impermanence and other aspects (*anityatādyākāra*). Therefore he does not mean to speak here about the store-consciousness; there is no fault in that.

But the bodhisattvas are trained to understand all things: they have a capacity belonging to their family (*gotraprabhāva*). Endowed with this capacity, with the wish and the ability, they are instructed to cognize everything. Otherwise they would be unable to bring about the welfare of others (*parārtha*). Why? Not being omniscient, they would not adequately understand the aspirations (*āśaya*) of others, their acquired inclinations (*anuśaya, dhātu*), the degree of their moral faculties (*indriyavarāvara*), their possibilities and their weaknesses, the different occasions: therefore they would not be able to bring about the welfare of others. But all these things are sought by the bodhisattvas; this is why they are taught the store-consciousness.

Without this knowledge ...: without the knowledge of the store-consciousness, they would be unable to cut through mental constructions regarding the object (*arthaparikalpa*). If these are not cut through, nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) would not be produced since there would still be imaginary objects (*parikalpitārtha*). *For this reason it*

would not be easy for them to acquire omniscience (*saravajñajñāna*). Why? They are able to grasp (*sākṣātkṛ-*) the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of objects; but the imaginary objects of conceptual knowledge (*savikalpajñāna*), the self-natures (*svalakṣaṇa*), concepts (*vikalpa*), are mutually different (*anyonyavyāvṛtta*) and infinite in number (*ananta*); it is absolutely impossible to know them all. But if they know that it is only by the power of transformation (*pariṇāmabala*) of the predispositions of speech (read: ming yen si k'i, *abhilāpavāsanā*) characterizing the store-consciousness that objects (*artha*), beings (*sattva*) and individuals (*ātman*) manifest (*avabhāsante*), then they understand that there is neither the object that is known (*grāhya*) nor the subject that knows (*grāhaka*), and thus they acquire nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). Then, by subsequent wisdom (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*), they penetrate (*pratividh-*) the nature of things (*dharmatā*) as studied (*yathābhyastam*). Since the true nature (*tathatā*), which consists (*prabhāvita*) of the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas, is of one taste (*ekarasa*), they know all dharmas. In one instant they acquire universal knowledge (*sarvaviṣayajñāna*), because the objects of this knowledge are not infinite (*ananta*).

Nevertheless, in order for the bodhisattvas to succeed in that, they must spend three incalculable periods (*kalpāsamkhyeya*, cf. chap. V, § 6): they must accumulate (*sambhṛ-*) vast accumulations (*sambhāra*) in order to acquire a vast perfection.

This universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñāna*), knowledge with marvellous fruits, is such as we have said. The gathering of this marvelous wisdom assumes the clear seeing of the nonexistence of dharmas (*dharmanairātmya*). Hence this stanza: 'If one does not cut through the concept of object (*grāhyadharmavikalpa*) for all objects, one does not acquire omniscience. Therefore it is proper to proclaim the nonexistence of dharmas.' - For those who do not understand this doctrine properly, this verse is added: 'Hence continuity (*saṃtāna*) is powerful. They will know that, like fire that devours everything, omniscience makes everything and cognizes everything.'

Thus, according to whether one cognizes or does not cognize the store-consciousness, it is easy or difficult to attain omniscience. In regard to this subject, it is asked whether the knowledge relating to the nonexistence of dharmas (*dharmanairātmya*) constitutes omniscience. Although it is omniscience (*sarvajñāna*), it is not universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñāna*).” (U)

11. In the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas also, the store-consciousness is mentioned by synonyms (*paryāya*).

i) Thus, in the Ekottarāgama (cf. Aṅguttara, II, p. 131), in the sutra of the four superiorities (*anuśamsā*) of the Tathagata's birth, it is said: “Creatures (*prajā*) love the ultimate basis (*ālayarata*), cherish the ultimate basis (*ālayārāma*), are fond of the ultimate basis (*ālayasammudita*), are pleased with the ultimate basis (*ālayābhirata*). In order to destroy the ultimate basis, when someone preaches the Dharma to them, they wish to hear it (*śuśrūṣanti*) and lend an ear to it (*śrotram avadadhati*); they seek perfect knowledge (*aññācittam upasthāpayanti*) and are in possession of the path of truth (*dharmānudharmapratipanna*). When the Tathagata appeared in the world (*prādurbhāva*), this marvelous (*āścarya*) extraordinary (*adbhuta*) Dharma appeared in the world.” It is by this synonym that the store-consciousness is mentioned in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas as well.

ii) In the āgama of the Mahāsāṃghikas also, it is called the root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*): it is mentioned by this synonym also. Thus, the tree (*vṛkṣa*) depends upon its root (*mūla*).

iii) In the āgama of the Mahīśāsaka also, it is called 'aggregate which lasts through all saṃsāra' (*āsaṃsārikaskandha*): it is mentioned by this synonym as well. In certain places (*kvacit*) and at certain times (*kadācit*), matter (*rūpa*) and mind (*citta*) are interrupted (*samucchinna*); but in the store-consciousness their seeds (*bīja*) are never interrupted. [134a26]

11. Comm. Bh 327a4-18, bh 152a3-152b2, U 386a2-386b3, u 245a1-245b6.

i) The text of the Ekottara is in Aṅguttara, II, p. 131: *Ālayārāmā bhikkhave pajā ālayaratā ālaalyasammuditā, sā tathāgatena anālaye dhamme desiyamāne sussūyati sotam odahati aññācittam upatthāpeti, tathāgatassa bhikkhave arahato sammāsambuddhassa pātubhāvā ayaṃ... acchariyo abbhuto dhammo pātubhavati.*

“*Creatures love the ultimate basis*: This first member of the phrase (*pada*) designates attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the store-consciousness in a general way. *They cherish the ultimate basis*: they cherish the store-consciousness of the present; *they are fond of the ultimate basis*: they are fond of the store-consciousness of the past; *they are pleased with the ultimate basis*: they will be pleased with the store-consciousness of the future. Because, in their nature, creatures are deeply attached to the ultimate basis. because they cherish it, are fond of it and are pleased with it, generally it is said that they *love the ultimate basis*.

In order to destroy the ultimate basis ... , when they are taught the doctrine: the holy doctrine (*āryadeśanā*), *they want to listen ... and lend an ear*: this refers to wisdom coming from hearing (*śrutamaya jñāna*). *They seek perfect wisdom*: they want to reflect on the doctrine which they have heard; this refers to wisdom coming from reflection (*cintāmaya jñāna*). *They are in possession of the path of truth* (*dharmānudharmapratipanna*); *Dharma* means that which should be realized (*sākṣātkartavya*); *anudharma* means the path (*mārga*), because it is favorable (*ānulomika*) to Dharma. Or else, *Dharma* means the supramundane path (*lokottaramārga*) and *anudharma* means the mundane path (*laukikamārga*). *They possess it* (*pratipanna*): they establish it (*avasthāpayanti*) in their mental continuum (*cittasaṃtāna*), they implant it and develop it to the point of manifesting the masteries (*vaśitā*); this refers to the wisdom coming from meditation (*bhāvanāmaya jñāna*).” (U)

“ii) Among the Mahāsāṃghikas, it is called root-consciousness. *In the same way that the tree depends on its root*: the store-consciousness is the root cause (*mūlahetu*) of all the consciousnesses. In the same way, the tree's root is the cause of the leaves, etc., and without the root, the leaves would not exist.” (Bh)

iii) "*In the Āgama of the Mahīśasakas ...* : this school accepts three kinds of aggregates (*skandha*): (1) momentary aggregates (*kṣanikaskandha*), i.e., the dharmas that arise and cease from moment to moment; (2) aggregates that last for a lifetime (*janmiskandha*), i.e., the dharmas that last up until death; (3) the aggregate that lasts for all of saṃsāra (*āsaṃsārikaskandha*), i.e., the dharma that lasts until the attainment of the diamond-like concentration (*vajropamasamādhi*, cf. Kośa, VI, p. 228). Other than the store-consciousness, nothing else could be this aggregate. Therefore it is synonymous with

store-consciousness; actually, the other aggregates of which we are going to speak do not last for all of saṃsāra.

Why? *Because in certain places and at certain times ...*: in certain places, i.e., in a certain world; at certain times, i.e., at certain moments. In the formless world (*ārūpyadhātu*), all matter (*rūpa*) is interrupted (*samucchinna*); among the gods without identification (*asaṃjnideva*) and in the two meditative attainments (*samāpatti*), every mind is interrupted. By contrast, the seeds (*bīja*) of matter and of mind contained in the store-consciousness can never be interrupted as long as the path that counteracts them (*pratipakṣamārga*) does not arise.” (U)

iv) For bhavāṅga see the commentaries in the following §. U: *ḥphags pa gnas brtan pa rnam* (*ārya sthavira*) *kyi luñ las ni srid paḥi yan lag* (*bhavāṅga*) *gi sgara gsuñs te / srid paḥi rgyu yin paḥi phyir ro// rnam par phye ste smra ba* (*vibhajyavādin*) *ḥi luñ las kyan de skad du ḥbyuñ ño // lta ba* (*darśana*) *la sogs pa drug ni mig la sogs paḥi rnam par śhes pa* (*cakṣurādivijñāna*) *nas yid* (*mana*) *la sogs paḥi bar du ci rigs su* (*yathāyogam*) *sbyar ro// gañ Ćig su dag kun gĆi rnam par śes pa* (*ālayavijñāna*); *la Će sdañ* (*dveṣa*) *ba ni rnam par śes paḥi cha bdun dañ ldan paḥi phreñ ba* (*vijñānasāptabhāgīyamālā*) *lta bar byedpa nas / dños po yoñs su gcod paḥi bar ro Ćes smra ba deḥi la ni rigs pa thigs pa* (*nyāyabindu*) *ḥi nañ du lta bar byaḥo*.

U: “In the school (*nikāya*) of the Ārya Sthaviras, this consciousness is also given the name of 'bhavāṅga' (factor of existence): indeed, the store-consciousness is the cause (*hetu*) of existence (*bhava*). According to what they say, the six consciousnesses do not cease nor do they arise. It is on account of either the bhavāṅga or the retrospective mind (*fān yuan* = *paryālabhāna*) that they cease. [My (Lamotte) understanding of this is: when the six consciousnesses cease, it is on account of the bhavāṅga where they subside, or on account of the retrospective mind which makes them subside there.] It is on account of the mental retribution-consciousness (*vipākamanovijñānadhātu*) that they arise. - They say this because the projector (*ākṣepaka*) is the mental consciousness alone (*manovijñāna*). The first five consciousnesses, having nothing to cognize in the Dharma, are merely projected (*ākṣipta*). It is the same for the manas element (*manodhātu*) which is merely the registering of the object (*saṃpratīcchana*). Seeing (*darśana*) - which precedes registering - is a simple apprehension (*tchao-tchou*). Examining (*saṃtīraṇa*) ensures a definite knowledge (*vinīścaya*). Defining (*avasthāpana*) is the creation of verbal concepts

(*vāgvikalpa*). The six (??) consciousnesses are capable only of producing conduct (deportment) (*īryāpatha*) as their result; they are incapable of accomplishing wholesome or unwholesome actions (*karmapatha*); they are incapable of entering into or coming out (*vyutthā-*) of concentration (*samādhi*). Function (*kriyā* ?) [Monier-Williams Dictionary gives performance, activity] alone is capable of causing production. By virtue of the projector, one is awakened from sleep; by virtue of function, one reviews what one has dreamed, etc. The Vibhajyavādin school also calls this consciousness 'bhavāṅga'."

Here U gives an incomplete list of the nine cittas of the Sthavira school. The list cites, among others, *bhavāṅga*, -, *darśana*, *saṃpratīchana*, *saṃtīraṇa*, *avasthāpana*, *kriyā*, *paryālabhana* and *bhavāṅga*. See below, Notes.

12. Thus, this support of the knowable called store-consciousness (§ 1-3), appropriating consciousness (§ 4-5), mind (§ 6-9), ultimate basis § 11, no. 1), root consciousness (§ 11, no. 2), element that lasts throughout all of saṃsāra (§ 11, no. 3), factor of existence (§ 11, no. 4), is the store-consciousness. The great path (*mahāmārga*) that is the store-consciousness is praised by all these names.

[134b1]

12. Comm. Bh 327a23-24, bh 152b2, U 386b7-18, u 245b246a2.

See § 11, no. 4.

13. i) Some think that, [in the words of the Bhagavat cited in § 6], the words 'citta' (mind), 'manas' and 'vijñāna' (consciousness) are one and the same thing (*ekārtha*), but that the syllables (*vyañjana*) are different (*bhinna*). This opinion does not hold (*ayukta*): we have noted (*upalabhyate*) that manas and vijñāna are two different things; thus citta also is a separate thing.

ii) Regarding the words of the Bhagavat cited [in § 11]: "Creatures love the ultimate basis," etc., some say: "The ultimate basis (*ālaya*) is the five elements of grasping (*upādānaskandha*)"; others say: " The ultimate basis is the pleasant feeling joined with lust (*sukhvedanā rāgasamprayuktā*)"; others

again say: "The ultimate basis is wrong view of self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*). " They are mistaken (*mūḍha*) about the store-consciousness in their texts (*āgama*) and their conceptions (*pratipatti*); that is why they interpret it in that way.

According to the interpretations (*vyavasthāpana*) current in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, these interpretations of the name of the ālaya do not hold.

Enlightened people (*amūḍha*), however, believe (*parigrihṇanti*) that the ultimate basis is the store-consciousness. Why is this preferable?

(1) The five elements of grasping are impediments (*pratikūla*) for those born into very painful (*praduḥkita*) destinies (*gati*). It would be absurd that these beings would take these extremely disagreeable (*aniṣṭa*) elements as ultimate basis (*ālī-*); on the contrary, they want to be liberated from them.

(2) Pleasant feeling joined with desire does not exist in and beyond the fourth dhyāna. It would be absurd that beings who experience it (*tadupeta*) would take it to be ultimate basis, because it annoys them.

(3) Wrong view of self also is an impediment for Buddhists (*chos ḥḍi pa*) who believe in the non-existence of self (*nairātmyādhimukta*). That is why it would be absurd for them to take it as ultimate basis.

1. Considering the store-consciousness as their own substance (*ālayavijñānam antarātmabhāvena abhyupagamyā*), beings born into very painful destinies want to eliminate (*vināśa*) the painful elements. Nevertheless, bound (*baddha*) to the store-consciousness by attachment to the self (*ātmāsneha*), they do not by any means wish the destruction of the latter.

2. Beings born in the fourth dyāna or beyond are opposed (*pratikūla*) to pleasant feeling joined with desire. Nevertheless, they remain bound (*anubaddha*) to the store-consciousness by attachment to their own substance (*ātmabhāvasneha*).

3. Similarly, Buddhists who believe in the nonexistence of self are opposed to wrong view of self. Nevertheless, they remain bound (*anubaddha*) to the store-consciousness by attachment to their own substance. Thus the

receptacle is the store-consciousness; this is indeed the correct interpretation.
[134b21]

13. Comm. Bh 327b19-28, bh 152b3-153a4, U 386c11-387b15, u 246a2-248a1.

The Tibetan version is shorter than that of H. - U brings out the principle on which this whole discussion rests: no one takes as ultimate basis that which is unpleasant to them (*aniṣṭārthe na kaścid ālīyate*). But the store-consciousness is always dear to beings since they confuse it with their ātman. The instinct of self-preservation is supported by it. Therefore it is really the 'ultimate basis'.

A variation that we note in the edition, § 13, no. 2, is worthy of discussion. H: “This is how they interpret the word ultimate basis but, according to the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, this interpretation is not logically correct.” U comments: “Even according to their own school (tseu tson), it is not correct. It is like the tattvas, etc., established by the Vaiśeṣikas (cheng louen), etc.: according to the Vaiśeṣika system itself, they include faults.” The way I (Lamotte) understand it is as follows: Just as the Vaiśeṣikas contradict their own system by setting up some tattvas, so the Śrāvakas contradict themselves by interpreting the word 'ālaya' in that way. - T: “Although these interpretations are not correct according to the interpretations current in the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, nevertheless enlightened people believe that the ultimate basis is the store-consciousness”; u comments: *ran̄ gis lo rgyus kyi lugs kyi na thams cad kyi thams cad du ruñ bar bstan to*.

14. Here ends the study of the synonyms (*paryāya*) of 'store-consciousness'. We will now take up the study of its natures (*lakṣaṇa*). In brief (*samāsataḥ*), its natures are three in number, i.e., self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*), nature of being cause (*hetuvalakṣaṇa*) and nature of being fruit (*phalavalakṣaṇa*).

i) First, the self-nature of the store-consciousness: by virtue of the predispositions (*vāsanā*) of all the afflictive dharmas (*sāṃklesika*) that perfume it, the store-consciousness is the generating cause (*janakahetu*) of

these dharmas since it has the ability to contain the seeds
(*bījaparigrahaṇopetatvāt*).

ii) Next, its nature of being cause: this store-consciousness furnished with all its seeds (*sarvabījaka*) is always present as the cause of these afflictive dharmas.

iii) Finally, its nature of being fruit: the store-consciousness arises by virtue of the eternal predispositions (*anādikālikā vāsanā*) of these same afflictive dharmas. [134c1]

14. Comm. Bh 327c10-29, bh 153a4-153b2, U 387b25-387c17, u 248a1-248b5.

The original Sanskrit may be restored as follows: *idam tāvād ālayavijñānasya paryāvyavasthāpanam / atas tasya lakṣaṇa vyavasthāpanam katham draṣṭavyam / tat trividham samāsataḥ svalakṣaṇavayavasthāpanam hetutvavyavasthāpanam phalatvavyavasthāpanam ca / atrālayavijñānasya svalakṣaṇam yat sarvasāmkleśika-dharmavāsanām niśritya bījaparigrahaṇopetatvāt tajjanakahetulakṣaṇam / atra hetutvalakṣhaṇam yad evam tasya sarvabījakasyālayavijñānasya teṣām eva sāmkleśikadharmāṇām hetutvena sarvakāle pratyupasthānam / atra phalatvavyavasthāpanam yad ālayavijñānam teṣām eva sāmkleśika-dharmāṇām anādikālikām vāsanām niśritya pravatate //*

“The self-nature of this consciousness is not understood from its names alone: this is why it is necessary to explain its self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) and its inherent natures (read ying siang = *sambandhilakṣaṇa*) ... The self-nature is separated from the inherent natures since the inherent natures of cause and fruit are different from the self-nature.

i) *By virtue of the predispositions of all the afflictive dharmas*: The afflictive dharmas are lust, hatred, etc. (*rāgadveṣādi*). Arising and ceasing (*sahotpādanirodha*) with these dharmas that perfume it, the store-consciousness becomes seed (*bīja*). Hence, in relation to the dharmas which are to be born, its power of being generating cause. *Since it has the power of containing the seeds*: Arising and ceasing with the dharmas of beings (*jātimat*), it undergoes perfuming by them. As a result of this perfuming, it contains the seeds of the dharmas. Joined with these seeds, it can give birth to the dharmas. The 'pradhāna', etc., does not have this power to contain the seeds; neither do the immediately-preceding

conditions (*samanantara-pratyaya*). These are auxiliary (*upakāra*) but not principal causes (*pradhānahetu*), since they do not have the power to contain the seeds. The principal cause is the seeds. The store-consciousness contains them; therefore relative to the dharmas, it plays the rôle of generating cause; it is only an auxiliary ...

ii) The nature of being cause is activity *par excellence* (*adhimātrakrīya*). Having the power of perfuming (*vāsanāśakti*), the store-consciousness has the nature of cause. Being present, it can give rise to the afflictive dharmas.

iii) The nature of being fruit: The store-consciousness is generated by the perfumings of the active afflictive dharmas, lust, etc., which come from (*sāṃgrhīta*) the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*). That is its nature of fruit.” (U)

15. What is propensity (*vāsanā*)? What is the entity designated (*abhidheya*) by this word (*abhidhāna*)? - That which, by simultaneous birth and destruction (*sahotpādanirodha*) of the dharma, is the generating cause (*janakanimitta*) of this particular dharma, is what is called propensity.

Thus, sesame seeds (*tila*) perfumed by a flower (*puṣpabhāvita*): sesame seeds and flower arise and perish at the same time, but the sesame seeds arise as the cause reproducing the scent (*gandha*) of the flower. In this way also among desirous people (*rāgādicarita*), the propensity of desire (*rāgādivāsanā*) arises and perishes at the same time as the desire, but their state of mind arises as the cause engendering this desire. Finally, among the sages (*bahuśruta*), the propensity to knowledge (*bahuśruta-vāsanā*) also is born and perishes at the same time as the act of reflecting on what has been heard (*śhrutamānasikāra*), but their state of mind arises as the cause engendering discourse (*abhilāpanimitta*). Filled (*parigrhīta*) with this propensity, they are called 'dharmagrāhin'. The same reasoning applies to the store-consciousness. [134c10]

15. Comm. Bh 328a11-14, bh 153b2-4, U 387c26-388a10, u 248b5-249a5.

“That which, by simultaneous birth and destruction of the dharma, is the generating cause of this particular dharma: that which is perfumed (*vāsyā, bhāvya*) arises and

perishes at the same time as that which perfumes (*vāsaka*, *bhāvaka*). In accordance with the perfuming, in harmony with that which perfumes, that which is perfumed has a perfume capable of giving rise to a fruit of special type which, in turn, will be capable of perfuming. Birth and destruction are *simultaneous*: this rules out births and destructions which would take place at different moments and excludes eternal entities ... *Thus, sesame seeds perfumed by a flower*: The author illustrates his explanation by examples generally accepted (*prasiddhadṛṣṭānta*) by his adversaries. Actually, sesame seeds and the flower are, both of them, modifications of the mind (*cittapariṇāma*). The sesame seeds arise and cease at the same time as the flower which perfumes them. Thereby they are a cause capable of reproducing the scent belonging to the flower immediately afterwards. It is the same here for successive moments of the sesame seeds.” (U)

16. Do the seeds (*bīja*) of afflictive dharmas (*sāṃkleśika*) contained in the store-consciousness constitute a category substantially different (*pratibhinna*) or non-different (*abhinna*) from this consciousness? – Substantially, these seeds are neither different nor non-different from the store-consciousness. However, the store-consciousness arises in such a way that it has the power (*prabhāvaviśiṣṭa*) of giving rise to the afflictive dharmas; it is said to be provided with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*). [134c14]

16. Comm. Bh 328a19-328b7, bh 153b4-154a4, U 388a14-16, u 249a5-249b6.

The seeds cannot be either different from the store-consciousness or identical with it: these two hypotheses present difficulties; bh comments: *de dan̄ tha dad na ni yan lag thams cad kyis kyan̄ tha dad pa thob par ḥgyur ĕin̄ kun gĕi rnam par śes pa skad cig mas kyan̄ gnod par ḥgyur te/ de dan̄ tha dad paḥi phyir de la dga ba dan̄ mi dge ba dag gi bag chags yod pa sa bon n̄id yin par ḥgyur na de ni luñ du ma bstan par ḥdod do// tha mi dad na yan̄ ji ltar na mañ po yin des na de lta na yan̄ ma yin te/ gñi ga ltar yan̄ skyon yod do.*
 - This passage is obscure; Bh differs slightly: “If they were different from the store-consciousness, the seeds would differ part by part (fen fen): instantaneous destruction (*kṣaṇikanirodha*) of the store-consciousness would not take place since they are different. By the power of the wholesome or unwholesome propensities (*vāsanā*), the seeds would

be wholesome or unwholesome. But it is accepted that they are indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). If they were not different, how could there be a number of them (*sambahula*)? Thus these two hypotheses present difficulties.”

“*The store-consciousness arises in such a way ...*: it is endowed with special potentialities (*śaktiviśeṣa*) capable of giving rise to afflictive dharmas. Furnished with these potentialities, it is called 'consciousness endowed with all the seeds'. There are examples (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) for this. The wheat seed (*yavabīja*), because it has the power to give rise to the shoot (*ānkura*), has the nature of seed. After having undergone the action of time or fire, the wheat loses its germinative power: its nature of being wheat subsists just as at the beginning, but since its strength is exhausted, it no longer has the nature of seed. It is the same for the store-consciousness. It has powers giving rise to afflictive dharmas; endowed with these powers, it is called 'consciousness endowed with all the seeds'. (Bh)

17. The store-consciousness and the defiled dharmas (*sāṃkleśika*) are simultaneously mutual causes (*anyonyahetuka*). How? - It is like the case of a lamp (*dīpa*): the arising of the flame (*jvālotpāda*) and the combustion of the wick (*vartidahana*) are mutual and simultaneous. Or like two bundles of reeds (*naḍakalāpa*) which, simultaneously leaning on each other, do not fall down. In the same way, here too it is a matter of mutual causes: the store-consciousness is the cause (*hetu*) of the defiled dharmas; in the same way, the defiled dharmas are the cause of the store-consciousness. That is the true definition (*vyavasthāpana*) of the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) because another causal condition does not exist (*nopalabhyate*). [134c20]

17. Comm. 328b14-23, bh 154a4-8, U 388a22-388b8, u 249b6-250a8.

“Let us take a lamp, for example: at a given moment, the lamp's wick gives rise to the flame and the lamp's flame consumes the wick; they are mutually cause and result. Similarly, the store-consciousness and the active consciousnesses [*pravṛttivijñāna* which are identified with defiled dharmas] are simultaneously and mutually cause and fruit. Thus, two bundles of reeds leaning against each other remain upright and do not fall down. At the time when the first one supports the second one so that it remains upright

and does not fall, at the same time the second one supports the first one so that it remains upright and does not fall over.

This is the true definition of the causal condition: as we have said above (§ 14), the cause that contains the seeds is the causal condition to the exclusion of any other.

For another causal condition does not exist: for the other dharmas cannot contain the seeds (*bīja*). [The Vaibhāṣikas, Kośa, II, p. 244 seq.] who claim that five causes are causal condition (*hetupratyaya*), equally (*paryāyeṇa*) name the store-consciousness. - Actually, in regard to the three causes, co-arisen cause (*sabhāgahetu*), omnipresent cause (*sarvatragahetu*) and completely-ripening cause (*vipākahetu*), their nature of cause (*hetutva*) is not justified (*ayukta*) if they do not carry the seeds (*vāsanā*). But the seeds exist nowhere else than in the store-consciousness. - As for the associated causes (*samprayuktahetu*), i.e., the interdependent mind-and-mental events (*cittacaitta*), like wandering merchants, they exert themselves on objects (*viśaya*) and possess a potentiality of their own (*svaśakti*); but, without the seeds that depend upon the store-consciousness [according to bh: *kun gñi rnam par śes pa la brten pañi sa bon med par*], this potentiality is not explained. - By simultaneously-arising cause (*sahabūhetu*) is understood the store-consciousness and the active consciousnesses. Apart from the store-consciousness, the mutual cause that contains the internal (*ādhyātmika*) and external (*bāhya*) seeds, no other causal condition exists " (U)

18. How can the non-different (*abhinna*) and non-variable (*acitra*) propensities (*vāsanā*) be the cause of different and variable dharmas? Like cloth (*vastra*) coated (*pariṇata*) by different ingredients: when it is coated, it does not show any variation, but when it is dipped into the dye-bath (*raṅgabhājana*), then many (*aneka*) different (*bhinna*) rainbow-hued (*nānāvidha*) colors (*raṅgaprabheda*) appear. Similarly, for the store-consciousness perfumed (*bhāvita*) by diverse propensities (*nānāvāsanā*): at the moment of impregnation it is not varied; but when it is dipped into the dye-bath, which is the arising of the fruit (*phalābhinirvṛtti*), a crowd of various dharmas (*apramāṇanānādharmā*) manifests. [134c27]

18. Comm. Bh 328c3-10, bh 154a8-154b3, U 388b16-20, u 250a8-250b2.

It is to be assumed that, in order to dye a cloth, the raw material is coated with various ingredients (*tshig guhi rtsi*: nut juice), then the whole thing is dipped into a developing bath. Only after coming out of the bath are the colors seen on the cloth. In our civilization, the example of photography would be even more appropriate.

“The store-consciousness is like a dyed cloth. The arising of the fruit being its dye-bath, the author speaks of *the dye-bath of the arising of the fruit*. It *penetrates* it when it is seized (*parigrhīta*) by the conditions (*pratyaya*). At the time of impregnation, it shows no difference or variety, but when it has reached the stage of retribution (*vipākāvasthā*), it appears as the very cause (*hetusvabhāva*) of multiple dharmas.” (Bh)

19. Here in the Greater Vehicle, there is dependent origination

(*pratītyasamutpāda*) which is subtle (*sūkṣmā*) and very profound (*atigambhīra*).

In brief (*samāsataḥ*), this *pratītyasamutpāda* is twofold: the *pratītyasamutpāda* that apportions the self-natures (*svabhāvavibhāgin*), and the *pratītyasamutpāda* that apportions pleasantness and unpleasantness (*iṣṭāniṣṭavibhāgin*).

i) The production of dharmas by virtue of the store-consciousness is the *pratītyasamutpada* that which apportions the self-natures, since it is the same condition (*pratyayasvabhāva*) of the distribution (*vibhāga*) the various self-natures (*nānāsvabhāva*).

ii) The twelve-membered *pratītyasvabhāva* (*dvādaśāṅgapratītyasvabhāva*) is that which apportions pleasantness and unpleasantness, since it is the same condition that differentiates pleasant and unpleasant existences (*ātmabhāva*) in the wholesome and unwholesome destinies (*sugatidurgati*). [135a5]

19. Comm. Bh 328c18-26, bh 154b3-8, U 388b27-388c8, u 250b3-8.

“*In the Greater Vehicle there is a dependent origination that is subtle*: because it is difficult to cognize (*durvigāhya*) by worldly (*loka*) people and *very profound*: because it is difficult to probe (*durvigāha*) by śrāvakas, etc.

Dependent origination signifies production as a result of a cause of that which has cause (rgyu las rgyu dan ldan pa ḥbhuñ: *hetoḥ sahetukotpādaḥ*, cf. Kośa, III, p. 78. When we want to indicate the reason, we use the gerundive suffix (*k-tva*).

That apportions the self-natures: as it has the power (*sāmarthya*) of apportioning them, or, as its activity (*prayojana*) is to apportion them, it is said that they *apportion*. The store-consciousness apportions the self-natures, for it apportions the defiled nature (*sāṃkleśikadharmasvabhāva*) of everything that arises (*jātimat*) by differentiating it.

That apportions the pleasant and the unpleasant: the twelve members [of the causal chain] beginning with ignorance (*avidyā*), by apportioning the different kinds of existences (*ātmabhāvaviśeṣa*), pleasant and unpleassant (*ramyāramya*), into wholesome and unwholesome destinies, operates as principal condition (*pradhānapratyaya*) in rebirth (*abhinirvṛtti*). Indeed, at the moment when the mental factors (*saṃskāra*), etc., arise from the store-consciousness, merit (*puṇya*), demerit (*apuṇya*) and non-agitation (*āniñjya*), etc. are differentiated (*viśiṣṭa*) by the power of ignorance, etc.” (U)

20. Here, those who are mistaken (*mūḍha*) about the first dependent origination, i.e., store-consciousness, think that the origin of things (*anvayatva*) is to be sought in self-nature (*svabhāva*), or in previous actions (*pūrvakṛta*), or in a transformation of the creator (*iśvaranirmāṇa*), or in the Self (*ātman*); or else they think that there is neither cause (*hetu*) nor condition (*pratyaya*).

Those who are mistaken about the second dependent origination imagine a self that is actor (*kāraka*) and enjoyer (*bhokṛ*).

Let us suppose there is a group of people who are blind from birth (*jātyandhapuruṣa*), who have never seen an elephant (*hastin*) and who one day are presented with an elephant. The first blind person touches (*sprśati*) the trunk (*tuṅḍa*) of the elephant, the second its tusks (*danta*), the third its ears (*karṇa*), the fourth its feet (*pāda*), the fifth its tail (*lāṅgūla*), the sixth its side (*prṣṭhavaṃśa*). Someone asks them what is the elephant like, and the first answers that it is like a plow (*haladaṅḍa*), the second, like a wooden leg (*musala*), the third, like a winnowing basket (*śūrpaka*), the fourth, like a pillar (*niśādaśilā*), the fifth, like a broom (*saṃmārjanī*) and the sixth, like a rock (*upala*). In the same way here,

those who are ignorant about these two dependent originations, blinded by ignorance, are ignorant about the store-consciousness which here is comparable to the elephant, are ignorant about its self-nature (*svabhāva*), its nature as cause and its nature as result. They think that the cause of things is the self-nature, or previous actions, or a creator, or a Self, or else that there is production without any cause. Finally, others believe in a Self which is active and enjoyer. [135a19]

20. Comm. Bh 329a14-24, bh 154b8-155a5, U 388c23-25, u 250b3-251a1.

“Being mistaken about the two dependent originations, they are like people who are blind from birth. *They think that previous actions are the origin of things*: because they reject human activity (*puruṣakāra*), they conceive this false belief (*mithyāgrāha*).” (U)

21. In short (*samāsataḥ*), the self-nature of the store-consciousness is that of being a retribution-consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna*). All the existences (*kāya = ātmabhāva*) of the three-fold world (*trai dhātuka*) and all the destinies (*gati*) are the result of this consciousness. [135a21]

21. Comm. Bh329a28-329b2, bh 155a5-7, U 388c28-389a7, u 251a1-6.

“*In short*, etc.: from birth to birth, because of the propensities of good or bad actions (*karmavāsanā*) and because of erroneous adherence (*abhiniveśa*) to dualistic concepts (*vikalpa*) about an object and a subject of consciousness (*grāhya - grāhaka*), the original substance of the being (*sattvamūladravya*), the result of seed, has retribution (*vipaka*) as nature (*svabhāva*) and the store-consciousness and the seeds (*bīja*) of afflictive (*sāṃkleśika*) dharmas as its self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*).” (U)

u continues: *des khams gsum paḥi lus thams cad dan / ḥgro ba thams cad bsdus so Œes bya ba la ḥdod pa dan gzugs dan / gzugs med pa na spyod paḥi lus thams cad dan / sem can gyi rgyud ḥgro ba thams cad de / lha la sogs pa bsdus pa ni ḥbrel pa can gyi mtshan ṅid do // ji ltar gzugs dan ḥjug paḥi rnam par Œes pa yul kha cig dan / res ḥgaḥi dus su rgyun chad pa de ltar kun gŒi rnam par Œes pa ni gŒen po ma byuṅ gi bar du ma yin te /*

khyab paḥi phyir thams cad ḥdzin par byed paḥo: “All the existences of the three-fold world and all the destinies are the result of this consciousness: all the existences belonging to the realm of desire, the realm of form and the formless realm (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacara*), and all the destinies in the continuum of the being (*sattvasaṃtāna*), divine rebirth, etc., are the result of this consciousness: are inherent in it (*saṃbandhilakṣaṇa*). Whereas matter (*rūpa*) and the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) are interrupted (*samucchinna*) at certain places and at certain times, the store-consciousness is never interrupted as long as its obstruction (*pratipakṣa*) has not arisen. Because it extends everywhere (*vyāpya*), it is 'all-inclusive' (*sarvagrāhaka*).”

22. Here are some verses:

i) The outer (*bāhya*) seed and the inner (*ādhyātmika*) seed are undifferentiated (*avyakta*). Of these two seeds, the first is purely conventional (*saṃvṛta*), the second is absolute (*pāramārthika*). It is accepted that there are seeds with six characteristics (*ṣaḍkārabīja*).

ii) They are momentary (*kṣaṇika*), simultaneous (*sahabhū*), proceeding in a continuum (*saṃtānapravṛtta*), determinate (*viniyata*), dependent on conditions (*pratyayāpekṣa*) and originator of a self-fruit (*svaphalopārjita*).

[135a26]

22. Comm. Bh 329b19-329c12, bh 155a7-155b8, U 389a19-389b14, u 251a6-252a3.

The versions vary considerably. Bh: “The outer seed and the inner seed are undifferentiated as to two points: as to goodness and maliciousness, as to defilement and purification. The first is purely conventional, the second is absolute.” - U: “The outer seed and the inner seed are undifferentiated. These two seeds are merely concept (*vijñaptimātra*). The first is conventional, the second is absolute.” u comments: *phyi rol sa bon ni nas sogs paḥo // nañ gi sa bon ni kun gñi rnam par śes paḥo // mi gsal ba ni lun du ma bstan paḥo // gñis ni phyi dañ nañ giḥo // yañ na ḥbras bu dañ rgyu ste / de gñis kyi rgyu mtsahn kung ĕi rnam par śes pa yañ gñis so // de las rgyu dañ gñiḥi dños pos kun nas ñon moñs pa dañ rnam par byañ baḥi chos ḥbyuñ baḥi phyir ro // gañ dag gñis*

dag ces ḥdon pa de dag gi ltar na rgyu dan ḥbras bu dag bśad do // kun rdzob ces bya ni phyi rol gyi nas la sogs pa ste/ kun gĕi rnam par śes pa gyur pa yin paḥi phyir ro // dam paḥi don ces bya ba la don dam paḥi sa bon ni kun gĕi rnam par śes pa ste / sa bon thams cad kyi rkyen yin pa dan / deḥi bdag ṅid yan lag yin paḥi phyir ro: “The outer seed is the wheat (*yava*), etc.; the inner seed is the store-consciousness. They are *undifferentiated*, indeterminate from the moral point of view (*avyākṛta*). *These two seeds:* this is a matter of the outer seed and the inner seed or of the fruit (*phala*) and the cause (*hetu*). With this two-fold object (*nimitta*), the store-consciousness is two-fold as well because afflicted (*sāṃkleśika*) dharmas and pure (*vaiyavadānika*) dharmas arise from the store-consciousness, cause and primary substance (*mūladravya*). Those who read *gñis dag* [in place of *gñis ni*] see this as an allusion to cause and fruit. The *conventional* seed is the external seed, wheat, etc., because it is just a development (*pariṇāma*) of the store-consciousness. The *absolute* seed is the store-consciousness, because it is the condition (*pratyaya*) for all the seeds and the quintessence of the seed.”

“All the seeds have six characteristics: 1) They are *momentary*: the two kinds of seeds perish as soon as they are born (*janmānantaram nirudhyante*). Why? It is impossible that an eternal (*nitya*) dharma could be seed because its nature remains unchanged from what it was at the beginning. - 2) They are simultaneous with their fruit. A past (*atīta*) dharma, a future (*anāgata*) dharma or a dharma dissociated from its fruit (*viśamyukta*) cannot be seed. Why? Because the fruit is born at the precise moment when the seed exists. - 3) They proceed in continuity: The store-consciousness lasts up until its obstruction (*pratipakṣa*) arises; the seeds of outer dharmas last until the formation of the root (*mūla*) or until maturity. - 4) They are *determinate*: they are individually determined (*pratiniyata*). Everything is not born from everything; each substance is born from the seed appropriate to it. Everything is not born at any time whatsoever; but a given substance arises from the seed belonging to it. - 5) They depend on conditions: these seeds require their own conditions in order to produce their fruit. Anything does not give rise to anything whatsoever but, at given times and given places, when the seeds encounter their proper conditions, at these places and times, their fruit takes birth. - 6) They are the *authors of an appropriate fruit*: a given seed produces only the fruit appropriate to it. Thus, the store-consciousness produces only the store-consciousness,

and wheat seed produces only the wheat fruit.” (Bh) – “This refutes the causality (*bījātva*) of the Pradhāna, etc., which does not have the qualities of seed. (u)”

23. i) Stable (*dhruva*), indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), perfumable (*bhāvya*) and in strict relationship with the perfumer (*bhāvakaśrta*), the perfumed and none other shows the nature of propensity (*vāsanālakṣaṇa*).

ii) [Theses refuting the nature of the perfumed are untenable] because i) there is no contact (*saṃbandha*) amongst the six active consciousnesses, and their respective three natures (*ākāra*) are in opposition (*viruddha*); ii) two moments (*kṣaṇa*) are never simultaneous (*sahabhū*); iii) there would be application (*prasaṅga*) to other categories (*jāti*). [135b1]

23. Comm Bh 329c13-330a18, bh 155b8-156b5, U 389b14-389c20, u 252a3-253a4.

“The union of the perfumed and the perfuming is necessary so that the nature belonging to the seed (*bīja*) and to the possessor of the seed (*bījīn*) be established. Describing the perfumed, the author says that it is 1) *stable*: the Dharma, like the sesame seed (*tila*) which forms a continuous and stable series, can be perfumed. It is not the same for unstable things like sound (*śabda*), etc. - 2) In order to be perfumed, it is not enough to be stable; it must also be *indeterminate*. Thus substances of neutral odor can be perfumed, but not odoriferous substances like agallochum (*agaru*) or malodorous substances like garlic (*laśuna*), etc. - 3) *Perfumable*: any substance that is perfumable or that is capable of concentrating perfumes and the parts of which are in mutual cohesion (*anyonyasaśrta*) is called 'perfumable'. Gold, stone, etc., are not perfumable because their parts are not in mutual cohesion. - 4) In order to be perfumed, it is necessary not only to be perfumable, but also to be *in strict relationship with the perfumer*: not to occupy a separate space. The relationship is the fact of never being separated.

The store-consciousness *alone*, which has these four qualities merits the name 'perfumed' and *none other*. These words deny that the active consciousnesses (*pravṛtījñāna*) are the 'perfumed': indeed, they are in opposition to the four points enumerated above. On the

contary, the store-consciousness is *stable* in its nature; until the arising of its obstacle (*pratipakṣa*), it forms a continuous series that is never interrupted. It is essentially *indeterminate*, being neither wholesome (*kuṣala*) nor unwholesome (*akuṣala*). Not being an eternal entity, it is naturally *perfumable* or capable of concentrating perfumes. Finally, it is *in strict relationship with the perfumer*, since it arises and ceases at the same time as the latter. It *shows the characteristics of propensity*: because of these qualities, the perfumed is the *lakṣana*, whereas the propensity is the *lakṣya*.” (U)

The opposing theses concerning the nature of the perfumed are untenable:

1st thesis: The active consciousnesses mutually perfume one another. - No, because *there is no contact between these active consciousnesses*: these consciousnesses have a mobile activity (*calapravṛtti*).

Their respective three natures are in opposition: each of them functions with a special support (*aśraya*), a special object (*ā lambana*) and a special act of attention (*manasikara*). Or again, each of them appears in particular aspects (*ākāra*).

2nd thesis: The Dārṣṭāntikas claim that the earlier moment (*pūrvakṣaṇa*) perfumes the later moment (*uttarakṣaṇa*). - To refute this thesis, the author says that *two moments are never simultaneous*: there are no two moments that exist at the same time. It is the simultaneous arising and cessation (*sahotpādanirodha*) that constitutes propensity. [U adds: It is clear that these two moments which are not simultaneous are not in contact (*sambaddha*). Not being in contact, they do not have the nature of perfumed-perfumer].

3rd thesis: But, it is said, these consciousnesses belong to the same type (*samajātīya*). Even though they are not in contact, they share the same type, the type consciousness (*vijñānajāti*). Therefore they can perfume one another. - No, because *it would be applicable to other categories*: it would be the same for other types. The organs (*indriya*), eye, etc., being of the same type of *rūpaprasāda* (subtle material element), should also be mutually perfumed, in the sense that the two organs, eye and ear, together having a subtle characteristic (*prasādadharmā*), should be mutually perfumed. Now you cannot accept that because, despite the subtle element common to them, these organs have distinct series and consequently cannot perfume one another. It is the same for the

consciousnesses: despite the characteristic of consciousness common to them, how could they perfume one another?” (Bh)

“These are the various theses arguing against perfuming. They claim that the six consciousnesses are mutually perfumed, or that the previous moment perfumes the subsequent moment, or that there is perfuming of the 'consciousness' type or of the 'moment' type. All of these theses are erroneous. Thus it is correct to say that only the store-consciousness, to the exclusion of the other consciousnesses, is susceptible of being perfumed.” (U)

24. The outer seed and the inner seed are, at the same time, generator (*janaka*) and projector (*ākṣepaka*, *āvāhaka*) because they project the offspring (*anupta*) and the corpse respectively. It is like an arrow (*iṣu*) which does not fall in mid-flight. [Variant]: because they cease (*vinaś-*) spontaneously (*svarasena*) in succession. [135b3]

24. Comm. Bh 330a18-27, bh 156b5-157a1, U 389c20-390a8, u 253a4-253b4.

“The two seeds in question, i.e., the outer seed and the inner seed, are both generating cause (*janakahetu*) and projecting cause (*ākṣepakahetu*). First, the outer seed is generating cause until the ripening of the fruit; the inner seed is generating cause until the end of life (*āyuhparyanta*). The outer seed projects the shoots (*anupta*) after the tree has rotted away. When the tree is dead, it shoots up off-shoots without them having to be planted (*vap-*). The inner seed projects the corpse after death. It is thanks to the projecting cause that the shoots and the corpse last long enough. If the two seeds were generating cause only, as soon as the cause disappears, the fruit would perish and would not last for even an instant. If the moments (*kṣaṇa*) followed one another, if the subsequent moment arose because of the previous moment, there would never be a final term. That is why the projecting cause necessarily exists. These two seeds are cause in the same way that the string that is released and the bow that is bent cause the arrow not to fall but to travel a long distance.” (Bh)

“These two kinds of seeds, outer and inner, are generating cause (*janakahetu*) and projecting cause (*ākṣepakahetu*) at the same time. The outer seed, on the one hand, is generating cause relative to the shoot (*aṅkura*) and, on the other hand, projecting cause relative to the leaves (*parṇa*), etc. The store-consciousness or inner seed is, on the one hand, generating cause relative to name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) and, on the other hand, projecting cause relative to the six sense organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*) up to and including old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*).

So be it; the seed is generating cause, but how is it projecting cause? In reply to this question, the writer responds: *they project the rotten wood and the corpse respectively*. If these two seeds were merely generating cause and not projecting cause, the seeds of grain contained in warehouses and storehouses could not be kept as such for a long time. After death, the corpse (*mṛtaśarīra*) could not exist (*anupravṛt-*) in the state of putrefaction, etc. (*vinīlakādyavasthā*), but it would disappear (*vinaś-*) immediately after death.

What is the example for that? *Because they spontaneously perish subsequently*, like the arrow (*iṣu*). The momentum (*saṃskāravega*) supplied by the stretched (*kṣepakaguṇa*) bowstring is the generating cause that makes the arrow released from the string not to fall. The force (*saṃskārabala*) exerted by the bent bow is the projecting cause that makes the arrow fly far to its target. It is not just the momentum furnished by the stretched cord, for then the arrow would fall at once. Neither is it just the continuing thrust belonging to the movement (*īraṇa*), for then the arrow would not fall. But when these two forces are joined together, the arrow, having left the string, travels far to its target. Thus it must be agreed that here there is a twofold force operating (*saṃskārabala*), that which gives birth and that which projects.

Those who read the variant: “because they subsequently perish spontaneously” establish the existence of the projecting cause by means of reasoning without resorting to the example of the arrow. How? When the oil wick (*tailavarti*) is used up, the flame of the lamp subsequently is extinguished spontaneously (*svarasena*) independent of any external cause (*bāhyapratyayānapekṣa*); but that occurs little by little (*kramaṇa*) and not right from the start. For these reasons, there must necessarily be a projecting force. In all compositional factors (*saṃskāra*) that are undestroyed and actually present, there must also be a germinating force which, by its development, projects them and causes them not to be cut.” (U)

25. Here are two stanzas that show the difference between the external and internal seed:

i) The outer seed sometimes (*ham*) is not planted (H: perfumed). It is not the same for the inner seed. If the propensity for hearing, etc., (*śrutādivāsanā*) did not exist, the arising of its fruit would be impossible.

ii) Because this absurd consequence would follow (*doṣaprasaṅga*), that the thing accomplished would perish (*kṛtavipraṇāśa*) and that the thing not accomplished would occur (*akṛtābhyāgama*). Therefore that is the support of propensity. [135b8]

25. Comm. U 390a14-390b7, u253b5-254a6.

“Up to now the author has talked about the outer and inner seed as vaguely similar. Now he notes their difference, saying: *the outer seed sometimes is not perfumed*, etc.

i) The word *sometimes* shows that it is not a fixed rule (*aniyatārtha*): the outer seed is sometimes perfumed, sometimes not. From coal, cow dung and sheep's wool respectively (*anukrameṇa*) there arise sesame (*tila*), lotus (*utpalamūla*) and panic grass (*dūrvā*). The sesame does not arise, does not cease at the same time as the coal, etc.; they do not mutually perfume each other, and yet the first arises from the second. Thus, sometimes the outer seed is not perfumed. On the other hand, the sesame, etc., arises and perishes at the same time as the lotus, etc.; thanks to the perfuming by the lotus, the sesame takes on the smell [of the lotus]. There is no fixed rule concerning this. This is why the author says *sometimes*. – The inner seeds are the predispositions of all the dharmas contained in the store-consciousness. These seeds of necessity exist due to the perfuming. How? If the predisposition of hearing (*śrutādivāsanā*) did not exist, its *fruit*, i.e., the great hearing (*bahuśruta*), etc., would not exist.

ii) Some outer seeds, such as rice, etc., (*śālyādi*) sometimes die even after having been planted (*upta*); others, such as rye grass, etc., sometimes develop even without having been planted. - It is not the same for the inner seed. Why is there this difference between the outer and the inner seed? Because if the inner seed died after having been planted,

like rice, or grew without having been planted, like rye grass, *there would be the absurd consequence that the thing accomplished would perish and the thing not accomplished would occur*. Therefore the outer seed and the inner seed are in opposition (*viruddha*).

Objection. Saying that the outer seed is different in nature from the inner seed, is that not contradictory to the thesis explained above (§ 15, 17), that the store-consciousness is the true seed of all dharmas? - In reply to this objection, the author says: *the inner seed is the condition for the outer seed, etc.* Actually, the seeds of outer dharmas, rice, etc. appear in the store-consciousness, considering the propensity-seeds (*vāsanābīja*) laid down in this consciousness by the actions (*karman*) of living beings (*prāṇin*) who are experiencing these dharmas (cf. Tibetan verses). That is why the outer seed does not exist aside from the inner seed. Cf. the stanza: The sky (*vyoman*), the earth (*prithivī*), the wind (*vāyu*), space (*ākāśa*), the rivers (*sarit*), the directions (*diś*) and the ocean (*sāgara*) are simply internal creations, mental constructions (*vikalpa*), and do not exist externally. There are innumerable verses of this type.” (U)

26. As for the other consciousnesses, the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), they are ‘enjoyers’ (*aupabhogika*) throughout all the existences (*kāya = ātmabhāva*) and destinies (*gati*). Cf. this stanza from the Madhyāntavibhaṅga (pg. 32-33):

*ekaṃ pratyayavijñānaṃ dvitīyam aupabhogikam /
upabhogaparicchedaprakāśaḥ tatra caitasāḥ //*

“The first consciousness is the condition-consciousness; the second is the ‘enjoyer’. It is there that the mental events act as] enjoyer, discriminating and stimulating.” [135b12]

26. Comm. Bh 330b4-6, bh 157a2-3, U 390b12-18, u 254a6-254b1.

*“In the course of the destinies: god realm, etc. They are enjoyers: the six active consciousnesses enjoy. They arise from conditions, for their objects (*ālambanaviṣaya*) are distinct (*paricchinna*). To explain this idea, the author cites a verse from the Madhāntavibhaṅgasūtra as proof of his theory. The sūtra says: *It is there*, i.e., amongst*

these consciousnesses, that the aggregate of sensation (*vedanāskandha*) acts as *enjoyer*; the aggregate of identification (*saṃjñāskandha*) acts as *discriminator* and the aggregate of concepts (*saṃskāraskandha*) acts as *stimulant*, because volition (*cetanā*) stimulates mind (*citta*). These three aggregates, the principal causes (*pradhānahetu*) of the activity (*pravṛtti*) of every mind, are called auxiliaries (*upakāra*) to mind. Because they enjoy objects, they are called mentals (*caitasa*).” (U)

27. These two consciousnesses, store-consciousness and active consciousness, are mutual conditions (*anyonyapratyaya*). A verse of the Abhidharmasūtra (cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 34) says:

sarvadharmā hi ālīnā teṣu tat tathā /

anyoyam phalabhāvena hetubhāvena sarvadā //

All dharmas are lodged in consciousness and the latter is lodged in them: eternally they are result and cause of one another. [135b16]

27. Comm. Bh 330b11-14, bh 157a3-6, U 390b23-390e15, u 254b1-3.

“The store-consciousness and all dharmas are always mutually cause and result; they arise from one another. At the moment when the store-consciousness is the cause of dharmas, at that very moment the latter are its result; at the moment when the store-consciousness is the result of dharmas, at that very moment the latter dharmas are its cause.” (Bh)

U cites a passage from the Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra, chap. of the Nirṇayasamgraha (cf. Taishō 1579, 580b9-29) at length. “The store-consciousness plays the role of two-fold condition relative to the active consciousnesses: it is both their seed (*bīja*) and their support (*āśraya*). It is their seed, for at the moment when the wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛita*) active consciousnesses are actualized, the store-consciousness is seed for all of them. It is their support, for the store-consciousness takes over (*upādādāti*) the material organs (*rūpindriya*). The five groups of consciousnesses are actualized (*pravartante*) by relying on these organs thus appropriated and not on the non-appropriated organs (*anupātta*). Moreover, it is because

there is a store-consciousness that there can be a manas: with the manas as support, the mental consciousness is actualized (*manovijñāna*). Just as the five groups of consciousnesses are actualized by depending on the five organs, eye, etc., - and not without these five organs - so the mental consciousness is not actualized without the manas organ (*manaindriya*).

Conversely, relative to the store-consciousness, the active consciousnesses play the role of twofold condition. Actually (*dṛṣṭadharme*), they nourish (*pariपोषयन्ति*) the seeds of the store-consciousness; later (*saṃparāye*), they envelop-plant (che-tche) their seeds so that it may grow. In the moment, they nourish the seeds of the store-consciousness: by relying on the store-consciousness, the active consciousnesses, wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate, are actualized. At that moment, their arising (*utpāda*) and cessation (*nirodha*) coincide with that of their single and common support. Thus they perfume the store-consciousness. As a result of this perfuming, causal condition (*hetupratyaya*), the subsequent active consciousnesses, wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate, are actualized by developing, multiplying and becoming more and more differentiated. Later, they envelop-plant their seeds so that it may be born: there is a certain kind of perfuming capable of drawing-enveloping (yin-che) the store-consciousness which is retributive (*vipāka*) and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*).

Thus, since on the one hand the store-consciousness is the seed and the support of the active consciousnesses, and since on the other hand the active consciousnesses nourish the seeds of the store-consciousness, envelop them and plant them, one is forced to admit that store-consciousness and active consciousness are reciprocal conditions.” (u)

28. If in the first dependent production (*pratītyasamutpāda*), these two consciousnesses are mutually conditional cause (*hetupratyaya*), of which condition is it a question in the second conditioned production? - Of the dominant condition.

Of how many conditions (*adhipatipratyaya*) are the six active consciousnesses the outcome? - They are the outcome of the dominant condition, the object condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) and the condition as equal and immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*)..

The three dependent productions, saṃsāra, pleasant or unpleasant (*iṣṭāniṣṭagatī*) destinies and complete enjoyment (*aupabhogika*), include these four conditions.
[135b20]

28. Comm. Bh 330b20-26, bh 157a6-157b2, U 390c20-391a2, u 254b3-255a1.

“ *In the first dependent production, i.e., in that which apportions the self-natures (cf. § 19), if these two consciousnesses are mutually causal condition - this is about to be explained - of which condition is it a question in the second dependent production, i.e., in the one which apportions approval or disapproval? Of the dominant condition, because it is due to the predominance (*adhipatibala*) exerted by ignorance (*avidyā*), etc., that actions (*saṃskāra*) produce the result of retribution (*vipākaphala*) in the good and bad destinies.*

The six consciousnesses come from three conditions. Thus, concerning the visual consciousness, the eye (*caḅṣus*) is the dominant condition, color (*rūpa*) is the object condition, the consciousness that has just disappeared (*anantaraniruddha vijñāna*) is the antecedent condition. Just as the visual consciousness is the outcome of three conditions, so each of the other active consciousnesses, the auditory consciousness, etc., is the outcome of three particular conditions, just like the visual consciousness.

The different self-natures (*svabhāva*) are the outcome of only the causal condition, because the other three do not play a part here (*na saṃbhavanti*). Thus *the three dependent productions, that of saṃsāra, etc., include four conditions.* It does not follow that each of them possesses all four; only mind-and-mental factors (*cittacaitta*) possess all four.” (U)

29. Here the store-consciousness is studied under its names (*paryāya*) and characteristics (*lakṣhaṇa*). How does one know that these names and characteristics apply exclusively to the store-consciousness and not to the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*)? - Without a store-consciousness defined in this way, defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) are impossible (*ayukta*): passion-affliction (*kleśasaṃkleśa*), action-affliction (*karmasaṃkleśa*) and birth-

affliction (*janmasaṃkleśa*) are impossible; mundane purification (*laukika vyavadāna*) and supramundane purification (*lokottara vyavadāna*) are impossible. [135b26]

29. Comm. Bh 330c4-6, bh 157b2-3, U 391a9-20, u 255a1-6.

“If the names and natures in question are applied to something other than the store-consciousness, affliction and purification are impossible. That is why there is definitely a store-consciousness.” (U) – “Affliction is a synonym for impurity (*aviṣuddhi*); purification is a synonym for purity (*viṣuddhi*).” (u)

“There are three kinds of afflictions: afflictions resulting from passion, action or birth. There are two kinds of purification: mundane or temporary weakening (*viṣkambhaṇa*) of the passions by the impure path (*sāsravamārga*), and supramundane purification or definitive cutting off (*prahāṇa*) of the passions by the pure path (*anāsravamārga*).” (U)

30. Why would the passion-defilement (*kleśasaṃkleśa*) be impossible? - Because the nature (t'i) consisting of being the seed (*bīja*) [of the passions and sub-passions] - the nature realized by the perfuming (*vāsanā*) of the afflictions (*kleśa*) and sub-afflictions (*upakleśa*) - does not belong to the six groups of active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*).

i) Indeed, let us suppose a visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*) arising and perishing with the afflictions and sub-afflictions, lust, etc. (*rāgādhikleśopakleśaiḥ sahotpannaniruddham*). It is this visual consciousness perfumed (*vāsita*) by the propensity of lust, etc., that must be the seed of lust and not another consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc. But when the visual consciousness perfumed by lust is destroyed (*niruddha*) and replaced (*antarāyita*) by another consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc., there is no longer the propensity of lust and the support of this propensity, namely, the visual consciousness, does not exist. It is impossible that from this visual consciousness previously destroyed there could arise a second visual consciousness provided with the aforesaid lust (*rāga*), etc. In the same way,

from a past action (*atitakarma*) presently without self-nature, there cannot arise a retributive result (*vipākaphala*).

ii) Furthermore, the propensity (*vāsana*) does not reside in the first visual consciousness arising with the lust. Also, it does not exist *a fortiori* in the second visual consciousness subsequent to the first. Moreover (*tāvat*), the propensity seed of the second visual consciousness does not reside in the lust, because the lust depends (*āśrita*) on the visual consciousness and is not stable (*dhruva*).

iii) Neither does the propensity reside in the other consciousnesses, auditory consciousness, etc., because the organs that support (*āśraya*) these consciousnesses are distinct, for these consciousnesses do not arise, do not perish, together.

iv) Finally, the propensity [of the visual consciousness] does not reside in the visual consciousness itself, because two consciousnesses of the same nature do not arise, do not perish, together.

This is why the visual consciousness cannot be perfumed by impregnation by afflictions and sub-afflictions, lust, etc. One consciousness cannot be perfumed by another. The same reasoning that is valid here for the visual consciousness will be applicable *mutatis mutandis* (*yathāyogam*) to the other active consciousnesses. [135c12]

30. Comm. Bh 330c23-331a20, bh 157b3-158b3, U 391b7-391c5, u255a6-256a8.

[Lamotte:] In order to make my translation understandable, I have been forced here and there to introduce, in brackets, extracts from the commentary. I have translated the first two indented lines of the paragraph according to H, which is more explicit than the Tibetan version.

“i) In the same way, a retributive result cannot arise from a past action presently without self-nature: like the Sautrāntika masters, [we say] that the past (*atīta*) is without self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), and that the retributive result is projected (*ākṣipta*) by an propensity (*vāsanā*) presently existing (*pratyutpanna*). But the Vaibhāṣika masters

believe that the retributive result arises from a past action; that is impossible. Why? Because the past does not exist. From this example, the author shows that a *citta* of *rāga*, etc., cannot arise. Therefore he accepts that that the visual consciousness arising with the lust, etc., may be perfumed by the lust. But he denies that another consciousness, a later visual consciousness, arises with the passion.” (U) This last phrase is clearer in u: *ḥdi ni re ĕig ḥdod chags la sogs pa dañ lhan cig bhuñ baḥi mig gi rnam par śes pa la ḥdod chags la sogs paḥi bag chags khas blañs te/ de las gĕan ḥbyuñ ba gañ yin pa de ḥdod chags la sogs pa dañ ldan par ḥbyuñ du mi ruñ bar bastan pa yin no /*

ii) “bh: *re ĕig mig gi rnam par śes pa ḥdod chags la sogs pa dañ lhan cig ḥbyuñ ba de la yañ bag chags mi ruñ ste / mig gi rnam par śes pa las lar skyes pa de la bag chags ji ltar rigs*”: If there cannot be impregnation in the visual consciousness that arises with lust, etc., how could there be impregnation in what arises later than this visual consciousness”? This is an *a fortiori* argument (*kaimutikanyāya*), clarified still further in the Chinese by the expression *chang ho houang*.

“Furthermore, the propensity does not reside in the lust: the propensity of the visual consciousness cannot reside in the lust” (Bh) - u continues: “*ḥdod chags ni sems las byuñ ba yin pas rnam par śes pa la brten paḥo // gnas pas gnas la bsgo ba ni rigs paḥi tshul tin gyi gnas pa ñid kyis gnas pa la bsgo bar ni mi ruñ ste*.” Being a mental event (*caitta*), lust depends (*āśrita*) on the consciousness. But, whilst the perfuming of the *āśraya* by the *āśrita* is possible, the perfuming of the *āśrita* by the *āśraya* is impossible.” In other words, the lust can perfume the consciousness on which it depends, but the consciousness cannot perfume the lust which it supports. Thus the propensity does not reside in the lust.

iii) “Neither does the propensity reside in the other consciousnesses: the impregnation cannot reside in the auditory consciousness, etc. (*śrotādivijñāna*). Why? Because the supports of these consciousnesses are distinct (*bhinna*). Since their supports are distinct, none of them can arise and perish together. Indeed, the visual consciousness depends on the eye, the auditory consciousness depends on the ear, and so on up to the mental consciousness which depends on the manas. Since the supports are separate (*viprakṛiṣṭa*), it is impossible that the impregnation of one of them be found in the other.” (Bh)

iv) “Finally, the impregnation does not reside in the visual consciousness itself:” the visual consciousness likewise cannot perfume the visual consciousness because two consciousnesses cannot arise at the same time. Since there are not two, simultaneous birth and destruction (*sahotpādanirodha*) definitely does not occur. - The visual consciousness does not return to perfume the visual consciousness because the perfumer (*vāsaka*) and the perfumed (*vāsyā*), the agent (*kāraka*) and the action (*kriyā*), would be confused.” (U)

31. Furthermore, amongst those who fall (*cyu-*) from a higher level, the ones without identification (*asaṃjñin*), etc., and are reborn here in the realm of desire, the first consciousness (*viññāna*), which is afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) by the afflictions and sub-afflictions of the realm of desire and which appears at the very beginning of the reincarnation: *pratisaṃdhi*, will be reborn without seed. Indeed, the propensity (*vāsanā*) of afflictions and sub-afflictions along with the consciousness that supports it is past (*atīta*) and no longer exists. [135c15]

31. Comm. Bh 331a25-27, bh 158b3-4, U 391c9-17, u 256a8-256b3.

I (Lamotte) have incorporated the commentaries into my translation. The reasoning is clear: the mind at birth is defiled by all the passions of the level into which it is born (cf. Kośa, III, p. 118: *upapattibhavaḥ kliṣṭaḥ sarvakleśaiḥ svabhūmikaiḥ*). But this mind at birth is separated from the earlier impassioned mind by an entire existence. Lacking a store-consciousness, it would then be born without seed.

32. When the consciousness that counteracts the afflictions (*kleśapratipakṣaviññāna*) is born, all the other mundane consciousnesses (*laukika viññāna*) are destroyed (*niruddha*). Thus, lacking a store-consciousness, it is impossible (*ayukta*) that this counteracting consciousness would contain the seeds (*bīja*) of the afflictions and sub-afflictions (*kleśopakleśa*) because it is free in nature (*svabhāvavimukta*), for it does not arise and does not perish with the afflictions and sub-afflictions.

If the store-consciousness did not exist, when a mundane consciousness arises (*tadanantaram*) later, it arises without seed, for the propensity of passion and its support-consciousness (*sāśrayam*) are past (*atita*) and have long ago ceased to exist.

Consequently, if the store-consciousness did not exist, the passion-defilement would be impossible. [135c23]

32. Comm. Bh 331b7-16, bh 158b4-159a1, U 391c25-392a9, u 256be-257a2.

*“When the consciousness that counteracts the passions is born: when, in the Ārya who possesses the fruit of stream-entry, the path counteracting (*pratipakṣamārga*) the afflictions that are to be cut by seeing (*darśanaheyakleśa*) arises for the first time, all the other consciousnesses, the mundane consciousnesses, are immediately destroyed. Then, if there were no store-consciousness, where would the seeds (*anuśaya*) of the afflictions that are to be cut by meditation (*bhāvanāheyakleśa*) reside? The counteracting consciousness cannot contain their seeds, since this counteracting consciousness is liberated in its nature: it is, in its nature, very pure (*ativiśuddha*). Moreover, it does not arise and does not perish with the afflictions: for the antidote (*pratipakṣa*) and what is counteracted (*vipakṣa*) are opposed to each other (*anonyaviruddha*) like light (*āloka*) and shadow (*tamas*). This shows that the counteracting consciousness cannot be the seed of the afflictions.*

*When later: when the path of meditation (*bhāvāmārga*) follows the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*), were a mundane consciousness to arise, it arises without seed] because the propensities of the afflictions and its support-consciousness are past and have not existed for a long time: this comes back to saying that what is past no longer exists. The prapti of the afflictions of which the Vaibhāṣikas speak [cf Kośa, II, p. 179-195] has already been refuted (*nirākṛta*); therefore we will not refute them anew. However, for the Sautrāntikas, the support (*āśraya*) of the propensity (*vāsanā*) is stained by the fault of nonexistence (*abhāvadoṣaprasaṅgāt*) and is thus inadmissible (*ayukta*).” (U) - u translates this last phrase as follows: *de la yan* (for the Sautrāntikas still) *bag chags kyi gnas med paḥi skyon chags pa ñid do*.*

33. If the store-consciousness does not exist, why is action-affliction (*karmasaṃkleśa*) impossible (*ayukta*)? Because then, in the twelve-membered causal chain,

i) the consciousness conditioned by the mental factors (*saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*) is impossible.

ii) Because, lacking a store-consciousness, existence conditioned by grasping (*upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ*) is impossible. [135c25]

33. Comm. Bh 331b19-29, bh 159a1-6, U 392a12-27, u 257a2-257b2.

i) “*The consciousness conditioned by the mental factors is impossible: if, by saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam, the active consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna) are understood, action-affliction is impossible. Indeed, it is impossible to consider a visual consciousness, etc., conditioned by the mental factors and existing with lust, etc., (rāgādi) as a vijñāna-factor (vijñānāṅga). According to the Buddha's words (āryavacana), this vijñāna is the condition for name-and-form (vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam). But the visual consciousness, etc., perishing instantaneously (kṣaṇaniruddha) and destroyed a long time ago, cannot be the condition for name-and-form.*

If, in order to avoid this fault, a consciousness of rebirth (*pratisaṃdhivijñāna*) is seen in the vijñāna-factor, one is still mistaken. Indeed, (a) at the moment of rebirth (*pratisaṃdhikāle*), the mental factors, meritorious (*punya*), unmeritorious (*apunya*) and invariable (*āniñjya*), have long ago been destroyed, and the consciousness of rebirth cannot arise from mental factors long since destroyed; (b) the rebirth consciousness (*pratisaṃdhicitta*) is not morally indeterminate (*avyākṛita*), as it is equipped with attraction (*anunaya*) and repulsion (*pratigha*) [for sex; cf. Kośa III, p. 50]. Since it is indeterminate, it does not have the mental factors as condition.

If the vijñāna-factor is understood to be the store-consciousness conditioned by the active consciousnesses associated with the mental factors and capable of containing the seeds, the reasoning is correct.” (U)

ii) “Lacking a store-consciousness, existence conditioned by grasping is impossible: there would be no *upādānapratyaya bhavaḥ*. Why? Given the consciousness perfumed (*bhāvita*) by the aforesaid mental factors, it is by the power of grasping (*upādānabala*) that the propensities (*vāsanā*) develop (*vṛdh-*) and give existence.” (Bh)

34. If the store-consciousness does not exist, why is affliction-birth (*janmasaṃkleśha*) impossible? - Because then the connection of rebirth (*pratisaṃdhibandha*) is impossible.

After death (*cyuti*) in a non-absorbed level (*asamāhitā bhūmiḥ*), an afflicted mental consciousness (*kliṣṭamanovijñāna*) which is the rebirth connection (*pratisaṃdhibandha*) is produced dependent on the manas of the intermediary existence (*antarābhava*). This afflicted mental consciousness perishes in the intermediary existence, and a *vijñāna* becomes coagulated as embryo (*kalalatvena saṃmūrcchati*) in the mother's womb.

i) If it was the mental consciousness of the intermediary existence that became coagulated, there would be, in the mother's womb, a second mental consciousness depending on the coagulated mental consciousness. Thus, two mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the mother's womb.

ii) Furthermore, the coagulated *vijñāna* (*saṃmūrcchita vijñāna*) cannot be a mental consciousness because [the mental consciousness always has a defiled support (*kliṣṭāśraya*) since, if it were the coagulated *vijñāna*, it would never be interrupted (*samucchinna*) and would have an imperceptible (*asaṃvidita*) object (*ālambana*).

iii) Supposing that the coagulated *vijñāna* is a mental consciousness, then either it is the coagulated mental consciousness that is equipped with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*), or it is another mental consciousness - arisen in dependence on this coagulated *vijñāna* - that is equipped with all the seeds. If it is the coagulated mental consciousness that is equipped with all the seeds, then what we call 'mental consciousness' is, in reality, synonymous with 'store-consciousness'. If, on the other hand, it is the mental consciousness

dependent on the coagulated vijñāna that is equipped with all the seeds, then the 'support causal' consciousness (*āśrayabhāvena hetubhūtam*) would not be equipped with all the seeds, whereas the 'supported (*āśrita*) fruitional (*phala*)' consciousness would be equipped with all the seeds, which is completely impossible.

Consequently, it is proved (*siddha*) that the coagulated vijñāna is not a mental consciousness but a retributive consciousness equipped with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna*). [136a12]

34. Comm. Bh 331c26-332a14, bh 159a6-159b7, U 292b22-393a10, u 257b2-259a2.

The second paragraph is obscure and, by correcting the Tibetan version according to H, I [Lamotte] think it can be restored thus: *Asamāhitāyām bhumau cyutvā jātikāle, antarābhavamanoniśritaṃ kliṣṭaṃ manovijñānaṃ pratisaṃdhibandha utpadyate. Etat kliṣṭaṃ manovijñānaṃ antarābhava nirudhyate, vijñānaṃ ca mātuḥ kuṣṣau kalalatvena saṃmūrcchati.*

“Non-absorbed level: the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). *Cyuti*, i.e., death (*maraṇa*), appears, dependent on the *manas* of the intermediate existence: dependent on the active mind (*citta*) in the intermediate existence between death (*maraṇabhava*) and birth (*upapattibhava*), an afflicted mental consciousness. It is afflicted: because, equipped with attraction (*anunaya*) and aversion (*pratigha*) for sex, it is disturbed (*viparyasta*); it is a mental consciousness because, at this moment, the other consciousnesses have long since been destroyed. Because it connects existence (*janmapratisaṃdhānāt*), it is called 'pratisaṃdhi, rebirth'; because it captures existence (*janmaparigrahaṇāt*), it is called 'bond'. This afflicted mental consciousness, because it has birth as object (*upapattibhava*), perishes in the intermediary existence: if it did not perish, there would be no birth (*upapattibhava*). And a vijñāna becomes coagulated as embryo in the mother's womb: at the moment when this mental consciousness perishes in the intermediary existence, in the mother's womb there is a retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) that unites with the semen and the blood (*śukraśoṇita*) in a shared sense of safety and risk (*ekayogakṣemeṇa*), which gives an embryo (*kalala*). As the Buddha said (Dīgha, II, p. 63): 'Ānanda, if the vijñāna did not descend into the mother's womb, the embryo would not form into an

embryo' (*sa ced Ānanda vijñānaṃ mātuḥ kuṣiṃ nāvakrameta, na tat kalalaṃ kalalatvāya saṃvarteta*). [For the vijñānasamūrcchana, see comments by P. Demiéville, in Notes, § 34).

i) *If it was the mental consciousness of the intermediary existence and not the store-consciousness, that coagulates, that is born, there would be, dependent on the coagulated mental consciousness: dependent on the retributive consciousness (vipākavijñāna), a second mental consciousness: another active consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna).* That is to say, in subsequent states (*uttarottarāvasthā*) there would be a mental consciousness associated (*saṃprayukta*) with faith (*śraddhādi*) and with lust (*rāgādi*) and equipped with pleasant, unpleasant and conceptual feeling (*sukhaduḥkhavedanā*) and conceptual (*savikalpaka*). *Thus, two mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the mother's womb, namely: (a) a mental consciousness retributive (vipākātma) in essence, the primary substance of the being (sattvamūladravya), existing independently of the effort of the moment (tatkālaprayogānapekṣa) and morally indeterminate (avyākṛta); and (b) a mental consciousness having an object (ālambana) and an aspect (ākāra) quite distinct (paricchinna), associated with pleasant, unpleasant, etc., feelings. These two mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the same body. But that is impossible, being contradictory to the sūtra (sūtavirodhāt). A verse says: 'It is impossible in the present, in the future, that two vijñānas of the same kind arise together in the same body without the one preceding and the other following' (asthānam anavakāśo yad apūrvācarama dve vijñāne samabhāge samakāya utpaddeyātām).* And it cannot be maintained that these two are only one, because their nature is different. Furthermore, the retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) cannot be interrupted; for, in this hypothesis, the rebirth (*pratisaṃdhi*) having taken place, there would be a new taking of rebirth in another place. Finally, the nature of the retributive consciousness is just a perpetual series, and it does not have a new destiny (*gati*).” (U)

ii) *“Furthermore, the coagulated vijñāna cannot be a mental consciousness. Why? Because the mental consciousness always has a defiled support; because, if it were the coagulated mental consciousness, it would never be interrupted. The mental consciousness has the manas defiled by the afflictions (kleśa), lust (rāga), etc., as support (āśraya) (cf. § 6), for it has birth (utpattibhava) as object. Since it has something that is afflicted as support, we say that it has an afflicted support (kliṣṭa āśrayo yasya sa*

kliṣṭāśrayaḥ). But here the retributive (or coagulated) vijñāna does not have an afflicted support because this vijñāna is indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). Furthermore, the coagulated vijñāna is never interrupted because it undergoes the mechanism of activity (*karmapravṛtti*). *Because then, if the mental consciousness were the coagulated vijñāna, it would have an imperceptible object.* The object of the mental consciousness is perceptible (*parihchinna*), i.e., the dharmas. But the coagulated vijñāna does not have a perceptible object of this kind. That is why the coagulated vijñāna cannot be a mental consciousness.” (Bh) - In other words, the coagulated vijñāna is morally indeterminate; it is never interrupted; it has an imperceptible object. On the other hand, every mental consciousness is afflicted, even if it is good; it is often interrupted and it has an easily distinguishable object. Thus, the coagulated vijñāna cannot be a mental consciousness. The clearest translation of this passage is from Paramārtha: “Furthermore, the coagulated vijñāna cannot be a mental consciousness because it depends on the afflicted, because it takes its object for a long time, and because its object is imperceptible.”

iii) Compare the Tibetan version with that of H, which is more explicit.

35. In those who are reborn, the grasping (*grāha*; Chinese, *upādāna*) of the material organs (*rūpīndriya*) is impossible without a retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*), for the consciousnesses other than this last one have their specific support (*āśraya* = organ) and are not stable (*dhruva*). On the other hand, there is no material organ without a consciousness. [136a15]

35. Comm. Bh 332a18-25, bh 159b7-160a2, U 393a13-27, u 259a2-259b2.

*“In those who are reborn: who have taken up existence (*ātmabhāva*); without a retributive consciousness: without a store-consciousness; the appropriation or the grasping (*parigrahana*) of the material organs, of organs other than the manas, would not take place. Indeed, the other consciousnesses, the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), are unable to appropriate the material organs. Why? Because these consciousnesses have their particular support: this shows that, lacking a store-consciousness, the six organs, eye, etc., would not have a single dharma to appropriate all at once. Indeed, the visual consciousness depends only on the eye; the auditory*

consciousness depends only on the ear, and so on. Each of them can appropriate only its own organ; it cannot appropriate a foreign organ. Thus a store-consciousness is necessary to appropriate all the organs at once.” (U) – “*Moreover, these consciousnesses are not stable: they are extremely mobile (cala) and disappear momentarily. Then, lacking a store-consciousness, the eye and the other organs, deprived of an appropriator, would perish.*” (Bh)

“Some say (cf. Kośa, II, p. 215): ‘The organ of touch (*kāyendriya*) appropriates the organs because it naturally accompanies (*vyāp-*) them.’ This is wrong because the organ of touch also is appropriated. If it is assumed that the organ of touch is the appropriator, there would be nothing else to appropriate it, which is inadmissible. Besides, the Bhagavat would have said: ‘When one abandons the organ of touch, there is death’, and would not have said what he did say (Majjhima, I, p. 296): ‘When life, heat and consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned like a piece of wood, without feeling’ (*āyur uṣmātha vijñānaṃ yadā kāyaṃ jahaty amī, apaviddhaḥ tadā śete yathā kāṣṭham acetanaḥ*). That is why the organ of touch cannot be the appropriator.” (U)

36. Consciousness and name-and-form, which function supported by each other (*anyonyaniśrayayogena*) like two sheaves of reeds (*naḍa kalāpa*), cannot be explained without a store-consciousness. [136a17]

36. Comm. Bh 332a28-332b4; bh 160a2-7; U 393a29-393b9; u 259b2-7.

“The Bhagavat said: ‘Name-and-form has vijñāna as condition (*vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarupam*)’. By ‘name’ here is meant the four non-material aggregates (*arūpaskandha*, i.e., vijñāna and the three mental factors, namely, vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā); by ‘form’ here is meant the embryo (*kalala*). ... The vijñāna, which is condition for name-and-form, can be nothing other than the store-consciousness. Why? If by ‘name’, the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) was already understood, then what is meant by ‘vijñāna’ if not the store-consciousness? Moreover, when the sūtra says: ‘Similarly, the vijñāna returns’, vijñāna here is the store-consciousness: the support of existence (*ātmabhāvāśraya*), it functions uninterruptedly. That is why it is said that it is condition for name-and-form. Finally, the Bhagavat said (Dīgha, II, p. 63): ‘Ānanda, if the vijñāna

were to be cut in a boy or a girl, would name-and-form grow, would it develop?' - 'No, Lord.' (*viññānaṃ ced Ānanda daharasya kumārasya kumārikāyā vā ucchidyeta vinaśyena bhaved api tu tan nāmarūpaṃ vṛddhiṃ virūddhiṃ vipulatām āpadyeta. no bhadanta*). Similar texts would not be explained if there were not a store-consciousness.” (U)

37. With the exception of the retributive consciousness (*vipāka*viññāna), no other consciousness can be the nutriment-consciousness (*viññānāhāra*) of which the Bhagavat speaks for beings (*sattva*) already born. Indeed, we do not see any one of the six active consciousnesses forming a nutriment for beings born in the three worlds (*trāidhātuka*). [136a20]

37. Comm. Bh 332b8-20, bh 160a7-160b4, U 393b12-17, u 259b8-260a2.

See the corrections supplied as a note to the Tibetan text.

“According to the Bhagavat, there are four nutriments: the nutriment which consists of (i) food-by-the-mouthfuls, (ii) contact, (iii) mental activity and (iv) consciousness. (i) The nutriment of food-by-the-mouthfuls (*kavaḍḍhīkārahāra*) is digestion (*pariñāma*) because digestion comforts (*upakaroti*) the body (*āśraya*); (ii) nutriment of contact (*sparśāhāra*) is the grasping of the object (*viśayagrahaṇa*) because merely seeing (*darśana*) the object, the color, etc., is a source of strength for the body; (iii) nutriment of mental activity (*maññaṣaṃcetanāhāra*) is aspiration (*āśaṃsā*, *abhilāṣa*) because aspiration comforts the body: thus, when one sees water in the distance, even though one may be thirsty, one does not die; (iv) nutriment of consciousness (*viññānāhāra*) is appropriation (*upādāna*) because by this appropriation the body subsists for a long time. Otherwise, like a corpse (*mṛtaśarīra*), the body would soon decompose (*acirāt*). Thus it must be accepted that consciousness is a nutriment since it comforts the body.

In this list, nutriment of contact refers to the six active consciousnesses; nutriment of mental activity refers to the greedy manas. Then what special consciousness except the store-consciousness could be called nutriment? Moreover, in the states deprived of mind (*acittaka*) - sleep (*nidrā*), swoon, blackout (*mūrcchā*), the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) - the six groups of consciousnesses are destroyed. What then is this

other consciousness, except the store-consciousness, that appropriates the body so that it does not decompose? Abandoned by the store-consciousness, the body would perish.” (Bh) – “The mind and the mental factors (*cittacaitta*) present at the entry into absorption do not merit the name of nutriment, for the sūtra does not speak of them, for, being destroyed, they no longer exist. Neither is the destruction (*nirodha*) of this mind and mental factors nutriment because the number of nutriments has been fixed as four.” (U)

38. When, after having died here (*ihatra cyutvā*), one is reborn in an absorbed level (*samāhitā bhūmiḥ*), a non-absorbed (*asamāhita*) and afflicted (*klišṭa*) mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) forms the bond of rebirth (*pratisaṃdhibandha*). But in regard to the non-absorbed and afflicted mind (*citta*) of the higher levels, nothing other than the retributive consciousness can constitute a seed (*bīja*).
[136a23]

38. Comm. Bh 332b25-332c5, bh 160b5-161a3, U 393b21-393c2, u 260a2-7.

“The author has already shown (§ 34) how, lacking a store-consciousness, the bond of rebirth in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) is impossible. It is equally impossible in the form and the formless realm (*rūpārūpyadhātu*): this is what the author is going to show.

When, after having died here, one is reborn in an absorbed level: when, having died in the realm of desire, one is reborn in one of the two higher realms, *a non-absorbed and afflicted mental consciousness*, for it is associated (*samprayukta*) with the passions of the higher realms: delight in concentration (*samādhirasāvādāna*), etc., *form the bond of rebirth*.

In regard to the non-absorbed and afflicted mind of the higher realms, nothing other than the store-consciousness can constitute a seed:

(i) The mind at death (*marañacitta*) belonging to the realm of desire (*kamāvacara*) is not a seed because the birth and destruction (*utpādanirodha*) of two minds are not simultaneous.

(ii) The mind at conception (*upapatticitta*) in the absorbed realm is not its seed because it is impossible that one and the same mind can be seed (*bīja*) and the possessor of seed (*bījīn*) at the same time.

(iii) The mind belonging to the material world, etc. (*rūpāvacarādicitta*) which in the past had been realized (*prāpta*) in the course of earlier existences (*jātaka*) is not a seed because there was no other consciousness to undergo the perfuming (*bhāvanā*).

(iv) The material series (*rūpasamṭāna*) is not a seed because it does not constitute a causal condition (*hetupratyaya*).

A store-consciousness, therefore, must necessarily be accepted in which resides the eternal propensity (*anādikālikā vāsanā*) of the mind returning from of the higher realms (*tadbhūmisamgrhīta*).” (U)

39. Among beings born in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), when there is an afflicted-wholesome mind (*kliṣṭakuśalacitta*), without a retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna*), it too would be born without seed (*bīja*) and without base (*ādhāra*). [136a25]

39. Comm. Bh 332c9-14, bh 161a3-6, U 393c5-9, 260a7-260b1.

“In beings born in the formless realm, having gone beyond form (*rūpavimukta*), the afflicted-wholesome mind: of enjoyment (*rasāvādāna*) and of concentration (*samādhi*) would be born without seed: would arise without cause (*hetu*); and without base (*āśraya*) [according to U, without *vipāka*]. Another meaning: if this twofold mind were without seed, from what would it arise? If it were without base, upon what would it depend in order to function? This mind has come from its own seed contained (*parigrhīta*) in the store-consciousness” (Bh)

40. In this same realm, when the supramundane mind (*lokottaracitta*) appears (*sākṣātkārakāle*), the other minds, the mundane minds (*laukikacitta*), disappear. Thus the destiny in this realm (*tadgati*) would be annihilated (*nivṛta*). [136a27]

40. Comm. Bh 332c17-20, bh 161a6-8, U 393c11-16, u 260b1-4

“In this same realm: in the formless realm, when the supramundane mind, the pure mind (anāsravacitta) appears, is born; the other minds, the mundane minds, i.e., the impure minds (sāsravacitta), disappear, are completely destroyed (nirudhyante). Thus the birth in this realm would be annihilated, because the retribution (vipāka) contained (samgrhīta) in this destiny in the formless realm would not take place, and the nirvāṇa without residue (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) would be acquired (adhigata) without preparatory effort (aprayogāt) by itself (svataḥ). Indeed, when the antidote (pratipakṣa) is present, all the opponents (vipakṣa) disappear.” (U) - But in reality, the destiny in the formless realm is not annihilated; “since this annihilation has not occurred, one cannot deny the existence of the store-consciousness.” (Bh)

41. Some beings born in the sphere of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification (naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana) produce a supramundane mind (lokottaracitta) of the sphere of nothingness (ākīṃcanyāyatana). But then, lacking a store-consciousness, the two destinies (gati) that these two spheres constitute would be annihilated (nivṛta). Indeed, this supramundane consciousness cannot have as support (āśraya) either destiny in the naivasamjñānāyatana or destiny in the akīṃcanyāyatana or destiny in nirvāṇa. [136b2]

41. Comm. Bh 332c25-333a5, bh 161a8-161b4, U 393c21-29, u 260b4-261a1.

“Some beings born in naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana: some beings born in the summit of existence (bhavāgra) wish to destroy (prahā-) the afflictions of their sphere (tadbhūmi). But, as their awareness (samjñā) is very weak (atimanda), their sphere does not include the path of destruction of the afflictions. Since the akīṃcanyāyatana is a sphere of lucid (paṭu) awareness they produce a pure mind (anāsravacitta) belonging to this sphere. But then the two destinies would be annihilated: the two destinies, in bhavāgra and ākīṃcanyāyatana, would be annihilated, and the beings residing there would die since the destinies which support them would no longer exist.. Indeed, the pure dharma

(*anāsravadharma*) - i.e., the supramundane mind - is not within the scope (*saṃgrhita*) of these destinies because it has no connection with them and counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) these destinies. *Finally, there is no nirvāṇa as destiny support:* because the pure dharma resides in the nirvāṇa-without-residue Element (*sopadhīśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*): because nirvāṇa, being the destruction of all destinies, is called 'a destiny which is not a destiny' (*agatikā gatiḥ*)” (U) - “The supramundane mind cannot have either the first sphere or the second sphere as destiny-support because these two spheres are mundane. Furthermore, produced as the mind of ākiṃcanyāyatana by beings belonging to another sphere [the sphere of naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana], it cannot have two destiny-supports simultaneously. Finally, this supramundane mind cannot have nirvāṇa as destiny-support because it has another support, namely, sopadhīśeṣanirvāṇadhātu. None of these three things can be its destiny-support. If one does not believe in the existence of the store-consciousness, what then is the destiny-support of this supramundane mind?” (Bh)

42. At the moment of death (*chuti*), beings who have accomplished good actions (*sukṛtakārin*) and beings who have committed bad actions (*duṣkṛtakārin*) experience a gradual cold feeling (*uṣmanirgama*) in the lower or the upper part respectively of the body which, without a store-consciousness, would be impossible. Consequently, the birth affliction (*janmasamkleśa*) also, lacking a retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna*) would be impossible. [136b5]

42. Comm. Bh 333a10-14, bh 161b4-7, U 394a4-8, u 261a1-3.

“At the moment of death (*cyuti* = *maraṇa*), those who have carried out good actions experience a gradual cooling in the lower part of their body; those who have committed bad actions experience it in the opposite part” (U), “because those who have carried out good actions must rise, whereas those who have committed bad actions must descend. Without a store-consciousness capable of appropriating the body, how could the body (*āśraya*) gradually become cold? But, as long as life lasts, the store-consciousness appropriates the body. That is why, when it abandons it, the body becomes cold in the lower part or the upper part, according to the case (*yathākramamam*).” (Bh)

43. Why is the mundane purification (*laukika vyavadāna*) impossible in the absence of a store-consciousness?

i) Those who have not rejected (*tyai-*) the lust of the desire realm (*kāmāvacarāga*) and who have not yet acquired the mind of the form realm (*rūpāvacaracitta*) endeavor (*prayuñjate*) to liberate themselves from the lust of the desire realm by a good mind (*kuśalacitta*) of the desire realm. But this mind of effort (*prayogikacitta*) belonging to the desire realm is not born, does not perish with the mind of the desire realm; thus it is not perfumed (*bhāvita*) by the latter and cannot be the seed (*bīja*).

ii) The preceding mind of the form realm is a past (*atīta*) mind; in the course of numerous earlier existences (*jataka*), it has been separated by other minds: it no longer exists. As a result, it cannot be the seed of the absorbed mind (*samāhitacitta*), i.e., of the mind of the form realm that occupies us.

(iii) Consequently, the retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna*) which proceeds in a continuous series is the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of the absorbed mind in the form realm, whereas the good mind of effort is its dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*). This is what has been proved (*siddha*).

The same reasoning may be applied *mutatis mutandis* (*yathāyogam*) to all realms exempt from lust. [136b15]

43. Comm. Bh 333a25-333b6, bh 161b7-162a4, U 394a18-394b2, u 261a3-261b2.

“The author has just shown that by confining oneself to the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttijñāna*) alone, the threefold defilement is impossible. He will now show that mundane purification is impossible as well. To this effect, he says: *Those who have not given up the lust of the desire realm*, etc.

i) The mind of effort and the good mind, the one belonging to the desire realm and the other to the form realm, do not arise and do not perish together. Therefore they cannot be respectively perfumed (*vāsya*, *bhāvya*) and perfumer (*vāsaka*, *bhāvaka*). Moreover, the

mind of the desire realm, not being indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), is not perfumable. As its level of attachment is separate, it is not causal condition for the good mind.

ii) The good mind of the form realm, already obtained (*prāpta*) in the course of other existences in eternal saṃsāra, is not the seed of the present good mind of the form realm because it is past (*atīta*) and, for many existences, has been replaced (*antarāyita*) by many minds belonging to the desire realm. For the Sautrāntika masters, the past does not exist. Since it does not actually exist, this past good mind cannot be the seed of the actual good mind of the form realm” (U)

iii) “The store-consciousness contains the seed of this mind and the actual mind of the form realm is born from its own seed contained in the store-consciousness. But the good mind of effort (*prāyogikakuśalacitta*) is not without efficacy (*sāmarthyā*): it is only a dominant condition and not a causal condition. It is from the power of its dominance that the mind of the form realm is born” (Bh)

44. Similarly, lacking a retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipāka vijñāna*), the supramundane purification (*lokottaravyavadāna*), is impossible (*ayukta*). Why would the supramundane purification be impossible?

The Bhagavat said (Aṅguttara, I, p. 87): "The words of others (*parataśca ghoṣaḥ*) and correct inner reflection (*adhyātmaṃ ca yoniśomanasikāraḥ*) are the causes of correct seeing (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*)". Words of others and correct reflection perfume either the auditory consciousness (*śrotavijñāna*) or the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) or both together. However, at the time of correct mental reflection on the texts (*dharma*), the auditory consciousness does not arise and similarly, the mental consciousness is replaced (*antarāyita*) by other consciousnesses, distracted consciousnesses (*vikṣipta vijñāna*). At the moment when the supramundane mind associated with correct reflection (*yoniśomanasikārasamprayuktaka citta*), i.e., correct seeing (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), arises, the mental consciousness perfumed (*bhāvita*) by the propensity of hearing (*śrutavāsana*) together with the propensity of hearing, is destroyed (*niruddha*), past (*atīta*), finished long ago. Not existing any longer, how could it be the seed

(bīja) able to give birth subsequently to the supramundane mind associated with correct reflection?

The mundane mind (*laukika citta*) associated with correct reflection does not arise, does not perish with the supramundane mind (*lokottara citta*) associated with correct seeing; thus it is not perfumed by the latter; not being perfumed by it, it cannot be the seed. Consequently, the supramundane purification also would be impossible in the absence of a retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds. Indeed, the impregnation of hearing, which occurs in the mundane mental consciousness, cannot contain (*parigrah-*) the seed of the supramundane mind. [136b28]

44. Comm. Bh 333b21-333c5, bh 162a4-162b3, U 394b15-18, u 261b2-4.

“This text is very easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.” (U)

45. How can the retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipāka vijñāna*), the cause of affliction (*saṃkleśahetu*), be the seed (*bīja*) of the supramundane mind (*lokottara citta*) that counteracts this affliction (*tatpratipakṣa*)? The supramundane mind is foreign (*anucita*); thus its propensity (*vāśana*) does not yet exist. Not having a propensity, from what seed (*bīja*) could it be said to arise?

Answer: It comes from the seed that is the propensity of hearing (*śrutavāśana*), issuing from (*niṣyananda*) the very pure (*ativiśuddha*) dharmadhātu. [136c4]

45. Comm. Bh 333c11-23, bh 162b3-163a2, U 394b23-394c6, u261b4-8.

“The retributive consciousness, the cause of that which is counteracted (*vipakṣa*), i.e., the affliction, cannot be the cause of the antidote (*pratipakṣa*), i.e., purity.” (Bh) – “Poison has never been known to produce ambrosia (*amṛta*). How could the store-consciousness, which is like the poison, produce this supramundane ambrosia which is the pure mind?”

The supramundane mind is foreign ...: the pure mind has not yet been realized (prāpta); how could it arise without an appropriated cause?" (U)

*"It comes from ... This phrase shows that the pure mind has a separate seed. It is certainly not born from the store-consciousness as its seed. What then is its particular seed? It is the propensity of hearing, issuing from the very pure dharmadhātu". (U) - " To show that the dharmadhātu is unknown to the śrāvakas, etc., it is qualified as *very pure*: indeed, this dharmadhātu, attested to by the Buddha Bhagavats, cuts through the attachment obstacle (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). The teachings (*deśanādharmā*), i.e., the sūtras, etc., which result from this very pure dharmadhātu, are called the *result of the very pure dharmadhātu*. Since we 'understand' these sūtras without error (*aviparyāsa*), we speak of *hearing*. The propensity coming from this hearing is called *propensity of hearing*; or again the hearing itself constitutes propensity; hence the expression *propensity-hearing*. [In Sanskrit: *śrutasya vāsaneti śrutavāsana*, or also *śrutam eva vāsaneti śrutavāsana*. This propensity-series (*vāsanāsaṃtāna*) residing as an foreign principle in the store-consciousness is the cause capable of producing the supramundane mind. That is why it is said that this mind *comes from this seed which is the hearing propensity resulting from the very pure dharmadhātu*". (Bh) - For dharmadhātu, see chap. V, § 1.*

46. Is the hearing propensity (*śrutavāsana*) the same as the store-consciousness or is it not the same as the store-consciousness? If it is identical with the store-consciousness, how is it the seed (*bīja*) producing the antidote (*pratipakṣa*) to this consciousness? If it is not identical with the store-consciousness, where could a support (*āśhraya*) to this hearing- propensity seed (*śrutavāsanābīja*) be found?

Answer: Until the enlightenment of the buddhas is attained (*adhigama*), this hearing propensity, according to whether it resides in any place of functioning whatsoever that serves it as support (*āśhrayapravṛttisthāna*), resides temporarily (ki tsai) in the retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*), becomes united with it, functions with it, like water (*ambu*) and milk (*kṣīra*). However, it is not the store-consciousness because it is its seed. [136c11]

46. Comm. Bh 334a2-13, bh 163a2-6, U 394c13-26, u 261b8-262a6.

Lamotte has translated this entire paragraph according to H.

“If the hearing propensity is identical with the store-consciousness, how could it be the seed of the antidote to the store-consciousness? If it is not identical with the store-consciousness, it must have a support distinct from the store-consciousness.” (Bh)

“Until the enlightenment of the Buddha is attained: until one acquires the supreme enlightenment (anuttarā bodhiḥ) acquired by the Buddhas” (Bh), - “until one acquires the destiny (gati) that serves as support (āśraya) for stainless emancipated wisdom (vimalam asaktaṃ ca jñānam)” (U), this hearing propensity: “the propensity coming from the teachings (deśanādharmā), i.e., the sūtras unmistakably (aviparyāsa) 'heard', according as it resides in any place of functioning whatsoever that serves it as support: depending on whether it has any series (saṃtāna) whatsoever as place of functioning, resides temporarily in the retributive consciousness, is joined to it, functions with it, like water and milk: although the hearing impregnation is not the store-consciousness, it resides in this consciousness and functions with it. Nevertheless, it is not the store-consciousness: the hearing propensity is the seed of the supramundane mind (lokottara citta), is not identical with the store-consciousness, is not the seed of this consciousness For it is the seed of the counteragent of the latter: it is the cause (hetu) of the nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna) that counteracts the store-consciousness. It is like an attic into which all sorts of things are all jumbled up, like a doctor's medicine (ṛiṣibhaiṣajya) mixed up with all kinds of poisons (viṣa), like a drug (agada) for all the illnesses. Although it functions for a long time with the bad poison, the good medicine is not identical with the poison, is not the seed of the poison. It is the same here for the hearing propensity.” (U)

47. From the small propensity (mṛduvāsana) is derived the medium propensity (madhyavāsana), from the medium propensity is derived the great propensity (adhimatravāsana); indeed, hearing (śruta), contemplating (cinta) and meditating (bhāvana) comprise a progression (bahulīkaraṇa). [136c13]

47. Comm. Bh 334a17, bh 163a6-163b1, U 394c29-395a1, u 262a6-7.

Here, by the propensity of the small, medium and great categories respectively, the wisdom (*prajñā*) born from hearing (*śrutamayī*), contemplating (*cintāmayī*) and meditating (*bhāvanāmayī*) should be understood. (Bh)

48. This hearing propensity-seed (*śrutavāsanabīja*), small, medium and great, is also the seed (*bīja*) of the dharmakāya.

Since it counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) the store-consciousness, it is not identical with the store-consciousness.

Issuing from (*niṣyanda*) the supramundane (*lokottara*) and very pure (*ativiśuddha*) dharmadhātu, even though it is worldly (*laukika*), it is the seed of the supramundane mind (*lokottara citta*).

Even before the supramundane mind arises, it counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) the explosion of the afflictions (*kleśaparyavasthāna*); it counteracts the hell destinies (*apāyagatī*); it is the antidote that suppresses (*paryādānapratipakṣa*) all bad actions (*duṣkṛta*).

It favors (*ānulomika*) meeting (*saṃyoga*) with the Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

Although worldly, it pertains (*saṃgrhīta*) to the dharmakāya of the beginning bodhisattvas (*ādhikārmika bodhisattva*); it also comes out of the vimuktikāya (body of deliverance) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Although it is not the store-consciousness, it comes from the dharmakāya and the vimuktikāya.

To the extent that the hearing propensity, small, medium or great, develops (*vardhate*) successively, to that extent the retributive consciousness (*vipākajñāna*) diminishes (*nyūnīkriyate*) and transforms its support (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). Having completely (*sarvathā*) transformed its support, the retributive consciousness, although supplied with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*), becomes deprived of seeds and completely cut off (*prahīṇa*). [136c35]

48. Comm. Bh 334b7-19, bh 163b1-6, U 395a14-195b12, u 262a7-263a4.

“Although mundane, because it is impure (*sāsrava*), it is the seed of the supramundane mind: for it constitutes the apparatus (*sambhāra*) of the pure (*anāsrava*) mind Arising in the world (*lokaṃ niśritya*), it is called mundane because it is mixed with the store-consciousness and functions with it.” (U)

“It counteracts the explosion of the passions: it is a cause capable of cutting through the excessive activity (*adhimātrapravṛtti*) of sensual desire (*rāga*), etc.” (Bh)

“It counteracts the hell destinies: “having cut through the explosion of the passions, it is able to counteract the bad destinies (*durgati*) of hell.” (Bh) – “Thus, a verse says 'Those who have correct worldly vision (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) but of the higher class, while passing through thousands of successive existences, do not fall into the bad destinies.’” (U)

It is the antidote that suppresses all bad actions. According to bh: *rnam grāns la myoñ bar ḥdyur baḥi las gañ gis nan soñdu skye bar ḥgyur ba de yañ / deñs par ḥgyur baḥi rgyu yin te / mdor bsdu na ḥdas pa dañ / ma ḥoñs pa dañ / da ltar byuñ baḥi ñes par spyad pa thams cad kyi gñen poḥo*: “It is the cause that suppresses these actions-to-be-experienced-later (*aparaparyāyavedanīyakarman*) as a result of which one is reborn in the bad destinies. In summary (*samāsataḥ*), it is the counteragent of all bad conduct (*duścarita*), past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*pratyutpanna*).

It favors the meeting with the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. According to bh: *ma ḥoñs pa na dge baḥi bśes gñen dañ bdag phrad pa thob paḥi rgyu ñid kyañ yin no*: “It is also the cause which will permit one later to become connected to spiritual friends (*kalyāṇamitra*).”

“It pertains to the *dharmakāya*: because it is its cause. Similarly, says the author, it is the concern of the *vimuktikāya*. There are differences between the *dharmakāya* and the *vimuktikāya*. The *vimuktikāya* is just the radical cutting off of the bond (*grantha*) that is the passion-obstacle (*kleśāvaraṇa*). It is like the citizen (*paurajana*) who breaks the painful straps of the cangue (the heavy wooden yoke worn on the neck by criminals): he escapes from the pain without, however, gaining any glory, any pre-eminence (*ādhipatyā*), sovereignty (*aiśvarya*), or fortune (*samṛddhi*). The *dharmakāya*, on the other hand, is free of both obstacle-bonds, the obstacle of the passions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), which disappear along with their traces (*vāsana*). The *dharmakāya* is ornamented (*alaṃkṛta*) with innumerable qualities (*aprameyaguṇa*),

wonderful and extraordinary (*āścarya-adbhuta*): the powers (*bala*), the fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), etc. It is the basis of all fortune (*saṃṛddhi*) and all sovereignty (*aiśvarya*). It has excellent masteries (*varavaśitā*) at its disposal. It does as it pleases (*yathākāmam*). It is like the prince (*rājaputra*) who is anointed (*abhiṣeka*), but who, guilty of a mistake, has been thrown into prison: once freed, he comes once more into possession of his prerogatives, sovereignty and fortune.

The retributive consciousness transforms its basis; it is like a sick person's body which is transformed by drinking the medicine of the doctor (*ṛṣibhaiṣajya*); he escapes from sickness and gets health. (U)

The last phrase of the paragraph should be understood properly; u comments on it in these words: *sa bon thams cad pa yañ sa bon med par hgyur Œes bya ba la sogs pa ni sa bon gyi rnam pa thams cad spañs pañi phyir te / kun nas ñon moñs pañi sa bon thams cad med pa ñid hdi ni spañs par rig par byaḥo*: “It is said that although it is furnished with all the seeds, it becomes deprived of seeds because these seeds are completely cut. And this absence of all seed of defilement (*saṃkleśabīja*) should be considered to be the cutting through (*prahāṇa*) of this consciousness. Indeed, the transformed store-consciousness amounts to the tathatā, to what it is in essence by the destruction of its seeds.”

49. As in the example of water (*ambu*) and milk (*kṣīra*), the hearing propensity, which is not the store-consciousness, and the store-consciousness itself exist together in the same place. But how is it that the store-consciousness becomes completely exhausted (*sarvakāreṇa*), whereas the hearing propensity, which is not the store-consciousness, develops completely?

It is like the milk drunk from water by a goose (*haṃsa*). In the same way, when the mundane attachment (*laukika rāga*) is eliminated, the propensity (*vāsana*) of the non-absorbed levels (*asamāhīta bhūmiḥ*) decreases little by little, whereas the propensity of the absorbed levels (*samāhīta bhūmiḥ*) develops little by little, and thus one arrives at the transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). [137a1]

49. Comm. Bh 334b25-334c1, bh missing, U 395b17-19; u 263a4-5.

There is a gap in the Tibetan text; Lamotte has translated this paragraph according to H.

“Let us return to the example given above (§ 46) of water and milk mixed: when geese drink this mixture, the milk disappears and the water remains.” (Bh) – “This text is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.” (U)

50. “In those who dwell in the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), the vijñāna does not leave the body (*kāya*)”: according to these words of the Buddha, we know that the retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) does not leave the body. The production (*utpāda*) of the *nirodhasamāpatti* does not counteract (*pratipakṣa*) this retributive consciousness but it does counteract all the other consciousnesses. [137a3]

50. Comm. Bh 334c4-7, bh 163b6-164a1, U 395b22-395c4, u 263a5-263b3.

u comments: *de ltar kun nas ñon moñs pa dan rnam par byañ ba ḥthad pas kun gñi rnam par śes pa bsgrubs nas ḥgog pa la sñoms par Ęugs pa rnams kyañ Ęes bya ba la sogs pas ḥgog paḥI sñoms par ḥjug pa mi srid par sgrub po // sañs rgyas dan / rañ sañs rgyas dan / dgra bcom pa dan / phyir mi ldog paḥi byañ chub sems dpah rnams ma gtogs pa ḥgog pa la sñoms par Ęugs pa gñan rnams śi ba las bye brag ston pa na bcom ldan ḥdas kyis deḥi rnam par śes pa lus dan bral ba ma yin no Ęes bkaḥ stsal te/ de ni gñi rnam par śes pa las gñan ma yin no // de ltar ci mñon Ęe na / ḥgog paḥi sñoms par ḥjug pa ni deḥi gñen po ma yin paḥi phyir ro // deḥi gñen por ḥgog paḥi sñoms par ḥjug pa skye ba ma yin te / dmigs pa dan rnam pa yoñs su ma chad paḥi phyir ro // rnam par rig paḥi mi gsal ba ni [ma] Ęi ba ñid du yoñs su mi gcod pas gñen po mi byed paḥi phyir ḥgog paḥi sñoms par ḥjug pa ni kun gñi rnam par śes paḥi gñen po ma yin no // gañ la gñen po med pa de ni ḥgog par mi ḥgyur ro // ḥjug paḥi rnam par śes pa gañ dmigs pa dan rnam pa yoñs su chad pas ma Ęi ba deḥi gñen por skye ste / de ḥgag pa ñid do: “The writer has proved the existence of the store-consciousness by showing that, without it, affliction (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) are impossible. By speaking now of 'those who dwell in *nirodhasamāpatti*', he proves that without it, *nirodhasamāpatti* could not take place.*

Except for the Buddhas, the pratyekbuddhas, the arhats and the avaiivartika bodhisattvas, those who dwell in nirodhasamāpatti are not dead (*marañaviśiṣṭa*): to show this, the Bhagavat said that, amongst them, the vijñāna does not leave the body. This vijñāna is none other than the store-consciousness. How does he know this (*katham gamyate*)? Because the nirodhasamāpatti does not counteract this consciousness: *the production of nirodhasamāpatti does not counteract this consciousness*, because the object (*ālambana*) and the aspect (*ākāra*) of the store-consciousness are not different (*aparicchinna*). Since a vague (*apatu*) and indistinct consciousness (*vijñāpti*) does not hinder the nirodhasamāpatti in its subsiding, the latter does not counteract the store-consciousness because it does not destroy that which it does not hinder.

But the nirodhasamāpatti, having a distinct object and aspect, is produced by counteracting the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), the non-calmed consciousnesses. The latter are then destroyed.”

51. In those who emerge from (*vyutthā-*) nirodhasamāpatti, the vijñāna is not produced anew. Indeed, when the retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) has been interrupted (*samucchinna*), it does not rearise (*abhinivṛt-*), except in being reborn (*pratisaṃdhi*). [137a5]

51. Comm. Bh 334c10-13, bh 164a1-3, U 395c6-9, u 263b3-4.

“Some believe that the consciousnesses which perish on entering absorption are produced anew when emerging from the absorption. For this reason, the Bhagavat said that the vijñāna does not leave the body.” (U) - “This is not true, because *on leaving the absorption, the vijñāna is not produced anew*. This vijñāna, which is fruit of retribution (*vipākaphala*), does not rearise once it is interrupted except to be reborn and take on a new existence.” (Bh)

52. Some think that the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) is provided with mind (*sacittaka*) because it contains a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).

But even from their point of view, such a mind (*citta*) is impossible [in nirodhasamāpatti]. Indeed,

i) Nirodhasamāpatti would be impossible.

ii) The object (*ālambana*) and the aspect (*ākāra*) of the absorption vijñāna are not perceived (*upalabdha*).

iii) Since the mental consciousness cannot be described here as an unwholesome (*akuśala*) or morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) consciousness, it would be associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*).

iv) In the nirodhasamāpatti, there would be a contact (*sparśa*) whence the presence (*samudaya*) of conceptualization (*saṃjñā*) and sensation (*vedita*).

v) Or rather, the nirodhasamāpatti would be reduced to a simple interruption of conceptualization (*saṃjñāsamuccheda-mātra*), which is erroneous because another mental stabilization (*samādhi*, namely, the *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*) has this power (*prabhāva*).

vi) Volition (*cetana*), faith (*śraddā*), and the other roots of good would be present. [137a11]

52. Comm. Bh 334c22-335b8, bh 164a3-165b3, U 395c16-396a10, u 263b4-264a6.

“The vijñāna which, in the course of absorption does not leave the body, is certainly not a mental consciousness.

i) *The nirodhasamāpatti would be impossible* because concept (*saṃjñā*) and sensation (*vedita*) would not be destroyed. Actually, if the mental consciousness were inseparable from these two general factors (*māhabhūmika*), these two factors, i.e., concept and sensation, would not be destroyed, and this absorption would not take place since the *saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti* is defined as the absorption where conceptualization and sensation are destroyed.

ii) The vijñāna of this absorption is definitely not a mental consciousness because *the object and the aspect of this vijñāna are not perceived*. Every mental consciousness

presupposes a perceptible object and aspect. But in the nirodhasamāpatti there is nothing like that. Therefore there is no mental consciousness in it.

iii) The vijñāna of this absorption is definitely not a mental consciousness because *this mental consciousness would be associated with the roots of good*. The mind of entry into this absorption (*samāpatti*) is definitely neither unwholesome nor morally indeterminate. Since concentration is wholesome, it, i.e., the mind of entry, is only wholesome (*kuśala*). But without the roots of good, non-attachment (*alobha*), etc., this wholesome mind would not exist. It is by association (*samprayogataḥ*) that it is good. But if these roots of good exist, how would the two mental factors, concept and sensation, not be present?

iv) Non-covetousness and other roots of good are inseparable from contact. That is why *there would be contact in the nirodhasamāpatti*. Now the contact coming from this absorption has well-being (*praśrabdhi*) as its nature: it is to-be-sensed pleasantly (*sukhavedaniya*) or to-be-sensed indifferently (*upekṣāvedaniya*), whence the presence of a sensation (*vedanā*) simultaneously (*sahaja*) with contact. But according to the definition given by the Buddha, if there is concept and sensation, there is no nirodhasamāpatti.

v) It is said: 'By suppressing (*vidūṣaṇa*) concept and sensation in the manner that an abscess (*visphoṭa*) or an arrow (*iṣu*) is removed, nirodhasamāpatti is produced. In this absorption it is only concept and sensation that are destroyed, but mind remains'. In order to refute this theory, the writer then says: *Another absorption (samādhi) has this power: this suppression of concept and sensation possible in samādhi is not characteristic of nirodha alone. Why? Thus, in the nonconceptual absorption (asamjñīsamāpatti), by virtue of a preparatory practice (pūrvopāya), there is this power of suppression characteristic of samādhi. The nirodhasamāpatti would be reduced to a simple destruction of concept if the suppression of conceptualization was characteristic of nirodha alone. The absorption of nonconcept, primarily and only, in suppressing conceptualization, would be merely the destruction of conceptualization (samjñānirodha) in the absorption of nonconcept and not a distinct absorption. Now you do not agree to this.*

vi) Finally, as the destruction of the supported thing (*aśrita*) does not occur without destruction of the support (*āśraya*), the mind present in this absorption should also be destroyed. If this mind contained in the nirodhasamāpatti were not destroyed, *volition*,

faith and the other roots of good would be present. On the other hand, if the latter had been destroyed, the mind too would definitely be destroyed. This is why *nirodhasamāpatti* is not simply the destruction of the factors supported (*āśrita*) by the mind because, when there is a support (*āśraya*), to suppress the things supported (*āśrita*) is not possible.” (U)

53. The absorption of cessation does not contain a mind (*citta*) without mental factors (*caitta*),

- i) because it is impossible to separate the things supported (*āśrita*, i.e., the mental factors) from their support (*āśraya*, i.e., the mind);**
- ii) because there are examples (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) where destruction of the things supported necessarily leads to destruction of the support;**
- iii) because the factors of the mind or mental factors are not like the non-omnipresent bodily factors (*asarvaga*). [137a12]**

53. Comm. Bh 335b8-335c2, bh 165b3-166a2, U 396a10-16, u 264a6-264b1.

“In order to avoid all the kinds of difficulties (*doṣa*) enumerated above and to avoid contradicting the āgamas, some scholars are content to exclude the mental factors (*caitta*). Thus rejecting these mental factors, they posit a mind without mental factors in this absorption of cessation. That also is impossible. Why?

i) *Because it is impossible to separate the things supported from their support:* the support (*āśraya*) is the mind (*citta*); the things supported (*āśrita*) are the mental factors (*caitta*). Support and things supported, i.e., mind and mental factors, have been inseparable from one another since beginningless saṃsāra because they mutually attract one another. This is why, if the absorption of cessation is equipped with a mind, it will necessarily bring along non-attraction and the other roots of good (*alobhādikuśalamūla*) inseparable from the mind.

Objection - But, you may say, the absorption and the means of absorption (*samāpattiyupāya*) are in opposition (*virodha*) to non-attachment and the other roots of

good. Therefore, in this absorption, the roots of good do not exist and the wholesome mind (*kuśalacitta*) alone exists.

Answer - Such a dissociation has never been seen elsewhere. If, at the time of its cause, the absorption is associated with these mental factors, it would remain associated with them at the time of the fruition of result (*niṣyandaphala*). Therefore the objection does not hold.

ii) Neither does it hold *because there are examples*. The Bhagavat has said (Majjhima, I, p. 296): 'In those who dwell in the absorption of cessation, the factors (*saṃskāra*) of the body (*kāya*), speech (*vāc*) and mind (*manas*) are destroyed (*niruddha*).' Here the factors of the body are the inbreath and the outbreath (*ānāpāna*); the factors of speech are examination (*vitarka*) and judgment (*vicāra*); the factors of mind are volition (*cetanā*), conceptualization (*saṃjñā*), etc. If examination and judgment were destroyed, speech could not arise. It is the same for the mind: if the factors are destroyed, it does not arise.

Objection - But, you may say, if the factors of the body perish when one enters into absorption, the body persists and does not perish. It is the same for the mind: the mental factors are destroyed but the mind persists and does not perish.

Answer - This objection does not hold. Why?

iii) *Because [the mental factors are not non-omnipresent like the body factors]*. The Bhagavat has said: 'When the body factors are suppressed, there is still another cause for the subsistence (*sthitihetu*) of the body: food (*āhāra*), drink (*pāna*), the vital organ (*jivitendriya*), consciousness (*viññāna*), etc. Thanks to these, although the inbreath and outbreath may have disappeared, the body persists.' But it is not the same for the mind. If the mental factors are suppressed, there is no further particular cause supporting the mind so that it can subsist. Thus, since the absorption of cessation would not have a mental consciousness, it would be necessary to call it absorption without mind (*acittakasamāpatti*).

But since the retributive consciousness (*vipākaviññāna*) remains in this absorption, the Bhagavat has stated that the viññāna does not leave the body, and it is from this viññāna supplied with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*) that, coming out of absorption (*samāpattivyutthāna*), the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttiviññāna*) arise. This is why the store-consciousness necessarily exists." (Bh)

54. Since it cannot be wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*) or morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), this mental consciousness is not in conformity (*na yujyate*) with the absorption of cessation. [137a14]

54. Comm. Bh 335c5-336a8, bh 166a2-167b5, U 396a18-196b19, u 264b1-265b1.

“The vijñāna which, according to the Buddha, does not leave the body during nirodhasamāpatti, cannot be a mental consciousness without ideation and sensation (§ 52), or a mind without mental factors (§ 53). Every mental consciousness must be either wholesome, unwholesome or morally indeterminate.” (U) - Now, in nirodhasamāpatti, the mental consciousness would have none of these qualities.

i) It could not be wholesome:

a) Neither by association (*saṃprayogogataḥ*) with the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*). “How could the roots of good be separated from contact (*sparśā*)? How could contact be separated from the universal (*sarvaga*) mental factors, sensation, etc.?” (U)

b) Nor by reason of its original cause (*samutthānataḥ*): a wholesome mind of effort (*prayogika kuśhalacitta*). “That contradicts the sūtra for which every mind is wholesome by virtue of an association with the roots of good. Moreover, who forces us to believe that, if the mind of effort, the condition for absorption, is wholesome by association with non-covetousness and the other roots of good, it is not the same for the mind of absorption which is the result that that resembles the cause (*niṣyandaphala*)?” (U)

c) Nor by its nature (*svabhāvataḥ*): “it would be included in the series of things wholesome by nature, roots of good, etc.” (U)

d) Nor absolutely (*paramārthataḥ*): “it would necessarily be liberated (*vimukta*).” (U)

ii) “It could not be unwholesome, because the nirodhasamāpatti is in essence wholesome.” (Bh)

iii) “Neither could it be morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), for it is not the *avyākṛta* relating to conduct (*īryāpatha*) or to the arts (*śilpasthāna*) or to magical creations (*nirmāṇa*). But, you may say, it is the *avyākṛta* arisen from retribution (*vipākaja*). In this case, it comes down to a store-consciousness. Beyond these four *avyākṛtas* there is no fifth *avyākṛta*.” (Bh)

“This is why the *vijñāna* residing in this absorption is the retributive consciousness and not the mental consciousness.” (Bh)

55. The theory according to which the continuous production (*anantaropāda*) of matter (*rūpa*) and of mind (*citta*) would be the seed (*bīja*) of the dharmas is inadmissible as we have seen above (§ 23).

It would be impossible to fall (*cyuti*) from the formless realm (*ārūpya*) or from the heaven of the non-identifying ones (*asaṃjñin*), and to emerge from the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).

The last mind (*antycitta*) of the arhat would not be explicable, unless the earlier mind, with respect to the later mind, would be an immediately preceding condition and (*samanantara-pratyaya*) and not a causal condition. [137a17]

55. Comm. Bh 336a13-21, bh 167a5-168a2, U 396b23-396c11, u 265b1-8.

“According to *one theory*, the authors of which are the Sautrāntikas, *the continuous production of matter and mind* (in the sense that forms and minds arise in series in order of anteriority and posteriority) *would be the seed of the dharmas*: would be the generative cause (*janakahetu*) of conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛta*). This theory says: the form (*rūpa*) of the later moment (*uttarakṣana*) arises immediately (*anantaram*) from the form of the preceding moment (*pūrvakṣana*); the mind (*citta*) of the later moment and the associated mental dharmas (*samprayukta*) arise immediately from the mind of the preceding moment. Thus cause (*hetu*) and result (*phala*) are explained correctly. Of what use (*kiṃ prayojanam*) would it be to imagine a store-consciousness, cause of the dharmas?

In order to refute this theory, the writer says: *it is inadmissible as we have seen above* when he said, in § 23, that two moments are never simultaneous. But this theory has yet other defects.

When one falls from the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) and is reborn into the form realm (*rūpadhātu*), it is impossible that the earlier form is the generating seed of the actual form, because the earlier form has long since been destroyed. - When the mind falls from the heaven of the non-identifying ones to be reborn into an identifying world, when the mind reappears to leave the absorption of cessation, etc., it is impossible that the earlier mind could be the generating seed of the later mind because the earlier mind has long since been destroyed.

If the earlier mind could contain the seed of the later mind without having a birth and cessation simultaneous with the later mind, if only the mind of the earlier moment could be the seed that produces (*āvahati*) the mind of the later immediately-following moment, *the last mind of the arhat could not be explained*: he would be unable to enter into the sphere of nirvāṇa-without-residue (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*). Indeed, this ultimate mind would be the seed which, as immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*), gives rise to another mind; the result would be that the sphere of nirvāṇa-without-residue would never occur.

Consequently, the forms and minds that arise following one another in order of anteriority and posteriority could only be immediately preceding conditions (*samanantarapratyaya*) or dominant conditions (*adhipratyaya*) with respect to one another; they are not causal conditions (*hetuprataya*).” (U) 55.

56. Consequently, lacking a retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) supplied with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*), defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) would be impossible (*ayukta*). Therefore the existence of a store-consciousness showing the characteristics that we have described (*yathoktalakṣaṇa*) is proven (*siddha*). [137a20]

56. Comm. Bh 336a25-26, bh 168a2, U 396c14-24, u 265b8-266a4.

“With the help (*yukti*) of innumerable arguments explained above (§29 to § 55), the author has proved that the store-consciousness exists necessarily.” (Bh)

57. Here are some stanzas:

i) If there was only one good mind (*bhadracitta*) among the bodhisattvas, i.e., a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) that is wholesome but impure (*kuśala-sāsrava*), apart from the first five active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) and distinct from the other mental consciousness - the unwholesome impure (*akuśala-sāsrava*) consciousness -, how would this mind transform its support (*kathaṃ parāvarteta*)?

ii) The counteragent (*pratipakṣa*) is the transformation (*parāvṛtti*), you would say? No, because the antidote to the affliction is not the cutting (*prahāṇa*) of the affliction. Besides, if the counteragent were the cutting, cause (*hetu*) and result (*phala*) would be indistinguishable.

iii) Perhaps you would admit that this mind loses its seeds (*bīja*), or loses its nature of seed (*bījasvabhāva*) and that that is its transformation. But since this mind no longer exists, these two losses are nonexistent and your claimed transformation is impossible. [137a27]

57. Comm. Bh 336b5, bh 168a2-168b6, U 387a3-19, u 266a4-266b4.

“These three stanzas explain how, by confining oneself to the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), the transformation of the support (*āśrayaparāvitti*) would not take place.

i) *If among the bodhisattvas there were only one good mind*: a wholesome (*kuśala*) mental consciousness associated with the counteragent of the afflictions (*pratipakṣasamprayukta*) and supramundane (*lokottara*), *separate from the five*: the first five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., and *distinct from the other*: from the unwholesome (*akuśala*) impure (*sāsrava*) and afflicted (*saṃkliṣṭa*) mental consciousness; the author, who has already spoken of a *good mind*, adds here that it is *distinct from the other* with the aim of distinguishing it from the wholesome but impure (*kuśalasāsrava*).

How would this mind transform its support?: if you believe in the existence of the store-consciousness, you could call 'transformation of the support' the phenomenon that causes all the seeds of affliction (*saṃkleśabīja*) that it contains to lose the quality of seed. But if you do not believe in it, what would this transformation consist of?

ii) You say that the arising of the counteragent is the transformation. But that is impossible. Why? *The counteragent is the transformation, you will say. No, because the counteragent is not the cutting:* it is the cutting of the afflictions that is called transformation of the support. But the counteragent is not this cutting, because it is merely the cause of the cutting (*prahāṇahetu*). If it were the cutting itself, *the cause and the result would not be different.* The result, i.e., nirvāṇa, is the cutting; the cause, i.e., the noble path (*āryamārga*), is the counteragent. If the counteragent were the cutting, the result and the cause would be one and the same thing and, on the arising of the counteragent, there would be nirvāṇa.” (Bh)

iii) *You would perhaps admit that this mind loses its seeds or loses its nature of seed and that that is the transformation:* “You would perhaps admit that the loss of the seeds or the loss of its nature of seed applied to the active consciousness constitutes the transformation of the support.” (Bh) – “The mind (*citta*) in which the numerous seeds of defilement (*saṃkleśabīja*) are accumulated (*ācita*) would be without seeds, and you would consider that to be the transformation of the support; or else its nature of seed (*bījasvabhāva*) would disappear, and you would consider that to be the transformation of the support.” (U)

But since this mind no longer exists, these two gates are nonexistent, and your claimed transformation is impossible: “If this mind still existed, one could say that it loses its seeds when it loses its nature of seed. But if it no longer exists, it cannot be said that it loses its seeds or its nature of seed. But at the moment when the supramundane mind (*lokottaracitta*) manifests, this mind of which you speak no longer exists. How could it be said that it loses its seeds when its nature is destroyed?” (U) – “The afflicted active consciousnesses (*saṃkliṣṭa pravṛtījñāna*) no longer exist in the state of absorption (*samāpattyavasthā*) with which we are concerned. Thus there are no longer any seeds that could be destroyed. The two losses that you call transformation of the support are impossible. But let us accept the existence of a store-consciousness: then, although the afflicted active consciousnesses no longer exist in the state of absorption, their seeds

reside in the store-consciousness which can be deprived of seeds or of its nature of seeds by transforming it. Since thus your claimed transformation of the support is not explicable in the hypothesis of the existence of only the active consciousnesses, it is necessary to believe in the existence of a store-consciousness.” (Bh)

58. What are the types (*prabheda*) of store-consciousness? – In short, the store-consciousness is threefold (*trividha*) or fourfold (*caturvidha*).

Firstly, it is threefold in regard to the three types (*viśeṣa*) of propensities (*vāśana*):

i) the propensity of speech (*abhilāpavāśana*),

ii) the propensity of the view of self (*ātmadr̥ṣṭivāśana*),

iii) the propensity of the factors of existence (*bhavāṅgavāśana*). [137b2]

58. Comm. Bh 336c3-12, bh 168b6-169a3, U 397a24-397b4, u 266b4-267a1.

“Having defined and demonstrated the store-consciousness and its characteristics, the author asks about its types and answers that it is threefold or fourfold.

i) *The propensity of speech*: The expressions (*abhilāpa*) of language concerning the self (*ātman*), entities (*dharma*) or actions (*kriya*) are numerous. From them are derived these special propensities (*vāśanaviśeṣa*) concerning the self (human, god, etc.), entities (eye, color, etc.) or actions (coming, going, etc.). As a result of these propensities, the 'self', things and actions appear and the consciousnesses exercise their special capacities (*śaktiviśeṣa*).

ii) *The impregnation of the view of the self*. By the power of the wrong view regarding the self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) peculiar to the manas gripped by the four afflictions (cf. § 6), there exists in the store-consciousness a special propensity of belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*). [Bh adds: it is the cause of the distinction between self (*sva*) and other (*para*)].

iii) *The propensity of the factors of existence*. By the power of dominance (*ādhipatya*) exerted by the mental factors (*samskāra*), meritorious (*puṇya*), non-meritorious (*apuṇya*) or unchanging (*āniñjya*), the special propensities of the twelve-membered causal chain,

cf. § 19, from ignorance (*avidyā*) up to old-age-and-death (*jatāmarāṇa*), exist in every destiny (*gati*), divine, etc.” (U)

59. The store-consciousness is fourfold: projection (*ākṣepaprabheda*), retribution (*vipākaprabheda*), cause (*hetuprabheda*), nature (*lakṣaṇaprabheda*).

i) 'Projection' store-consciousness is the propensity (*sadyojātātā vāsanā*) newly arisen by the fact of retribution. Without this projecting store-consciousness, the consciousness conditioned by the factors (*saṃskārapratyayaṇaṃ vijñānaṃ*) and the existence conditioned by attachment (*upādanapratyayo bhavaḥ*) would be impossible (*ayukta*).

ii) 'Retribution' store-consciousness is the retribution in the destinies (*gati*) according to the factors (*saṃskāra*) and the acts of existence (*bhava*). Without this retribution-consciousness there would be no seed (*bīja*) and, as a result, the dharmas destined to arise (*paunarbhāvika*) could not arise.

iii) 'Cause' store-consciousness is the cause (*hetu*) of the belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*) belonging to the manas. Without it, the belief in a self belonging to the manas would have no object (*ālambana*).

iv) 'Nature' [store-consciousness] is that which has a shared nature (*sādhāraṇalakṣaṇa*) and a unshared nature (*asādhāraṇalakṣaṇa*), a nature of seed with respect to the insensate world (*nirveditopattibījalakṣaṇa*) and a nature of seed with respect to the sensate world (*saveditopattibījalakṣaṇa*).

[137b11]

59. Comm. Bh 336c15-337a9, bh 169a3-169b3, U 397b10-23, u 267a1-7.

This paragraph continues and completes the preceding paragraph: the store-consciousness, as projection, retribution and cause, corresponds respectively to the propensities of speech, factors of existence and view of the self.

i) *Impregnation newly arisen*: “impregnation coming from first speech (*abhilāpa*) is called species-projection because this projection projects the birth.” (U)

ii) *The dharmas destined to arise ...* : “the material organs (*rūpindriya*), eye, etc., and other entities of retribution would not be able to arise.” (Bh) - “If the root is suppressed, there will be no leaves, etc.” (U)

3. “The store consciousness is the object (*nimitta*) of the view of self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) and the belief in the self (*ātmagrāha*) that resides in the afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) manas. If this special store-consciousness which is object did not exist, belief in the self that has as its cause the wrong view of self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) contained in the afflicted manas would no longer have an object (*ālambanaviṣaya*). But it should be known that it is the result resembling the cause (*niṣyandaphala*).” (Bh)

iv) The fourth point is developed in the following paragraph.

60. When it is shared (*sādhāraṇa*), the store-consciousness is the seed of the world-receptacle (*bhājanaloka*); when it is unshared (*asādhāraṇa*), it is the seed of the individual bases of consciousness (*prātyātmikāyatana*).

Shared, it is the seed of the insensate (*nirveditotpattibīja*) world; unshared, it is the seed of the sensate (*saveditotpattibīja*) world. When [the truth of the Buddhist path (*mārgasatya*)] counteracting (*pratipakṣa*) the store-consciousness arises, the unshared store-consciousness which is counteracted (*vipakṣa*) disappears (*nirudhyate*); on the other hand, the shared store-consciousness which continues to exist, grasped by the concepts of others (*paravikalpa*), becomes the object of a purified (*visuddha*) vision (*darśana*).

Thus, by reason of diverse aspirations (*bhinnādhimuktī*), the yogins have different visions (*bhinnadṛśya*) of one and the same thing (*dravya*). Here are some stanzas:

a) The universe, the shared fetter (*sādhārṇabandhana*), is difficult to cut (*duṣpraheya*) and difficult to know (*duṣparijñeya*). Because the outer world (*bāhyanimitta*) is vast, the yogins have different views of it.

b) Although the universe is not destroyed by the *mārgasatya*, the vision (*darśana*) of it by pure people is pure (*śuddha*). Because the buddhafiends (*buddhakṣetra*) are pure (*viśudda*), the vision of the Buddhas is pure.

Lacking such a shared and unshared store-consciousness, the distinction (*viśeṣa*) between receptacle-world (*bhājanaloka*) and animate world (*sattvaloka*) would be impossible. [137b26]

60. Comm. Bh 337a26-337b3, bh 169b4-7, U 397c12-398a18, u 267a8-268a8.

*“When it is shared, the store-consciousness is the seed of the world-receptacle: it is the cause (*hetu*) of a concept (*viññāpti*) having the appearance (*ābhāsa*) of a world-receptacle. It is *shared* in the sense that by the *dominant* power (*adhipatibala*) providing retribution (*vipāka*) of similar actions (*tulyasvakarma*), this concept (*viññāpti*) world is conceived (*utpadyate*) in a form that is the same for all who enjoy it. *When it is unshared, it is the seed of the individual bases of consciousness: the eye and the other bases of consciousness (*āyatana*), being the object (*ālamaba*) of the belief in self (*ātmagrāha*), are called *individual* (*pratyātmika*); residing in the inner person, they are called *internal* (*ādhyātmika*). Since it is the cause of these bases of individual consciousnesses, the unshared store-consciousness is their *seed*.**

Shared, it is the seed of the insensate world. In fact, because it is beyond any advantage (*upakāra*) or disadvantage (*apakāra*) resulting from a pleasant or unpleasant sensation (*sukhaduḥkhavedanā*), the receptacle-world is free of pleasure and pain [cf. u: *bde ba dan̄ sdug bsñal gyi tshor bas phan ḥdogs pa dan̄ gnod par byed pa med paḥi phyir te / snod kyi ḥjog rten la bde ba dan̄ sdug bsñal med do*]. *When the counteragent of the store-consciousness arises: when the truth of the path arises (*mārgasatyā*), the unshared store-consciousness, which is counteracted, disappears: the seed of the bases of the individual and internal consciousness disappears because it is counteracted (*viruddha*). On the other hand, the shared store-consciousness which continues to be grasped by the concepts of others becomes the object of a purified vision, for this shared store-consciousness is the receptacle-world. Among the yogins, conceptualizations (*vikalpa*) coming from the individual bases of consciousness are destroyed. Nevertheless, they have only a purified view (*darśanaviśuddhi*) of the receptacle-world grasped by the conceptualizations of others (*parasamtānavikalpa*). They see this world as a pure thing, like space (*ākāśa*) that is not stained (*pūtīkrta*) by water (*āpas*), or in the grip (*grhīta*) of earth (*pṛthivī*) or burned (*dagdha*) by fire (*tejas*), or shaken (*prakampita*) by wind (*vāyu*). - But how does*

one acquire a purified vision (*darśanaviśuddhi*) of something real (*sadārtha*)? - Fearing some such objection from his adversary, the author says: *Thus the yogins, by reason of diverse aspirations, etc.:* Thus they have a different vision of one and the same thing according to such and such an aspiration: they see gold, etc. (*suvarṇādiviśeṣa bhinnadrśyam upalabhyate*). Depending on whether they see gold (*suvarṇa*) or silver (*rajata*) or grass (*tṛṇa*) or wood (*kāṣṭha*) there, the object they perceive (*ālambana*) is multiple [cf. u: *mos pa gaṅ daṅ gaṅ yin pa ji ltar mos pa bĕin du gser la sogs paḥi bye brag gis blta bar bya ba sna tshogs pa dmigs pa lta bu ste / gser daṅ / dñul daṅ / rtswa daṅ / śiṅ la sogs paḥi bye brag gis dmigs pa sna tshogs so*].” (U)

The commentary on the stanzas follows: “*Since the outer world is vast:* because the world-receptacle has a great extent *Since the universe is not destroyed:* because it is grasped by the concepts of other beings, it is not destroyed *Pure beings:* those who have transformed their support (*parāvṛttāśraya*).” (U)

It is because the vision of the Buddhas is pure that the buddhafields are pure; u comments: *gzugs la sogs paḥi rnam par rtog pa ma spaṅs paḥi soḥi skye bo rnam kyis ĕin gaṅ dag ḥdam rdza ba daṅ / rdo daṅ / brag tshwa can daṅ / mi mñam pa daṅ / sdoṅ dum daṅ / tsher ma daṅ / mi gtsaṅ ba daṅ ldan par mthoṅ ba de dag ñid gzugs la sogs paḥi rnam par rtog pa spaṅs pa de bĕin gśegs pa rnam kyis gser la sogs paḥi ran bĕin du gzigs te:* “There where ordinary people (*prthagjana*) who have not cut through the concepts of matter, etc. (*rūpādivikalpa*) see only fields (*kṣetra*) full of mud (*pañka*), stones (*pāṣāṇa*), dry land, unevennesses, tree trunks, thorns (*kaṅṭaka*) and dirt (*aśuci*), the Tathagatas who have cut through the concepts of form, etc., see gold, etc.

61. i). The store-consciousness also has a nature of weakness (*dauṣṭhulyalakṣaṇa*) as well as a nature of validity (*praśradhilakṣaṇa*). As weak, it is the seed of the defilements (*kleśa*) and the minor kleśas (*upakleśa*); valid, it is the seed of the impure but wholesome (*sāsravakuśaladharmas*) dharmas. Without this twofold store-consciousness, the distinction (*viśeṣa*) between inaptitude (*akarmanyatā*) and aptitude (*karmanyatā*) - a distinction that comes from retribution (*vipāka*) - would be impossible.

ii) The store-consciousness has a further twofold nature: it is exhausted (*bhuktalakṣaṇa*) or it is non-exhausted (*abhuktalakṣaṇa*). As exhausted, it is the wholesome or unwholesome seed (*kuśalākuśalabīja*) that, once retributed, is retributed for the good. As non-exhausted, it is the seed of propensity of speech (*abhilāpavāsanā*), because, throughout eternity (*anādikālāt*), it is the seed that engenders the multiplicity (*prapañca*) of discursiveness (*vyavahāra*). Without this [twofold store-consciousness], (1) the good or bad actions (*kuśalapāpakarman*) already accomplished (*kṛta*) would not be exhausted by giving their result and would become retributed indefinitely; (2) the production of a new propensity of speech would be impossible.

iii) The store-consciousness has also a nature of similarity (*dṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇa*), because the store-consciousness is like an illusion (*māyā*), a mirage (*marīci*), a dream (*svapna*) and an optical illusion (*timira*) (cf. II, § 27). Without this nature, the store-consciousness that is the seed of false conceptualizations (*abhūtaparikalpa*) would not, at the same time, be the object of errors (*viparyāsanimitta*).

iv) The store-consciousness has yet another twofold nature: it is complete (*sakalatālakṣaṇa*) or it is incomplete (*asakalatā-lakṣaṇa*). Among beings bound by all the bonds of the world of desire (*sakalabandhana*), it is complete. Among those who have rejected the mundane attachments (*vigatalaukikarāga*), it is reduced. Among the śaikṣas - śrāvakas and bodhisattvas - it is partially suppressed. Among the arhats, pratyekabuddhas and Tathagatas, it is free of all obstacles of passion (*kleśā-varaṇa*). *Mutatis mutandis* (*yathāyogam*), it is the same for freedom from all obstacles of passion and all obstacles to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*). Without this store-consciousness, the gradual suppression (*kramanivṛtti*) of afflictions (*saṃkleśa*) would be impossible. [137c13]

61. Comm. Bh 337b21-337c4, bh 169b7-170a6, U 398b5-23, u 268a8-268b8.

“i) Weakness (*dausṭhulya*) is inaptitude (*akarmanyatā*) Validity (*praśrabdhī*) is quite the opposite; it is synonymous with aptitude (*karmanyatā*), with lightness (*lāghava*), with good physical constitution (zo mdog bdr ba).” (u)

ii) “As exhausted, it is the good or bad seed which, once retributed, etc.: the good or bad seed, once retributed, cannot be retributed again because it is exhausted. It is like the seed (*bīja*) which, after having produced a stem (*aṅkura*), cannot produce another one. As non-exhausted, it is the seed of the speech impregnation: this seed which develops according to conditions (*anutpratyayam*) is a cause capable of giving rise to the multiplicity of discursiveness (*vyavahāraprapañca*) Without a store-consciousness of exhaustion, good or bad acts would not perish by exhaustion after having given their result: that is, after having given their result, they would produce it again according to u: *spyad zin paḥi mtshan ñid med na dge ba dañ sdig pa ĕes bya la sogs pa ni ḥbras bu phyin pas spyad zin pa ḥjig pa de med pa ḥgyur te / ḥbras by byin nas yañ ḥbras bur ḥgyur re ĕes bya baḥi tha tshig go*].

Without a store-consciousness of non-exhaustion, *the production of a new speech impregnation would be impossible*: without earlier speech (*pūrvābhilāpa*), no present speech (*pratyutpannābhilāpa*).” (U)

iii) “These magical entities, etc. are a cause capable of producing wrong views (*asamyagrṣṭi*); it is the same for the store-consciousness.” (U)

iv) This passage is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.

62. Why is the store-consciousness, which is the retribution (*vipāka*) of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas (*kuśalākuśaladharmā*), a nonafflicted and morally indeterminate (*anivṛta-avyākṛta*) retribution? - Because, being nonafflicted and indeterminate, it opposes neither good nor bad; it is the good and the bad that oppose each other. If the retribution were good or bad instead of being nonafflicted and indeterminate, the disappearance of the afflictions (*saṃkleśanivṛtti*) would be impossible. As a result, the retribution consciousness is nonafflicted and indeterminate. [137c18]

62. Comm. Bh 337c10-15, bh 170a6-170b1, U 398b28-398c5, u 268b8-269a5.

“Nonafflicted and indeterminate: i.e., without affliction (*akliṣṭa*) and morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). The word *because* gives the reason: *because, being nonafflicted*

and indeterminate, it opposes neither the good nor the bad with which it is in the relationship of cause and result.” (u) - *If the retribution were not nonafflicted and indeterminate, the disappearance of the afflictions would be impossible: since the good arises from good and the bad from bad, the process of saṃsāra would have no end.*” (Bh)

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

More or less complete accounts of the doctrine of the alayavijñāna: Saṃdhir., chap. V; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 46-54 and Suzuki, *Studies*, p. 248- 264; Sūtrālaṃkāra, I, 18; XIX, 51; Madyāntavibhaṅga, p. 32-35 (Stcherbatsky, p. 54-57); Yogacaryābhūmi, Taisho 1579, p. 579 sq; Ālambanaparīkṣā, JA, 1929, p. 41-46; Triṃśikā, p. 18-22; Karmasiddhi in MCB, IV, 1935-36, § 33-40; Siddhi, p. 94-220; Fan yi ming in S. Lévi, *Matériaux*. – Mādhyamika sources: Madhyamāvatāra, p. 125-160 (Muséon, 1910, p. 317-344); Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, 15-35. – Brāhmanical sources: Bathmasūtra, II, 28-32 (Belvalkar, II, p. 91-95); Sarvadarśanasamgraha in Muséon, 1901, p. 191 sq.; Śaḍdarśanasamgraha Other references in Hobogirin, art. *Araya*, p. 35.

1. Jñeyāśraya: Siddhi, p. 166; Fan yi ming, p. 127. The stanza *anādhikāliko dhātuḥ* is cited and commented in Triṃśikā, p. 37 and Siddhi, p. 169.

2-3. Etymology of the ālaya: Saṃdhir., V, § 3; Triṃśikā, p. 18 (23): *tatra sarvasāṃkleśikadharmabījasthānatvād ālayaḥ. ālayaḥ sthānam itipaeāyau. atha vālīyante upanibdhante ‘smīn sarvadharmāḥ kāryabhāvena. tad vālīyate upanibadhyate kāraṇabhāvena sarvadharmeṣv ity ālayaḥ*; Karmasiddhi, § 33; Siddhi, p. 96, 167; Fan yi ming, p. 127.

4-5. The stanza of Saṃdhir., V, v. 7, *ādānavijñāna gambhīrasūkṣmo* occurs in Triṃśikā, p. 34; Karmasiddhi, § 32, 37; Yogacaryābhūmi, Taishō 1579, p. 379a12; Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 196 (3) ; Siddhi, p. 173. Comparison with the river and the mirror: Saṃdhir., V, § 5; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 48 (3), 37 (16), 127 (12), etc.; Triṃśikā, kārikā 4; Siddhi, p. 156-157; H. Ui, *Indo-tetsugaku-kenkyū*, VI, 1930, p. 559.

Upādāna: Saṃdhir., V, v. 2 (the ālaya appropriates *sādhiṣṭhānarūpīndriya* and the threefold *vāsanā*); Triṃśikā, p. 19 (*upadānam upādīḥ sa punarātmādivikalpavāsanā rūpādidharma-vikalpavāsanā ca*); Siddhi, p. 124; the *upādhi* is twofold: *bija* or threefold *vāsanā* and *sendriyakakāya*); Fan yi ming, p. 140-141.

The expression *yogakṣema*: Vinaya, II, p. 205; Dīgha, III, p. 123, 124, 164; Majjhima, I, p. 117, 349, 357; Saṃyutta, I, p. 173; II, p. 195, 226; III, p. 112; IV, p. 125; V, p. 130; Aṅguttara, I, p. 50; II, p. 40, 53, 87, 247; III, p. 21, 294, 353; Divyāvadāna, p. 98, 123, 303, 408; Saṃdhir., V, § 3; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 33 (6); Triṃśikā, p. 19 (17); Siddhi, p. 125. Cf. C. H. Jacobi, *Triṃśikāvijñapti des Vasubandhu*, p. 54; R. B. A. Ray, *Yogakṣema*, BSOS, VII, 1934, p. 133-136.

The coagulated (*sammūrcchita*) vijñāna: below, § 34.

6. Citta-mano-vijñāna. These seem to be synonymous for the Lesser Vehicle: Dīgha, I, p. 21 (*Yañ ca kho idaṃ vuccati cittan ti vāmano ti vā viññānan ti vā ayam...*); Saṃyutta, II, p. 95 - Visuddhimagga, II, p. 452 (*Viññāṇaṃ, cittaṃ, mano ti atthato ekaṃ*); Kośa, II, p.

176. There are, however, slight differences: Mano represents intellectual functioning of consciousness, while Viñāna represents the field of sense and sense-reaction (“perception”) and Citta the subjective aspect of consciousness (cf. Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhist Psychology, p. 19). For Asaṅga, these are three different things (see below, § 8). - Laṅkāvatara, p. 322 (16): *cittaṃ vikalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam eva ca, ālayaṃ tribhavaśceṣṭā ete cittasya paryāyāḥ*); but, *ibid.*, p. 46 (17): *cittena cīyate karma manasā ca vicīyate, vijñānena vijñānāti drśyaṃ kalpeti pañcabhiḥ*).

Asaṅga distinguished two manas: the *manodhātu* of the Lesser Vehicle, also called *mana-āyatana* or *mana-indriya* (cf. Kośa, I, p. 31-33) and the *kliṣṭamanas*. The latter is studied in *Triṃśikā*, p. 22-23 and *Siddhi*, p. 225-274. It is always associated with the four defilements. In these two texts, the four defilements are called *ātmadrṣṭi*, *ātmanāna* and *ātmasneha* (*Triṃśikā*, p. 23 (11); *Siddhi*, p. 255). In the *Samgraha* the former is the *satkāyadrṣṭi*: cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 300; *Samyutta*, III, p. 16 seq.; J. Rahder, *La sathāyadrṣṭi d’après la Vibhāṣā*, MCB, I, 1931-32, p. 227-239.

7. Demonstration of the existence of the *kliṣṭamanas*: *Siddhi*, p. 275-288.

i) On *avidyā āveṇikī*, Kośa, III, p. 84; V, p. 31. The word *āveṇika*: *Samyutta*, IV, p. 239; *Aṅguttara*, V, p. 74 seq.; *Visuddhimagga*, I, p. 268, *Divyādanā*, p. 2, 182, 268, 302; Kośa, VII, p. 66; *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, p. 56 (15); *Siddhi*, p. 277-279.

ii) There is a discussion on the support of the *manovijñāna*. This would be: a) The consciousness which has just passed (*yad anantarātītaṃ vijñānam*) as immediately preceding condition and antecedent (*samanantarapratayaya*); Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theory, cf. Kośa, I, p. 31-32; *Siddhi*, p. 281. b) A substance (*rūpa*) as co-arisen support (*sahabhū-āśraya*): root-Sautrāntika theory mentioned here. More precisely, this material would be the fleshly heart (*hṛdayavastu*): theory of the later Abhidhamma, cf. *Milinda*, p. 281; *Atthasālinī*, p. 140, 257, 264, 342; *Tikapapṭhāna*, p. 17, 26, 53 seq. 62, 256; *Visuddhimagga*, p. 447, 588; *Paramatthajotikā*, II, p. 228; *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, p. 14; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 87-88. It is also the *Tāraparṇīya* theory, cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 39 (26): *Tāraparṇīyā api hṛdayavastu ,amovijñānadhātor āśrayaṃ kalpayanti*; and that of the early Sautrāntikas, cf. note of K'oueī ki in *Siddhi*, p. 221. c) A previous moment of the organ as condition as the equal and immediate antecedent: another Sautrāntika theory mentioned in *Siddhi*, p. 282. d) The *kliṣṭamanas* as co-arisen support, specific and dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*): *Yogacāra* theory defended here and in *Siddhi*, p. 282.

iii) Etymology of *manas*: *manuta iti manas* (Kośa, II, p. 177); *manasā manyate punaḥ* (*Laṅkāvatara*, p. 316 (2)); *mano manyanti vai sadā* (*ibid.*, p. 323 (4)); *manyata iti manas* (*Siddhi*, p. 280).

iv) Difference between the two concentrations. There is a discussion on the nature of the concentrations. a) They exist by themselves (*dravyasat*), both being the two destructions of mind, but they differ from each other in the preparatory practice, the level where they are practiced, the goal pursued, etc.: Sarvāstivādin-Sautrāntika theory, cf. Kośa, II, p. 210-213; *Siddhi*. b) They have only nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*), being the simple nonexistence of the mind for a time: Sautrāntika theory, cf. Kośa, II, p. 214. c) They have only nominal existence but they differ by the presence of the *kliṣṭamanas* in the *asamjñīsamāpatti* and its absence in the *nirodhasamāpatti*: *Yogacara* theory defended here and in *Siddhi*, p. 283.

v) Presence of ātmagrāha in the asaṃjñin. This is explained differently. a) Asaṃjñins, aware at birth and at death, are in 'possession' (*prāpti*) of belief in a self, for the mind of ātmagrāha at birth 'projects' (*ākṣipati*) the mind of ātmagrāha at death: Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theory, cf. Kośa, II, p. 199; Siddhi, p. 284. b) The body of the asaṃjñin who lives in unawareness during existence contains the seeds of future belief in a self: root-Sautrāntika theory, cf. Siddhi, p. 284. c) The asaṃjñins are unaware because they lack any active consciousness (*pravṛtijnāna*), but they retain a seventh consciousness, the kliṣṭamanas, always associated with belief in a self: Yogacāra theory.

vi) Only the presence of the kliṣṭamanas explains the possibility of a good-impure (*sāsaravakuśala*) mind, i.e., defiled by belief in a self, cf. Siddhi, p. 284-287.

8. Compare the references in § 6. On the contrary, Vimśikā, p. 3 (2): *cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ*.

9. Etymology of citta: Kośa, II, p. 179; Siddhi, p. 166, 182-183; Fan yi ming, p. 126.

10. The silence of the Lesser Vehicle in regard to the ālaya is explained by many reasons:

a) The ideal of the śrāvakas, adepts of the Lesser Vehicle, is personal salvation, deliverance (*mokṣa*) by destruction of the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*). For this result, it is enough for them to understand coarse objects, the truth of suffering, etc. The ideal of the bodhisattvas, adepts of the Greater Vehicle, is the acquisition of omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) which assumes suppression of the obstacle of the afflictions and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*) and which allows them to achieve the welfare and happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvahitasukhakriyā*). The acquisition of omniscience is greatly facilitated by the knowledge penetrating the subtle object or the ālaya. That is why the Buddha reserves the preaching of the ālaya for the bodhisattvas. This first response formulated here by the Saṃgraha is also found in Triṃśikā, p. 15 (7): *kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇaṃ api mokṣasarvajñatvādhigamārtha. kleśa hi mokṣaprāpter āvaraṇaṃ iti atas tesu prahīṇeṣu mokṣo 'dhigamyate. Jñeyāvatraṇaṃ api sarvasmin jñeyae jñanapravṛttipratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñanam. tasmīn prahīṇe dsarvākāre jñeye 'saktam paratihataṃ ca jñānam pravartata ity atah sarvajñatvam adhigamyate.*

On the two āvaraṇas, *kleśāvaraṇa* (= *āvaraṇa* consisting of the *kleśas*) and *jñeyāvaraṇa* (= *āvaraṇa* that covers over or veils the true nature of *jñeya* and thus forms an obstacle to knowledge), cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, index; Siddhi, p. 566 seq.

b) The ālaya is not preached to the śrāvakas who might take it for an ātman, above, § 4; Saṃdhinir., V, § 7; Karmasiddhi, § 37b.

c) The sūtras of the Lesser Vehicle where it is treated have disappeared, cf. Karmasiddhi, § 37b. - On the disappearance of sūtras, Kośa, index, p. 138; Būston, II, p. 169-171; Vyākhyāyukti, etc.

d) The ālaya is preached to the śrāvakas in veiled terms; cf. following §.

11. The ālaya in the Lesser Vehicle: Siddhi, p. 179 and Karmasiddhi, § 35, note 116.

1) *Ālayārama*. A phrase having three members: *ārāma, rata, sammudita* in Pāli (Vinaya, I. p. 4; Majjhima, I. p. 167; Saṃyutta, I., p. 136; Aṅguttara, II, p. 131) and in Sanskrit (Māhāvastu, III, p. 314; Tibetan Saṃgraha); the same phrase preceded by a fourth member: *ngai-ālaya* in the Chinese versions and in Siddhi, III, fol. 23b. Related expressions: *Loka anālaya* (Saundarandana song XII, v. 22), *dharma anālaya* (Lalitavistara, XXV, p. 302). Same phrase in the Vinaya of the Dharmagupta (Sse fen liu, chap. 31, Tok., XV, 5, 7a: "Beings are happy in the *tch'ao k'ou*", 75 and 11; 116 and 8) and of the Mahīśāsaka (Wou fen liu, chap. 15, Tok, XVI, 1, 90a: "Beings being happy, become attached to *k'ou tche*", 116 and 8, 40 and 3). See S. Lévi, *Ālayārama*, JA, CCXV, 1929, p. 281-283; Hobogirin, art. Araya, p. 35, col. 2.

Śrutamaya jñāna, etc.: Dīgha, III, p. 219; Vibhaṅga, p. 324; Visuddhimagga, II, p. 439; Kośha, II, p. 265; VI, p. 143; Saṃdhanir., VIII, v. 24; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 35 (19), 210 (12).

Dharmānudharmaptipatti: Dīgha, II, p. 224; III, p. 119; Saṃyutta, III, p. 40 seq.; Aṅguttara, III, p. 176. Defined in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 107 (22): *yathāparyeśitānām yathodgrhītaānām dharmānām kāyena vacā manasā 'nuvartnā samyakcintanā bhāvanā ca*. Lengthy study in Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 213-233.

2) *Mūlavijñāna of the Mahāsāṃghikas*: The Sautrāntika thesis 3 in Vasumitra's Yi tsong louen louen (J. Masuda, Orogon and Doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools, *Asia Major*, II, 1925, p. 68) seems to be of Mahāsāṃghika inspiration: "There exist mūlantikaskandhas and ekarasaskandhas." – "The Mahāsāṃghika preceded the Sautrāntika whose thoughts have been influenced by the founders of the Yogācāraschool. It seems to me that the Sautrāntika idea of the ekarasaskandha of the subtle consciousness which becomes the substance of transmigration and from which the current five *skandha* come into existence was derived originally from the Mahāsāṃghika thought". (J. Masuda, *ibid.*).

3) *Āsaṃsārikaskandha* of the Mahīśāsaka. Cf. thesis IXB, 9 of the Mahīśāsaka: "The skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus are always present." – "According to the "Shu-chi, the constant existence of the 'bīja or seeds' and not of the current (*samudācāra*) *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu*. This is undoubtedly an ingenuous interpretation because otherwise the present proposition contradicts one of the other doctrines of the Mahīśāsaka, namely the doctrine of the perpetual destruction and recreation of the saṃskāra (IXA, 23). This interpretation is subject, however, to a serious doubt. As it is well-known the bīja theory, i.e., the theory of the causation of the phenomena out of the bīja, plays an important role in the later Yogācāra literature, such as the Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi, etc, I am unable, at present, to ascertain if the Mahīśāsaka Ābhidharmika had already the bīja theory in mind". (J. Masuda, *ibid.*).

4) *Bhavāṅga*, in Pāli *bhavaṅga*, 'subconscious life-continuum'. Many Pāli and Sanskrit references: Atthasālini, p. 72, 140, 269; Sammohavinodanī, p. 81, 156 seq., 406; Abhidhammatthasaṃgraha, p. 12-13; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 91; Milinda, p. 299 seq., Visuddhimagga, p. 21, 164, 457 seq., 549, 617, 676; Jataka, VI, 82; Mrs. Rhys-D., *Buddhist Manual of Psych. Ethics*, p. 3, 132, n.1, 134, n. 1; *The Buddhist Philosophy of Change*, Quest review, Oct. 1917, p. 16; A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, 1923, p. 104, 180, 194; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, p. 65-66.

The Upanibandhana passage on *bhavāṅga* is closely related to the doctrine of the Visuddhimagga and the Sthavira doctrine summarized by K'ouei ki in Tch'eng wei che tchang tchong tch'ou yao, Taishō 1831, P. 635b18-635c1.

a. *Bhavaṅga* (or *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa*) extends between birth (*paṭisaṃdhiviññāṇa*) and death (*cutiviññāṇa*). It is a flow from which arise the mental operations. First there is *āvajjana*: the *bhavaṅga* is disturbed by the presence of an object; 'the subject merely turns to something that arouses its attentions after producing a disturbance in the *bhavaṅga*, but knows no more about it': this operation of *āvajjana* belongs to *kiriyāmanodhātu* (resultant mental element). - Then follows 'vision, etc.' (*dassana, savana* ...): there is a visual sensation (*cakkhuvīññāṇa*): one sees, but there is no awareness of the nature of what is seen. - Then follows 'reception' (*sampañicchana*): reception of the object so seen' with pleasant or unpleasant impression. - Then follows 'examination' (*sa^ttīraṇā*): examination of the object which has been 'received'. - Then follows 'determining' the *voṭṭhapana*: the arranging of the examined or investigated material in such a manner as to constitute it into a definite object'. - Then comes the stage called 'apperception' (*javana*): 'the object, determined or integrated by the foregoing activity, is apperceived, or properly cognized'. - Then there is *tadmarammaṇa*, 'registering or identifying of the object thus apperceived.' - The operation is thus complete and the 'consciousness is lost in the *bhavaṅga*' See S. Z. Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 28-30; Visuddhimagga, p. 21, 457 (Pe Maung Tin, *Path of Purity*, p. 25). .

Thus there is *bhavaṅga-āvajjana-dassanasavanaṣṭhāyanasāyana = phusanasampañicchana-saṃtīraṇa-voṭṭhapana-javana-tadārammaṇa- bhavaṅga* in all nine *viññāṇas*.

Pe Maung Tin trans. Visuddhimagga, p. 21, (*Path of Purity*, p. 25): But indeed, when a visible object (*rūpārammaṇa*) enters the avenues of sight (*cakkhussa āpātham*), on the cessation of the subconsciousness (*bhavaṅga*) after arising two or three times, the inoperative mind-element (or the five-door adverting, *kiriyāmanodhātu*, *pañcadvārāvajjana*), arises, accomplishing the function of adverting (*āvajjanakicca*), and then ceases. The arise and cease in order, the visual consciousness (*cakkhuvīññāṇa*) accomplishing the function of seeing (*dassanakicca*), the resultant mind-element (*vipākamanodhātu*) accomplishing the function of receiving (*sampañicchanakicca*), the resultant element of mind-cognition without root-conditions (*vipākāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu* : *ahetuka* maenas not depending on *rāga*, desire, etc.) accomplishing the function of scrutinizing (*saṃtīraṇakicca*), and the inoperative element of mind-cognition without rootcondition (*kiriyāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu*) accomplishing the function of determining (*voṭṭhanakicca*). Immediately afterwards, apperception takes place (*javanam javati*).

b) The Sthaviras of K'ouei-ki have a list of nine *cittas* which may be superimposed on the preceding. There are, however, some problems.

i) *bhavāṅgacitta*: "When, for example, at the beginning, one is born and since one is still incapable of *vikalpa* (conceptualization), the *citta* can only take place concerning (*ālamb-*) objects automatically, this is called *bhavāṅgacitta*."

ii) *citta* having the power of pulling-producing: "If there are objects that present themselves and the *citta* produces a 'watchful guard-duty' (*king-kio*, 149 and 13, 147 and 13 = *āvarjana*) [attracting, overcoming: Monier-Williams dictionary], this is called *citta* having the power of pulling-producing.

iii) *darśanacitta*: “The *citta* with regard to this object having occurred, it sees (*kien*), it looks at it (*tchao-tchan*, 86 and 9, 109 and 13).”

iv) *citta* of 'equal investigation' (*saṃpraticchanachitta*): “Having seen, it examines (*tch'a*, 40 and 11, *mīmāṃsā*, *ūhanā*) by means of ‘equal examination’ of the good and the bad.”

v) *citta* of 'equal penetration' (*saṃtīraṇacitta*): “Having examined, it then cognizes (*vijānāti*) the good and the bad by means of 'equal penetration'.”

vi) *citta* of establishment (*vyavasthāpanacitta*): “Then the mind of establishment produces verbal concepts (*vāgvikalpa*) and tells the good and the bad of the object.”

vii) *citta* of functioning (*che yong*): “Then, according to the good and the bad, there is 'movement-action' (*tong tso*, 19 and 9, 9 and 5; this phrase in *Siddhi*, X, 28a1; corresponds to *ceṣṭitā iñjita*: may be the *javana* of the Pāli sources, and the *citta* of functioning arises.”

viii) *citta* of *fan-yuen* (162 and 4, 120 and 9). This corresponds to *tadārammaṇa* in the Pāli sources: S. Z, Aung retranslates: “The mind by which one says 'that object', just that very one and no other.” – “When the *javana* has taken place, at the moment when the *citta* is about to enter into rest, it refers back to (*fan-yuen*) the thing previously accomplished”.

ix) The *citta* of *fan-yuen* having taken place, return to the *bhavāṅga* which concerns objects automatically.

13. This whole paragraph is taken up and developed in *Siddhi*, p.181-182.

14. On the *lakṣaṇas* of the ālaya, cf. *Siddhi*, p. 96-99. K'ouei-ki has a learned note on the relationships between *lakṣaṇa* and the natures of being cause and effect. These two natures will be studied in § 17 and 27.

15. In this paragraph, *vasanā* has the meaning of perfumed. The perfumed is studied in § 23. On the theory of the *bīja-vasanā* in the Sāmkhya-Yoga, see L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Le Bouddhisme et la Yoga de Patañjali*, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 230-232.

The example of sesame seeds is well known. For the Kośa, the smell of sesame perfumed by the flower is different from the smell of the flower; cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 329 (19): *yathā tileṣu puṣṣpagandhād gandhāntraram utpadyate 'nyad eva na sa pauṣpo gandha ity āha*.

16. The seeds are neither different nor non-different from the ālaya, "because they have been made its own, appropriated (*upātta*) by the ālaya, embraced (*parigrhīta*) within its being, sharing its good or bad destiny (*ekayogakṣema*)." *Siddhi*, p. 124.

17. Two well-known examples of reciprocal causes:

i) The flame and the wick: *Seyyathāpi... telañca paticca vaṭṭiṃ ca paṭṭicca telapdīpo jhayeyya. tasseva telassa ca vaṭṭiyā ca pariyādānā anāhāro nibbāyeyya* (Saṃyutta, III, 126; V, p. 319). Expression repeated in Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 588 (2): *tailavartikṣayaniruddhapradīpavat*. Compare also Majjhima, I, p. 295: *Seyyathā pi āvuso telappadīpassa jhāyato acciṃ paticca ābhā paññāyati. ābhaṃ paṭicca acci paññāyati*.

ii) The bundles of reeds: *Seyyathāpi āvuso dve nalajalāpinaṃ aññaṃ aññaṃ nissāya tiṭṭheyyum... Tāsaṃ ce āvuso nalakalāpinaṃ ekam ākaḍḍheyya ekā papateyya aparāñce ākaḍḍheyya aparā papaateyya* (Saṃyutta, II, p. 114); *tadathāyuṣman Śāriputra dve naḍakalāpyav ākāse ucchrite syātām. te 'nyonyaniśrite anyonyam niśritya tiṭṭheyātām. tatra kaścid ekām apanayet. dvitīyā nipatet. dvitīyām apanayet. ekā nipatet* (Kośavyākhyā, p. 668 (2), ad Kośa, VIII, p. 138). Cf. also Madyamakavṛtti, p. 561 (11): *naḍakalāpayogena*.

The six hetus in the Vaibhāṣika system: Kośa, II, p. 244 seq.; Kośavyākhyā, p. 188-189; Vikhyāpana, Taishō 1602, p. 170a12. Lengthy discussion on the ten and two hetus in Siddhi, p. 453-463.

18. On the crafts of tailor and dyer, some information in Jātaka no. 38; trans. H. Obermiller, *Reden des Buddha*, 1922, p. 428.

19. To be compared with § 28. The Yogacārinś distinguish three pratīyasamutpādas:

i) Mutual causality of the ālaya and dharmas: cf. above, § 17; Siddhi, p. 468-472. It is mingled with the mutual causality of the ālaya and the pravṛttijñānas, cf. § 27.

ii) Causality in the twelve-membered causal chain: cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 517-586; Sammohavinodanī, p. 130-213; *Compendium*, p. 260 sq.; Śālistambasūtra; Daśabhūmīka, p. 47-52; Madhyamakavṛtti, XXVI, p. 542; Kośa, III, p. 60 seq., Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 35-45; Siddhi, p. 481-501. – Various works: L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Théorie ds douze causes*, 1913; P. Oltramare, *La formule bouddhique des douze causes*, 1909; P. Masson-Oursel, *Essai d'ontepretation de la théorie bouddhique des douze conditions*, 1915; Oldenberg-Foucher, *Le Bouddha* (4), 1934, p. 250 sq. Recent works: V. Gokhale, *Pratīyasamutpādaśāstra des Ullaṅgha* (Nanjio 1227), 1930; *Die buddhistische Theorie der Kasalkette*, Sinica, V, 1939, p. 37-40; N Dutt, *The Place of the Āryasatyas and the Pratīyasamutpāda in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna*, ABORI, XI, pt. II, p. 101-27; G. Tucci, *A Fragment from the Pratīyasamutpāda of Vasubandhu*, JRAS, 1930, p. 611-623.

iii) Causality of the pravṛttivijñānas, cf. below, § 28.

The division of the saṃskāras into *puṇya*, *apuṇya*, *āniñjya*: Dīgha, III, p. 217; Vibhaṅga, p. 135; Kośa, III, p. 84; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 36 (11), 238 (8).

20. This paragraph appears to be a development of Aṅguttara, I, p. 173: *Santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmanā evaṃvāino evaṃdīṭṭhino – yaṃ kiñcāyaṃ purisapuggalo paṭisaṃvedeti sulhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā sabbam taṃ pubbe kataahetū ti...taṃ issaranimānahetū ti... taṃ ahetu-appaccayā ti*.

The theories of the tīrthikas on the origin of things (guṇa, padārtha, Īśvara, Mahābrahma, kāla, diś, pūrvakoṭi, svabhāva, ākāśa, ātman, śabda, paramāṇu) are explained and refuted in Siddhi, p. 23-27.

Parable of the blind and the elephant: Udāna, VI, 4, p. 68-69; E. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues*, 1934, no. 86; Kiṃsukopamajātaka, no. 238; G. A. Jacobs, *A second Handful of Popular Maxims*, 1902, p. 53; JRAS, 1902, p. 174; T. W. Rhys-Davids, JRAS, 1911, p. 200 sq.; V. S. Ghate, *Ind. Ant.*, 42, 1913, p. 251; M. Winternitz, *Hist. Of Indian Lit.*, II, 1933, p. 88.

On puruṣakāra, cf. Dīgha, I, p. 53; Milinda, P. 96; Kośa, II, p. 289; Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 193 (20), 197 (17).

21. Sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna: Siddhi, p. 97-99.

22. Six characteristics of seed: Siddhi, p. 116-118.

23. Four characteristics of perfumed: Siddhi, p. 120.

The Saṃgraha mentions and refutes three theses on the nature of the perfumed:

i) that the pravṛttijñānas are perfumable : root-thesis of the Sautrāntika, cf. Siddhi, p. 183, 207.

ii) that the previous moment of a vijñāna perfumes the later moment : thesis of the Dārṣṭāntika according to Saṃgrahabhāṣya, p. 330a9; Sthavira thesis according to Siddhi, p. 187 (here Sthavira probably means the Sautrāntika Śrīlābdha, cf. Siddhi, p. 222).

iii) that the vijñānajāti is perfumable: thesis of the divergent Sautrāntika masters (*vi che*), according to Siddhi, p. 185.

Other theses mentioned in Siddhi, p. 182-188.

24. Twofold causality of seed: Siddhi, p. 118-119.

Example of the bow and arrow: Vibhaṣā, Taishō 1545, k. 20, p. 103c; k. 21, p. 105a; Kośa, II, p. 200, 217; IV, p. 102.

25. Example of the flame and the wick: above, § 17.

Expression *akṛtābhyāgama, kṛtavipraṇāsa*: Mahāvvyutpatti, 7529-7530; Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 321 (1) Sarvadarśanasamgraha, ed. Ānand- āśrama, p. 21; Syādvādamañjarī, § 18, p. 151; Bodhicartāvatāraṭikā in L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme. Etudes et materiaux*, 1898. [306 (18); Advaitabrahmas., p. 125.

26. Ālaya and pravṛttivijñāna: Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 32-35(Stcherbatsky, p. 54-57); L de Lavallée Poussin, MCB, I, p. 403.

28. Pratītyasamutpāda: above, § 19. - Four pratyayas: Kośa, II, p. 299; Abhidharmasamuccaya, Taishō 1605, p. 671b seq.; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 43-35; Siddhi, p. 436-452.

29. Introduces the proof of ālaya due to saṃkleśa (§ 30-42) and vyavadāna (§ 43-44). The same proof in Karmasiddhi, § 34; Triṃśikā, p. 37 seq.; Siddhi, p. 214-220.

The affliction is passion, action and birth; the compounds *kleśasaṃkleśa*, etc., are to be analyzed: *kleśa eva saṃkleśa iti kleśasaṃkleśaḥ*. Definition in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 41 (10): *tredhā saṃkleśaḥ hetor dvidhābhedaḥ. kleśasaṃkleśo 'vidyātrṣṇop adānānīti. trṭyam api kleśātmakatvāt. karmasaṃkleśaḥ svarūpāvasthaṃ karma vijñānanāma-rūpaśaḍāyatanasparśavedanājātijarāmarañāni. eṣāṃ janmasaṃgrhītvāt.*

30-32. Directed against the thesis that has the pravṛttijñānas as perfumable, cf. above, § 23. Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntika argument on the existence and causality of a past action: Kośa, V, p. 49-65; Karmasiddhi, § 15-17; L. de Vallée Poussin in Études Asiatiques, 1925, p. 343-376; MCB, V, 1937, p. 1-158.

Problem of the praptis: Kośa, II, p. 179-195; Karmasiddhi, p. 16 of the off-print

The consciousness counteracting the afflictions cannot be the seed of the afflictions: Triṃśikā, p. 38 (23): *na hi tat kleśabījānuśaktam eva tatpratipakṣo bhavitum arhati.*

33. Theories on the nature of vijñāna conditioned by the saṃskāras: Triṃśikā, p. 37 (16) - 38 (13); Siddhi, p. 217. This would be either the pravṛttivijñāna or the pratisaṃdhivijñāna (consciousness at conception) or the ālaya.

34. Pratisaṃdhibandha: Visuddhimagga, II, p. 499, 548 seq.: 649; Nettipakarāṇa, p. 79, 80; Milinda, p. 140; Sammohavinodanī, p. 155-160; Compendium, p. 267 (theory of Buddhaghosa); Triṃśikā, p. 37; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 241 (21); Siddhi, p. 195-199.. - The present paragraph seems to be directed against the root opinion of the Sthaviranikāya for which two manovijñānas, the coarse and the subtle, coexist at conception-death; cf. K'ouei ki ad Siddhi, p. 198.

The passage on the descent of the vijñāna is preserved in Pāli and Sanskrit: *Viññānaṃ va hi Ānanda m atū kucchiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ asucchissath ati. No h'etaṃ bhante* (Dīgha, II, p. 63). - *Sa ced Ānanda vijñānaṃ mātuḥ kuḥṣiṃ nāvakrāmeta na tat kalalsṃ kalalatvāya saṃvarteta* (Madhayamakavṛtti, p. 552 (6)). - *Vijñānaṃ ced ānanda mātuḥ kukiṃ nāvakrāmed api tu tan sāmarūpaṃ kalalatvāya saṃmūrchet* (Kośavyākḥā, p. 669).

The phrase in § 34: *rnam par śes pa yañ maḥI mñal du nur nur po ñid du brgyal lo* surely covers an original Sanskrit: *vijñānaṃ ca mātuḥ kuḥṣau kalalatvena saṃmūrcheti* 'and a vijñāna coagulates an embryo in the mother's womb.' Cf. Mahāvīyut, 295: *brgyal ba = mūrccitaḥ*; 7578: *brgyal ba = mūrccā*. The present phrase recalls the canonical phrase cited above. The Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 40, also deals with the *vijñānasamūrccana*. But the Chinese translators experienced some problems in translating this phrase. Demiéville makes this remark in this regard: "Hiuan-tsang

(Taishô 1594, p. 135c29): *In the mother's womb, the vijñāna and the kalala mutually unite again.* Physiological conception of the vijñāna, cf. S. Schayer, *Ueber den Somatismus der indischen Psychologie*, Bull. Ac. Pol., 1936. - Paramārtha (Taishô 1593, p. 116b6): *This vijñāna takes its support (t'ouo) upon the kalala and one is born by transformation and union in the mother's womb.* - Comm. of Vasubandhu translated by Paramārtha (Taishô 1595, p. 169b29-169c3): *To take support upon the kalala means that at one moment the vijñāna is associated (siang ying) with the kalala; it is 'transformed' means that the retribution-vijñāna is different from the preceding samklišṭavijñāna; it is 'united' means that the blood and semen, coagulated by the wind which produces the power of earlier actions, is identified with the vijñāna (ling yu che t'ong).* - H. Ui, *Shodaijoron kenkyū*, p. 303, cites, according to the commentary of the Saṃdhinirmocana of Yuan-t'so, a passage by Paramārtha on the Saṃgraha, where Paramārtha says: *The union of the mūlavijñāna (pen che) with the body coming from the father and mother (fou mou yi t'i) is called upapattibhava (cheou cheng). Paramārtha says that kalala should be translated as coagulated fat (hoa, 85 and 10).* - The vijñāna undoubtedly becomes coagulated by becoming identified with the kalala but, properly speaking, it is the kalala that is a coagulant."

The phrase *asthānam anavakāśaḥ*, in Aṅguttara, I. p. 27; Kośa, III, p. 198; explained in Kośavyākhyā, p. 228 (17).

35. Appropriation of the material organs by the mind and mentals: Kośa, I, p. 63; Karmasiddhi, § 34a; Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 576; Siddhi, p. 193.

The verse *āyur uṣmāthā ...* Majjhima, I, p. 296; Saṃyutta, III, p. 143; Kośa, II, p. 215; Kośavyākhyā, p. 668 (16).

36. Theories on the vijñānāṅga. It is made up of:

i) the six pravṛttivijñānas of the intermediate existence: Sarvāstivādin theory, cf. Kośa, III, p. 85.

ii) the manovijñāna: another Sarvāstivādin theory according to K'ouei ki, ad Siddhi, p. 200.

iii. the ālaya: Yogācāra theory, cf. Siddhi, p. 199.

Continuation of the Buddha-Ānanda conversation: *Viññāṇaṃ va hi Ānanda daharass' eva sato vocchijjissatha kumārassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissathāti* (Dīgha, II, p. 63). - The Sanskrit phrase reproduced in Lamotte's commentary is taken from Kośavyākhyā, p. 669 (4).

37. Theory of *āhāra*: Majjhima, I, p. 261; Dīgha, III, p. 228, 296; Dhammasaṅgānī, p. 58, 121, 358; Visuddhimagga, p. 3421; Kośa, III, p. 119-128; Siddhi, p. 200-204. Here the Saṃgraha refutes the Sarvāstivādins. Other theories in Siddhi.

38-42. The question of the *gatis* and the *yonis* and, more specifically, that of the destiny in ārupyadhātu is studied in Kośa, III, p. 12 seq.; Karmasiddhi, v. 34c; Siddhi, p. 191.

§ 40 is clearest in Siddhi, p. 102.

On the necessity of a being born in bhavāgra to realize the absorption of ākiṃcanya in order to practice the pure path, cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 175; Karmasiddhi, v. 34c, note 114.

On the gradual cooling of the body in the case of kramamṛtyu: Kośa, II, p. 133; III, p. 134-135; Siddhi, p. 199.

43-44. The impossibility of a mundane and supramundane purification without an ālaya: Triṃśikā, p. 38 (13) - 39 (4); Siddhi, p. 218-220. Difference between the mundane and the supramundane path: Kośa, VI, p. 238; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Morale bouddhique*, p. 23-27; MCB, V, 1936, p. 192.

45. Śrutavāsanā: Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 186 (7); Siddhi, p. 106, 113.

46. Example of milk and water: cf. the phrase *khīrodakībhūta*, symbol of harmony, Aṅguttara, I, p. 70; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 225; Majjhima, I, p. 207, 398.

47. Threefold prajñā, cf. references to § 9.

48. Kleśaparyavasthāna explained in Kośa, V, p. 3-4, as note.

Distinction between dharmakāya and vimuktikāya, Saṃdhanir., X, v. 2; Triṃśikā, p. 44 (25) - 45 (1); Siddhi, p. 702 seq.

50. On nirodhasamāpatti, see Majjhima, I, p. 301-400; Kathāvatthu, II, p. 327, 516-518; Patisambhidāmagga, I, p. 97-100; Milinda, p. 300; Visuddhimagga, p. 702-710; Kośa, II, p. 203-214; VI, p. 223; VIII, p. 193, 203, 207; Karmasiddhi, v. 22-32; Siddhi, p. 61, 63, 196, 204-214, 405-409 P. Demiéville, *Origine des sects bouddhiques*, MCB, I, 1931-32, p. 48; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *La Nirodhasamāpatti*, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 210-22. The major text is the Vedallasutta in Majjhima, I, p. 296: *yo cāyaṃ bhikkhu saññavedaitanirodhaṃ samāpanno, tassa pi kāyasaṅkhārāniruddhā paṭippassaddhā, vacīsaṅkhārā .n p. cittasaṅkārā n. p. āyu aparikkhino, usmā avūpasantā, indriyāni vipasannāni.* The Sanskrit version of the same sūtra in Karmasiddhi, v. 24; Saṃgraha, I, v. 50; Siddhi, p. 204, ends with the phrase: " The vijñāna does not leave the body". - This vijñāna is the ālaya according to Vasubandhu who adopts the view of a class of Sūtraprāmānika in Karmasiddhi, § 36, note 100, and according to Siddhi, p. 205.

51. Presents and refutes the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theory found in Kośa II, p. 211; Karmasiddhi, § 22, note 72; Siddhi, p. 205.

52. Presents and refutes the branch-opinion advocating a subtle citta. Kośa, II, p. 212 and Karmasiddhi, § 24, attribute this theory to Vasumitra described as Bhadanta or Sthavira,

author of a Paripṛcchāśāstra and a Pañcavastuka commented on by Dharmatrāta (Taishō 1555). Vibhāṣā (Taishō 1545, k. 151, p. 772c, 774a) attributes this theory to the Dārṣāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins. According to K'ouei ki, ad Siddhi, p. 207, it concerns the Sūtra-nikāya-branch-system-shifted(?)-opinion (tsong-tchouan-ki: 40 and 5; 59 and 11; 140 and 2) and the Sthavirācāryas share this view.

53. Presents and refutes the branch-opinion advocating a citta without caitta. This is a question of the branch-thesis of the Sautrāntikas mentioned in Karmasiddhi, § 26, and Siddhi, p. 211.

"In his Bhāṣya, Vasubandhu gives quite a different interpretation for § 52 and 53: the arguments there are divided into 19 (Paramārtha's translation) or 11 (Hiuan-tsang's translation) unless I'm (P. D.) very much mistaken; and the interpretation differs noticeably from that of Asvabhāva. But the commentary of the latter is very clear and more plausible." (P. Demiéville)

54. Repeated and developed in Karmasiddhi, § 27-29; Siddhi, p. 213.

55. Presents and refutes the root-opinion of the Dārṣāntikas which will be found in Kośa, II, p. 212; Karmasiddhi, § 23; Siddhi, p. 207.

57. For *parāvṛtti* and its compounds, H. Jacobi, *Ueber das ursprüngliche Yogasystem*, SPAW, 1930, p. 322-332; M. Winternitz, *Notes on the Guhyasamāja Tantra*, IHQ, IX, 1, p. 1-10; A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Parāvṛtti = Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy*, Mel. Wog., p. 232-36; P. C. Bagchi, *A note on the word parāvṛtti*, COJ, I, 1933; G. Coedes, *Les inscriptions malaises de Śrīvijaya*, BEFEO, XXX, 1930, [29-80. - For the doctrine of *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, below, chap. IX, § 2; Samdhinir., VIII, § 13; X, v. 1; Sūtrālamkāra, VI, 9; IX, 12-17; Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 51 (19), 84 (21), 122 (17); Triṃśikā, p. 27 (21); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367-370; Siddhi, p. 607-612; 661-667.

58-59. On the three vāsanās, kārīkā 19 of Triṃśikā:

karmaṇo vāsanā grahadvayavāsanayā saha /

kṣīṇe pūrvavipāke 'nyad vipākam janayanti tat //

Compare the commentary of Sthiramati, *ibid.*, p. 36-37, and the four explanations of Siddhi, p. 473-513.

60. For the *adhimukti* (*adhimokṣa*, *adhiṣṭhāna*) of the yogin, cf. Kośa, II, p. 155; VIII, p. 207; Kośavyākhyā, p. 125 (7): *śaktir eva hi nānāvidhā 'sti yayā yogibhir adhimokṣaviśeṣeṇa suvarṇadhātu rūpyadhātus tāmradh atur ity evamādayo dhātavaḥ kriyante*; Triṃśikā, p. 25, Viṃśikā 10 (7) (*adhiṣṭhāna*); Bodh. bhūmi: *adhimukty-adhiṣṭhāna*, p. 95 (13), 195 (12); *adhimokṣa*, p. 40 (5), 41 (12); S. Lévi, *L'inscription de Mahānāman à Bodh-gaya*, Mémoires. P. 352 sq.; below, chap. II, 14.

61. Dauṣṭhulya and praśrabdhi: Saṃdhir., p. 96, 116, 118, 120, 126, 127, 129, 146, 161, 127-129; Laṅkāvatara, p. 94 (12), 109 (6); Sūtrālaṅkāra, transl. p, 51; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 9 (1), 14 (26), 20, (16); Triṃśikā, p. 22 (9), 27 (14), 43 (23), 44 (11); Siddhi, p. 608-612.
Ālaya among the arhats: Siddhi, p. 162-166.

62. Moral nature of the ālaya: Triṃśikā, p. 21(11); Siddhi, p. 152.

Chapter II

THE NATURES OF THE KNOWABLE

(*jñeyalakṣaṇa*)

1. How must the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*) be described (*katham draṣṭavyam*)? These are, in brief (*samāsataḥ*), three in number: i) the dependent nature (*paratantralakṣaṇa*), ii) the imaginary nature (*parikalpītalakṣaṇa*), iii) the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*). [137c26]

1. Comm. Bh 337c24, bh 170b1-2, U 398c13-26, u 269a5-269b4.

“*These, in brief, are three in number*: because, in every dharma, that which huls be known (*parijñeya*), that which must be cut (*prahātavya*) and that which must be realized (*sākṣātkartavya*) is distinguished (*paricchid-*).” (U)

i) *Dependent nature*: *gzun ba dan ḥdzin par yoṅs su rtog paḥi rjes su ḥjug paḥi las dan ṅon moṅs pa gḥan dag gis dbaṅ byas paḥi phyir te / śes bya ci yaṅ ruṅ ste de ltar mtson pa ni gḥan gyi dbaṅ gi mtshan ṅid do*: “This is to be dependent in regard to another thing: action (*karman*) or affliction (*kleśa*) resulting from imagination (*parikalpita*) bearing upon an object and a subject of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhaka*). Every dharma, no matter what it may be, which shows up in that way is dependent.” (u)

“ii) *Imaginary nature*: This is a nature of absolute nonexistence (*atyantābhāvalakṣaṇa*). That which does not exist absolutely is imaginary (*parikalpita*), namely, the object and subject of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhaka*), the pudgala and the dharmas

iii) *Absolute nature*: This is the absence of self-nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) which is the basis of imaginary things: *grāhya-grāhaka*, *ātman* and *dharma* ...” (U)

2. What is the dependent nature (*paratantralakṣaṇa*)? It is the concepts (*viññapti*) that have the store-consciousness as seed (*bīja*) and that pertain to (*saṃgrhīta*) erroneous imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*). What are these concepts?

i) - iii) *dehadehibhokṭṛviññapti*: the concept of the body (five sense organs), of the possessor of the body (*kliṣṭaṃ manas*) and of the enjoyer (*manodhātu*).

iv) *tadupabhuktaviññapti*: the concept which is known by the preceding (the six sense objects).

v) *tadupabhokṭṛviññapti*: the concept which knows the preceding (the six consciousnesses).

vi) *kālavijñapti*: the concept of time.

vii) *saṃkhyāvijñapti*: the concept of number.

viii) *deśavijñapti*: the concept of place.

ix) *vyavahāravijñapti*: the concept which manifests as speech.

x) *svaparaviśeṣavijñapti*: the concept which produces the distinction between self and other.

xi) *sugatidurgaticyutyupapattivijñapti*: the concept which manifests as good destiny, bad destiny, death and birth.

* * *

i - ix) Concepts i – ix have speech impregnation (*abhilāpavāsanā*) as seed.

x) Concept x has impregnation of the view of self (*ātmadrṣṭivāsanā*) as seed.

xi) Concept xi has impregnation of the members of existence (*bhavāṅgavāsanā*) as seed.

* * *

All the worlds (*dhātu*), all destinies (*gati*), all wombs (*yoni*) and all the defilements (*saṃkleśa*) pertain to (*saṃgrhīta*) these concepts. The dependent nature is expressed as wrong imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*). These concepts are nothing other than conceptual (*viññaptimātra*) and pertain to wrong imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*). The support of the appearance (*ābhāsāśraya*) of a nonexistent

(*asat*) and fictitious (*bhrānta*) thing (*artha*) is called the dependent nature. (Cf. the Chinese versions) [138a11]

2. Comm. Bh 338a11-338b2, bh 170b2-171a6, U 399a14-399b11, u 269b4-270a8.

“The concepts that pertain to wrong imagination: the concepts that have wrong imagination as self-nature (*svabhāva*).” (Bh)

i) - iii) *dehadehibohokṭrvijñapti*: “*deha* is the five dhātus, eye, etc.; *dehin* is the kliṣṭāmanas; *bhokṭr* is the manodhātu.” (Bh) - As will be seen below (§ 5), these are the six internal elements (*ādhyātmikadhātu*), eye, etc. Among them, the manodhātu, the support of the five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., is called *dehivijñapti*. The manodhātu, the support of the sixth consciousness or mental consciousness (*manovijñana*) is called *bhokṭrvijñapti*.” (U)

iv) *tadupabhuktavijñapti*: “This is the six external elements (*bāhyadhātu*), color, etc.” (Bh, U)

v) *tadupabhokṭrvijñapti*: “This is the six consciousness elements (*vijñānadhātu*).” (Bh, U)

vi) *kālavijñapti*: “This is non-interruption of the stream of saṃsāra (*saṃsārapravāhāsamuccheda*).” (Bh) – “This is the concept which manifests with the appearance of the three times (*tryadhvan*).” (U)

vii) *saṃkhyāvijñapti*: “This is enumeration (*gaṇana*).” (Bh) – “This is the concept which manifests numerically with the appearance of the number 1, etc.” (U)

viii) *deśavijñapti*: “This is the receptacle world (*bhājanaloka*).” (Bh) – “This is the concept which manifests with the appearance of a village (*grāma*), a garden (*ārāma*), etc.” (U)

ix) *vyavahāravijñapti*: “This is the concept which manifests with the appearance of discourse: what is seen, heard, felt and known (*dr̥ṣṭaśrutamatavijñātavyavahāra*).” (U)

x) *svaparaviśeṣavijñapti*: “This is the concept of person, etc. As long as the belief in me and mine (*ātmātmīyagrāha*) has not been cut (*samucchinna*), one believes in 'me' and 'mine', in 'self' and 'what belongs to self'; one makes distinctions.” (U)

xi) *sugatidurgaticyutyupapattivijñapti*: “This is the concept which manifests as god (*deva*), human (*manuṣya*), the damned (*naraka*), animal (*tiryak*), hungry ghost (*preta*); as birth and death.” (U)

* * *

“Concepts *i* to *ix* have speech propensity (*abhilāpavāsanā*) as seed, because they are a transformation of the consciousness (*vijñānapariṇāma*) and are not a separate substance. Concept *x* has the impregnation of the view of self as seed: it develops because of the propensity of the view of self. Concept *xi* has the propensity of the members of existence as seed: it develops because of the propensity of the members of existence.” (U) (Cf. I, verses 58, 59).

3. What is the imaginary nature (*parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*)? It is to manifest as the appearance of an object (*arthābhāsa*), whereas there is no object, nothing but concept (*vijñaptimātra*). [138a13]

3. Comm. Bh 338b5-8, bh 171a6-8, U 399b11-13, u 270a8-270b1

“It is to manifest as the appearance of an object: It manifests as the appearance of a known object (*grāhyārtha*) or manifests as the appearance of an ātman-knower, whereas there is no object: whereas there is no known object or ātman that knows, nothing but concept: whereas there is no real object but simply an idea (*vijñapti*) like an object or a like a concept similar to an ātman.” (freely from Bh)

“In reality, there is neither a known object (*grāhya*) nor a knowing (*grāhaka*) subject; there is only a multiplicity of concepts pertaining to (*saṃgrhīta*) wrong imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*) in which the imaginary appears as object.” (U)

4. Finally, what is the absolute nature (*pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*)? - It is the complete absence (*ātyantikābhāva*) of any objective nature (*arthalakṣaṇa*) in the dependent nature. [138a15]

4. Comm. Bh 338b11-13, bh 171a8-171b1, U 399b13-399c13, u 270b1-3.

bh: *yoñs su grub pañi mtshan ñid ni gañ yod pa ma yin pa mi bden pa snañ bañi rgyu la don deñi bdag ñid du snañ med par gyur ba ste / ñdi ltar bdag tu snañ ba gtan med par gyur pa ñid ni bdag med pa tsam yod par gyur pa ñid yin te //* “The absolute nature is the fact that, in the paratantra, the cause of the appearance (*ābhāsahetu*) of non-existent and false things, that which appears as being an object is non-existent in the absolute sense. Similarly, that which appears as an *ātman* is non-existent in the absolute sense: there is *nairātmyamātra*.” - u: *de ñid kun brtags pa de dañ gtan du bral ba ni yoñs su grub pañi mtshan ñid de:* “The absence of *parikalpita* in the paratantra constitutes the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*.”

The Chinese Upanibandhana adds a well-chosen series of explanations at this point: “Another definition: 1) All dharmas that arise from causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasamutpanna*) are nothing but concept (*vijñaptimātra*): this is their dependent nature. 2) Out of error (*viparyāsa*) and miscalculation, they manifest as the appearance of an object (*artha*); this is their imaginary nature. 3) Their true nature (*tathatā*) which is characterized (*prabhāvita*) as the complete absence of *parikalpita* in the paratantra, constitutes their absolute nature.” There follows an example borrowed from the mirage (*marīci*) which will be translated freely. The water in a mirage, produced by the action of the mirage, is real in its nature of appearing: this is its dependent nature. This appearance, however, manifests as real water: this is its imaginary nature. The water of the mirage is, in the absolute sense, without any nature of true water; this is its absolute nature. For other examples see Notes and References.

U continues: “The imaginary character is the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*); the dependent character is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), also called conceptual nature (*vikalpasvabhāva*); the absolute character is the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*), also called the fundamental nature of things (*dharmatāsvabhāva*). These three characters appear respectively as the dharma-to-be-known (*parijñeya*), the dharma-to-be-cut (*prahātavya*) and the dharma-to-be-realized (*sākṣātkartavya*). Thus in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (Taishō no. 220 = Śatasāhasrikā), the Buddha said to Maitreya: One imagines everything that is a conditioned substance

(*saṃskāralakṣaṇavastu*) as form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), discrimination (*saṃjñā*), volition (*saṃskāra*), consciousness (*viññāna*), or, finally, as an attribute of the Buddha (*buddhadharma*). All of this relies on names (*nāman*), designations (*saṃjñā*), signs (*prajñapti*), speech (*vyavahāra*) and conceptualizations (*parikalpa*). Indeed, the self-nature of form (*rūpasvabhāva*) up to and including that of the conceptual attributes of the Buddha are imaginary form (*parikalpitarūpa*) and imaginary attributes of the Buddha (*parikalpitabuddhadharma*). In all these conditioned substances, a conceptual reality (*vikalpadharmatā*) alone can be established (*vyavasthāpa*-). These concepts are the cause of all these proliferations (*prapañca*), metaphors (*upacāra*), names (*nāman*), designations (*saṃjñā*), signs (*prajñapti*) and speech (*vyavahāra*). Thus, when one speaks of form or the attributes of the Buddha, it is a matter of conceptual form (*vikalparūpa*) and conceptual attributes of the Buddha (*vikalpabuddhadharma*). Whether the Tathāgatas appear or not (*utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā*), this nature of things remains, this fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*) remains. Because of of this imaginary nature (*parikalpitarūpa*), conceptual form (*vikalparūpa*) is eternal and constant: this is the true nature (*tathatā*), the absence of self-nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), the nonexistence of dharmas (*dharmanairātmiya*), the limit of existence (*bhūtaḥkoṭi*); it is called dharmatārūpa. Because of these imaginary attributes of the Buddha (*parikalpitabuddhadharma*), the conceptual attributes of the Buddha (*vikalpabuddhadharma*) are eternal and constant; they are called dharmatābuddhadharma.”

5. Among the concepts listed in § 2, the concept of body, of the possessor of the body and of the enjoyer (*dehadēhibhokṭṛvijñapti*) is the six inner elements (*ādhyātmikadhātu*), eye, etc. The concept cognized by the preceding ones (*tadupabhuktavijñapti*) is the six outer elements (*bāhyadhātu*), color, etc. The concept that cognizes the preceding one (*tadupabhokṭṛvijñapti*) is the six elements, visual consciousness, etc., (*caḥsurjñānādi-ṣaddhātu*). The other concepts, vi) - xi), are modes (*prabheda*) of the first five. [138a19]

5. Comm. Bh and bh are lacking. U 399c17-25, u 270b3-4.

“The other concepts, vi) - xi), are modes of the first five: concepts i) - v), beginning with *dehavijñapti* and ending with *tadupabhokṭṛvijñapti* Indeed, there are temporal distinctions in the concept of *saṃskāra*, namely, past, present or future *saṃskāra*; hence the concept of temporal appearance. There are numerical distinctions in this concept of *saṃskāra*: the number 1, etc.; hence the concept of numerical appearance. There are distinctions of place in this same concept, namely, above, below, etc; hence the concept of the aspect of space; and so on for the other concepts.” (U)

6. You say: "These notions (*vijñapti*) are none other than concept only (*vijñaptimātra*) since there is no object (*arthābhāvāt*)." What is the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) for that? - The dream (*svapna*), etc., can be used as an example. Thus, in a dream where there is no object (*artha*), nothing but a bare consciousness (*vijñānamātra*), various objects - colors (*rūpa*), sounds (*śabda*), smells (*gandha*), tastes (*rasa*) and tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*), houses (*ghara*), forests (*vana*), lands (*bhūmi*) and mountains (*parvata*) - appear; however, there is no real object there. By this comparison, it will be understood (*avabudh-*) how, not only in the dream but everywhere else (*sarvatrapī*), there is nothing but concept (*vijñaptimātratā*). In the phrase 'the dream, etc., can be used as example', the word 'etc.' should be understood as including other examples: magic (*māya*), mirage (*mārici*) and optical illusion (*timira*). [Cf. I, § 61, no. 3; II, § 27].

Let us agree that in the awake state (*prabodha*) as in the dream state (*svapna*), everything comes down to concept-only (*vijñaptimātra*). But on emerging from the dream, one has the feeling that the dream was just a concept. Why does the same feeling not arise equally in the awake state? – It appears in those who are awakened (*prabuddha*) by means of the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*). Just as the feeling of the non-objectivity of the dream visions is lacking during the dream but appears after waking up, in the same way the feeling of the non-objectivity of the visions of the waking state is lacking in those who have not been awakened by the knowledge of reality, but does appear in those whom this knowledge has awakened. [138b1]

6. Comm. Bh and bh are lacking. U 400a5-7, u 270b4-5.

7. How can those who have not yet been awakened (*prabuddha*) by the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*) understand the existence of concept only (*viññaptimātra*) by deduction (*anumā-*)? - By scripture (*āgama*) and by reasoning (*yukti*).

i) Scripture, first. In the Daśabhūmika (p. 49), the Bhagavat said: "This three-fold world is nothing but mind" (*cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*). And in the Saṃdhinirmocana (VIII, v. 7), Maitreya asked: "Bhagavat, are the images (*pratibimba*) perceived during concentration (*samādhigohara*) different (*bhinna*) or not different (*abhinna*) from the mind (*citta*) that perceives them?" and the Bhagavat replied: "Maitreya, they are not different from the mind. Why? Because these images are concept only (*viññaptimātra*). I have said that the object of consciousness (*viññānālamabana*) is formed (*prabhāvita*) by concept only, thus there is no external object." - Maitreya asked: "Bhagavat, if the images perceived during concentration are not different from the mind, how can the mind grasp (*gr̥hnāti*) the mind itself?" - "Maitreya, no dharma grasps another dharma; nevertheless, the mind that arises thus (*evam utpannam*) from causes and conditions appears thus (*evam avabhāsate*) in the twofold aspect of a mind that is seen and a mind that sees. Thus, for example, given a form (*rūpaṃ niśritya*) in the polished surface of a mirror (*suparīśuddha ādarśamaṇḍala*) in which it is reflected, one imagines that one sees the form and the image (*pratibimbam api paśyāmīti manyate*). The form and the image that one sees appear as two distinct things (*bhinnārthenāvabhāsante*), whereas the image is non-existent [cf. Kośa III, p. 34-35.] Similarly, the mind that arises thus from causes and conditions and the images [perceived in concentration seem to be different things, whereas they are two aspects, the one passive, the other active, of one and the same mind.

ii) The reasoning is given as well by this āgama. Thus, when the mind (*citta*) is in concentration (*samāhita*), whatever dharma image (*jñeyapratibimba*),

blue (*vinīlaka*), etc., is seen, it is the mind itself that is seen. There is no object blue, etc., separate from the mind. By means of this reasoning, the Bodhisattva is able to deduce (*anumanā*) that, at the basis of all notions [and not just at the basis of meditated concepts], there is concept only (*vijñaptimatrāta*) and not objective reality. [138b18]

7. Comm. Bh 338c21-28, bh 171b1-4, U 400a28-400c15, u 270b5-272a1.

“By scripture and reasoning: By proof drawn from scripture (*āgamapramāṇa*) and by proof of deduction (*anumānapramāṇa*), those who have not attained the cognition of reality (*tattvajñāna*) concerning concept only nevertheless can indirectly understand that there is concept only and there is no object

In the Daśabhūmīka, it is said that the threefold world is only mind (*cittamātra*). Mind (*citta*) and concept (*vijñapti*) are synonymous. The word *only* (*mātra*) denies the existence of the known object (*grāhya*); since the known object does not exist, neither does the knowing subject (*grāhaka*) exist. The word *mātra* does not deny the mental factors (*caitta*) because the mental factors are inseparable from the mind (*citta*). Indeed, it says: “If the mental factors are absent, the mind also is absent.....” The text says that the *traidhātuka*, ‘that which belongs to the three worlds’, is only mind. What should one understand by *traidhātuka*? That which is associated with *tṛṣṇā*, desire, etc., (*kāmādi*), is part of the three worlds. The word *cittamātra* thus establishes that only mind and mental factors exist, that the falsely imagined objects (*ālambana*) of the three worlds do not exist. It does not deny that the true nature (*tathatā*) and the dependent nature (*paratantra*) are objects (*ālambana*) of mind and mental factors, for these two constitute part of the truth of the path (*mārgasatya*), are the object of root-cognition (*mūlajñāna*) and subsequent cognition (*prṣṭalabdhajñāna*), are not held by *tṛṣṇā*, are not to be counteracted, are not erroneous, are not included in the three worlds, are not separate (*vyatirikta*) from mind. Consequently, the text does not deny them.

Objection - You say that the world of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and the form realm (*rūpadhātu*) are only mind (*cittamātra*). But why say that the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) is only mind? The Lesser Vehicle accepts that the third realm is only mind. Your text proves that which is already accepted (*siddhasādhana*).

You are mistaken about the meaning of the word *cittamātra*. It is not only a question of the nonexistence of form (*rūpa*), but also of the nonexistence of the mind and mental factors (*rāga*, etc.) inasmuch as they take an object, of the nonexistence of objects taken by the mind, including the *ākāśānantya*, etc., [objects of the mind in *ārūpyadhātu* according to the Sarvāstivādins.] On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas think that *ākāśa*, the simple absence of form, has no reality: in fact, the *ākāśa* is a manifestation of the mind; it is *cittamātra*. Fearing lest the Sautrāntikas would say: "The *ākāśa*, being separate from the *citta-caitta*, should be called a dharma that is not mind", or lest they say: "The mind that bears upon *ākāśa*, not having an object, does not exist", the text says the three worlds are only mind" (U after Siddhi, p. 420)

Here is the passage of the Samdhinirmocana commented on by u: *tiñ ñe ḥdzin ni sems rtse gcig tu byed pa sems las byuñ baḥi chos so /deḥi spyod ni yul lo // gzugs brñan ni gzugs dños ltar snañ baḥo // dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu dbye ba can Ĕes bya ba ni phyi rol gyi dmigs pa med paḥo // rnam par śes pa dmigs pa yin par bśad do // Ĕes ba ni ḥdi ltar dmigs pa de rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba ni deḥi ño bo ñid ces bya baḥi tha tshig go // rnam par śes pa ni dmigs par snañ ba tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin par bśad Ĕes bya baḥi tha tshig go // sems de ñid kyis Ĕes bya ba la sogs pa ni bdag ñid la byed pa ḥgal bar ston paḥo // byams pa chos gañ yañ Ĕes ba la sogs pa ni lan ḥdebs pa ste / chos thams cad ni byed pa med pas byed pa dañ byed pa po mi ḥthad paḥi phyir ro // de ltar skyes pa Ĕes bya ba ni rten ciñ ḥbrel par ḥbyuñ baḥi che ba ñid kyis ni gcig kho na rnam pa gñis su snañ baḥi tshul brjod paḥo // dper na gzugs kyis gĔi bo rañ gi bĔin ñid la brten nas me loñ la sogs paḥi nañ du de ñid snañ yañ gzugs brñan mthoñ ño sñam du log par sems te / me loñ la sogs pa rgyuḥi mthus don gĔan du med kyañ snañ baḥi phyir ro // de bĔin du dran pa dañ kun tu rtog pa la sogs paḥi rkyen gyi mthus gañ tha dad pa ma yin yañ tha dad par snañ ba tiñ ñe ḥdzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brñan de de bĔin du skyes so // luñ de ni tshad ma dañ bcas par bcom ldan ḥdas ñid kyis gtan la phab po /: "Concentration is the one-pointed fixing of the mind (*cittaikāgratā*): it is a mental factor (*caittasikadharmā*). The domain (*gocara*) perceived by it is its object (*viṣaya*). The image (*pratibimba*) is a representation similar to the original. The object of consciousness is formed (*prabhāvita*) by a concept only: there is no external object (*bāhyā lambana*). I have said that the object of consciousness is a concept only: that is to say that this object formed by a mere concept has this simple concept as self-nature*

(*svabhāva*). This goes back to saying: I have said that consciousness is formed simply by an appearing object. *How can the mind grasp the mind itself?* This shows the duality between substance and its activity [between the emptiness that has been thought of and the fact of the consciousness]. *Maitreya, no dharma, etc.:* this refutes the objection: indeed, since all dharmas are without activity (cf. Koṣa, IX, p. 280), action (*kriyā*) and agent (*kāraṇa*) are non-existent. *Nevertheless, the mind that arises in this way, etc.:* by the vastness (*mahattva*) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the mind, single and simple, is caused to appear in a twofold aspect (*ākāra*) [of a mind that is seen and a mind that sees]. Thus, when one places a screen (?) before one's face (*svamukha*), it is the face itself which appears in the mirror (*ādarśa*), etc.; however, one wrongly thinks that one sees an image (*pratibimba*) distinct from the face. By the causal power (*hetubala*) of the mirror, etc., the image which is not something other than the face (cf. Koṣa, III, p. 34)] appears nevertheless as different from it. Similarly, by the conditioning power (*pratyayabala*) of memory (*smṛti*), of imagination (*parikalpa*), etc., images seen in concentration arise which, without being different from the mind, nevertheless appear as different from it. This āgama with its commentary (*sapramāṇam*) was given by the Bhagavat himself.”

8. At the basis of the image blue, etc., there can be no consciousness of memory because the object perceived in concentration is immediately present (*puro 'vasthita*). Arising from hearing (*śrutamaya*) and pondering (*cintāmaya*), the consciousness of memory has the past (*atīta*) as object; therefore what it sees is concept only (*viññaptimātra*). By this deduction (*anumāna*), even if he is not yet awakened (*prabuddha*) by the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*), the bodhisattva can deduce the existence of concept only. [138b22]

8. Comm. Bh 338c28-339a8, bh 171b5-172a2, U 400c15-29, u 272a1-7.

“*There can be no consciousness of memory at the basis of the image blue, etc.:* The author speaks in this way because he is afraid that someone may believe the opposite. Indeed, there are people who think that the images perceived in concentration are a

reminder of the skeletons (*kaṅkāla*) once seen in a cemetery (*śmaśāna*), etc. To dispel this theory, the author says: *At the basis of the image blue, etc., there can be no consciousness of memory because the object perceived in concentration is immediately present.* If the image perceived in concentration were the memory of some past day, one ought to remember the particular place where the thing had been seen earlier as well as the earlier perception. But this is not the case. The knowledge resulting from meditation or concentration (*bhāvanāmayajñāna*) is a consciousness of the present; the object seen by it is distinct (*spaṣṭa*) and immediately present (*sākṣāt*). The consciousness of memory has no such object.

Objection - If the distinctive feature (*mūladravya*) of memory is to be a consciousness associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the wisdom stemming from hearing (*śrutamayī prajñā*) and with the wisdom stemming from contemplation (*cintāmayī prajñā*), its twofold object (*gocara*) is distinct from consciousness.

That is not so: stemming from hearing, etc., the twofold consciousness of memory has the past (*atīta*) as object. And since the past does not exist, the image which it perceives is mere concept, for example, the memories of childhood. Therefore, what is remembered by this consciousness is mere concept because the object of the mind (so nien) is empty (*śūnya*). This is like the images of men and women - impure skeletons - perceived directly by yogins.” (U)

9. Among the eleven concepts (*viññapti*) (in § 2, 5), - ideas that are like a dream (§ 6), - we understand that the concept of the visual consciousness, etc.

(*caḥsurviññānaviññapti*) is mere concept (*viññaptimātra*), but how do we know that material ideas (*rūpaviññapti*), eye, etc. (*caḥsurādī*), are mere concept? - By scripture (*āgama*) and by reasoning (*yukti*) as above (§ 7).

If these [material concepts, eye, etc.,] are concept only, why do they have a material appearance and form homogeneous and solid series (*saṃtāna*)? - Because they are the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) or cause of error and other afflictions (*viparyāsadisamkleśa*). Otherwise, if these concepts arose without material appearance, the error that consists of taking as an object that which is not an object (*anarthe 'rtha iti viparyāsaḥ*) would not occur. If the error would not occur,

the afflictions constituting the obstacle of desire (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle of knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) would not occur. If the afflictions would not occur, purification (*vyavadāna*) also would not occur (see below, § 25). That is why it is necessary that these concepts arise in this way with a material appearance. Here is a verse (cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XI, 24):

*bhrānter nimittaṃ bhrāntiś ca rūpavijñaptir iṣyate /
arūpiṇī ca vijñaptir abhāvāt syān na cetarā //*

“The cause of illusion and the illusion itself are, respectively, material concept and non-material concept. If the first were missing, the second would not exist.”
[138c4]

9. Comm. Bh 339a13-339b6, bh 172a2-172b1, U 401a4-401b4, u 272a7-273a6.

Explanation of the stanza: “*The cause of illusion*, is the concepts that develop similar to rūpa; *the illusion itself*, is the concepts of the non-material development. According to the rule relating to stanzas, the words separated in the phrase are very similar in meaning. If cause-concepts did not develop in rūpa, result-concepts, non-material, would not exist because without *viśaya*, there is no *viśhayin*.” (U)

10. i – v. Why do concepts i) to v), namely, the concept of body, the possessor of the body and the enjoyer (*dehadehi-bhokṭrivijñapti*), the concept cognized by the preceding ones (*tadupabhuktavijñapti*) and the concept that cognizes the preceding one (*tadubhokṭrivijñapti*), arise simultaneously (*sahabhū*) and together (*sahajāta*) during all of existence (*kāya = ātmabhāva*)? - Because they are destined to maintain (*paripūr-*) birth (*jāti*) and pleasure (*upabhoga*).

vi – xi. Why do concepts vi) to xi), called concept of time (*kālavijñapti*), etc., exist? - Because:

vi) Beginningless saṃsāra (*anādikālika*) is never interrupted (*samucchinna*).

vii) The world of beings (*sattvadhātu*) is incalculable (*aprameya*).

viii) The receptacle-world (*bhājanaloka*) is immense (*aprameya*).

- ix) Speech (*vyavahāra*) which maintains relationships is limitless (*aprameya*).
- x) The variety of pleasure taken up (*pariḡhītopa-bhogaviśeṣa*) is infinite (*aprameya*).
- xi) In the pleasant or unpleasant (*iṣṭāniṣṭavipāka*) retribution of the result of action (*karmaphala*), the kinds of pleasure (*upabhogaviśeṣa*) are infinite; the kinds of birth, old age and death (*jātijarāmarāṇa*) that one undergoes are infinite (*aprameya*). [138c12]

10. Comm. Bh 339b15-17, bh 172b1-2, U 401b7-19, u 273a6-273b3.

“Because they are destined to maintain birth and pleasure: indeed, if these five concepts enter into all of existence, all of the existences capable of pleasure are explained. But if one or the other of these concepts is absent, the existence is not explicable.” (u)

11. How are these concepts (*vijñapti*) established (*avasthita*) as concept only (*vijñaptimātra*)? - Briefly (*samāsataḥ*), according to a threefold aspect (*ākāra*):

- i) According to unicity (*tanmātra*), because they have no object (*artha*).
- ii) According to duality (*dvaya*), because these concepts are supplied with image (*sanimitta*) and vision (*sadarśana*).
- iii) According to arising as multiplicity (*nānātva*), because they arise simultaneously with different aspects (*nānāvidhākāra*).

* * *

- i) Thus, all these concepts are uniquely concept since they have no object.
- ii) They are twofold since they are supplied with image and vision. Thus, the concept of the eye, etc. (*cakṣurādi-vijñapti*) has, as image, (*nimitta*), the concept of color, etc. (*rūpādivijñapti*), as vision (*daršana*), the concept of visual consciousness (*cakṣurjñānavijñapti*), and so on up to the concept of body consciousness (*kāyajñānavijñapti*).

iii) The concept of manas (*manovijñapti*) has, as image, all the concepts from the concept of eye up to that of dharma; as vision, it has the concept of mental consciousness (*manovijñānavijñapti*), because the mental consciousness is concept (*vikalpa*) and arises similar to all the concepts. Here is a verse:

Yogins wish to understand unicity (*tanmātra*), duality (*dvaya*) and multiplicity (*nānatva*) because the one who has penetrated mind-only (*cittamātra*) is free from mind. [138c23]

11. Comm. Bh 339b29-339c20, bh 172b2-173a5, U 401c2-25, u 273b3-274a8.

“Here the prose (*gadya*) and the verse (*gāthā*) explain how concept only is established because of three characteristics.” (Bh)

i) *Because of unicity*: “Since there is merely concept, all concepts are nothing but concept because the known object (*viññātārtha*) is not there (*akimcit*).” (Bh) – “Because of unicity (*tanmātra*), that is to say, that there is no object The word *mātra* denies the object. The proof of the non-existence of the object has already been made (cf. § 7): the author will now go on to a new section.” (U)

ii) *Because of duality*: “The author establishes (*vyavasthāp-*) image and vision in one and the same consciousness (*viññāna*). In one and the same concept (*viññapti*), there is one part (*bhāga*) that is image and a second part that is vision. This is why the visual consciousness, etc., is twofold.” (Bh) - *Because of duality*: “This is a matter of image and vision. In one and the same concept, there is image and there is vision. These two parts (*bhāga*), the image part (*nimittabhāga*) and the vision part (*darśanabhāga*), are simultaneous (*sahabhū*). They are neither identical with the concept nor different from it. The concept of eye up to the concept of body, each according to its type, develops (*pariṇamanti*) as all kinds of image-concepts (*nimittavijñapti*), the concept of color, etc.; this is what is called *nimittabhāga*. The consciousnesses, visual consciousness (*caḥsurviññāna*), etc., that cognize the object (*viśaya*), that see the object, are called *darśanabhāga*. Or else, the part which is the object cognized (*grāhyabhāga*) is called *nimitta* and the part which is knower subject (*grāhakabhāga*) is called *darśana*. This is what is called duality.” (U)

iii) “The author establishes multiplicity. In one and the same concept, the first part develops into various images which the second part grasps (*grhṇāti*) in various ways as the case may be (*yathāyogam*).” (Bh) – “*Because of multiplicity*: that is to say, the concept arises under multiple aspects. In one and the same concept, the first part develops (*pariṇamati*) in the aspect of an image, object of consciousness (*grāhyanimitta*), and the second part in the aspect of a vision, subject of consciousness (*grāhakadarśana*). These two parts arise simultaneously in many different aspects. If one did not accept that one and the same consciousness, at one given time, presents all kinds of aspects, this consciousness would not be able to cognize several objects simultaneously.” (U)

The concept of manas has, as image, all the concepts, from the concept of the eye up to that of dharma; as vision, the concept of mental consciousness: “This concept of manas is able to grasp all objects simultaneously. As image, it has all the concepts from that of the eye, which is the dominant power (*adhipatibala*), to that of of dharma; this is its image part (*nimitta bhāga*). The concept of mental consciousness, which cognizes the object, is its vision part (*darśanabhāga*), because this mental consciousness is universal concept (*sarvavikalpa*) and arises similar to all concepts.” (U) – “In this third point, relative to the mental consciousness only is there variety, because the object which it grasps (*grāhyaviṣaya*) is not determinate (*pratiniyata*). The other consciousnesses have a determinate object and lack conceptualization (*vikalpa*). But the mental consciousness is conceptual. Therefore one attributes the third point to it alone, namely, the multiplicity of images and visions. This is why it is enough to show that this consciousness is concept only.” (Bh)

Verse: Yogins who understand concept only, duality and multiplicity, crush the external object (*bāhyaviṣaya*) and finally crush the mind that takes the object (*grāhakacitta*). Since the object (*ālambana*) does not exist, the consciousness that takes it (*grāhakavijñāna*) does not exist either; since the object to be known (*jñeya*) does not exist, the knower (*jñātṛ*) does not exist either. Without *jñeya*, there is no *jñātṛ*” (U)

12. Some think (*kecin manyante*) that the first five consciousnesses do not exist but that the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) takes such and such a name, e.g., the name of visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc., according to

the support (*āśraya*) it takes, the eye, ear, etc., - in the same way that volition (*cetana*) is called bodily action (*kāyakarman*) or vocal action (*vākkarman*) according to whether it depends on the body or speech.

Although arising on a material support, the mental consciousness is not, however, without concept: arising on any support whatsoever, the mental consciousness together with its various aspects (*nānākāreṇa*) takes on a twofold appearance, namely, the appearance of just an object (*arthamātrabhāsa*) and the appearance of a concept (*vikalpābhāsa*).

In the two worlds endowed with form (*rūpidhātu*), the mental consciousness relies on the body (*kāya*); consequently, as the material organs (*rūpīndriya*) which are different from it (*tadanya*) and which rely on the body, it appears everywhere (*sthāna*) in the aspect of the tangible (*spraŌthavya*).

i) Here is a verse (cf Siddhi, p. 5; Dhammapada, stanza 37):

dūraṅgamam ekacaram aśarīraṃ guhāśayam /

damayan durdamaṃ cittaṃ tam ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇam //

“He who tames the stubborn mind that wanders afar, that wanders alone, that has no body and that dwells in the cave, him I call brahman.”

ii) In the same way, (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 295; Saṃyutta, V, p. 218): *imesaṃ kho pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ gocaravisayaṃ mano paccaṇubhoti mano cesaṃ patisaraṇaṃ*: “The manas senses the object perceived by the five organs; the manas is their refuge.”

iii) Similarly, it is said: “Among the twelve āyatana in question, the six groups of consciousnesses (*ṣaḍvijñānakāya*) are the mana-āyatana.” [139a6]

12. Comm. Bh 339c23-340b13, bh 173a6-174b2, U 401c27-402b10, u 274a8-275a7.

“Some people think : Here the author explains a particular system (*darśanaviheṣa*). One category of bodhisattva gathers everything into one single mental consciousness. According to whether it relies on such and such an organ, eye, etc., it takes such and such a name, visual consciousness up to mental consciousness, at the moment of its arising.

Beyond the mental consciousness there is no other consciousness of any other kind. How is that? *Just as volition*: if it relies on the body and moves (*pravartayati*) the body, it is called bodily action; if it relies on the voice and moves the voice, it is called vocal action; if it is associated with the manas, it is called mental action. It is the same for the mental consciousness.

Objection - If that were so, the mental consciousness would be without conceptualization (*vikalpa*) like the visual consciousness, etc. (cf. I, § 7; Kośa I, p. 60), since it would have a coarse (material) support (*āśraya*). The thing supported (*āśrita*) is always in accord with its support (*āśraya*); thus, because the afflicted manas (*kliṣṭamanas*) is the support of defilement (*saṃkleśāśraya*), the mental consciousness that functions with it is defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*). To reply to this objection, the bodhisattvas say: *arising on no matter what support*, etc., that is to say, on the eye and the other support-organs, the mental consciousness, *together with its various aspects, takes on a twofold appearance*, namely, the appearance of a cognized object (*grāhya*) and the appearance of a cognizing subject (*grāhaka*). Then to define these, these bodhisattvas say: *the appearance of just an object*, etc. This means that there is one single mental consciousness of which one part (*bhāga*) manifests as the appearance of an imitation-object, while the other manifests as a concept about this object (*arthavikalpa*). Thus it avoids the error of being without concepts.

Moreover, *it appears everywhere in the aspect of the tangible*: in concentration, it takes in and imagines tangibles, heaviness and lightness, without, nevertheless, being distracted (*vikṣipta*), because it accompanies these tangibles. This occurs *in the two worlds with form* (*rūpidhātu*) and not in the formless world (*ārūpyadhātu*). Why? Because in these two worlds, *this mental consciousness relies on the body and on the material organs different from it which rely on the body*. Just as the eye and the other material organs that rely on the body can do good (*hita*) or evil (*upadrava*) to the body, so the mental consciousness which, in the two worlds with form, relies on the body, is able to register and imagine the body and do good or evil for it.” (U)

By means of three scriptural texts, the bodhisattvas show that the mental consciousness cognizes not only its own object but also those of the other five consciousnesses, and that, consequently, these five consciousnesses are useless. “To establish their system, the bodhisattvas cite scriptural stanzas (*āgamagāthā*) as proof: *he who tames the mind which wanders afar* (because it has all the *viśayas* as *ālambana*), *which goes alone* (because

advitīya), which has no body (= *vigatakāya*) and which dwells in a cave (inhabits the cave of the body)” (Bh)

13. When the concept of store-consciousness (*ālayavijñānavijñapti*) is considered as an objective concept (*arthavijñapti*), then it must be recognized (*veditavyam*) that all the other concepts (*tadanyavijñapti*) make up its concept-image (*nimittavijñapti*), whereas the concept of mental consciousness (*manovijñānavijñapti*) together with support (*sāśrayam*), make up its concept-vision (*darśanavijñapti*). The concept-images (*nimittābhūtā vijñaptiḥ*), being the image generating the vision (*darśanotpādanimitta*), appear as object (*arthavad ābhāsante*) and play the rôle of support of arising (*utpādāśraya*) in regard to vision. This is how the existence of concept-only (*vijñaptimātratā*) is established.
[139a11]

13. Comm. Bh 340b19-27, bh 174b2-6, U 402b15-25, u 275a7-275b4.

“If the idea of store-consciousness is considered as an objective concept: objective (artha) has the meaning of causal (hetu): if the concept of store-consciousness is considered as a causal concept, then all the other concepts, concepts of body, etc., (kayādivijñapti), make up its concept-image because they are its object (ālambananimitta) and its domain (gocara); whereas the concept of mental consciousness together with the support - i.e., the sixth consciousness and the support, or the manas just past (anantarātita) and the afflicted (kliṣṭa) manas, because these two manas are the support of arising and of the defilement (saṃkleśa) of the mental consciousness - form its concept-vision.” (U)

14. How does one explain that, although it manifests, the object does not exist? - As the Bhagavat has said: When bodhisattvas have four qualities (*guṇa*), i.e., four knowledges, they understand (*avabudh-*) the non-objectivity (*anarthakatva*) of all concepts (*vijñapti*). These four knowledges are:

i) *Viruddhavijñānanimittatvajñāna*: knowledge that one and the same object is the cause of opposing consciousnesses. Thus hungry ghosts (*preta*), animals (*tiryak*), humans (*manuṣya*) and gods (*deva*) have differing concepts (*bhinnavijñapti*) of one and the same thing (*ekadravya*).

ii) *Anāmbanavijñaptiyupalabdhitvajñāna*: knowledge that one can perceive concepts without object. Thus the past (*atīta*), the future (*anāgata*), dream (*svapna*), reflection (*pratibimba*) are perceived in the absence of any object.

iii) *Aprayatnāvīparītatvajñāna*: knowledge that there would be neither effort nor error if the object were real. If the object existed, the consciousnesses bearing on this object (*tadāmbana vijñāna*) would be made effortlessly and without error since one would be cognizing reality (*tattva*).

iv) *Trividhajñānānukūlatvajñāna*: knowledge that the object conforms to the threefold knowledge:

(a) For bodhisattvas and those in the dhyāna states (*dhyāyin*) who have attained mastery of mind (*cetavaśita*), objects appear as they want them by the power of their aspiration (*adhimuktibala*).

(b) For yogins who have attained tranquility (*śamatha*) and who practice the examination of dharmas (*dharmavipaśyanā*), objects appear at the precise moment of attention (*manasikāra*).

(c) For those who have attained nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) and who abide there, no more objects appear.

Thus, because of the close correspondence of the object with this threefold knowledge and for the other reasons (*hetu*) given above, it is proved (*siddha*) that the object does not exist. [139a25]

14b. Here are some verses:

(a) According to their class, hungry ghosts, animals, humans and gods have different concepts of the same object. Therefore we conclude that the object does not exist.

(b) In the past, etc., in the dream and in double reflection, there is no object of consciousness; nevertheless, they can be perceived.

(c) If the object were truly an object, the wisdom free of concept would not arise; without this wisdom, buddhahood could not be attained.

(d) For bodhisattvas possessing mastery and also for yogins, earth, etc., are transformed into whatever substance they wish by the power of their aspiration.

(e) Finally, for the sage (*dhīmat*) who assures for himself the possession of tranquility, objects appear in this way together with the set of their characteristics when he reflects on the dharmas.

(f) When nonconceptual wisdom is attained, no further objects appear. Thus it is known that the object does not exist. Since it does not exist, concept is not objective.

14. Comm. Bh 340c14-29, bh 174b6-175a7, U 402c11-403a22, u 275b4-276b8.

“To prove that there is no object, the author cites another āgama and another argument.

i) *Viruddhajñānanimittatvajñāna*: to understand that the *nimitta* of opposing consciousnesses is just a development of the inner mind (*ādhyātmikacittapariṇāma*) and that the outer object (*bāhyārtha*) does not exist” (U) - u continues: *chu kluñ gañ la yi dwags rnam kyis ran gi las kyī rnam par smin pañi dbaṅ gis rnag la sogs pas gañ bar mthoñ ba de ñid la dud ḡgro ña la sogs pas btuñ ba dañ gnas yin pañi blos gnas par byed do // mi rnam ni dñar ba dañ dañ ba dañ bsal bañi chur rtog ciñ khruś byed do // ḡthuiñ ño // ḡjug go // nam mkhaḡ mthaḡ yas skye mched la sñoms par ḡjug pañi lha rnam kyis ni nam mkhar mthoñ ste / gzugs kyī ḡdu śes rnam par bśig pañi phyir ro // dños po gcig la phan tshun mi mthun pañi rnam par śes pa du ma ḡbyuñ ba de ni mi ruñ ba ste / chu kluñ de ñid rnag dañ gcin dañ phyi sas gañ ba dañ / dbyug pa dañ ral gri thogs pañi mis bsruñs pa yin na dri Ēim pa dañ bsil bañi chu dañ / gnas dañ / btun ba la sogs pañi bya bañi ḡos dañ nam mkhaḡi bdag ñid du ji ltar ḡgyur te / pha rol gyi don med do // brtags pas der snañ bar ni ruñ ste / ji skad du*

bud med lus ni gcig pu la/

/ ro daṅ ḥdod bya za ba €es/

/ kun rgyu ḥdod can khyi rnam kyī/

/ rnam par rtog pa rnam pa gsum mo/

€es bśad pa lta buḥo/: “There where, by the power of retribution (*vipākabala*) of their actions (*svakarma*), hungry ghosts (*preta*) see a river (*nadī*) filled with pus (*pūyapūrṇa*), animals (*tiryak*), fish (*matsya*), etc., see a drink (*pāna*), a home, and they settle in it. Humans (*manuṣya*) see delicious water, clear and pure: they use it to bathe, quench their thirst and wash. As for the gods in concentration (*samāhitadeva*) in the sphere of infinite space (*ākāśānantyāyatana*), they see only space there because they no longer have physical sensation (*rūpasamjñā*). But it is impossible in this way to have mutually different experiences of one and the same thing if this thing were real. How could this same river, full of pus (*pūya*), urine (*mūtra*) and excrement (*purāṣa*), guarded by armed men with sticks and swords (*daṅḍāsidharaiś ca puruṣair adhiṣṭhitā*), be at the same time sweet-smelling (*sugandha*) fresh (*śītala*) water, a home and a drink? How could it be identical with space? But if it is accepted that the external object does not exist, all this is explained. Cf. Sarvadarśanasamgraha, (ed. by Ānandāśrama, p. 12) where it is said: *parivrāṭkāmukaśunām ekasyāṃ pramadātanau / kuṅapaḥ kāmīnī bhakṣya iti tisro vikalpaṇāḥ //* : the monk, the lover and the dog have three different conceptions of one and the same woman: she is a carcass, a mistress or food.” (u)

ii) *Anālabanavijñāptyupalabdhitvajñāna*: “The Sautrāntikas have proved (cf. Kośa, V, p. 58) that the past and the future are cognized without being objects. The non-reality of the dream is well known. We have spoken (§ 7) of images perceived in concentration and we said (§ 8) that they could not be memories because they are perceived directly. We have shown above (§ 7) how the reflection of a face, etc., in a mirror, etc., is nothing but what it is (*akimcit*). It is established that consciousnesses bearing on these things have no object (*ālabana*).” (u)

iii) *Aprayatnāvīparītatvajñāna*: “The text is clear and needs no explanation. If one accepts that objects are really such as they are perceived, one would understand the truth (*bhūta*) and beings (*dehin*) would be delivered (*vimukta*) effortlessly.” (u)

iv) *Trividhajñānānukūlatvajñāna*: “(a) The *ecstatics*, the ones who are in *dhyāna*, are the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; *dhyāna* is the one-pointed fixing of the mind

(*cittaikāgratā*). They are called 'ecstatics' because they practice ecstasy. *Who have attained mastery of the mind*: who have attained aptitude of mind (*cittakarmanyatā*). By the power of their beliefs, they transform earth into water, etc. - (b) *For the yogins who have attained tranquility*: who have attained concentration (*samādhi*). Śamatha and samādhi are synonymous. Because it calms the distractions of the mind (*cittavikṣepa*), śamatha is tranquility.... *And who practice examination of the dharmas*: who, by a practice subsequent to tranquility (*prṣṭhalabdha*), practice vipaśyanā (or prajñā) of the dharmas, sūtras, etc.” (u) - bh: *don gcig la yañ ji lta ji lta yid la byas pa de lta de lta rnam pa mañ po snañ baḥo*: "one and the same object, according to how it is considered, appears to them with its set of characteristics, impermanence, suffering, etc.” - (c) “If the object really existed, the acquisition of nonconceptual knowledge would no longer be explained because the object would be seen as it is from the start.”(u)

15. i) If the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is the concept-only (*vijñaptimātra*) basis of the object (*arthābhāsāśraya*), how is it dependent and why is it called dependent? - Because it stems from (*utpanna*) its own propensity seeds (*vāsanābīja*), it is dependent on conditions. Because it is incapable of lasting by itself (*svataḥ*) for a single moment after its arising, it is called dependent.

ii) If the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is this manifestation of non-object as object that is based on the dependent nature (*tadāśrito 'narthasyārthavad ābhāsaḥ*), how is it imaginary and why is it called imaginary? - Because it is the generating cause (*utpādanimitta*) of errors (*viparyāsa*) of the mental consciousness of innumerable aspects (*aprameyākāra manovijñāna*) or imagination (*parikalpa*), it is imaginary. Because it has no nature of its own (*svalakṣaṇa*) and is present as a pure imagination (*parikalpamātra*), it is called imaginary.

iii) If the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is the complete absence in the dependent nature (*ātyantikābhāvalakṣaṇa*) of this imaginary nature, how is it absolute and why is it called absolute? - Because it is immutable (*avikāra*), it is absolute. Because it is the object of the purified mind

**(*viśuddhāmbana*) and the quintessence of all good dharmas
(*kuśaladharmasreṣṭha*), it is rightly called absolute. [139b9]**

15. Comm. Bh 341a6-341b4, bh 175a7-175b8, U 403a27-403c1, u 276b8-277b1.

This paragraph is easy to understand according to the preceding one. The dependent nature or mere concept, underlying the imaginary nature, arises from the propensities of speech. Thus it depends on conditions and merits the name ‘dependent’. The imaginary nature is the fact that the dependent nature is poorly understood. Instead of recognizing it as mere concept, it is perceived as a duality consisting of the grasped (object of consciousness) and the grasper (subject of consciousness). These mistakes are the work of the mental consciousness or imagination (*parikalpa*) of innumerable aspects; “concerning all kinds of *viśaya*, *ātman* and *dharmas*.” (U) The absolute nature, which is defined as the absence of *parikalpita* in the *paratantra*, is the tathatā, the true inalterable nature and the object of the non-erroneous mind (*viśuddhāmbana*). The commentaries get lost in explaining the details.

16. An imagination (*parikalpa*) and something imagined (*parikalpya*) are required for an imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). What are imagination, the thing imagined and the imaginary nature here?

i) Imagination is the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) because it is furnished with conceptions (*savikalpaka*). It has its own speech propensities (*svābhilāpavāsanā*) as seed; it has also as seed the *abhilāpavāsanā* of all concepts (*vijñapti*). As a result, it arises with concepts of infinite aspects (*anantākāravikalpa*). Because it imagines by fabricating in every way, it is called imagination (*sarvathā kalpena parikalpayatīti parikalpaḥ*).

ii) The thing imagined is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*).

iii) The imaginary nature is the aspect (*ākāra*) in which the dependent nature is imagined. The ‘aspect’ is the way (*kathām*).

How does the imagination imagine? What is the object (*ālambana*), the grasping of characteristics (*nimittograhana*), the belief (*abhiniveśa*), the uttering of the

voice (*vāksamutthāna*), speech (*vyavahāra*) and the imputations (*samāropa*) by means of which it imagines? - It takes its object by means of the name (*nāman*); it apprehends the characteristics in the dependent nature; it adheres to them by wrong views (*dr̥ṣṭi*), it emits voice by inspection (*vitarka*); it speaks by fourfold speech: that which is seen, etc. (*dr̥ṣṭādivyavahāra*); it imputes by attributing existence to a non-existent thing. This is how it imagines. [139b23]

16. Comm. Bh 341b20-341c1, bh 175b8-176a6, U 403c16-404a14, u 277b1-278a5.

“An imagination is required, etc.: the author says this so as to analyze imagination.

*i) Imagination is the mental consciousness because it is furnished with conceptions: because it is linked (*anubaddha*) to the two vikalpas called examination (*nirūpaṇā*) and memory (*anusmaraṇa*). It has as seed its own speech propensities: in beginningless transmigration (*anādikālikasaṃsāra*) there is a mental consciousness, and the seed propensities (*vāsanābīja*) derived from the plurality of speech (*vyavahāraprapaṅca*) are its generating cause (*kanakahetu*). It has also as seed the *abhilāpavāsanās* of all ideations: it has as cause the *abhilāpavāsanābījas* of all the conceptions of infinite aspects (*anantābhāsa*), color, etc., because it arises similar to these ideas (cf. § 11). As a result, it arises with conceptions of infinite aspects.*

*ii) The imagined thing is the dependent nature, because a part (*ekadeśa*) of this dependent nature, the eye and the other *nimittas*, is what is fabricated.*

*iii) The imaginary nature is the aspect (*ākāra*) in which the dependent nature is imagined. 'Aspect' is the manner, the particular angle.*

How does the imagination imagine? The author poses this question in order to explain the modalities of the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāvaprabheda*). *It takes its object by means of the name:* because when one has heard a name (*nāman*), e.g., Devadatta, one can imagine the thing (*artha*); but if one has not heard the name, it is not possible to conceive of the thing [according to u: *lhas sbyin ſes bya ba la sogs paḥi miñ thos nas don la kun tu rtog par byed kyi miñ ma thos par ni don la rnam par rtog par byed mi nus so*]. - *It apprehends the characteristics in the dependent nature:* it adheres (*abhniṣ-*) to its own mark (*svanimitta*) because the grasping of characteristics (*nimittodgrahaṇa*) is

conceptualization (*saṃjñā*), and it is in conformity with this conceptualization that it engages itself in speech (*anuvyavahriyate*). *It adheres there by false views*: by means of the practice of fivefold examination (*nitīraṇa, nirūpaṇā*), it produces belief because, after having apprehended the characteristics, it adheres there; it is to these characteristics that it sticks firmly. After having adhered there, it wishes to speak about it to others and *it emits voice by means of inquiry*. Thus the sūtra says: 'It is after having inquired and judged that one speaks, not without having inquired, not without having judged' (*vitarkya vicārya vācaṃ bhāṣate nāvitarkya nāvicārya*). *It speaks by fourfold speech, that which is seen*, etc.: it speaks by fourfold discourse: that which is seen, heard, felt, cognized (*dr̥ṣṭaśrutamatavijñātavāvahāra*). Thus, in face of a rope (*rajju*) the characteristics (*nimitta*) of which resemble that of a snake (*sarpa*), one apprehends the characteristics of a snake in this rope, sinuosity (*vakratva*), etc., and after having believed in this false snake, one wishes to speak about it to others and one says: "I saw a snake! I saw a snake!" It is the same here. And hearing that, others impute (*samāropayanti*) a real existence to this snake. (U)

17. Are these three natures (*svabhāvatraya*) different (*bhinna*) or are they the same (*abhinna*)? - They are neither different nor the same. The dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is dependent (*paratantra*) in one sense (*pariyāyena*), imaginary (*parikalpita*) in another, absolute (*pariniṣpanna*) in a third sense.

In what sense is the dependent nature 'dependent'? - Insofar as it depends on something else, i.e., the arising of the propensity seeds (*vāsanābīja*) (cf. § 15).

In what sense is it 'imaginary'? - Insofar as it is the object of imagination (*parikalpa*) and is imagined (*parikalpita*) by the latter (cf. § 15, 16).

In what sense is it 'absolute'? - Insofar as it does not exist in the absolute sense in the way it is imagined (cf. § 4, 15). [139c2]

17. Comm. Bh 341c11-18, bh 176a7-176b2, U 404a22-404b9, u 278a6-278b3.

“*They are not different*, because the dependent nature and the imaginary nature are respectively existent and non-existent. And yet one can speak about the difference

between one existent thing and another existent thing, but not between an existent thing and a non-existent thing. Thus the horn of a rabbit (*śaśaviṣāṇa*), which does not exist, is not different from that which it is. They are not the same because existence and non-existence do not constitute one and the same thing. It is the same for the dependent nature and the absolute nature which are impure (*aśuddha*) and pure (*śuddha*) by nature (*prakṛti*) respectively.” (U)

18. How many types (*katividha*) are there in the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*)? – In brief (*samāsataḥ*), there are two (*dvidvidha*): dependence in respect to the propensity seeds (*vāsanābīja*), and dependence consisting of a fundamental non-differentiation (*svabhāvapariniṣpanna*) in regard to defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*).

It is dependent because of this twofold dependency.

The imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) also is twofold because it is imagined by the imagination creating a self-nature (*svabhāvaparikalpa*) and by the imagination creating specifications (*viśeṣaparikalpa*).

The absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) also is twofold. It is absolute by virtue of the absoluteness of self-nature (*svabhāvapariniṣpatti*) and by virtue of the absoluteness of purity (*viśuddhipariniṣpatti*). [139c10]

18. Comm. 341c26-342a4, bh 176b2-6, U 404b17-23, u 278b3-279a2.

“Dependence in regard to the propensity seeds: Because it requires causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) to order to arise, it is dependent. *Dependence consisting of a fundamental non-differentiation in regard to defilement and purification:* because at the time of concept (*vikalpakāle*) it is of defiled nature; in the absence of concept (*nirvikalpakāle*), it is of purified nature

The imagination creating a self-nature is that which seizes (*upaḡrhmāti*) broadly the substrate furnished with attributes (*dharmidravya*), the eye, etc.; *the imagination creating specifications* is that which seizes in detail the various attributes of the thing (*arthadharmā*): eternity (*nityatā*), impermanence (*anityatā*), etc.

The absoluteness of self-nature is the stained true nature (samalā tathatā); the absoluteness of purity is the unstained true nature (vimalā tathatā)." (U)

19. i) Furthermore, there are four mental constructions (imagination) (parikalpa):

- (a) *Svabhāvaparikalpa*: mental construction creating a self-nature.
- (b) *Viśeṣaparikalpa*: mental construction creating a specification.
- (c) *Niṣṇāta*: mental construction belonging to well-endowed beings. The mental construction belonging to well-endowed beings is that which belongs to beings who are skilled in speech (*vyavahārakuśala*).
- (d) *Aniṣṇāta*: mental construction belonging to poorly-endowed beings. The mental construction belonging to poorly-endowed beings is that which belongs to beings not skillful in speech.

ii) Furthermore, there are five mental constructions:

- (a) *Nāma niśrityārthasvabhāvaparikalpaḥ*: by starting from the name, to imagine the thing, i.e., such-and-such a word has such-and such a meaning.
- (b) *Arthaṃ niśritya nāmasvabhāvaparikalpaḥ*: by starting from a thing, to invent a name, i.e., such-and-such a thing has such-and-such a name.
- (c) *Nāma niśritya nāmasvabhāvaparikapah*: by starting from a name, to invent a name. This is to invent a name for a thing which is unknown.
- (d) *Arthāṃ niśrityāsvabhāvaparikapah*: by starting from a thing, to invent the thing. This is to invent a meaning for a thing the name of which is unknown.
- (e) *Ubhayaṃ niśrityobhayasvabhāvaparikalpaḥ*: by starting from both, to invent both, i.e., a thing of such-and-such a type (*tādṛś*) has such-and-such a nature and such-and-such a name. [139c18]

19. Comm. Bh 342a14-15, bh 176b7-8, U 404b26-404c10, u 272a2-5.

“*Well-endowed, those who are skillful in speech*: those who having already used speech have at their disposal an instrument to express their mind; *poorly-endowed* is the opposite; this is in regard to oxen, etc.” (u) – “Although they have an imagination, oxen are unable to express themselves in phonemes (*akṣara*).” (bh)

“*Nāma niśritya nāmasvabhāvaparikalpaḥ*: Thus, a person who is born and lives on an island of sugarcane (*pauṇḍradvīpa* ?) hears the word 'cow' pronounced of which he does not know the meaning, has many mental constructions on the word 'cow'. [The translation 'island of sugarcane' is uncertain. *Ye tseu tcheou* (75 and 7; 39; 85 and 6), probably synonymous with *kan tchō tcheou* (99; 140 and 11; 85 and 6) is translated into Tibetan as *li ke* (= *kha*) *raḥi gliñ*. In the Mahāvvyut., 4113, there is an equivalence of *li kha ra = puṇḍra*, but in Mahāvvyut., 5788, *li kha ra = śarkarā*. For Pauṇḍra or Puṇḍravardhana, Northern Bengal, cf. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Dynasties et Histoire de l'Inde depuis Kanishka jusqu'au invasions musulmanes*, Paris, 1935, p. 87.] - *Arthaṃ niśrityasvabhāvaparikalpaḥ*: when one does not know beforehand the relationship (*sambandha*) between the designation (*saṃjñā*) and the thing designated (*saṃjñin*) and suddenly one sees a cow (*gokāya*), the mental constructions of cow increase. - *Ubhayam niśrityobhayasvabhāvaparikalpaḥ*: being based on a hypothetical name (*aupacārika*) and a named hypothetical thing (*abhidheya*), one invents both.” (U)

20. All in all, there are ten concepts (*vikalpa*).

i) *Mūlavikalpa*: the root concept, i.e., the store-consciousness.

ii) *Nimittavikalpa*: the object concept, i.e., the concepts of color, etc. (*rūpādivijñapti*).

iii) *Nimittabhāsavikalpa*: the concept which takes the aspect of an object, i.e., the ideas of visual consciousness, etc. (*caḥsurvijñānādivijñapti*), equipped with their supports (*sāśraya*).

iv) *Nimittapariṇamavikalpa*: the concept which is a modification of the object, i.e., the modifications resulting from old age, etc. (*jarādi*), of pleasant sensation, etc. (*sukhavedanādi*), of lust (*rāgadi*), of agony (*upadrava*) and

changes of the seasons (*ṛtuparivarta*), of the hells, etc. (*narakagatyādi*), of the world of desire, etc. (*kāmadhātuvādi*).

v) *Nimittābhāsapariṇā mavikalpa*: the concept which is the modification of that which has the aspect of an object, i.e., the modifications brought about in the nimittābhāsa or the consciousnesses by the preceding modifications.

vi) *Parānvayavikalpa*: the concept by reference, i.e., the concept which depends (*anugata*) on the hearing of the bad Dharma (*asaddharmaśravaṇa*) or the hearing of the good Dharma (*saddharmaśravaṇa*).

vii) *Ayoniśovikalpa*: the incorrect concept, i.e., the concept resulting from the hearing of the bad Dharma: the concept of heretics (*bāhiraka*).

viii) *Yoniśovikalpa*: the correct concept, i.e., the concept resulting from the hearing of the true Dharma: the Buddhist concept.

ix) *Abhiniveśavikalpa*: the concept adhering to wrong views, i.e., the concept associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the 62 kinds of wrong views (*dr̥ṣṭigata*) that have as root the wrong view of self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) resulting from wrong contemplation (*ayoniśomanasikāra*).

x) *Vikṣepavikalpa*: the distraction-concept, i.e., the ten concepts of the bodhisattvas. [140a1]

20. Comm. Bh 342a28-342b27, bh 176b8-178a1, U 404c23-405b6, u 279a5-280b4.

“i) *Mūlavikalpa*: this is the store-consciousness. It is the root of the other vikalpas and is itself vikalpa; this is why it is named root-vikalpa.

ii) *Nimittavikalpa*: this is matter, etc. (*rūpādi*) which thus constitutes an object (*nimitta*).

iii) *Nimittābhāsavikalpa*: these are the conceptions of visual consciousness, etc., equipped with their supports, because they take the aspect of the object.

iv) *Nimittapariṇā mavikalpa*: this is a vikalpa resulting from modifications of ideas to material appearance (cf. no. ii). *Modification of old age, etc.*; because old age modifies ideas to the material appearance. Why? Because outer and inner matter (*bāhyādhyātmikarūpa*) is changed by old age. The word 'etc.' includes sickness (*vyādhi*)

and death (*maraṇa*). *Modification by pleasant sensation, etc.*: because pleasant sensation modifies the body. Thus it is said that in a happy man, his face (*mukha*) and eyes shine (*prasādyante*). The word 'etc.' includes unpleasant sensation (*duḥkhavedanā*) and neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensation (*aduḥkhasukhavedanā*) also. *Modification by lust, etc.*: because lust modifies the aspect of the body. The word 'etc.' includes hatred (*dveṣa*), worry (*moha*), anger (*krodha*), etc. Thus it is said that an irritated (*ruṣita*) man has a bad color (*apriyavarṇa*). *Modifications by agonies and changings of the seasons*: murder (*vadha*), iron fetters (*bandhana*) modify the body, etc.; the changing seasons also modify the color of the outer and inner body, the color of the trees, etc. Thus it is said that the body changes under the action of cold (*śītakāla*). *Modifications by the hells, etc.*: the word 'etc.' includes all the bad destinies (*durgati*). It is known that in these places, *rūpa*, etc., are changed. *Modifications by the infernal destinies, etc.* The word 'etc.' includes all the bad destinies. We know that in these places, the *rūpa*, etc., is modified. *Modifications by the world of desire, etc.*: the word 'etc.' includes the form realm (*rūpadhātu*) because in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) there are no concepts of material appearance. But among the gods and in the four dhyānas, beings (*sattva*) and cosmic matter (*bhājanarūpa*) are changed. By the power (*prabhāva*) of pearls (*maṇi*), all kinds of lights and colors alternate.

v) *Nimittābhāsapariṇāmavikalpa*. By virtue of their organ-support (*āśrayendriya*), eye, etc., the concepts of visual consciousness, etc. (*caḥsurjñānādivijñapti*), which take the aspect of color, etc. (*rūpāyābhāsa*), undergo all kinds of modifications upon which the vikalpas arise. They undergo, according to circumstances (*yathāyogam*), the modifications of old age, etc., mentioned above. Why? According to whether the eye is healthy or dulled, the visual consciousness is clear or blurred. The consciousness is changed to the degree that its support is changed. It is the same for the transformation by way of pleasant sensation, etc., because in the happy person the mind is collected and in the unhappy person it is scattered. It is the same for the modifications resulting from lust, agony and the changes of the seasons. Similarly, among the damned and in the desire realm, when the body (*āśrayakāya*) changes, the consciousness changes likewise. In the formless realm also there are transformations caused by feelings, etc.

vi) *Parānvayavikalpa*: this is a vikalpa which has as its cause the meeting with good or bad friends, hearing the true or the bad Dharma.

vii-viii) The vikalpa of the heretics (*tīrthika*), such as Kapila, and that of the orthodox, such as the Saugatas, are called *ayoniśo-* and *yoniśo-vikalpa* respectively. These two vikalpas are associated, the first with wrong views (*mithyadr̥ṣṭi*) and the second with right views (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), respectively

ix) The vikalpa associated with the 62 types of views (*dr̥ṣṭigata*) which have as cause the wrong view of self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) is the vikalpa of the words 'earlier', 'later' and 'middle' which is treated by the Brahmajālasūtra: "Did I exist in the past?" These vikalpas are called *abhiniveśavikalpa*. In the term *dr̥ṣṭigata*, *gata* has the meaning of 'type' (*ākāra*).

x) That which distracts is called distraction (*vikṣipyate 'nenti vikṣepaḥ*): it is a vikalpa. That is why one speaks of *vikṣepavikalpa*. This vikalpa distracts from nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). Why? Because it distracts from the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*). Nonconceptual wisdom is the virtue of wisdom. Those are the ten vikalpas of the bodhisattvas." (U and u)

21. The ten distractions of the bodhisattvas are: i) *abhāvanimittavikṣepa*, non-existence; ii) *bhāvanimitta-vikṣepa*, existence; iii) *adhyāropavikṣepa*, imputation; iv) *apavādavikṣepa*, negation; v) *ekatvavikṣepa*, identity; vi) *nānātvavikṣepa*, difference; vii) *svabhāvavikṣepa*, self-nature; viii) *viśeṣavikṣepa*, specifications; ix) *yathānāmā-bhiniveśavikṣepa*, interpreting the object according to the name; x) *yathārthanāmābhiniveśavikṣepa*, interpreting the name according to the object.
[140a5]

22. i) In order to counteract the concept of non-existence (*vikalpasya pratipakṣeṇa*), it is said (in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, Taishō 220, k. 4, p. 17b25-17c16; cf. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI, 77): "A bodhisattva being truly a bodhisattva" (*bodhisattvo bodhisattva eva sann iti*).

ii) In order to counteract the concept of existence (*bhāvavikalpa*), it is said: "..... sees no bodhisattva in the absolut sense" (*bodhisattvaṃ na samanupaśyati*).

iii) In order to counteract the concept of imputation (*adhyāropavikalpa*), it is said: “does not see, in the absolute sense, the name of bodhisattva or the virtue of wisdom, or whether he acts or does not act, or form, or feeling, or perception, or formation or consciousness. Why? Because name is empty of self-nature” (*bodhisattvanāma na samanupaśyati, prajñāpāramitāṃ n. s., caratīti n. s., na caratīti n. s., rūpaṃ n. s., vedanām api n. s., saṃjñām api n. s., saṃskārān api n. s., vijñānam api n. s. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathāhi nāma svabhāvena śūnyam iti*).

iv) In order to counteract the concept of negation (*apavādavikalpa*), it is said: “It is not by means of emptiness” (*na śūnyatayeti*).

v) In order to counteract the concept of identity (*ekatvavikalpa*), it is said: “The emptiness of form is not form (*yā rūpasya śūnyatā na tad rūpaṃ iti*).

vi) In order to counteract the concept of difference (*nānātvavikalpa*), it is said: “Outside of emptiness, there is no form; form is emptiness, emptiness is form” (*na cānyatra śūnyatāyā rūpaṃ. rūpaṃ eva śūnyatā śūnyataiva rūpaṃ iti*).

vii) In order to counteract the concept of self-nature (*svabhāvavikalpa*), it is said: “Form, O Subhūti, is nothing but a word (*nāmamātram idaṃ Subhūte yad idaṃ rūpaṃ iti*).

viii) In order to counteract the concept of specification (*viśeṣavikalpa*), it is said: There is no arising, no cessation, no defilement, no purification of self-nature” (*svabhvasya hi notpādo na nirodho na saṃkleśo na vyavadānam iti*).

ix) In order to counteract the concept that is attached to interpreting the thing according to the name (*yathānāmārthābhiniveśavikalpa*), it is said: “The name is fabricated. But about the dharma of their conception, they discuss it in exotic terms and they adhere to it as a result of this discursiveness (*kṛtrimaṃ nāma. pratipattidharmaṃ te āgantukena nāmadhyeyena vyavahriyante. vyavahārāc cābhiniviśante*).

x) In order to counteract the conception that is attached to interpreting the name according to the thing (*yathārthanāmābhiniveśavikalpa*), it is said: “The

**bodhisattva does not, in the absolute sense, see all these words; not seeing them in the absolute sense, he is not attached to them”, meaning:
“interpreting them according to the thing” (*tāni bodhisattvaḥ sarvanāmāni na samanupaśyaty asamanupaśyan nābhiniśate yathārthatayety abhiprāyaḥ*).
The logic applied here to form is to be applied to all the others up to consciousness**

To counteract all of these ten distractions (*vikṣepa*), nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) is taught in all the Prajñāpāramitās. Thus the entire content (*sakalārtha*) of the Prajñāpāramitās consists of an explanation about the distractions that are counteracted (*vipakṣa*) and the nonconceptual wisdom that counteracts them (*pratipakṣa*). [140a7]

22. Comm. Bh 342c5-343a8, bh 178a1-179a4, U 405b12-405c11, u 280b4-281b5.

This paragraph is missing in B and H. P and Dh replace it by a quotation from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (Taishō 220, k. 4, p. 17b25-17c16) which is also found in the Upanibandhana. Cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 812, 932 et passim.

kathaṃ punar bhagavan bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caravitavyam. bhagavān āha. iha śaradvatīputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caran bodhisattvaṃ na samanupaśyati, bodhisattvacaryāṃ na samanupaśyati, prajñāpāramitāṃ na samanupaśyati, prajñāpāramitānāmāpi na samanupaśyati, caratīti na samanupaśyati, na caratīti na samanupaśyati, rūpaṃ na samanupaśyati, vedanāṃ api na samanupaśyati, saṃjñāṃ api na samanupaśyati, saṃskārāṃ api na samanupaśyati, vijñānaṃ api na samanupaśyati. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathāhi śaradvatīpūtra bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ svabhāvena śūnyaḥ evaṃ hi bodhisattvanāma bodhisattvanāmnā śūnyaṃ. tat kasya hetoḥ. prakṛtir asyaisā tathāhi na śūnyatayā rūpaṃ śūnyaṃ, nānyatra rūpāt śūnyatā, rūpaṃ eva śūnyataiva rūpaṃ; na śūnyatayā vedanā śūnyā, nānyatra vedanāyāḥ śūnyatā, vedanaiva śūnyatā śūnyataiva saṃjñā; na śūnyatayā saṃjñā śūnya, nānyatra saṃjñāyāḥ śūnyatā, saṃjñāiva śūnyatā śūnyataiva saṃjñā; na śūnyatayā saṃskārāḥ śūnyāḥ, nānyatra saṃskārāṇāṃ śūnyatā, saṃskārā eva śūnyatā śūnyataiva saṃskārāḥ; na śūnyatayā vijñānaṃ śūnyaṃ, nānyatra vijñānasya śūnyatā, vijñānaṃ eva śūnyatā śūnyataiva vijñānaṃ. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathāhi nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta bodhisattvaḥ, nāmamātram

idaṃ yaduta śūnyatā, *nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta rūpaṃ*, nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta vedanā, nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta saṃjñā, nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta saṃskārāḥ, nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta vijñānam, tathāhi māyopamaṃ rūpaṃ, māyopamā vedanā, māyopamā saṃjñā, māyopamāḥ saṃskārāḥ, māyopamāṃ vijñānam. māyā ca nāmamātraṃ na deśasthā na pradeśasthā asad asaṃbhūtaṃ vitathasamaṃ māyādarśanam svabhāvavirahitam asvabhāvaś *cānutpāda 'nirodhaḥ* asthānaṃ na hānir na vṛddhir *na saṃkleśo na vyavadānam*. evaṃ caran bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ kasyacid dharmasya utpādaṃ na samanupaśyati, nirodhaṃ na samanupaśyati, sthānaṃ na s., hānaṃ na s., vṛddhiṃ na s., saṃkleśaṃ na s., vyavadānaṃ na s., rūpaṃ na s., vedanāṃ na s., saṃjñāṃ na s., saṃskārāṃ na s., vijñānaṃ na s., bodhir iti bodhisattva iti yad ucyate tad api na s. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathāhi *kṛtrimaṃ nāma. pratipattidharmaṃ te kalpitāgantukena nāmadheyena 'bhūtaparikalpitenā vyavahriyante, vyavahārāc cābhiniviśante*; tad *bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caran sarvadharmān na samanupaśyati nopalabhate, asamanupaśyan anupalabhamāno na manyate nābhiniviśate*.

23. If in one sense (*pariyāyeṇa*) the dependent nature (*paratatrsvabhāva*) merges with the three natures (cf. § 17), why are these three natures (*svabhāvatraya*) not identical (*nirviśiṣṭa*)? – Inasmuch as (*yena pariyāyeṇa*) it is dependent (*paratantra*), it is not imaginary (*parikalpita*) and it is not absolute (*pariniṣpanna*). Inasmuch as it is imaginary, it is not dependent and is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is absolute, it is not dependent and not imaginary.

[140a13]

23. Comm. Bh 343a15, U 405c17.

24. How do we know (*kathaṃ gamyate*) that the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), which appears as the imaginary nature (*parikapitasvabhāva*), is not merged with the latter (*na tadātmaka*)? - It is impossible (*viruddha*) that the thing is merged with the name because the notion (*buddhi*) does not exist prior to the name (*nāman*), because the name is multiple (*saṃbahula*) whereas the thing cannot be multiple, because the name is

indeterminate (*aniyata*) whereas the thing cannot be composite (*saṃsr̥ṣṭa*). Here are some verses:

a) Since the notion does not exist prior to the name, since the name is multiple and indeterminate, it is proved that the thing cannot be merged with the name, that it is not multiple and that it is not composite.

b) (Cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIII, 16):

dharmābhāvopalabdhiś ca niḥsaṃkleśaviśuddhitā /

māyādisadr̥ṣṭī jñeyā ākāśasadṛṣṭī tathā //

“The dharma does not exist but it is seen; it has no stain but there is purification. It is like magic, etc. ; it is like space. [141a21]

24. Comm. Bh 343b3-28, bh 179a4-180a2, U 406a4-20, u 281b5-282a6.

“Because prior to the name, the idea did not exist in the name, it is impossible for the thing to merge with the name. If the dependent and the imaginary were identical (*ekalakṣaṇa*), it would be necessary that one would have the notion of the thing (*artha*) independently from the name (*nāmānapekṣam*), as, for example, for the pitcher (*ghaṭa*). Outside of the word pitcher (*ghaṭanāman*), there is no notion of pitcher (*ghaṭabuddhi*) for the pitcher (*ghaṭārtha*) because the pitcher has existence by designation only. If the word pitcher and the pitcher were identical, the notion of pitcher would exist; but since they are not identical, this notion does not exist prior to the word. Consequently, it is contradictory that the name and the thing merge. Here, by 'name', we mean the imaginary nature, and by 'thing', we mean the dependent nature [Bh corrected according to bh]. It is by the power of the word that the dependent is imagined. - Moreover, there are several names for a single thing. If the name and the thing were identical, the thing, like the name, should be multiple. In this case, the thing would have several natures (t'i). But it is impossible that one and the same thing could have several natures. Therefore, if the two merged, a second contradiction would result. - Finally, the name is indeterminate (*aniyata*): the word '*puṅgava*' may be applied to nine different things. If it were admitted that the name and the thing are identical, it would be that several different things would constitute one and the same nature (t'i). Thus there would result a third contradiction,

because it would have to be admitted that very different things (*anekavidhārtha*), cows, etc., make up one and the same nature.

The first stanza repeats these ideas. *It is proved*, etc.: this shows that the dependent and the imaginary are not the same thing.

The dharma does not exist but it is seen: this first part of the stanza is explained to students (*śiṣya*) by the example of magic. The students experience two difficulties here: they ask anxiously: "If the dharma does not exist, how can it be seen; in the absence of stain, how can there be purification?" Two examples answer these questions. *It is like magic, etc.* The magical elephant (*māyāhastin*) does not exist as a true elephant, nevertheless it is seen. It is the same for things (*artha*): they are seen and yet they do not exist. *It is like space*. Space is not soiled (*kliṣṭa*) by fog (*nīhāra*), etc., because it is pure by nature (*prakṛtiviśuddha*); nevertheless, when the fog dissipates, we say that space is purified. It is the same for dharmas. They are not stained because they are pure by nature; nevertheless, when the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) and adventitious (*āgantuka*) stains (*mala*) are destroyed, we say that the dharmas are purified." (Bh)

25. If it does not such exist as it appears, why is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) not completely (*sarveṇa sarvam*) non-existent? Without the dependent nature, the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) does not exist. If the former were missing, how come there would not be universal non-existence (*sarvanāstitva*)? If the dependent and absolute natures did not exist, defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) would be absent. But defilement and purification do exist (*upalabhyante*). Thus it is wrong that everything would be non-existent. Here is a stanza:

If the dependent and the absolute did not exist at all, defilement and purification would not take place. [140a29]

25. Comm. Bh 343c8-14, bh 180a2-6, U 406a29-406b5, u 282a6-8

"Without the dependent nature, the absolute nature does not exist: because stains are necessary for there to be purification." (Bh)

26. In the Greater Vehicle, the Buddha Bhagavats taught the Vaipulyasūtras: in this teaching (*deśanā*), it is said:

i) How should the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) be conceived (*katham veditavyaḥ*)? It should be conceived by proclaiming it as non-existent (*nāstiprayāyadeśanayā*).

ii) How should the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) be conceived? It should be conceived as a magic show (*māyā*), a mirage (*marīci*), a dream (*svapna*), a reflection (*pratibhāsa*), an image (*pratibimba*), an echo (*pratiśrutkā*), the reflection of the moon in water (*udakacandra*), a magical creation (*nirmāṇa*).

iii) How should the absolute nature (*pariniṣpanna*) be conceived? It should be conceived by proclaiming the fourfold pure dharma (*caturvidha vaiyavadānikadharmā*). The fourfold pure dharma is:

(a) The essential purity (*prakṛtivyavadāna*), i.e., the true nature (*tathatā*), emptiness (*śūnyatā*), the utmost point of reality (*bhūtakoti*), the signless (*animitta*), the absolute (*paramārtha*), the fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*).

(b) The stainless purity (*vaimalyavyavadāna*), i.e., the same essential purity as being free of all obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇahita*).

(c) The purity of the path leading to the essential purity (*tatprāpakam mārgavyavadānam*), namely, all of the dharmas which are the limbs of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣyadharmā*), the virtues (*pāramitā*), etc.

(d) The purity of the object destined to give rise to the path (*tajjananārtham ālambanavyavadānam*), i.e., the teaching of the true Dharma of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyānasaddharmadeśanā*). Because this teaching is the cause for purity (*vyavadānahetu*), it is not imaginary; because it is the outflow (*niṣyanda*) of the pure fundamental element (*viśuddhadharmadhātu*), it is not dependent.

All the pure dharmas (*vaiyavadānika*) result from (*saṃgrhīta*) from this fourfold purity. Here are some stanzas (cf. Abhidharmasūtra, in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 112):

(i) *māyadideśanā bhūte kalpitān nāstideśanā /*
caturvidhaviśuddhes tu pariniṣpannadeśanā //

“Concerning the product, we speak of magic; concerning the imaginary, we speak of non-existence; but concerning the fourfold purity, we speak of the absolute.”

(ii) *śuddhiḥ prakṛtivaimalyam ālambanaṃ ca mārgatā /*
viśuddhānāṃ hi dharmāṇāṃ caturvidhagrhītatvam //

“The purities are the essential purity, the stainless purity, the purity of the path and the purity of the object. Indeed, the pure dharmas come from these four natures.” [140b16]

26. Comm. Bh 344a3-22, bh 180a6-181a2, U 406b22-406c11, u 282a8-282b8.

“i) The imaginary nature is proclaimed to be non-existent because it does not exist absolutely (*ātyantikabhāva*).

ii) The dependent nature is like a magic show, a mirage, etc.: These various points will be developed below (§ 27).” (U)

iii) There are good definitions in u for the absolute nature and its synonyms: *rañ bĕin gyis rnam par byañ ba ni so soḥi skye bo rnam kyī ño bo ñid yañ dag pa gañ yin paḥo // de bĕin ñid ni gĕan du mi ḥgyur baḥi phyir chos thams cad kyī spyi mtshan ñid yin te / de ñid la brten nas sems can thams cad ni de bĕin gĕsags paḥi sñin paḥo ĕes gsuñ rab las ḥbyuñ ño // stoñ pa ñid ces bya ba ni kun brtags pa med paḥo // yañ dag paḥi mthaḥ ĕes bya ba ni bden paḥi mur thug paḥo // mtshan ma med pa ni gzugs la sogs paḥi mtshan ma thams cad dañ bral bḥi phyir ro // don dam pa ni ye śes mchog gis thob par bya baḥi phyir ro // chos kyī dbyiñs ni rnam par byañ baḥi chos rnam kyī rgyu yin paḥi phyir ro // dbyiñs kyī sgra ni ḥdir rgyuḥi tshig ste / gser la sogs paḥi ḥbyuñ khuñ bĕin no: “The *prakṛtivyavadāna* is the true self-nature of ordinary people (*prthagjana*). The *tathatā*,*

being unchangeable (*avikāra*), is the shared nature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas. It is because of the tathatā that it is said (*pravacana*): 'All beings (*sattva*) are the seed of the tathāgata (*tathāgatagarbha*).' *Śūnyatā* is the absence of mental constructions. [According to U: *Śūnyatā* is the tathatā consisting of (*prabhāvita*) the complete absence of the parikalpita in the paratantra; [cf. § 4]. The *bhūtaakoṭi* is that which reaches the summit of the truth (*satyakotiṣṭha*). *Animitta*, because it is free of all marks, material mark, etc. (*rūpādinimitta*). *Paramārtha*, because it is attained (*adhigata*) by superior knowledge (*agrajñāna*). *Dharmadhātu*, because it is the cause of pure (*vaiyavadānika*) dharmas. Here the word *dhātu* is synonymous with cause. Just as gold ore (*suvarṇākara*) [is called *suvarṇa* ----- [one line is missing from my (Migme Chodron) xerox copy]

The *tatprāpakam mārḡavyavadānam* is the pure path capable of acquiring (*adhigama*) the stainless tathatā. Enlightenment (*bodhi*) consists of a stainless unhindered knowledge (*vimalam apratihataṃ ca jñānam*) free of emotional obstacles (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). Being in accord (*ānulomika*) with enlightenment, certain dharmas are called limbs of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣya*): these are the 37 categories of dharma, the foundations of mindfulness, etc. (*smṛtyupasthānādi*), and the ten virtues (*pāramitā*). The virtues are treated below (chapter V). The word 'etc.' includes the entire Noble Path (*āryamārḡa*).

Tajjanakam ālambanavyavadānam is the preaching of the Noble Path, namely the limbs of enlightenment, etc., of which we have spoken." (U)

27. Why is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) proclaimed to be like a magic show, etc. (*māyādyupama*)? - In order to dispel (*nirākr-*) all unjustified hesitation (*bhrāntyākāṅkṣā*) about this dependent nature in other people .

Why do others experience unjustified hesitations about it?

i) They wonder: "How can the non-existent be perceived (*viśaya*)?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to a magic show (*māyā*).

- ii) They wonder: "How can the mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*) which have no object arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to a mirage (*marīci*).
- iii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object (*asaty artha*), how can one experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings (*iṣṭāniṣṭa upabhoga*)?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to a dream (*svapna*)
- iv) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can good or bad actions (*kuśalākuśalakarman*) produce (*abhinirvṛt-*) a pleasant or unpleasant result (*iṣṭāniṣṭaphala*)?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to an image (*pratibimba*).
- v) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the various rebirths (*nānāvijñāna*) arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to a reflection (*pratibhāsa*).
- vi) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the different kinds of speech (*nānāvyaṅmāhāra*) arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to an echo (*pratiśrutkā*).
- vii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the images perceived during correct concentration (*samyag-grāhakaśamādhigocara*) be produced?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to the reflection of the moon in water (*udakacandra*).
- viii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the bodhisattvas whose mind is unerring (*aviparītacitta*) be reborn at will (*yathāśayam*) for the service of beings (*sattvārthakriyā*)?" To dispel this hesitation, the sūtra compares the dependent nature to a magic show (*pariṇāma*). [140c1]

27. Comm. Bh 344b9-345a7, bh 181a2-182b8, U 406c25-407a28, u 282b8-283b7.

“i) The magical elephant (*māyāhastin*) is not a real thing (*artha*) and yet it is perceived (*viśaya*). It is the same for the object.

ii) Here, the mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*) play the rôle of mirage (*marīcisthānīya*) and the object (*artha*) plays the role of the water (*toyasthānīya*). While the mirage does shimmer (*pracarati*), there is no real water (*toyasthānīya*), and yet the notion of real water (*toyāarthabuddhi*) is produced. In the same way, when the mind and mental factors shimmer, there is no real object (*artha*) and yet the notion of object (*arthabuddhi*) is produced.

iii) In the dream, there is no real object; nevertheless, one knows that various pleasant and unpleasant feelings are experienced. It is the same here in the awake state.

iv) The image is not a real object: it is relatively to the model that one has of the notion of image (*pratibimbabuddhi*); nevertheless, there is no reality-'image' distinct from the model. It is the same here. There is no reality 'pleasant or unpleasant result' and yet it is perceived.

v) In a shadow-play (*cāyākrīḍā*), all kinds of reflections (*pratibhāsa*) are seen. Although these reflections are seen, the reality 'reflection' is non-existent. It is the same for the consciousnesses: these are not different things (*nānāvidārtha*) and yet they appear as different things.

vi) The echo is not a real sound and yet it is heard. It is the same for superficial speech (*vyavahāraprapañca*): it is not ---- [one line missing in my (Migme Chodron) xerox copy]

vii) The moon's reflection in water is not a real thing and yet, thanks to the clearness (*ārdratā*) and clarity (*prasāda*) of the water, it is seen in the water. It is the same for the concentrated mind (*samāhitacitta*). The objects it perceives (*ālambanaviṣaya*) are not real things, yet they are perceived. Here, concentration (*samādhi*) plays the part of the water (*toyasthānīya*) because it is fresh and clear.

viii) The magical creation (*nirmāṇa*) is not a real object but, by the power of the magician (*nirmātr*), all kinds of things are created. A magically created object (*nirmāṇārtha*) does not fail to be perceived. It is the same here: the existence (*kāya = ātmabhāva*) assumed (*upātta*) by the bodhisattva is not real and yet the existence assumed by the bodhisattva who is working for the benefit and happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvāhitasukha*) is perceived.” (Extracted from Bh)

The Bhāṣya gives another interpretation: “There is yet another meaning to these eight comparisons of the Bhagavat. The example of the magic show serves to reject the six inner bases of consciousness (*Óaḍ ādhyātmikāyatana*) ... The example of the mirage serves to reject the receptacle world (*bhÁanaloka*) ... The example of the dream serves to reject the objects of enjoyment, color, etc. (*rūpādyubhuktaviṣaya*) ... The example of the image serves to reject the result of bodily action (*kāyakarmaphala*) ... The example of the echo serves to reject the result of vocal action (*vākkarmaphala*) ... Mental action (*manaḥkarman*) is threefold: non-concentrated stage (*asamāhitā bhūmiḥ*), concentrated stage (*samāhitā bhūmiḥ*), and the coming from hearing (*śrutamaya*). The example of the reflection serves to reject the result of the mental action of non-concentrated stages ... The example of the moon reflected in water serves to reject the result of mental action of the concentrated stages ... The example of metamorphosis serves to reject the result of the mental action resulting from hearing ...” Cf. the commentary of Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI, 30.

28. With what intention (*kiṃ saṃdhāya*) did the Bhagavat say, in the Brahmāparipṛcchā (cf. Viśeṣa-cintābrahmāparipṛcchā, Taishō no. 585, p. 4b23-24; no. 586, p. 36c9; no. 587, p. 66c3-4), that the Tathāgata does not see saṃsāra and does not see nirvāṇa? - Since the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is imaginary (*parikalpita*) on the one hand and absolute (*pariniṣpanna*) on the other hand (cf. v. 17), by expressing himself in this way the Bhagavat had in mind the identity (*nirviśeṣa*) of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Indeed, in its imaginary part (*bhāga*), this dependent nature is saṃsāra; in its absolute part, it is nirvāṇa.

[140c6]

28. Comm. Bh 345a13-22, bh 182b8-183a5, U 407b4-11, u 283b7.

“The Bhagavat had the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa in mind. If mental constructions (*parikalpita*) are destroyed, there is no longer anything else. One no longer sees saṃsāra. When one does not see saṃsāra, one sees tranquility (*śānta*), nirvāṇa. However, here we are talking about complete relativity (p'ien yi pou tch'eng), non-difference, in order to destroy the erroneous adherence (*viparītābhiveśa*) of foolish people (*bāla*) to a difference

in nature between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The meaning of 'dependent' is also explained, because the latter, being based on the two natures, is not determinate (*viniyata*).” (U)

29. In the Abhidharmasūtra, the Bhagavat said: “There are three dharmas: that which is part of defilement (*saṃkleśabhāgapatita*), that which is included in purity (*vyavadānabhāgapatita*) and that which is included in both (*tadubhayabhāgapatita*). What did he mean (*kiṃ saṃdhāya*) by speaking in this way?

i) The imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) which occurs in the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) falls into the defilement part.

ii) The absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) which occurs in the dependent nature falls into the purity part.

iii) As for the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), it falls into both parts.

It was with this intention that the Bhagavat spoke thus.

Is there an example (*drṣṭānta*) for this? The example of gold-bearing clay (sa khoṅ na gser yod pa = *kāñcanagarbhā mṛttikā*, Mahāvvyut. 7650). Thus, in gold-bearing clay, three things are noticed (*upalabhyate*): the earth element (*pṛthivīdhātu*), the earth (*pṛthivī*) and the gold (*kāñcana*). In the earth element, the earth, which is not there, is seen (*upalabhyate*), whereas the gold, which is there, is not seen. When one has burned (*dah-*) the earth element by means of fire (*agni*), the earth does not appear, whereas the gold appears.

The earth element, when it appears as earth, has a false appearance (*mithyābhāsa*); when it appears as gold, it has a true appearance (*tattvabhāsa*). Consequently, the earth element falls into both parts [both the earth and the gold]. Similarly, when one has not burned concept (*vijñapti*) by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, the false imaginary nature (*abhūtaparikalpitasvabhāva*) contained in this concept appears, whereas the true absolute nature (*bhūtapariniṣpannasvabhāva*) does not appear. When one has burned concept by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*), the true absolute nature contained in this concept

appears, while the false imaginary nature does not appear. Consequently, the dependent nature which consists as idea to wrong mental construction (*abhūtaparikavijñapti*) is included in both parts [participates in both defilement and purity] and is similar to the earth element in the gold-bearing clay. [140c23]

29. Comm. Bh 345b11-19, bh 183a5-183b2, U 407b28-407c9. u 284a1-6.

"Thus in gold-bearing clay The earth element (*pṛthivīdhātu*) is solidity (*kakhaṭatva*); the earth (*pṛthivī*) is form (*rūpa*) and appearance (*saṃsthāna*), respectively (*yathākramam*): ordinary matter (*bhūta*) and derived matter (*bhautika*); the gold (*kañcana*) is the seed of gold (*bīja*).” (u)

30. In some places (e.g., in the Laṅkāvatāra, p. 115-116), the Bhagavat said that all dharmas are eternal (*nitya*); elsewhere he said that they are transitory (*anitya*), and yet elsewhere he said that they are neither eternal nor transitory. What was his intention (*kiṃ saṃdhāya*) in proclaiming them to be eternal? - The dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is eternal in its absolute part (*pariniṣpannabhāga*), transitory in its imaginary part (*parikalpitabhāga*), neither eternal nor transitory in its two parts together. It was with this intention that the Bhagavat spoke in this way.

All distinctions are exactly like this distinction between eternal, transitory and their absence of both (*advaya*): happiness (*sukha*), sadness (*duḥkha*) and their *advaya*; goodness (*śubha*), malice (*aśubha*) and their *advaya*; emptiness (*śūnya*), non-emptiness (*aśūnya*) and their *advaya*; the self (*ātman*), the non-self (*anātman*) and their *advaya*; tranquility (*śanta*), non-tranquility (*aśanta*) and their *advaya*; the thing with self-nature (*sasvabhāva*), the thing without self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) and their *advaya*; that which arises (*utpanna*), the non-arisen (*anutpanna*) and their *advaya*; that which has been destroyed (*niruddha*), the non-destroyed (*aniruddha*) and their *advaya*; primordial tranquility (*ādiśanta*), primordial non-tranquility (*anādiśanta*) and their *advaya*; the

essentially nirvanized (*prakṛtiparinirvrta*), the non-essentially nirvanized (*aprakṛtiparinirvrta*) and their *advaya*; *saṃsāra*, *nirvāṇa* and their *advaya*, etc. In these distinctions (*prabheda*), all the enigmas posed by the Bhagavats should be understood (*adhigantavya*) in the light of the three self-natures as the teaching (*paryāya*) on the eternal, non-eternal, etc. Here are some stanzas:

(a) Since dharmas are non-existent, since they appear in many aspects (*anekavidha*), there is neither dharma nor adharma. Thus non-duality (*advayārtha*) is proclaimed.

(b) On the one hand (*ekabhāgena*), it is proclaimed (*prakāś-*) that they do not exist; on the other hand], ot os proclaimed that they do exist. From both sides, it is proclaimed that they are neither existent nor non-existent.

(c) They are not such as they appear; this is why they are proclaimed to be non-existent. But because, nevertheless, they do appear, for this reason they are proclaimed to be existent.

(d) (Cf. *Sūtrālamkāra*, XI, 50-51).

svayaṃ svenātmanā 'bhāvāt svabhāve cānvasthiteḥ /
grāhavat tadābhāvāc ca niḥsvabhāvatvam iṣyate //

“Because they do not exist in themselves, because they do not exist by their self-nature, because they do not persist in their self-nature, because they are not what they are thought to be, the absence of their self-nature is affirmed.”

(e) *niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniśrayāt /*
anutpādānirodhāḍiśantiprakṛtinirvrṭiḥ //

“The fact results gradually from their absence of self-nature that they have neither arising nor destruction, that they are primordially tranquil and essentially nirvanized.” [141a16]

30. Comm. Bh 345c13-346a7, bh 183b2-184a7, U 408a3-408b9, u 284a6-285a7.

“In some places the Bhagavat said that all dharmas are eternal, etc.: The paratantra, in its dharmatā or tathatā, is eternal: in its mentally constructed part, it is transitory because it does not have eternity. That which is not eternal is called transitory and not that which has birth and cessation (utpādanirodha). In its two parts together, the paratantra is neither eternal nor transitory: this is the fact of being neither one nor the other (advayatva). Happiness (sukha) is the absolute part of the paratantra; sadness (duḥkha) is the imaginary part; their advaya is the paratantra itself, and so on.” (U)

Explanation of the stanzas according to bh:

“(a) Since the dharmas are non-existent, there is no dharma; since they appear in many aspects, there is no adharma; it is in this sense that the dharmas exist (chos yin no Ęes bya ba tha tshig go). Consequently, since there is neither dharma nor adharma, non-duality is asserted.

(b) On the one hand, i.e., from the one extreme (anta), it is asserted that they do not exist: that they are without self-nature (niḥsvabhāva); from the other extreme, it is asserted that they do exist, that they do have self-nature. From both sides, it is asserted that they are neither existent nor non-existent: by considering (parigrah-) the paratantra that partakes of both natures at the same time (gñi gaḥi bdag ñid can), it is asserted that they are neither existent nor non-existent.

(c) They are not such as they appear: they are not as they are perceived (upalabdha): this is why they are asserted to be non-existent. But because, nevertheless, they do appear: but because it is said that they exist insofar as they are simply appearance (snañ ba tsam du yod paḥi phyir yod pa Ęes brjod pas), they are asserted to be existent for this reason.

(d) Now it will be shown in what sense (kiṃ saṃdhāya) it is asserted that all dharmas are without self-nature (niḥsvabhāva). (1) Because they do not exist in themselves: because all dharmas do not arise by themselves (svataḥ), independent of conditions (pratyaya): that is the first meaning of the expression 'without self-nature'. (2) Because they do not exist by way of their self-nature. Because once they are destroyed, since the dharmas do not re-arise out of their own nature of self (niruddhānām punas tenātmanānutpatteḥ), they are without self-nature: that is another meaning of the expression 'without self-nature'. (3) Because they do not persist in their self-nature. Because, once arisen, they do not have the power to last for a single moment (kṣaṇa) afterwards, they are without self-

nature. These three absences of self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) of dharmas are shared with the śrāvakas (*śravakasādhāraṇa*). (4) *Because they are not such as they are thought to be, their absence of self-nature is asserted*: this fourth absence of self-nature is not shared with the śrāvakas. The dharmas do not exist with the imaginary nature which foolish people (*bāla*) cling to (*parigrhīta*). And it is in this sense (*tatsaṃdhāya*) that here in the Greater Vehicle we say that all dharmas are without self-nature.

(e) *From their absence of self-nature, there results the fact* : from the fact that all dharmas are without self-nature, it results that they are unborn, etc. indeed, that which is without self-nature is unborn (*yo hi niḥsvabhāvaḥ so 'nutpannaḥ*); that which is unborn is unceasing (*yo 'nutpannaḥ so 'niruddhaḥ*); that which is unborn and unceasing is primordially tranquil (*yo 'nutpanno 'niruddhaḥ sa ādiśantaḥ*); that which is primordially tranquil is essentially nirvanized (*ya ādiśantaḥ sa prakṛtiparinirvṛtaḥ*). This results *gradually*: i.e., these various points are a chain of causes (*uttarottatahetu*).” (bh)

31. Furthermore, all of the Buddha's words (*buddhavāc*) should be understood (*adhigantavya*) in the light of four purposes (*abhiprāya*) and four intentions (*abhisam̐dhi*). (Cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XII, 16, 18).

i) *Samatābhiprāya*: intention dealing with an identity, e.g., when he said: "It was I who at that time was Vipaśvin, the perfectly enlightened one" (*aham eva sa tasmīn samaye vipaśvi samyakṣambuddho 'bhūvam*; (cf. Sūtrālamkāra, p. 83, l. 1).

ii) *Kālāntarābhiprāya*: intention dealing with another time, e.g., when he said: "By merely invoking the name of the Tathāgata Bahuratna, one is predestined to supreme complete enlightenment" (*bahuratnasya tathāgatasya nāmadheyagrahaṇamātreṇa niyato bhavaty anuttarāyāṃ samyakṣambodhau*, (ibid. p. 83, l. 24). Or again when he said: "Those who take a vow in view of Sukhāvati will be reborn there" (*ye sukhāvatyāṃ praṇidhānaṃ kariṣyanti te tatropapatsyante*, (ibid. p. 83, l. 4).

iii) *Arthāntarābhiprāya*: intention dealing with something other, e.g., when he said: "When one will have served as many Buddhas as there are grains of

sand in the Ganges, then one will understand the Greater Vehicle" (*iyato gaṅgānadīvālukāsamānabuddhān paryupāsya mahāyāne 'vabodha utpadyate* (ibid. p. 83, l. 21).

iv) *Pudgalāśayābhiprāya*: intention dealing with the individual's dispositions, e.g., when he criticized in one person the gift which he had praised in another person (*yat tad eva dānaṃ kasyacit pudgalasya praśaṃsate kasyacid vigarhate* (cf. ibid. p. 83, l. 5 and 26). It is the same for discipline (*śīla*) and a certain meditation (*kacid bhāvana*) as for gift. These are the four intentions.

Furthermore, there are four motives:

1) *Avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi*: the motive of introduction, when, in the Vehicle of the śrāvakas and in the Greater Vehicle, from the point of view of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtīsatya*), he deals with the existence, respectively, of the individual (*pudgala*), of the self-nature (*svabhāva*) and of the specifications (*viśeṣa*) of dharmas.

2) *Lakṣaṇābhisaṃdhi*: the motive of nature, when, in speaking of the nature of dharmas, he explains their threefold self-nature (*svabhāvatraya*).

3) *Pratipakṣābhisaṃdhi*: the motive of antidote, when he sets forth the practices (*caryā*) that counteract the 84,000 obstacles.

4) *Paññāmanābhisaṃdhi*: the motive of interpretation [or riddle], when he wishes to say something other than what he says. On this subject, here is a stanza (cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 82, l. 20):

asāre sāramatayo viparyāse ca susthitāḥ /

kleśena ca susaṃkliṣṭā labhante bodhim uttamām //

“Taking as solid that which is not solid, completely stuck in error, completely stained by desire, they attain supreme enlightenment.” [This riddle means: Taking concentration as the main thing, thoroughly fixed in the inverse of error, completely worn out by effort, they attain supreme enlightenment]. [141b5]

31. Comm. Bh 346a27-346c7, bh 184a7-185b3, U 408b28-408c28, u 285a7-286a6.

In the commentaries there are definitions of *abhiprāya* and *abhisam̄dhi* that are not at all clear. Bh: “There is a difference between *abhiprāya* and *abhisam̄dhi*. When the Buddha first cognizes (yuan) the thing (che, 6 and 7) and then says it to someone else, that is *abhiprāya*. When, from this clarification (*niyama*), he succeeds in introducing it into the holy doctrine (*āryadeśanā*), that is *abhisam̄dhi*. - bh: *dgoñs pa dan ldem por dgoñs pa la tha dad du bya ba ci yod ce na / bcom ldan ḥdas kyis gañ thugs la bĕag pa dton par mdzad pa de ni dgoñs pa yin no // gañ ñid kyis nes par bstan pa la ḥjug par mdzad pa de ni ldem por dgoñs pa yin no*: “What is the difference between *abhiprāya* and *abhisam̄dhi*? When the Bhagavat is teaching (*deśayati*), that which he has in his mind (*citta*) is *abhiprāya*. When, in this way, he introduces (*avatārayati*) it into the teaching (*nirdeśa*), that is *abhisam̄dhi*.” - U: “To see something from afar (yuan kouan) and wish to capture (*upādāna*?) it, that is *abhiprāya*. Seeing something nearby (kin kouan) and wishing to introduce it, that is *abhisam̄dhi*.” - u: *dgoñs pa ni yid la bĕag pa tsam yin gyi pha rol la bltos par ni khas mi len no // ldem por dgoñs pa ni de ñid pha rol gzud pa la bltos paḥo*: “*Abhiprāya* being a simple fixation in the mind (*mano'vasthāpanamātra*), it is not an acceptance (*abhyupagama*) relative to something else (*parāpekṣa*). *Abhisam̄dhi* has, as its purpose, the introduction of it to another (*parāvatāraṇāpekṣa*).”

i) *Samatābhiprāya*. “Because all the Buddhas are alike in their collections (*sambhāra*), etc., the Bhagavat said: “It is I who at that time was Vipaśvin”. Similarly, when one discovers a resemblance with someone else, one says: “That’s me.” But it is clear that the Buddha Vipaśvin of the past is not the actual Śakyamuni Bhagavat.” (U)

ii) *Kālāntarābhiprāya*. “Seeing that lazy (*kuṣīda*) people are unable to practice the Dharma zealously, the Bhagavat said: ‘Merely by invoking the name of the Tathāgata Bahuratna, one is predestined’, or: ‘By means of a simple vow, one will be reborn in the realm of Sukhāvati.’ The Bhagavat had in view the increasing of the roots of previous good (*pūrvakuśalamūla*) in his listeners and thus to lead them later (*kālāntara*) to enlightenment and to Sukhavati.” (U) – “It is not enough to invoke a name to attain supreme enlightenment definitively. Similarly, when we say that a paṇa (part of a rupee) is worth a thousand paṇas, we mean that some day or at some other time, this paṇa will be the cause of a thousand paṇas.” (Bh)

iii) *Arthāntarābhiprāya*. - *luñ gi mtshan ñid kyi theg pa chen poḥi chos las rtogs paḥi mtshan ñid kyi theg pa chen poḥi chos ni don gĕan te / de la dgoñs nas / sañs rgyas gañ*

gāhi kluñ gi bye ma sñed cig la bsñen bkur byas na theg pa chen poñi chos kyi don khoñ du chud par hgyur ro Ęes bya ba gsuñs te / hphags pa so so rañ gis rig pañi chos ni rtogs par dkañ bañi phyir ro // hdis ni theg pa chen po la sgra ji bñin par hdzin pa bsal bar rig par byaño: “The doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as understanding (*abhisamayalakṣaṇa*) is something other than the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as text (*āgamalakṣaṇa*). This is what the Bhagavat had in view when he said: ‘When you have served as many Buddhas as there are grains of sand in the Ganges, you will understand the Greater Vehicle’, because the holy Dharma (*āryadeśanā*), knowable by one's own intuition (*pratyātmavedya*), is difficult to understand (*durvigāhya*). By these words, the Bhagavat forbade the literal interpreting of the Greater Vehicle (*yathārutagrāha*).” (u)

iv) Pudgalāśayābhiprāya. “First the Bhagavat praises a gift made by the miser (*matsara*), then he criticizes the same gift made by a generous man (*dānaruci*). First the Bhagavat praises the discipline of the undisciplined person (*duḥśīla*), then he criticizes the same discipline of the honest person (*śīlavat*) in order to lead the latter to the cultivation of a higher category of good. *A certain meditation*, i.e., worldly meditation (*laukikā bhāvanā*).” (U)

1. Avatārañābhisamñdhi. “There are places where the Bhagavat talks about the pudgala, about self-nature (*svabhāva*) and the specifications (*viśeṣa*) of dharmas: this is in order to serve as introduction into the Vehicles, and from the point of view of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatyā*). In the same way, as introduction into the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, he speaks about the existence of apparitional beings (*upapāduka*), etc. As introduction into the Greater Vehicle and as reassurance to those who fear annihilation (*ucchedabhītajana*), he says that the mind is eternal, etc.” (U)

2. Lakṣaṇābhisamñdhi. “Its purpose is the introduction into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*).” (U)

3. Pratipakṣābhisamñdhi. “This concerns the 84,000 kinds of conduct (*carya*) destined to counteract (*pratipakṣa*) the evils to be counteracted (*vipakṣa*): desire (*rāga*), etc.” (U)

4. Pariñamāñābhisamñdhi. “The motivation of interpretation is the wish to say something other than what one is saying [cf. bh: *gañ du tsig gi don gñan du brjod la don de ñid gñan du ston pa ste*]. In the stanza *asāre sāramatayo*, the word *asāra*: Because concentration

(*samādhi*) is not strong and because distraction (*vikṣepa*) is difficult to overcome, concentration is called *asāra*. Considering this concentration as something important (*tasmin pradhānabuddhiḥ*) is rendered by *sāramataye*. The phrase *viparyāse ca susthitāḥ* means 'well settled in the opposite of errors' (*viparyāsaviprayayena susthitāḥ*). Taking that which is not eternal to be eternal (*anitye nityam iti*), etc., is error (*viparyāsa*); taking that which is not eternal to be non-eternal is the opposite (*viparyaya*) of error. That is what they are well established in (*susthitāḥ*). In the phrase *kleśena susaṃkliṣṭāḥ*, *kleśa* means effort (*vyāyāma*), fatigue (*śrama*). Therefore the phrase means: completely fatigued by effort and by the length of the time they have set for themselves in the interest of beings (*sattvārthaṃ dīrghakālavayāyāmaśrameṇa parikliṣṭāḥ*). This is as in the phrase: 'He abides in the long *kleśa* (fatigue) of saṃsāra but only out of great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*).' The phrase *labhante bodhim uttamām* is easy to understand." (Bh)

32. He who wishes to explain (*nirdiś-*) the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle in brief (*samāsataḥ*) must express himself in three points (*trividhā*): i) he must give an explanation of dependent production (*pratītyasamutpādanirdeśa*), ii) an explanation of the nature of dharmas resulting from dependence (*pratītyasamutpannadharmalakṣaṇanirdeśa*) and iii) an explanation of the meaning of the discourses (*uktārthanirdeśa*).

i) First, an explanation of dependent production (cf. I, v. 17, 27), by saying for example: "Dharmas result from speech-propensities (*abhilāpavāsanā*) and the latter from the former." Indeed, the retributive consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) and the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), being reciprocal conditions (*anyonyapratyaya*), arise from one another.

ii) The dharmas that are active consciousnesses (*pravṛtti-vijñānalakṣaṇa-dharma*) have concept equipped with image and vision (*sanimitta-darśanavijñapti*) as nature (*svabhāva*). (Cf. II, § 11). As characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), they have the basis (*āśraya*, i.e., the dependent nature), the imaginary nature (*parikalpita*) and the absolute nature (*dharmatā*, the nature of things): this is how the characteristics of the threefold self-nature

itself are explained, as, for example, when one says: "Resulting from concept furnished with image and vision, these dharmas have three natures."

How should the natures of these dharmas be explained? - In the dependent nature (*paratantralakṣaṇa*), the imaginary nature (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*) does not exist but the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*) is present. Thus, by someone who does not see the truth (*adr̥ṣṭatattva*) and by someone who does see it, these two natures, imaginary and absolute, are simultaneously (*ekakāle*) not perceived (*anupalabdha*) or perceived (*upalabdha*) as existent (*sat*) and non-existent (*asat*) respectively. In the dependent nature, the imaginary is absent but the absolute is present. That is why, when it arises, if one perceives its imaginary nature, one does not perceive its absolute nature; if one perceives its absolute nature, one does not perceive its imaginary nature. Similarly, it is said: "In the dependent, the imaginary is absent, but the absolute is present there. That is why, in the dependent, these two natures, imaginary and absolute, non-perceived and perceived, are the same."

iii) What is the explanation of the meaning of the phrases (*uktārthanirdeśa*)? - It consists of explaining (*vibhaj-*) a phrase (*purvoktapada*) spoken first by means of the phrases that follow (*śeṣapada*), when dealing with the qualities of the Buddha (*guṇādhikaraṇāt*), or when dealing with the aims of the bodhisattva (*arthādhikaraṇāt*). [141b24]

32. Comm. Bh 346c11-347a23, bh 185b4-186a8, U 409a7-409b15, u 286a5-287a3.

i) "The dharmas come from the speech-propensities: The propensities of concept *ad extra* (*bāhyavikalpavāsanā*) reside in the store-consciousness. With these propensities as cause, there arise all the dharmas that have the active consciousnesses as self-nature. *And the latter from the former*: The concept-propensities have these dharmas as cause. This shows that the store-consciousness and active consciousnesses are mutual cause." (Bh)

ii) Thus, by the one who does not see the truth and by the one who does see the truth, it is simultaneously that these two natures, etc.: "The parikalpita and the pariniṣpanna are

called *these two natures*. Of these two natures, the first is non-existent, the second is existent. He who has not seen the truth (*adr̥ṣṭatattva*) sees the parikalpita but does not see the pariniṣpanna. He who has seen the truth (*driṣṭatattva*), sees, at one and the same moment, the pariniṣpanna and does not see the parikalpita. This idea has been explained in the stanza.” (Bh) – “At the moment when the one who has not seen the truth sees the non-existence of the pariniṣpanna and the existence of the parikalpita in the paratantrasvabhāva, at that same moment, the one who has seen the truth sees the non-existence of the parikalpita and the existence of the pariniṣpanna.” (U)

iii) “Up to now, the meaning has been explained independently of the intention of the authors (*vaktr̥āśayānapekṣam*). Now, the meaning of the uttered phrases (*uktārtha*) must be explained according to the intention of the authors. The phrase *guṇādhikaraṇād arthādhikaraṇād vā* means *guṇāśayād arthāśayāc ca*. The perfection (*paripūri*) or the benefit (*upakāra*) already gained, already set up, is called quality (*guṇa*); the search (*paryeṣeṇa*) directed towards a benefit not yet acquired but settled ----- [Here a line is missing from my [Migme Chodron] xeroxed text].

33. I. The treatise on the qualities (*guṇādhikaraṇa*), i.e., the presentation of the qualities of the Buddha (cf. Saṃdhi-nirmocanasūtra, § 2, p.32; *idem* transl. by Bodhiruci, Taishō no. 675, p. 665c3-12; *idem* transl. by Hiuan-tsang, Taishō no. 676, p. 688b17-25; Buddhahūmisūtra, Taishō no. 680, p. 720c7-16; Mahāvvyutpatti, no. 351-372).

0) *suviśuddhabuddhiḥ*: the Buddha's intellect is very pure,

1) *advayasamudācāraḥ*: he moves in non-duality,

2) *alakṣaṇadharmaparāyanaḥ*: he penetrates the dharma without nature,

3) *buddhavihāreṇa viharan*: he dwells in the abodes of the Buddha,

4) *sarvabuddhasamatāprāptaḥ*: he has attained identity with all the Buddhas,

5) *anāvaraṇagatiṃ gataḥ*: he has arrived at the absence of obstacles,

6) *apratyudāvartyadharmāḥ*: his doctrine is without decline,

7) *asaṃhāryagocaraḥ*: his domain cannot be reduced,

- 8) *acintyavyavasthānaḥ*: his system is inconceivable,
- 9) *tryadhvasamatāniryātaḥ*: he penetrates the identity of the three times,
- 10) *sarvalokadhātuprasṛtakāyaḥ*: their bodies extend throughout all the universes,
- 11) *sarvadharmiḥsaṃśayajñānaḥ*: his wisdom bears on all things without any doubt,
- 12) *sarvacaryāsamanvāgatabuddhiḥ*: his intellect is endowed with all the practices,
- 13) *niḥkāṅkṣadharmajñānaḥ*: his knowledge of the dharmas is free from error,
- 14) *avikalpitaśarīraḥ*: their bodies are unimaginable,
- 15) *sarvabodhisattvasaṃpratīcchitajñānaḥ*: his wisdom is the object of the vows of all bodhisattvas,
- 16) *advayabuddhavihāraparamapāramigataḥ*: he has reached the summit of the abode of the Buddhas free of duality,
- 17) *asaṃbhinnatathāgatavimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ*: he has reached the summit of the unmixed liberating wisdom of the Tathāgata,
- 18) *anantamadyabuddhabhūmisamatādhigataḥ*: he has reached the identity of the buddha-realms free from center and periphery,
- 19) *dharmadhātuparyantaḥ*: he has risen to the fundamental element,
- 20) *ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ*: he exhausts space,
- 21) *aparāntakoṭiniṣṭhaḥ*: he reaches the ultimate end.

It should be noted that the phrase: “the Buddha's intellect is very pure” has the other 21 phrases as its commentary. Thus the nature of the Buddha is well explained. [141c5]

II. “He has a very pure intellect”: The very pure intellect of the Buddha results (*saṃgrhīta*) from nineteen qualities (*guṇa*):

- 1st quality: moving in the absolute sense without obstacle in the knowable (*jñeya ātyantikānāvaraṇa pravṛttiguṇaḥ*).
- 2nd quality: penetrating into the highest purity of the Tathāgata, the nature of which is the non-duality of existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvādvayalakṣaṇatathātī-viśuddhipraveśaguṇaḥ*).
- 3rd quality: uninterruptedly maintaining the spontaneous activity of the Buddha (*nirābhogabuddhakriyasamucchinna-sthitiguṇaḥ*).
- 4th quality: possessing the identity of the supports, intentions and actions in the dharmakāya (*dharmakāya āśrayābhīprāyakriyābhedhaguṇaḥ*).
- 5th quality: cultivating the antidote to all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇapratipakṣabhāvanāguṇaḥ*).
- 6th quality: escaping from the attacks of all the heretics (*sarvāīrthikanīrdharṣaṇaguṇaḥ*).
- 7th quality: while dwelling in the world, not being confined by human relationships (*loke 'pi lokadharmāsaṃhāryatva-guṇaḥ*).
- 8th quality: establishing the doctrine (*vyavasthita-dharmaguṇaḥ*).
- 9th quality: explaining the past and the future (*vyākaraṇaguṇaḥ*).
- 10th quality: manifesting the saṃbhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya in all the universes (*sarvalokadhātuṣu saṃbhoganirmāṇakāyapradarśanaguṇaḥ*).
- 11th quality: cutting through doubt (*saṃśayacchedana-guṇaḥ*).
- 12th quality: introducing into all kinds of practices (*nānācaryāpraveśaguṇaḥ*).
- 13th quality: cognizing the arising of dharmas to come (*amutrādharmotpādajñānaguṇaḥ*).
- 14th quality: appearing in accordance with the aspirations of beings (*yathādhimuktiprakāśanaguṇaḥ*).
- 15th quality: engaging in disciplining beings by means of an immense troop (*aprameyakāyena sattvavinaya-prayogaguṇaḥ*).

16th quality: attaining to the perfection of the virtues in an equalized dharmakāya (*samadharmakāye pāramitāniṣpatti-guṇaḥ*)

17th quality: manifesting various buddha-fields in harmony with the aspirations of beings (*yathādhimuktisaṃbhinnabuddhakṣetrapradarśanaguṇaḥ*).

18th quality: unlimited extension of the three bodies of the Buddha (*buddhatrikāyapradeśapricchedaguṇaḥ*).

19th quality: devoting himself until the end of time to transmigration for the benefit and well-being of all beings (*āsamsārakoṭisarvasattvahitasukhopasthānaguṇaḥ*).

20th quality: indestructibility (*akṣayatvaguṇaḥ*). [141c19]

33. Comm. Bh 347b20-348a8, bh 186a8-187b2, U 409c11-411b3, u 287a3-291b4.

U comments at great length on this passage as follows:

“*The Buddha's intellect is very pure (suviśuddabuddhiḥ)*; this first phrase is explained by the other 21 phrases for a good explanation (*subhāṣita*) consists of explaining one and the same quality by numerous qualities.

1) *Moving in the absolute sense without obstacle in the knowable (jñeya ātyantikāvaraṇapravṛttiguṇaḥ)*: this 1st quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha moves within nonduality (advayasamudācāraḥ)*. The Buddha's wisdom is completely without any obstacle because he is without attachment (*āsaṅga*) and without obstacle (*āvaraṇa*) in regard to substances of all kinds (*sarvadṛavyaviśeṣa*). This is not like the śrāvakas, etc.; their wisdom is twofold, sometimes encountering an obstacle, sometimes not encountering an obstacle, or it moves in duality. But here, in the case of the Buddha, there is no question of a twofold *samudācāra*; that is why we say *advayasamudācāraḥ*. For this reason *the Buddha has a very pure intellect* because he possesses the perfection of wisdom and the suppression of the defilements [in Tibetan, *ye śes dan spans pa phun sum tshogs pa = jñānaprahāṇasamṣad*]. The following phrases will be expressed in a corresponding manner.

2) *Penetrating the highest purity of tathatā, the nature of which is the nonduality of existence and non-existence (bhāvābhāvādvayalakṣaṇa-tathatātiviśuddhipraveśagaṇaḥ)*: this 2nd quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha penetrates the dharma without nature (alakṣaṇadharmaparāyaṇaḥ)*. This tathatā possesses an absolute nature (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*), it does not possess imaginary nature (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*). Consequently, it has a nature of nonduality (*advayalakṣaṇa*): it does not have a nature of non-existence (*abhāvalakṣaṇa*) because it really exists; it does not have a nature of existence (*bhāvalakṣaṇa*) because it is not as it is imagined. *Penetrating the highest purity*: this pertains to the high purity of the tathatā (*tathatātiviśuddhi*) for, of all the dharmas, it occupies first place because it is free of all adventitious stains (*āgantukamala*). The Buddha penetrates this tathatā himself and makes others penetrate it: this is why it is called *ativiśuddhipraveśagaṇa*. The phrases should be connected thus: the Buddha has very pure intellect because he himself is pure and because he makes others pure.

3) *Uninterruptedly maintaining the spontaneous activity of the Buddha (nirābhogabuddhakriyāsamucchinnaśhitigaṇaḥ)*: this 3rd quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha dwells in the abodes of Buddha (buddhavihāreṇa viharan)*. The Buddha does not exert any effort in all his activities and he can abide amongst beings uninterruptedly as is suitable (*yathāyogam*) in a stable manner in the abodes (*vihāra*) of the āryas, devas and Brahma. This is not so for the śrāvakas who must make an effort (*ābhoga*) to procure the interest of beings. It is not like the tīrthikas who do have abodes, but lower ones. The devavihāras are the four dhyānas; the brahmavihāras are the four limitless practices (*apramāṇa*): loving-kindness (*maitrī*), etc; the āryavihāras are emptiness (*śūnyatā*), signlessness (*animitta*) and other vimokṣamukhas.

4) *Possessing the identity of the supports, the intentions and the activities in the dharmakāya (dharmakāya āśrayābhīprāya-kriyābhedaḡaṇaḥ)*: this 4th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha has attained identity with all the Buddhas (sarvabuddhasamatāprāptaḥ)*. Identity of the supports, because all the Buddhas rely on pure knowledge (*viśuddhajñāna*). Identity of intentions, for all have the high aspiration (*adhyāśaya*) of procuring the benefit and welfare of all beings (*sarvasattvahitasukhakriyā*). Identity of activities, because all the Buddhas procure the

interest of others (*parārtha*) by means of their *sambhogakāya* and *nirmānakāya*. It is not like the śrāvakas, etc., who have only the support.

5) *Cultivating the antidote to all the obstacles (sarvāvaraṇapratipakṣabhāvanāguṇaḥ)*: this 5th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha has attained the absence of obstacles (anāvaraṇagatiṃ gataḥ)*. Having practiced (*abhyas-*) the noble path (*āryamārga*) which counteracts every obstacle of passion, every obstacle to knowledge (*sarvakleśajñeyāvaraṇapratipakṣa*) and which consists of universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñāna*) and mastery of concentration (*samādhivaśitā*), the Buddha has reached a state that is the basis of the suppression of any traces (*vāsanā*) of obstacles.

6) *Escaping the attacks of heretics (sarvatīrthikanirdharṣaṇaguṇaḥ)*: this 6th quality explains the phrase: *the doctrine of the Buddha is without decline (apratyudāvartyadharmāḥ)* for its twofold law - the doctrine (*deśana*) and the understanding (*adhigama*) - cannot be shattered by others, since there is no other law superior to his.

7) *While abiding in the world, not being diminished by human relationships (loke 'pi lokadharmāsamhāryatvaguṇaḥ)*: this 7th quality explains the phrase: *the domain of the Buddha cannot be diminished (asamhāryagocaraḥ)*. The place where one always circulates in the world is that person's 'domain'. Although he circulates in the world, the Buddha, who experiences neither fondness (*anunaya*) nor revulsion (*pratigha*), is not diminished by the eight worldly concerns (*aṣṭau lokadharmāḥ*), gain (*lābha*), loss (*alābha*), etc. [cf. Mahāvvyutpatti, 2342-2348]. Thus it is said: 'The Buddhas always circulate in the world in order to procure the benefit and welfare of all beings, but the evil vikalpa of the hot wind of the eight dharmas cannot upset them or hinder them.'

8) *Establishing the doctrine (vyavasthitadharmaguṇaḥ)*: this 8th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha has an inconceivable system (vyavasthitadharmaguṇaḥ)*. The twelve-membered doctrine, sūtra, etc., (*sūtrādidvādaśāṅgapravacana*), is called system (*vyavasthāna*) because the Buddha establishes (*vyavasthāpayati*) such and such a self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) or general nature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Since this system is not perceived by the intellect of fools (*bālabuddhyaviṣayatvāt*), since it is superior in the world (*lokottara*), it is inconceivable. The inconceivability of what the Buddha establishes is a quality connected as above.

9) *Explaining the past and future (vyākaraṇaḡuṇaḡ)*: this 9th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha penetrates the sameness of the three times (tryadhvasamatāniryātaḡ)*. The Buddha can move equally throughout the three times or through eternity because in the equality of the three times, he is able to cognize past (*atīta*) and (*anāgata*) future things that have occurred or will occur. The Buddha explains them (*vyākṛ-*) just like present things (*pratyutpanna*).

10) *Manifesting a sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya in all the universes (sarvalokadhātuṣu sambhoganirmāṇakāyapradarśanaḡuṇaḡ)*: this 10th phrase explains the phrase: *the bodies of the Buddha extend throughout all the universes (sarvalokadhātuprasṛtakāyaḡ)*. According to the beings to be disciplined (*vineya*), the Buddha penetrates into the universes and manifests his twofold form there for their welfare (*hita*) and their happiness (*sukha*).

11) *Cutting through doubt (saṃśayacchedanaḡuṇaḡ)*: this 11th quality explains the phrase: *the knowledge of the Buddha concerns everything without there being any doubt (sarvadharmiḡsaṃśayajñānaḡ)*. The Buddha is completely resolved (*niyata*) on all objects (*viṣaya*). If he were not himself decisive on all dharmas, he could not cut through the doubts of others: lacking decisiveness (*niyama*), one cannot cut through doubt.

12) *Introducing into all kinds of practices (nānācaryāpraveśaḡuṇaḡ)*: this 12th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha's intellect is endowed with all the practices (sarvacaryāsamanvāgatabuddhiḡ)*.

13) *Cognizing the arising of dharmas to come (amutradharmotpāda-jñānaḡuṇaḡ)*: this 13th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha's knowledge of the dharmas is free from error (niḡkāṅkṣadharmajñānaḡ)*. In saying that a certain person possesses no roots of good (*kuśalamūla*), the śrāvaka āryas discourage him; but the Buddha Bhagavat foresees the arising in the future of a good dharma in that person, for he actually perceives the seeds of subtle roots of good (*sūkṣmakuśalamūla*) in future rebirths for they are accompanied by them.

14) *Manifesting in accordance with the aspirations of beings (yathādhimuktiprakāśanaḡuṇaḡ)*: this 14th quality explains the phrase: *the bodies of the Buddha are not imaginary (avikalpitaśarīraḡ)*. Although he manifests his bodies in the color of gold, etc., - in conformity with the diverse aspirations of beings - his bodies are

not imaginary; it is like the pearl (*maṇi*), the ferryboat (*vādyā*), as is said in the Tathāgataguhyasūtra, Taishō no. 312.

15) *By means of an immense troop, he works to discipline beings (aprameyakāyena sattvavinayaprayogagunaḥ)*: this 15th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha's knowledge is the object of the vows of all the bodhisattvas (sarvabodhisattvasamprattīcchitajñānaḥ)*. Wishing to convert beings, he works by means of an immense troop of bodhisattvas. And the bodhisattvas, by means of the Buddha's dominant power (*adhipatabala*), hear the doctrine first and attain great bodhi. Bodhisattvas of other classes gather and transmit this doctrine which is propagated in an uninterrupted succession. This is how they reach the knowledge which is the object of the vows of all bodhisattvas.

16) *Attaining the perfection of virtues in an equalized dharmakāya (samadharmakāye pāramitāniṣpattiguṇaḥ)*: this 16th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha has reached the nondual summit of the abode of the Buddhas (advayabuddhavihāraparamapāramigataḥ)*. Whatever is nondual (*advaya*) is equalized (*sama*). In the equalized dharmakāya, the virtues that are in the fruitional state (*phalāvastā*) are perfected (cf. chap. IV, § 1). Or again, that which is neither more nor less is equalized. In the dharmakāya, the virtues are perfected: they have neither more nor less. This is not like the virtues in the bodhisattva levels which consist of degrees.

17) *Manifesting various buddhafiels conforming to the aspirations of beings (yathādhimuktisaṃbhinnabuddhakṣetrapradaśanagunaḥ)*: this 17th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha has reached the summit of the unadulterated liberating knowledge of the Tathāgata (asaṃbhinnatathāgatavimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ)*. Seeing the different aspirations of beings, the Buddha manifests diverse buddhafiels of gold, silver, etc., which are unadulterated. When aspirations are formed (*sammukhībhavanti*), the Bhagavat makes everything appear in conformity with the wishes of beings. Because there is nothing that he does not know, we speak of the vimokṣajñāna of the Tathāgata. Here *vimokṣa* is in place of *adhimukti*.

18) *Unlimited extension of the threefold body of the Buddha (buddhatrikāyapradeśāparicchedagunaḥ)*: this 18th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha has reached the identity of the buddhafiels free from center and periphery*

(*anantamadhyabuddhabhūmisamatādhigataḥ*). Just as the universe is free of center and periphery, so the buddhafield is of unlimited space. Or else, the extension of the universe is unlimited, and the threefold body of the Buddha found there is of the measure of the universe and completely penetrates it. Indeed, the threefold body, the dharmakāya, etc., dwells in this universe since there is no other place. Or finally, the threefold body, dharmakāya, etc., which penetrates equally into the buddhafield, is free of center, limit and edge because it penetrates everywhere in order to procure the welfare of beings. But it is not by way of its self-nature (*svabhāvaḥ*) that it is without limit [for it transcends infinity ?].

19) *Being dedicated to the benefit and happiness of all beings (āsamsārakoṭisarvasattvahitasukhopasthānagaṇaḥ) until the end of transmigration*: this 19th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha rises up as far as the fundamental element (dharmadhātuparyantaḥ)*. Being very pure (*ativiśuddha*), the fundamental element gives rise to the doctrine, sūtra, etc. (*sūtrādidharma*) which is its natural result (*niṣyanda*). Rising up to this fundamental element, the Buddha will be able to be dedicated to the welfare and happiness of beings as is suitable (*yathāyogam*).

20) *Indestructibility (akṣayatvagaṇaḥ)*: this 20th quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha exhausts space (ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ)*. Space has non-resistance as its nature; for activity, it does not resist bodies offering resistance (*sapratighadravya*). As such, it is a *dhātu* because it has a self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*). It does not have the nature of showing holes (*kūpa*), alternating light and darkness (*andhakāra*). This space has no limit, no end, no diminishing, no arising, no cessation; it does not involve change; always it lends itself to the containing of all bodies. Similarly, the dharmakāya has the nature of being dedicated to the welfare and happiness of all beings; until the exhaustion of the universe, it procures the welfare of beings without cessation.

21) In the phrase '*indestrucutibility, etc.*' the word 'etc.' designates the last quality (*niṣtagaṇaḥ*). This quality explains the phrase: *the Buddha reaches the ultimate end (aparāntakoṭiniṣṭhaḥ)*. This quality, which consists of attaining the ultimate end, is equivalent to a perpetual non-interruption (*nityāsamuccheda*): this is attaining the 'end without future end'. Indeed, the Buddha's qualities will never be exhausted because the number of beings to be converted (*vineyasattva*) will never be exhausted.

* * *

Adorned with these qualities, *the Buddha has a very pure intellect (suvisuddhabuddhiḥ)*; thus the Bhagavat is distinguished from the śrāvakas, pratyakabuddhas and bodhisattvas because of his pure intellect.

1) How does he obtain this very pure intellect? Next, it is said: *he moves in nonduality (advayasamudācaraḥ)*. On the other hand, the śrāvakas, etc., have a twofold *samudācāra* with regard to the objects to be cognized (*jñeyaviṣaya*), namely, knowledge (*jñāna*) and unafflicted ignorance. The Buddha, not having this twofold *samudācāra*, possesses the perfection of knowledge (*jñānasamṗad*).

2) To explain the perfection of the cutting through of the afflictions (*prahāṇasamṗad*) in the Tathāgata, next it is said: he penetrates the dharma without nature (*alakṣaṇadharmaparāyanaḥ*). This is non-abiding nirvāṇa (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*) the nature of which is to be disgusted with saṃsāra and nirvāṇa [cf. u: *ḥkor ba dan mya ñan las ḥdas paḥi mtshan ñid dan mi mthun paḥi mtshan ñid mi gnas paḥi mya ñan las ḥdas paḥi phyir ro*].

3) By what means (*upāya*) does he gain this nirvāṇa? Next the answer is: *he resides in the abodes of the Buddha (buddhavihārena viharan)*. Since the Bhagavat abides in emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and in great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), he resides neither in saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa.

4) Is this abode (*vihāra*) of the Buddha shared with others (*anyasādhāraṇa*) or is it reserved (*asādhāraṇa*) for the Buddha? Then the answer is: *he has obtained equality with all the Buddhas (sarvabuddhasamatāprāptaḥ)*, because the Buddhas follow one another and are united with one another in all points (*sarvākāreṣu*). The preceding shows the perfection of self-interest (*svakārthasamṗad*) in the Buddha.

5) Wishing to explain the perfection of altruism (*parārthasamṗad*) and to show that the Buddha possesses the means to counteract (*pratipakṣa*) all the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) that fetter the beings to be disciplined (*vineya*), next it is said: *he has attained the absence of obstacles (anāvaraṇagatiṃ gataḥ)*.

6) There are beings, Māra, etc., capable of causing the doctrine to decline and causing the interest of beings (*sattvārtha*) to decline; but here, there is nothing like that. That is why it is said: *his doctrine is without decline (apratyudāvartyadharmah)*.

7) There is no height or no depth that can hinder the Buddha from acting for the good and happiness of beings (*sattvahitasukha*). That is why it is then said: *his domain cannot be diminished (asamhāryagocarah)*.

8) Concerning the means (*upāya*) that allow the Buddha to procure the interest of beings, next it is said: *his system is inconceivable (acintyavyavasthānah)*.

9) Are these efforts the same or different in all the Buddha Bhagavats? They are not different. Why? Because *he penetrates the identity of the three times (tryadhvasamatāniryātah)*. All the Buddhas procure the interest of beings in the same way throughout the three times.

10) Does the Buddha procure the interest of beings in this way gradually (*anukramena*) in each universe one by one? No. Why? Because *his bodies are extended in all the universes (sarvalokadhātuprasṛtakāyḥ)* and manifest the perfect Buddha fully (*yugapad*) in all the universes.

11) In order to show that the Buddha can cut through doubt that arises on any point, next it is said: *his knowledge pertains to everything so that there is no doubt (sarvadharmiḥsaṃśayajñānah)*.

12) Since the beings to be disciplined (*vineyasattva*) are of different lineages (*bhinnagotra*), it is necessary to discipline them by appropriate means (*upāya*). To indicate this knowledge of skillful means (*kuśalopayajñāna*) of the Buddha, next it is said: *his intellect is endowed with all the practices (sarvacaryāsamanvāgatabuddhiḥ)*.

13) Basing himself on the abilities and inabilities of the beings to be disciplined (*vineyasattva*), the Buddha distinguishes skillfully. That is why it is said next: *his knowledge of the dharmas is free of error (niḥkāṅkṣadharmajñānah)*.

14) In the beings to be disciplined, whether they are of bad, correct or mixed practices (*pratipatti*), the aspects in which the Buddha manifests are not imaginary. In order to show this, next it is said: *his bodies are not imaginary (avikalpitaśarīrah)*.

15) In order to attract and give support to the śrāvakas and bodhisattvas of indeterminate lineages (*aniyatagotra*), the Buddha praises the Greater Vehicle. To show this, next it is said: *his knowledge is the object of the vows of all the bodhisattvas (sarvabodhisattvasaṃpratīcchitajñāna)*.

16) A certain category of beings to be disciplined wonders if the Śāstri (or the Buddha) is omniscient (*sarvajñā*) or non-omniscient. To remove this doubt, it is then said: *he has reached the summit of the nondual Buddha abodes (advayabuddhavihāraparamapāramigataḥ)*. Listening to all the Buddhas, he has obtained the same words.

17) It is asked whether all the Buddhas come down to one and the same nature. To remove this doubt, it is then said: *he has reached the summit of the unadulterated liberating knowledge of the Tathāgata (asaṃbhinnatathāgatavimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ)*.

18) If they are neither identical nor different, what is their nature? To reply to this question, it is then said: *he has reached the identity of the buddha realm free of center and periphery (anantamadhyabuddha-bhūmisamatādhigataḥ)*.

19) Since eternity (*nityatā*) and non-eternity (*anityatā*), etc., are completely the outcome of the two extremes (*antadvayalakṣaṇa*), is the Buddha then without nature? In order to refute this objection, it is said next: *he rises up to the fundamental element (dharmadhātuprayantaḥ)*. Purity (*parīśuddhi*) and absence of all empty proliferation (*nihprañca*) are the natures of the dharmadhātu.

20) How long do these types of activities for the benefit of beings last? Next, the answer is: *he exhausts space (ākāśadhātuparyvasānaḥ)* and *he attains the ultimate end (aparāntakoṭiniṣṭhaḥ)*.

34. I. The presentation of purposes (*arthādhikaraṇa*): when the bodhisattva is endowed with thirty-two attributes (*dharma*) he is called bodhisattva. What are these thirty-two attributes?

0) These bodhisattvas have the high aptitude of working for the benefit and happiness of all beings (*sarvasattva-hitasukhakriyādhyāśayaḥ*).

1a) They introduce beings into omniscience (*sarva-jñānāvatarakaḥ*).

- 2a) They cognize themselves completely (*ahaṃ kim iti parijānan*).
- 3a) They have conquered pride (*nirghātitasamānaḥ*).
- 4a) Their lofty aptitude is firm (*dṛḍhādhyāśayaḥ*).
- 5a) They possess (i) unfabricated loving-kindness (*akṛtrimamaitryaḥ*), (ii) unbiased predispositions in regard to friends and enemies (*mitrāmitrasanacittaḥ*), (iii) profound love extending to the limits of nirvāṇa (*ānirvāṇakoter ātyantikapremakaḥ*).
- 6a) They express themselves in measured words with smiling face (*mitapadasmitamukhapūrvābhilāpī*).
- 7a) Their compassion is unlimited (*aparicchinna-mahākaruṇaḥ*).
- 8a) They watch over the burdens they have taken on (*āttabhāreṣv analasaḥ*).
- 9a) Their zeal is indefatigable (*aparikhinnamānasaḥ*).
- 10a) They are insatiable in hearing and doctrine (*śrutārthātrptaḥ*).
- 11a) (i) They see the faults of their own errors (*svaskhalitadoṣadarśī*), (ii) they reprimand the faults of others without anger (*paraskhalitaniṣkrodhoddeśakaḥ*).
- 12a) They practice the mind of enlightenment in all their postures (*sarveryāpatheṣu bodhicittaparićāraḥ*).
- 13a) (i) They practice generosity without any wish for reward (*vipākanirapekṣadānaḥ*); (ii) their morality does not depend on rebirths in the course of existence (*sarvabhāvagati-janmānīśritaśīlaḥ*); (iii) their patience is not disheartened by anyone (*sarvasattveṣv paratihataḥsantiḥ*); (iv) their energy collects all the roots of good (*sarvakuśalamūla-saṃgrāhakavīrtāḥ*); (v) they practice a dhyāna that excludes the non-material world (*ārūpyadhātuviṣkambhidhyānaḥ*); (vi) they practice wisdom endowed with means (*upāyasamanvāgataprajñāḥ*); (vii) their means are drawn from the four elements of conversion (*catuḥsaṃgraha-vastugṛhītopāyaḥ*).

14a) (i) They have the same loving-kindness toward honest and dishonest people (*śīlavadduḥśīleṣv advayamaitryaḥ*); (ii) they listen to the doctrine respectfully (*satkṛtyadharmā-śravaṇaḥ*); (iii) they dwell in the forest respectfully (*satkṛtyāraṇyanivāsī*); (iv) they disdain all the frivolities of the world (*lokavaicitryānabhirataḥ*); (v) they have no desire for the Lesser Vehicle (*hīnayānānabhilāṣī*); (vi) they see the advantages of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyānānuśaṃsa-prekṣī*); (vii) they abandon bad friends (*pāpamitra-parityaktaḥ*); (viii) they are attached to good friends (*kalyāṇamitrāśrayaḥ*).

15a) (i) They practice the four limitless ones (*caturbrahmaparivāraparicāraḥ*); (ii) they play with the five supernatural faculties (*pañcābhijñāvikṛditaḥ*); (iii) they take refuge in knowledge (*jñānapratīṣṭī*).

16a) (i) They do not abandon beings given to good or bad practices (*pratipattimithyāpratipattiniśrita-sattvānikṣepakaḥ*); (ii) they have precise language (*ekavacanavādī*); (iii) they esteem the truth (*satya-bahukaraḥ*); (iv) they are preceded by the mind of enlightenment (*bodhicittapūrvamaṅgalaḥ*).

These sixteen phrases explain the first phrase: “The bodhisattvas have as their lofty predisposition the accomplishing of benefit and happiness for all beings”. [142a12]

II. The phrase “They have as their lofty predisposition the accomplishing of benefit and happiness for all beings” is explained by sixteen actions (*karman*), which are:

1b) The action of successive effort (*paraṃparaprayoga-karma*).

2b) Non-erroneous action (*aviparyāsakarma*).

3b) The action of personal effort independent of another's invitation (*parodyojanānapekṣaṃ svataḥprayogakarma*).

4b) Immutable action (*akṣobhyakarma*).

5b) Disinterested action (*nirāmiṣakarma*) defined by the three phrases of no. 5a. It consists of (i) absence of self-interested views (*āmiṣāsaṃsargaḥ*), (ii)

absence of fondness for benefactors and aversion for evil-doers (*upakartrapakartranunayapratighābhāvaḥ*), (iii) continuity in later existences (*janmāntarānuparivartanam*).

6b) Action of body and speech conforming to the lofty predisposition (*tadanukūlavākkāyakarma*) defined by the two phrases of no. 6a.

7b) Equality of action in regard to fortunate, unfortunate, neither fortunate nor unfortunate beings (*dukhasukhādvayeṣu samatākarma*).

8b) Courageous action (*adīnakarma*).

9b) Action without retreating (*avivartanīyakarma*).

10b) Action that consists of taking possession of means (*upāyaparigrāhakakarma*).

11b) Action tending to expel that which is to be counteracted (*vipakṣanirākaraṇakarma*) defined by the two phrases of no. 11a.

12b) Action that consists of ceaseless reflection on bodhicitta (*samitaṃ tanmanasikāarakarma*).

13b) Action that consists of going towards the spiritual good (*viśeṣagamanakarma*) defined by the seven phrases of no. 13a. It consists of the good practice of the six virtues (*ṣaṭpāramitāsamyakprayogaḥ*) and the practice of the elements of conversion (*saṃgrahavastuprayogaḥ*).

14b) Action of perfect effort (*niṣpattiprayogakarma*) defined by the eight phrases of 14a. It consists of (i) serving good people (*satpuruṣāpaśrayaḥ*), (ii) hearing the true doctrine (*saddharmaśravaṇam*), (iii) living in the forest (*araṇya-nivāsaḥ*), (iv) fleeing from bad distractions (*aśubhavikalpa-parityāgaḥ*), (v) the quality of reflection (*manasikāraguṇaḥ*) defined in no. 14a by two phrases, (vi) the quality of good company (*sahāyaguṇaḥ*) defined by two phrases of no. 14a.

15b) Perfect action (*niṣpannakarma*) defined by three phrases in no. 15a. It consists of (i) the purity of infinite practices (*apramāṇaviśuddhiḥ*), (ii) taking

power (*prabhāvaprāptih*), and (iii) the quality of realization (*adhigamaḡuṇaḡ*).

16b) Stabilizing action of lofty predisposition (*tatprasthānakarma*) defined by the four phrases of no. 16a. It consists of (i) the quality permitting the directing of assemblies (*saḡghapariṇayaḡuṇaḡ*), (ii) intellectual and moral direction given unhesitatingly (*niḡsaḡśayaṡvavādānuśāsanam*), (iii) joining material interests with the doctrine (*āmiṡadharmaiḡbhāvaḡ*) and (iv) undefiled mind (*asaḡkliṡṡacittam*).

Note that the first phrase has been subdivided (*prabhinna*) into these thirty-two phrases. Thus a stanza says: Starting from the first phrase, there are various phrases concerning the qualities (*ḡuṇa*) of the Buddha; starting from the first phrase, there are various phrases concerning the various purposes of the bodhisattva. [142b4]

34. Comm. Bh 348b23-349b2, bh 187b2-189a5, U 411c16-413b4, u 291b4-295a7.

Here again is the commentary of U at length.

“The thirty-two attributes of the bodhisattva are explained by sixteen actions. *Their lofty predisposition is to act for the benefit and happiness of all beings (sarvasttvahitasukhakriyādhyāśayaḡ)*. There can be benefit (*hita*) without happiness (*sukha*), e.g., in very impassioned (*tīvraṡāga*) people who practice celibacy (*brahmacarya*) with difficulty. There can be happiness without there being benefit, e.g., among beings of desire (*ḡdod pa can*) who enjoy all kinds of reprehensible objects (*nānāsāvadyaviṡaya*). There can be benefit and happiness at the same time, e.g., among only slightly impassioned people (*parittarāga*) who practice celibacy easily. [These definitions of *hita-sukha* occur in u but are absent in U: *phan pa ni phyi ma la bde ba ste bde ba ni da ltar gyi dgaḡ ba ste phan pa daṡ bde ba ni ltar daṡ ma ḡoṡs pa na dgaḡ ba ste*. That is to say, *hita* is future benefit (*amutrakuśala*); *sukha* is present joy (*pratyutpannaprīti*); *hita-sukha* is present and future joy.] The bodhisattvas wonder: “What shall I do so that all beings may obtain benefit and supreme (*anuttara*) happiness?” Predisposition (*āśaya*) has faith (*śraddhā*) and aspiration (*chanda*) as nature

contrived (*kṛtrima*) and is conceived only temporarily. But if the action is not mixed with biased views (*āmiṣāsamsṛṣṭa*), the loving-kindness is not contrived and is never abandoned. (ii) If loving-kindness is practiced while one is based on biased affection, one experiences fondness (*anunaya*) for one's friends and revulsion (*pratigha*) for one's enemies; the predispositions are not impartial. But if one is based on a disinterested predisposition, one acts in the same way towards both. (iii) If loving-kindness is practiced with a biased predisposition, the loving-kindness will last only until the end of this life. But if one practices loving-kindness without biased predisposition, the kind predisposition (*maitricitta*) will last forever throughout all rebirths. That is why the bodhisattvas have *profound love until the end of nirvāṇa*.

6) *They express themselves in moderate words with a smiling face (mitapadasmitamukhapūrvābhilāpī)*: this is explained by the twofold *action of body and speech (vākkāyakarman)* conforming to the lofty predisposition of working for the welfare and happiness of all beings.

7) *Their great compassion is unlimited (aparicchinnamahākaruṇaḥ)*: this is explained by equal action towards unfortunate, fortunate and neither fortunate nor unfortunate beings (*duḥkasukhādvayeṣu samatākarma*). If they felt compassion only for the unfortunate and not for the fortunate or indifferent beings as well, their action would not be equal for they would be acting with bias. But the great compassion of the bodhisattvas extends to all beings, fortunate, unfortunate, neither fortunate nor unfortunate, who are all subject to the sufferings of transmigration. Their equal compassion makes no distinctions. This is why it is called *action of equality*.

8) *They watch over the burdens they have accepted (āttabhāreṣv analadaḥ)*: this is explained by *courageous action (adīnakarma)*. They are specially attached to the salvation (*uttāraṇa*) of all beings as though to a heavy load. In the face of this heavy load, their courage never fails; they do not retreat before this pain but they adapt themselves to this burden. That is why *courageous action* is spoken of.

9) *Their zeal is indefatigable (aparikhinnamānasah)*: this is explained by *action that does not turn back (avivartanīyakarma)*, for the bad actions (*duṣcarita*) of beings to be converted (*vineyasattva*) cannot deter them from acting in conformity with their lofty predisposition of working for the welfare and happiness of beings.

10) *They are insatiable in listening and insatiable to the doctrine (śrutārthātṛptaḥ):* this is explained by *action that consists of providing oneself with means (upāyaparigrāhakakarma)*. Listening (*śruta*) is the doctrine, sūtras, etc. that one has heard; this is not a question of hearing just anything at all. The doctrine (*artha*) is the points of the teaching explained by these sūtras. Towards this listening and doctrine the bodhisattvas are insatiable (*asaṃtuṣṭa*); these are the skillful means with which they provide themselves in order to ripen (*paripāka*) beings. That is why it is called *action consisting of providing oneself with means*. Being insatiable in listening and the doctrine, they discipline according to their ... [A few words are missing here from my (M.C.) xerox copy].

11) *They see the faults of their own errors (svaskhalitadoṣadarśī) and reprimand the faults of others without anger (paraskhalita-niṣkrodhoddeśakaḥ):* this is explained by *action tending to expel that which is to be counteracted (vipakṣanirākaraṇakarma)*. That which is to be counteracted (*vipakṣa*) is desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), etc. To expel them is to distance oneself from them. Seeing the faults of their own errors, the bodhisattvas quickly expel them and are able to criticize the faults of others. But it is with dignified words that they make this reprimand and not otherwise. Thus the sūtra says: “The person who is given to misconduct (*mithyācāra*) incurs the blame of others; this person will never have the right to criticize the wrong-doings of another.” People also say: “If one commits faults oneself, after some time one does not notice them; one does not avoid them as one should: prideful people will have no merit.” To blame angrily the faults of others is not doing good and is not practicing means. If your words lack dignity, others will turn their back on you and will continue their bad conduct. Thus a stanza says: “If one reprimands the faults of others with the kindness (*maitrī*) one feels for an only child, one will certainly succeed in strengthening them so that they will no longer sin in the future.”

12) *In all their postures, they cultivate the mind of enlightenment (sarveryāpatheṣu bodhicittaparicāraḥ):* this is explained by *the action consisting of ceaselessly reflecting on this thought (samitaṃ tanmanasikāraḥ)*, for they continually cultivate the mind of enlightenment in all their activities. Thus it is said in the Gocarapariśuddhisūtra: “Seeing a seated posture, they have this thought: 'I wish that

beings may sit on the throne of enlightenment (*bodhimaṇḍa*).’ “ Cf. other stanzas of this type.

13) *They practice generosity without any wish for reward (vipākanirapekṣadānaḥ)* and the other phrases of § 13a up to *their means are drawn from the four elements of conversion (catuḥsaṃgraha-vastugr̥hūtopayaḥ)*: this is explained by *the action of going towards the spiritual good (viśeṣagamanakarma)* defined by the seven phrases of § 13b, namely, the six virtues (*pāramitā*) and the four elements of conversion (*saṃgrahavastu*). Having expelled the wrong-doings to be counteracted (*vipakṣadoṣa*) of § 12, the bodhisattvas attain the fullness of going towards the spiritual good (*viśeṣagamanapariṇipūrī*) in the successive bhūmis, pramuditā, etc.; and this is why it is said that they have accomplished what was to have been accomplished (*kṛtakṛtya*).

In the seven phrases of § 13a, the first four perfections are easily understood. The rest will be briefly explained:

Phrase 5: *They practice a dhyāna that excludes the formless realm (arūpyadhātuviṣkambhidhyānaḥ)*: bodhisattvas are not born into the formless realm because they do not see any possibility of working there for the welfare and happiness of beings. They do not join those who enter into the formless concentrations because they do not consider them as the source of many qualities (*sambahulaguṇāśraya*); that is why they avoid them.

Phrase 6: *They practice a wisdom endowed with means (upāyasamanvāgataprajñāḥ)*. To cultivate (*abhyas-*) the marvellous wisdom (*prajñā*) associated with great compassion (*mahākaruṇāsamānvāgatā*) is to work for the welfare and happiness of beings. If this wisdom were to be lacking, the welfare and happiness of beings would not be assured, for it is especially for them that the state of buddhahood (*buddhaphala*) is sought. Thus a stanza says: “Exercising wisdom and compassion together is to work for the welfare and happiness of others. By working appropriately in the interest of others, one is completely oriented towards bodhi.”

Phrase 7: The four elements of conversion (*saṃgrahavastu*) are generosity (*dāna*), kind words (*priyavādītā*), service (*arthacaryā*) and the pursuit of a shared goal (*samānārthatā*). By generosity, the bodhisattvas win others over (*ādadati*); by kind words, they skilfully (*upāyena*) explain the nature of things (*dharmalakṣaṇa*); by service,

they encourage them as necessary (*yathāyogam*) to practice good; by pursuit of a shared goal, they cause them to acquire special qualities (*asādhāraṇaḡuṇa*) later. Or also, by generosity, they make others a receptacle of the law (*dharmabhājana*); by friendly words, they inspire them to adhere to the law (*dharmādhimukti*); by service, they lead them to correct practices in conformity with adhesion to the law; by pursuit of a shared goal, they make them acquire special qualities (*asādhāraṇaḡuṇa*) later. Or else, by generosity, they make another to become a receptacle of the doctrine (*dharmabhājana*); by kindly words, they inspire him to adhesion to the doctrine (*dharmādhimukti*); by service, they lead him to the right practices conforming to this adhesion to the doctrine; by the pursuit of a shared goal, they cause the practices carried out by another to become pure (*viśuddha*) and sublime. The bodhisattvas, by these elements of conversion, embrace the essence of means (*upāyasvabhāva*).

14) *They have the same benevolence towards honest and dishonest people (śīlavadduḡśīleṣv advayamaitryaḡ)* and the other phrases of § 14a up to: *they have recourse to good friends (kalyāṇamitrāśrayaḡ)*: this is explained by the action of perfected effort (*niṣpattiprayogakarma*) and the six phrases of § 14b. Because this effort leads to perfection, it is called *perfected effort*: it is an action. The six phrases of § 14b: *the service of good people (satpuruṣāpāśrayaḡ)*, etc., explain the eight phrases of § 14a taken from the sūtra, because the last two phrases of § 14b: *the quality of reflection (manasikāraḡuṇaḡ)* and the *quality of good companions (sahāḡuṇaḡ)* each explain two phrases of § 14a. (i) People who possess good discipline are called honest (*śīlavat*); those who possess bad discipline are called dishonest (*duḡśīla*). One listens with respect to these two categories of people who are able to preach the law so that it may be heard with respect, to whom the bodhisattvas attach the label 'good friend' (*teṣu kalyāṇamitrasamjñām utpādayanti*), without making any distinction; this is why it is said that bodhisattvas *have the same benevolence towards honest and dishonest people*. Actually, in regard to dishonest people, one cannot say in the absolute sense (*atyantena*) that they are not good friends. Thus a stanza says: “Whoever possesses a satisfactory discipline (however tiny) and can teach eloquently for the benefit of many people, he should be venerated like the Great Teacher because he is like him inasmuch as people like his good sermons. (ii) *They listen to the law respectfully (satkr̥tyadharmāśravaṇaḡ)*: concerning the vast meanings that are explained, one should listen to the law by means of

sixteen practices. (iii) They dwell respectfully in the forest (*satkṛtyāraṇyanivāsī*). That which is farther than one krośa from a town is called a *forest*; to live there is to *dwell* there. By dwelling there appropriately without strolling about is to dwell there *respectfully*. (iv) They disdain all the frivolities of the world (*lokavaicitryānabhirataḥ*): they distrust all worldly frivolities, singing, laughing, dancing, etc. To do that is to avoid the evil preoccupations associated with desire (*rāga*), etc. (v - vi) *The quality of reflection* (*manasikāraguṇaḥ*), because the bodhisattvas have rejected the Vehicle of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and are filled with desire for the qualities of the Greater Vehicle. (vii - viii) *The quality of good companions* (*sahāyaguṇaḥ*), because the bodhisattvas distance themselves from bad friends (*pāpamitra*) and stay close to good friends (*kalyāṇamitra*).

15) *They practice the four immeasurables* (*caturbrahmavihāraparicāraḥ*), *they play with the five supernatural faculties* (*pañcābhijñāvīkṛditāḥ*), *they take refuge in knowledge* (*jñāna*): this is explained by *perfect action* (*niṣpannakarma*). The action of perfect nature (*niṣpannalakṣaṇa*) is called *perfect action*. Here the word 'action' is synonymous with 'mark' (rtaḥ = *liṅga*). The three phrases of § 15b: *purity in infinite practices* (*apramāṇaviśuddhiḥ*), etc., explains the three phrases of § 15a: *they practice the four immeasurables* (*caturbrahmavihāraparicāraḥ*), etc. (i) The four immeasurables (*catvāry apramāṇāni*), namely, loving-kindness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*), are called *limitless practices*. The four inner qualities of the bodhisattva become manifest outwardly by means of them because, their purity (*viśuddhi*) being perfect, these practices are the mark (*liṅga*) of purity. (ii) The fact of playing with the five supernatural faculties is a power (*prabhāva*). The knowledge that destroys the impurities (*āsravaḥśhayajñāna*) or liberating knowledge (*vimokṣajñāna*) is called great power (*mahāprabhāva*); or rather, by great power one understands the abhijñā of the bodhisattvas. These abhijñās are also a mark of perfection (*niṣpattiliṅga*). (iii) *The quality of realization* (*adhigamaguṇaḥ*), i.e., that which they have realized, made present, mastered: this explains the phrase: *they take refuge in knowledge* (*jñānapratisāri*). Individual knowledge (*pratyātmajñāna*) is called *refuge in knowledge*; this is not the awareness of a simple object (*artha*), but it is taking refuge in one's own vijñāna.

16) *They do not abandon beings who are given up to good or bad practices (pratipattimithyāpratipatti-nisritasattvānikṣepakaḥ)*: like the other phrases of § 16a, this one is explained by *stabilizing action (tatprasthānakarma)* and the four phrases of § 16b. The stabilization of the lofty predisposition of acting for the welfare and happiness of beings is an action; that is why one speaks of the *stabilizing action*. (i) *The quality that permits the directing of assemblies (saṃghapariṇayakaguṇaḥ)*. Sending away dishonest (*duḥśīla*) people and gathering honest (*śīlavat*) people, bodhisattvas wish alike to cause them to leave the bad states (*akuśalāt sthānād vyutthānam*) and introduce them into the good states (*kuśale sthāne pratiṣṭhāpanam*); this is *not to abandon them*. (ii) *They have precise speech (ekavacanavādī)*: bodhisattvas teach (*avavāda*) and exhort (*anuśāsana*) with precision and unhesitatingly because their speech (*vacana*) is dignified (*ādeya*). If speech is not precise, it is not dignified. (iii) *They esteem the truth (satyabahukaraḥ)*. Material interests (*āmiṣa*) and the doctrine (*dharma*), which are dual, are united and form a single kind of generosity. To accumulate wealth or to accumulate the doctrine is the same thing. Bodhisattvas distribute them equally in conformity with their earlier promise. This generosity exists only in the present. Thus a stanza says: “The offering of material goods causes beings to exhaust their life (*āyus*), the offering of the doctrine causes them to attain heavenly calm.” (iv) *They are preceded by the mind of enlightenment (bodhicittapūrvamaṅgamaḥ)*: this is explained by the phrase: *the undefiled mind*. Embraced by the mind of enlightenment, bodhisattvas in all their activities are without desire and do not seek the offerings of others, etc. They seek only the approach (*adhigama*) to supreme enlightenment (*anuttarabodhi*).

NOTES to CHAPTER II

1. The three natures have been studied in Saṃdhimir., Chap. VI -VII; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 67-68, p. 130-133; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 37-38; Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI, 13, 38; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, Chap. III: *Tattvapariṇchedaḥ*, p. 110-165; Triṃśikā, p. 39 (4)- 42 (8); Siddhi, p. 514-561; Treatise by Vasubandhu-Nāgārjuna on the three natures, MCB, II, 1932-33, p.147-161. Mādhyamika works: Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 274, 445, 553; Madhymakāvātāra, p. 166, 195. - Preparation for the doctrine of the three natures in the Prajñās and the Madhyamaka: Saṃdhinir., Introduction, p. 14-16; Abhis. alaṃ āl. , p. 47; Madhyamakāvātāra, p. 101; Bodhicaryāvataraṇajikā, p. 361 (4).

2. Paratantra, in Saṃdhir., VI, § 4-11; Triṃśikā, p. 39 (19-27); Siddhi, p. 526; Madhyamakavatāra, p. 139.

The eleven vijñaptis, below, § 5, 10; Siddhi, p. 514.

3. Parikalpita, in Saṃdhir., VI, § 4-11; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 113 (17-22); Triṃśikā, p. 39 (27-40); Siddhi, p. 527.

4. Parinispāna, in Saṃdhir., VI, § 4-11; Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 113 (17-22); Triṃśikā, p. 39 (27) – 40 (5); Siddhi, p. 527.

Examples illustrating the theory of the three natures: optical illusion (Saṃdhir., VI, § 7; Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 373; Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 102, 109; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 363-365); crystal (Saṃdhir., VI, § 8); water in mirage, (Upanibandhana, Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 220 (8); magical elephant (Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 220 (2)). See below, § 27.

4. Example of the dream: Laṅkāvatāra, p. 91 (1-7); Viṃśikā, kār. 17b-c, p. 9-16); Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 113; Siddhi, p. 429. - Same example used by Śaṅkara, ad Brahmasūtra, II, 1, 14: *sarvavyavahārāṇām eva prag brahātmatāvijñānāt satyatvoppatteḥ, svapnavyavahārasyeva prāk prabodhāt*; idem, ad Brahmasūtra, 2, 29; III, 2, 4.

7. The demonstrtion of vijñaptimātratā will be continued in § 11 and § 14. See Triṃśikā, p. 35-36; Siddhi, p. 416-432. In Laṅkāvatāra, exception being made for the sagāthakam, § 44, 77, there is the expression 'cittamātra'; cf. p. 70 (18), 104 (8), 208 (13).

8. On smṛti, cf. Viṃśikā, p. 9 (6-8).

The skeletons seen in a cemetery: allusion to *aśubhabhāvanā* practiced by yogins; cf. Vinaya, III, p. 68; Dīgha, II, p. 296; Majjhima, III, p. 82; Aṅguttara, III, p. 323; Dhammasaṅgaṇi, p. 55; Atthasālini, p. 115; Visuddhimagga, p. 178; Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 209; Bodhicaryāvatāra, VIII, 83; IX, 41; Kośa, VI, p. 149; Kośavyākhyā on the five *vimuktyāyatanas*, p. 54 (1); Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 78 (3).

9. Same objection and same response in Sūtrālamkāra, p. 428.

11. The thesis of Asaṅga is repeated by Dharmapāla who refers to Saṃgraha, cf. Siddhi, p. 523: " The citta-caittas develop into two bhāgas by the power of perfuming (*vāsanā*). These two bhāgas, thus developed, arise from causes and are paratantra. But by relationship with the two bhāgas, the imagination conceives wrong notions The two bhāgas, conceived under these various modes, take the name of parikalpita." - The opinion of Sthiramati is opposed to this thesis; cf. Siddhi, p. 522: " The impure citta-caitta, by reason of an *abhūtavāsanā* which is beginningless - although it is of unique

nature, it arises in the mode of duality, as *darśanabhāga* and *nimittabhāga*. These two bhāgas exist as point of view (*ruci*), they do not exist as proof (*yukti*). The Madhyānta states that these two characteristics are imaginary." The passage of the Madhyāntavibhaṅga cited here occurs in kār. I, 13 a-b, p. 46 (19): *dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaś ca śūnyalakṣaṇam*: "The non-existence of the two (grāhya and grāhaka) and the existence (underlying) this non-existence, such is the essence of the void (or the absolute)."

On the theory of the bhāgas or aṃśa, cf. Siddhi, p. 125-131, where there is a rich bibliography.

12. On this theory of certain bodhisattvas, cf. Siddhi, p. 4-5, 396. Volition (*cetanā*) is called *kāya-vāk-, manaḥ-karman*, according to whether it moves the body, the speech, or is associated with the manas: this is the Sautrāntika thesis (cf. Kośa, IV, p. 12; Karmasiddhi, v. 46-49) and the Vijñānavādin thesis (cf. Siddhi, p. 51-52).

According to Kośa, I, p. 59-61, the five vijñānas involve vitarka and vicāra (= *svabhāvavikalpa*); the sixth involves the vikalpa of *nirūpaṇā* and *anusmaraṇa* as well.

The presence of the tangible in the dhyānas: Kośa, VIII, p. 154.

Manas caisām pratisaraṇam: Saṃyutta, V, p. 218; Kośavyākhyā, p. 703 (15). On the other hand, the Dārṣṭāntikas say: "The *manovijñāna* has a distinct object: it does not pertain to the object of the five *vijñānas*, *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc." (Vibhāṣā, in Kośa, VIII, p. 242).

13. On the development of the ālaya, cf. Laṅkāvatāra, p. 54 (10): *dehabhogapraṭiṣṭhānam ālayam khyāyate nṛṇām*; p. 56 (7): *ālayavijñānam svacittadṛśyadehapraṭiṣṭhābhogaviṣayam yugapad vibāvayati*. For the Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 16-17, the vijñāna arises in a threefold appearance: *arthasattvapratibhāva* (= ālayavijñānam śasaṃprayogam), *ātmapratibhāsa* (= kliṣṭam manaḥ śasaṃprayogam), *vijñaptipratibhāsa* (= śasaṃprayogam cakṣurjñānādiṣaṭkam).

14. The sūtra of the four knowledges, probably taken from the Abhidharmasūtra is reproduced in the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Taishō 1616, p. 715b19-715c1, and Siddhi, p. 421-423. These four knowledges are:

i. *Viruddhajñānanimittatvajñāna*. - The example of water seen by the pretas, etc., in Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 164 (12); Viṃśikā, p. 4 (2-6); Nyāyavārttika, p. 528 (12).

ii. *Anāmbanavijñaptiyupalabdhitvajñāna*. Cf. below, § 27.

iii. *Aprayatnāvīparītatvajñāna*. Cf. Saṃdhanir., III, § 3; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XI, 24; Acintyastotra in Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, 6: *indriyair upalabdham yat tat tattvena bhaved yadi, jātā tattvavido bālā tattvajñānena kiṃ tadā*.

iv. *Trividhajñānānukūlatvajñāna* involves a threefold knowledge designated by Siddhi as:

a) *Vaśitājñānānuvartakajñāna*. This concerns the cetovaśitā already mentioned in chap. I, § 60, dealing with the *adhimuktibala* of the yogins. The results of this vaśita are

described in Daśabhūmika, p. 70; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 352 (7): *yathepsitam ca sarvaddhikāryaṃ karoti. Sarvaprāṇidhānāni cāsya yathākāmaṃ samṛdhyanti. yad yad eva vastu yathādhumucyate tat tathaiva bhavati.* See also Madhyamakāvātāra, p. 163 (8). Some concrete examples in Saṃyutta, I, p. 116: *ākaṅkhammano ca pana bhante Bhagavā Himavantam pabbatarājam suvaṇṇamtv eva adhimucceyya, suvaṇṇaṃ ca pabbatassmati;* Kathāvatthu, II, p. 608: *āyasmā Pilindavaccho rañño Māgadhassa Seniyassa Bimbisārassa pāsāda suvaṇṇan teva adhimucce suvaṇṇo ca pana āsi.*

b) *Pravicayajñānānuvartakajñāna.* On śamatha and vipaśyanā, cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 95; Aṅguttara, II, p. 494; Saṃdhir., VIII, § 1-18; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 260 (15) - 261 (5); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 151 (20), 215 (8); Siddhi, p. 596.

c) *Nirvikalpakajñānānuvartakajñāna.* Nonconceptual wisdom will be the subject of chap. VIII. It is, in essence, nonperception (*anupalambha*).

14 b. Missing in the four Chinese versions. It may be found in the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Taishō 1606, p. 715b19.

16. The *abhūtaparikalpa* is studied in detail in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 30-45. The functioning of the imagination involves *ālambana, nimittodgrahaṇa = samjñā* (Kośavyākhyā, p. 37 (5), *abhiniveśa* or belief by means of the five *dr̥ṣṭis* (five *dr̥ṣṭis* in Kośa, V, p. 15; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 240 (4); Siddhi, p. 256; sixty-two *dr̥ṣṭigatas* in Brahmajālasutta, Dīgha, I, p. 12-39; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 286; Paṭisambhidāmagga, I, p. 130; Cullaniddesa, p. 271; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 96, 112, 160; Kośa, IX, 265; below, § 20, no. 9, *vāksamutthāna* (cf. Kośa, II, p. 174; the phrase *vitarkya vicārya* is in Majjhima, I, p. 301; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 293; Kośavyākhyā, p. 139 (10); fourfold *vyavahāra* (cf. Dīgha, III, p. 134; Cullaniddesa, p. 276; Itivuttaka, p. 121; Dīgha, III, p. 232; Suttanipāta, st. 1086, 1122; Saṃdhir., II, § 3; IX, § 14; Kośa, IV, p. 160), *samāropa* (for the example of the rope taken to be a snake, cf. notes and references to chap. III, § 8).

17. See Siddhi, p. 530-532.

18-21. Many lists of vikalpa, parikalpa, kalpa, vikṣepa. Two v. in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 51 (21); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 31 (6); Saṃgraha, II, v. § - Three v. in Kośa, I, p. 60; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Taishō 1616, p. 703a13-19; Siddhi, p. 390; Dharmasaṃgraha, § 135. - Four p. in Saṃgraha, II, § 19. - Five p. in Saṃgraha, II, § 19; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XI, 77. - Six vikṣepa in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 214 (10). - Seven v. in Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Taishō 1606, p. 703a19-27. - Eight v. in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 50 (23) - 51 (13); Vikhyāpana, Taishō 1602, p. 558b14 - 558c3. - Nine v. in Abhis. alaṃ āl, p. 69 (14). - Ten vikṣepas in Saṃgraha, II, § 21; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XI, 77. Twelve § in Laṅkāvatāra, p. 128 (4) - 129 (11). - See Abhis. alaṃ āl, p. 66 seq.; Siddhi, p. 520-522.

22. Borrowed from Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, Taishō 220, k. 4, p. 17b25 - 17c16, and from Sūtrālamkāra, XI, 77. Not translated by Buddhāsanta or by Hiuan-tsang. However, the latter passes over it in his translation of the upanibandhana.

24. For the explanation of the last stanza, cf. Sūtrālamkāra, p. 88: *dharmabhāvaś ca dharmopaladhiś ceti trāsasthānaṃ niḥsaṃkleśatā ca dharmadhātoḥ prakṛtyā viśuddhatā ca paścād iti trāsasthānaṃ bālānāṃ, tad yathākramaṃ māyādis adṛṣyenākāśād rṣyena ca prasādhayaṃ tatas trāsaṃ pratiśedhayati tathā citre natonnatasādṛṣyena lutitaprasāsitatotyasādṛṣyena ca yathākramam*. These last two examples along with a slightly different application are found in Saṃdhinir., VII, § 28; VIII, v. 28.

25. Seems to be an objection by the Mādhyamikans for whom the paratantra does not exist.

26. Has been borrowed from the Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 112, which itself depends on the Abhidharmasūtra. For the terms designating the absolute, cf. Siddhi, Appendix II: Notes on the tathatā or dharmaṭā, p. 743-757.

27. On the dharmas comparable to a magical show, see the following texts:

1) Saṃyutta, III, p. 142:

Phenaṇiṇḍūpmaṃ rūpaṃ // vedanā bubbulupamā //

*marīcikūpamā sañña // saṅkhārā kadalūpamā // māyūpamañca viññaṇaṃ //
dīpitādiccabandhunā //*

ii) Vajracchedikā, An. Oxon., p. 46: *tadyathākāṣe tārakā timiraṃ dīpo māyāvaśyāya budbudaṃ / svapnaṃ ca vidyud abhraṃ ca evaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ //*

iii) Saṃdhinir., Chap. I, § 4-5; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 29 (15-17), 42 (1-2), etc.; Daśabhūmika, 9th dharmasamatā, p. 47 (15): *sarvadharmamāya-svapnapratibhāsapratiśrutkodakacandrapratibimbānirmānasamatā: Avataṃsakasūtra, Taishō 279, chap. 29 on the ten kṣāntis; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1209; Lalitavistara, p. 181 (21).*

iv) Catuḥśataka, XIII, kār. 25, cited in Madyamakavṛtti, p. 173 (3), 552 (2):

*alātacakranirmāṇasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaiḥ / dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrutkāmarīcyabhraiḥ
samo bhavaḥ //*

v) Mahāvvyutpatti, no. 854.

vi) Nirvikalpakapraveśā dhāraṇī, in Triṃśikā, p. 40 (25): *tatpṛṣṭhalabdheṇa jñānena māyāmarīcisvapnapratīśrutkocandra-nirmītasamān sarvadharmān pratyeti.*

vii) Sūtrālamkāra, XI, 29:

*māyāsvapnamarīcibimbasadrśāḥ prodbhāsaśrutkopamā / vijñeyo-
dakacandrabimbasadrśā nirmāṇatulyāḥ punaḥ //*

viii) Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 220:

yathā māyā svatmany avidyamāne na hastyādyātmanā prakhyānād hastyādibhāvena nāstīti hastyādibhāvena nāstīti savathaiva nāsti. kiṃ tarhi nāpi nāsti tasya bhrāntimātrāstitvāditi. hastyādyākāreṇa prakhyāyāmanasya bhrāntimātrasyāstitvān na sarvathā nāsti. tathārto 'pi yathā grāhyagrāhakatvena prabhāsate tathā naivāsti. tasya traidhātukacitta-caittasvarūpasya tathāprakhyāyāmanasya bhrāntimātrāstitvān nāpi nāsti. āstīśabdena marīcisvanodaka-vandrādayo dṛṣṭāntā yathāyogaṃ veditavyā iti na hi marīcisvapnodakacandrādayoyathā strīpumātmanā prakhyāyante tathā santi na ca santy eva bhrāntimātrāstitvāt. evam artho 'pīti vistareṇa pratyekaṃ yojayitavyam. atra cādiśabdena gandharva-nagarapratīśrutkādayo veditavyāḥ.

ix) Siddhi, p. 532.

28. Cf. Viśeṣacintābrahmaparipṛicchā, transl. Dharmarakṣha, Taishō 585, p. 4b23-24: "One does not obtain either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa"; transl. Kumārajīva, Taishō 586, p. 36c9: "The Buddhas do not attain saṃsāra nor do they attain nirvāṇa"; transl. Bodhiruci, Taishō 587, p. 66c3-4: "I do not obtain saṃsāra, I do not obtain nirvāṇa."

29. Example of gold purified by means of fire: Bodh. bhūmi, p. 331 (11):

tadyathā suvarṇaṃ prakṛtisthaṃ yathā agnau prakṣipatyate daksheṇa karmāreṇa tathā tathā viśuddhataratāṃ gacchati.

30. Concerns the three niḥsvabhāvatās. For the phrase *niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*, cf.:

i) Saṃdhinir. VII, § 1 seq.:

niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā anutpannāḥ sarvadharmā ādiśāntāḥ prakṛtiparinirvṛtāḥ.

ii) Ratnameghasūtra in Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 225 (9) and Subhāṣitasamgraha:

ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ / dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakrapravarane //

iii) Sūtrālamkāra, XI, 51:

niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttararottarānīśrayāt / anutpannāniruddhā-diśāntaprakṛtinirvṛtāḥ //

iv) Gaudapāda, IV, 93:

ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunivṛtāḥ /

For the doctrine, see also Yogacaryābhūmi, Taishō 1579, p. 702b17-702c3; Vikhyāpana, Taishō 1602, p. 557b17-24; Vikhyāpanakārikā, Taishō 1603, p. 586c26-27; Abhidharmasamuccaya, Taishō 1605, p.688a5-8; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Taishō 1606, p. 751c25-752a18; Siddhi, p. 556-561.

31. On the expressions *saṃdhi*, *saṃdhā*, *abhisamdhi*, *abhiprāya*, see Bodh. bhūmi, p. 56, 108, 174, 301-305

33. The twenty-one Buddha qualities (one general quality because of twenty special qualities) are found in:

i. Saṃdhir., Tib. § 2 and Chin. § of Bodhiruci, Taishō 675, p. 665c3-12, and of Hiuan-tsang, Taishō 676, p. 688b17-25. Introduction of Paramārtha, Taishō 667, p. 711b27-711c15.

ii. Buddhabhūmisūtra, Taishō 680, p. 720c7-16.

iii. All versions of Saṃgraha

iv. Mahāvvyutpatti where these qualities occur in the list of the 93 *tathāgatamāhātmyanāmānis*.

In paragraph 33 II, a new series of qualities explaining the preceding ones. But the versions differ as to number: the Tib. verse and Buddhaśanta indicate 19 qualities and cite 20 of them; Paramārtha and Dharmagupta indicate 21 and cite 20; Hiuan-tsang indicate 21 qualities and cite 20 but end their enumeration by the word 'etc.' According to the Chinese version of the Upanibandhana by Hiuan-tsang, this 'etc.' means 'the last quality' (*niṣṭhagūṇa*) explaining the epithet *aparāntakoṭiniṣṭha*, the 22nd māhātmyanāmān in the list in the Mahāvvyutpatti.

The Buddha qualities are presented differently in Sūtrālaṃkāra, XX-XXI, 43-61; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 375 to the end.

34. Lamotte says he has not found anywhere a similar explanation regarding the bodhisattvas, but it may be gleaned from Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIX, 63-80; Bodh. Bhūmi, *anudharmayogasthānam*, p. 301 seq.; Mahāvvyutpatti, 806-884. Bodh. bhūmi gives details on *āśayaśuddhi*, p. 333 (5); *samacitta*, p. 286 (11); *ādeyavacanā*, p. 29 (3); *saṃgrahavastu*, p. 217-230. the *apramāṇas* or *brahmavihāras*, p. 241 (15); the *abhijñās*, p. 58 (13); *avavādānuśāsana*, p. 111-112.

Continuation of Chapter II

34. Kaśyapaparivarta, § 23-25, p. 47-50 contains the original Sanskrit of chapter II, § 34, the reconstituted translation of which follows:

When the bodhisattva is endowed with 32 attributes, he is called 'bodhisattva' (*dvātriṃśadbhir dharmaiḥ samanvāgato bodhisattvo bodhisattvo ity ucyate*). What are these 32 (*katame dvātriṃśadbhiḥ*)? They are (*yad uta*):

0. Having the high intention of working for the benefit and happiness of all beings (*hitasukhādhyāśayatayā sarvasatveṣu*).

i. Introduction into omniscience (*sarvajñājñānāvatarānatayā*).

ii. Knowing his own worth and consequently not criticizing the skill of others (*kim aham argāmīti pareṣaṃ jñānākunsanatā*) [Lamotte: *akunsanatā* for *akutsanatā*?]

iii. Suppressing pride (*niradhimānatayā*).

iv. Having a steady high aspiration (*drḍhādhyāśayatayā*).

- v. Having (1) unfabricated benevolence (*akṛtrimaprematayā*), (2) impartial feelings with regard to friends and enemies (*mitrāmitreṣu samacittatayā*), (3) extreme friendliness lasting until the end of nirvāṇa (*atyantamitratayā yāvan nirvāṇaparyantatāye*).
- vi. Telling the truth [Lamotte: Vol. I, fasc. 1, p 45, l. 10: correct *tshig nan pa* to *tshig ran pa*] and expressing oneself with a smiling face (*anṛtvākyatā smitamukhapūrvābhībhāṣaṇatā*).
- vii. Having unlimited great compassion for all beings (*sarvasatveṣv aparicinnamahākaruṇatā*).
- viii. Watching over the accepted burdens (*upādatteṣu bhāreṣu. v. s. d. n....*).
- ix. Having indefatigable zeal (*aparikhinnamānasatayā*)
- x. While seeking the holy Dharma, being insatiable in hearing and in the doctrine (*saddharmaparyeṣṭim ārabhyātr*[Lamotte: probably *atrptiḥ*] *śrutārthyatayā*).
- xi. (1) Seeing the wrongs of one's own faults (*ātmaskhaliteṣu doṣadarśanatayā*); (2) criticizing without anger the faults of others (*paraskhaliteṣv aruṣṭāpatticodanatayā*).
- xii. In all postures, using the mind of awakening (*sarvairyāpatheṣu bodhicittaparikarmatayā*).
- xiii. Practicing (1) a generosity that does not look for repayment (*vipākāpratikkṣiṇa tyāgaḥ*), (2) a discipline that does not depend on births in the cycle of existence (*sarvabhavagatyupapa niḥśritam* [Lamotte: probably *upapatty aniḥśritam*]), (3) a patience that is not disheartened by anyone (*sarvasatveṣv apratihātā kṣāntiḥ*), (4) an exertion that gathers all the roots of good (*sarvakuśalamūla-sammadānanāya vīryam*), (5) dhyāna sheltered from the formless realm (*ārūpya parikarṣitam* [Lamotte: probably *ārūpyadhātu-parikarṣitam*] *dhyānam*), (6) wisdom endowed with all the means (*upāyasamgrhītā prajñā*), (7) skillful means associated with the four factors of conversion (*catuḥsamgrahavastusamprayuktā upāya* [Lamotte: probably *upāyāḥ*])
- xiv. (1) Having the same benevolence for honest or dishonest people (*śīlavadduḥṣī yatayā maitratā*), (2) listening respectfully to the Dharma (*satkṛtya dharmasravaṇam*), (3) living respectfully in the forest (*satkṛtyāraṇyavāsaḥ*), (4) disdaining all the frivolities of the world (*sarvalokavicitrikeṣv anabhiratiḥ*), (5) not desiring the Lesser Vehicle (*hīnayānāsprhaṇatā*), (6) seeing the advantages of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyane cānuśamsasamdarśitayā*), (7) giving up bad friends (*pāpamitravivarjanat* [Lamotte: probably *vivarjanatā*]), (8) serving kind friends (*kalyānamitrasavanatā*).
- xv. (1) Establishing the four brahmanical practices (*caturbrahma-vihāraṇiṣpādanatā*), (2) playing in the five abhijñās (*pañcābhijñā-vikrīḍanatā*), (3) taking refuge in wisdom (*jñānapratīsarāṇatā*).
- xvi. (1) Not abandoning beings given up to good practices or bad practices (*pratipattivipratipattisthitānāṃ satvānāṃ anutsargaḥ*), (2) having 'cut and dried' language (*ekāṃśavacanatā*), (3) valuing the truth (*satyagurukatā*), (4) being preceded by the mind of awakening (*bodhicittapūrvamgamatā*).

CHAPTER III

ENTRANCE INTO THE NATURES OF THE KNOWABLE

(jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa)

1. The natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*) have been presented in chapter II; how should the entrance into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa*) be understood?

These are the mental states perfumed by great hearing (*bahuśrutabhāvitāvasthāḥ*).

These states are not mingled with the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñānenāsaṃgrhitāḥ*).

Like the store-consciousness, they are seeds (*ālayavijñānavad bījībhūtaḥ*).

They are merged with right attention (*yonisomanasikāreṇa saṃgrhitāḥ*).

They arise under the aspect of texts and theses (*dharmārthābhāsenotpannāḥ*).

They are like cognizable substances (*grāhyadravya-sthānīyaḥ*).

They are mental discourse endowed with vision (*sadarśana-manojalpāḥ*). [142b9]

1. Comm. Bh 349b12-21, bh 191b8-192a6, U 413b13-412c8, u 295a7-295b8.

“How does the bodhisattva who has practiced the sixteen activities [treated in chap. II, §34, p. 145] reach full understanding (*abhisamaya*) of the natures of the knowable? This is what the author is going to explain.

These are states perfumed by the great hearing, i.e., states (avasthā) characteristic of a mental series (cittacaittasamtāna) perfumed (bhāvita) by the great hearing (bahuśruta) of the texts (dharma) and theses (artha) of the Greater Vehicle. Those in whom the hearing (or the knowledge of the texts) is inferior are not able to reach full understanding (abhisamaya). In the Āryarāhulasūtra, Rāhula said: 'My only wish is that the Bhagavat

would teach me full understanding', and the Bhagavat replied: 'Have you already understood the basket of the holy texts (*saddharmapiṭaka*)?' Rāhula replied: 'No, Bhagavat.' Then the Bhagavat said to him: 'First you must understand the basket of texts.'

They are not mingled with the store-consciousness because these states follow from (*sravanti*) the very pure fundamental element (*ativiśuddhadharmadhātu*) and counteract (*pratipakṣa*) the store-consciousness. They are not mixed since they oppose (*viruddha*) one another (cf. chap. 1, § 45).

2. Who is it who enters into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*)? - The bodhisattva who has perfumed (*bhāvanā*) his mental series (*cittasaṃtāna*) by means of the great hearing (*bahuśruta*) of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle, who has served (*ārādhana*) innumerable Buddha avatars (*apramāṇaprādurbhāva*), who, with single faith (*ekādhimukta*), has fully accumulated the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*), and has thus fully accomplished the accumulations of merit and wisdom (*puṇyajñānasambhāra*). [142b13]

2. Comm. Bh 349b26-349c15, bh 192a6-192b1, U 413c12-20, u 295b8-296a3.

“Each agent (*kāraka*) assumes an activity (*kāritra*) and a being endowed with activity. That is why the author puts a question to the writer of the entry by asking: *Who can enter?* In answer to this question, he says: *The bodhisattva who has perfumed his mental series by the great hearing of the Greater Vehicle:* with the great hearing derived from the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle, he has perfumed his series. *Who has served innumerable Buddha avatars:* thanks to this series thus perfumed, he has been able to meet and serve the avatars of the Buddhas. *Who, with single faith ... :* having served the Buddhas, he has developed profound faith (*śraddhā*) in the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle from which bad friends (*pāpamitra*) are unable to turn him away. For these three reasons, i.e., great hearing of the Greater Vehicle, etc., he has accumulated innumerable roots of good (*apramāṇa kuśalamūla*). Thus he is called a bodhisattva endowed with merit and wisdom.” (U)

3. Where does the bodhisattva enter? - Amidst this mental discourse (*manojalpa*) furnished with vision (*sadarśana*) that has the appearance of texts and theses (*dharmārthabhāsa*) and that comes from the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyānadharmānvaya*), the bodhisattva enters into the stage where faith is practiced (*adhimukticyābhūmi*), into the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*), into the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*) or the final path (*niṣṭhāmārga*). – He enters into the *adhimukticyābhūmi* because, being based on what has been said to him (*anukathitam*), he adheres (*adhimucyate*) to the purely ideational nature of all dharmas (*sarvadharmāṇāṃ vijñaptimātram*). - He enters into the *darśanamārga* because he penetrates mental discourse correctly (*yathābhūtaprativedha*). - He enters into the *bhāvanāmārga* because he trains in counteracting all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇapratipakṣabhāvanā*). - He enters into the *niṣṭhāmārga* because he has eliminated the obstacles. [142b17]

3. Comm. Bh 349c20-350a4, bh 192b1-8, U 413c25-414a5, u 296a3-8.

“Now the author is going to explain the categories and aspects (*ākāra*) of the entry (*praveśa*). The mental states (*manobhūmi*) are called *mental discourse* (*manojalpa*) with examination (*vitarka*) and analysis (*vicāra*) (cf. Siddhi, p. 385). These mental words have the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as the cause of their arising, i.e., this doctrine (*deśanādharma*) is the cause which gives birth to them.” (Bh)

“Amidst these mental words, some bodhisattvas enter into the stage where faith is practiced (*adhimukticyābhūmi*) because, being based solely on the teaching received (*śravaṇa*), they adhere to the *vijñaptimātratā* of all the dharmas. - Others enter into the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) because they penetrate this word correctly. To penetrate correctly is to understand (*pratividh-*) that it is without dharma or artha, without grāhya or grāhaka. - Others enter into the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*) because they train in counteracting (*pratipakṣa*) the obstacle of the afflictions and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*). - Finally, others enter into the final path (*niṣṭhāmārga*) because they are very pure (*ativiśuddha*) and freed from obstacles (*āvaraṇa*). These four things are the stages of entry (*praveśāvasthā*).” (U)

4. How (*kena*) does the bodhisattva enter into the natures of the knowable? - He enters:

- (i) by putting to work the roots of good (*kuśalamūlabalādhiṣṭhāna*),
- (ii) by rousing his courage in three ways (*trividhacittottāpana*),
- (iii) by eliminating four blockages (*catuṣṭhānaprahāṇa*),
- (iv) by being zealous (*apramāda*) in a continuous and respectful (*sātatyasatkṛtyaprayoga*) effort applied to tranquility (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*) concerning the texts and theses (*dharmārthālambana*). [142b20]

4. Comm. Bh 350a8-13, bh 192b8-193a4, U 414a8-11, u 296a8-296b1.

“How does he enter? The author asks about the cause of entry (*praveśahetu*). He replies: By putting to work the powers of the roots of good, etc. Nevertheless, despite the power of the roots of good, his courage may sag (*cittam avalīyate*). That is why the author adds: By rousing his courage in three ways, etc. (U)

Cittotāpana and *catuṣṭhānaprahāṇa* will be studied in § 5 and 6 respectively. In Chinese, *cittotāpana* is rendered by *lien mo sin* (120 and 9; 112 and 11; 61) and in Tibetan by *sems sbyon ba* (cf. Mahāvvyut. 1826, *sbyans pa = uttapta*). According to U, *uttāpana* means *tsh'e kiu* (118 and 6; 134 and 11), 'stimulate-raise up'; according to u, *rab to ḥdzin pa*, 'stimulate', and *rnon por byed pa*, 'diminish' (*tīkṣhṇīkāra*).

By being zealous in a continuous respectful effort: continuous (*sātatyā*), i.e., eternally used (*rtag tu bya ba*); respectful (*satkṛtya*), i.e., deferential (*gurukāra*). - The expression *sātatyasatkṛtyaprayoga* occurs in *Sūtrālamkāra*, X, 3, p. 50.

5. The three *cittotāpanas* are:

- i) The bodhisattva thinks: Innumerable human beings (*aprameyamanuṣyasattva*) in innumerable universes (*aprameyalokadhātu*) reach supreme perfect enlightenment (*anuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhāv abhisambuddhā bhavanti*) each moment." This reflection constitutes the first stimulant for courage (*cittotāpana*).

ii) He thinks: "It is with these intentions (*āśaya*) that beings practice (*samuddācaranti*) generosity and the other perfections (*dānādīpāramitā*). I too am going to attain such intentions. By means of them I shall cultivate the perfections (*pāramitābhāvanā*) without too much trouble (*alpakṛcchreṇa*) and I shall reach perfection (*paripūri*)." This reflection constitutes the second stimulant.

iii) He thinks: "Beings equipped with limited moral goodness (*sapratighakuśaladharmasamanvāgata*) are reborn after death with the perfections of existence (*kāyasampad*) of their choice (*yathākāmam*). As for myself, admirably endowed with limitless moral good (*apratighakuśaha*), why should I not obtain universal perfection (*sarvasampad*) at that moment?" This is the third reflection. Here are some stanzas:

(i) (Cf. Sūtrālaṅkāra, X, 11).

manuṣabhūtāḥ sambodhiṃ prāpnuvanti pratikṣaṇam /

aprameyā yataḥ sattvā layaṃ nāto 'dhivāsayet //

"Since throngs of beings in human condition reach enlightenment at each instant, discouragement should not be permitted."

(ii) (Translated from H). It is with the intentions of a pure mind that generosity, etc. is practiced. The Victorious Ones (*jina*) who have acquired them can cultivate generosity, etc.

iii) (Translated from H). After death, good people obtain the perfections of their choice (*yathākāmasampad*). Why should not very good people, who have cut through the obstacles, not obtain the most excellent perfections? [142c6]

5. Comm. Bh 350a23-350b26, bh 193a4-193b6, U 414a20-414c4, u 296b1-297a8.

"In order to counteract the threefold discouragement, it suffices to practice the threefold stimulant. How? If the bodhisattva hears it said that the supreme perfect enlightenment is great (*adhimātra*), profound (*gambhīra*), vast (*viśāla*) and difficult to obtain (*durlabha*),

his courage sags (*cittam avalīyate*). To counteract this discouragement, he practices the stimulants.” (Bh)

“i) *Innumerable human beings in innumerable universes*, etc. This explains the first stimulant. When he contemplates the series of other delivered beings, his courage increases and he no longer feels discouraged. [He says to himself in fact: If, in the human destinies, innumerable beings in innumerable universes at each moment come to supreme perfect enlightenment, why should not I myself come to that point? Cf. Bh.]

ii) *It is with these intentions*, etc. This explains the second stimulant. *I also have acquired such intentions*, i.e., his intentions are free of obstacles (*vibandha*) because they are strangers to avarice (*mātsarya*), desire (*kāma*), wickedness (*vyāpāda*), laziness (*kausīdya*), languor-torpor (*styānamiddha*) and ignorance (*avidyā*). *By means of them, without too much trouble, I will cultivate the virtues and come to perfection*: having obtained these higher intentions, I will spontaneously (*svarasena*) cultivate generosity, etc. and quickly reach perfection (*paripūri*).

iii) *Beings endowed*, etc. This explains the third stimulant. *Equipped with a limited moral goodness*, i.e., equipped with moral goodness of worldly order (*laukikakuśala*). Because it has not suppressed the obstacles ranged against it (*vipakṣāvaraṇa*), it is *limited* (*sapratigha*). *As for myself, admirably endowed*, etc.: I, who have cut through the obstacles ranged against it, have acquired a moral goodness free of obstacles. Why should I not later obtain full complete Buddhahood (*paripūrṇabuddhatā*)? *To rouse courage* is to excite and raise it by reinforcing it and combatting discouragement.

Some stanzas summarize these ideas:

(i) *Since beings in the human condition*, etc. Timidity and weakness are called *discouragement* (*laya*). The author exhorts (*samādāpayati*) the bodhisattva not to become discouraged. If he says: "I am incapable of reaching supreme perfect enlightenment", that is timidity and weakness. The author exhorts him not to say that he is incapable and consequently not to be discouraged. Thus a stanza says: Innumerable beings (*aprameyasattva*) in the ten directions (*daśadiś*) at each moment (*pratikṣaṇam*) reach Buddhahood (*sugataphala*). These people (*puruṣa*) and myself are equal. It's not necessary to be discouraged in the least.

(ii) *It is with the intentions of a pure mind that generosity is practiced, etc.:* Generosity is not practiced with a bad (*akuśala*) mind or a morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) mind, etc. Here it is a matter of pure mind only. Some people (*loka*) practice generosity with a bad (*akuśala*) mind, a morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) mind or a distracted (*vikṣipta*) mind because they are looking for certain forms of existence (*bhāva*) or wealth (*bhoga*). This is not the case for the bodhisattva: he seeks only supreme perfect enlightenment (*anuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ*). These intentions (*āśaya*) are the cause permitting the development of generosity, etc., without obstacle, as was said above (cf. Prastāvanā, § 3, p. 7; chap. IV, § 1). *The Victorious Ones who have acquired them can develop generosity, etc.* The bodhisattvas are called victorious (*jina*) because they have already acquired these high intentions. By means of them, the perfections of generosity, etc. operate spontaneously (*svarasena*). ... By virtue of this determination (*niyama*), the bodhisattvas cut through obstacles (*pratipakṣa*) to the virtues, and because they have cut through these obstacles, the perfections of generosity operate spontaneously (*svarasena*) without effort (*anābhoga*). By 'etc.' is meant the other five perfections, from discipline (*śīla*) to wisdom (*prajñā*).

(iii) *Good people, after their death, etc.* This concerns those who are good from the mundane level (*laukikakuśala*). At the end of their life, *they obtain the perfections of their choice:* as result, they obtain the personal perfections of the mundane order which they wished for; thus they come to be reborn at the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*). As for *those very good ones who have cut through the obstacles, i.e., who are good without any obstacles, why should they not obtain the perfected perfections?* Why should they not obtain the perfect Buddhahood (*sampūrṇabuddhatā*) that they wish for? (U)

6. [Catuḥsthānaprahāna]:

1. **By abandoning reflection (*manasikāraprahāṇāt*), the bodhisattva rejects (*parityajati*) the customary reflections of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas.**
2. **By abandoning perplexity and hesitation (*vimatikāṅkṣāprahāṇāt*), he rejects any doubt (*vicikitsā*) regarding the Greater Vehicle.**

3. By abandoning adhesion to dharmas (*dharmābhiniveṣaprahāṇāt*), he rejects adhesion to the belief in ‘me’ (*ātmagrāha*) and belief in ‘mine’ (*ātmīyagrāha*) in regard to dharmas heard and thought (*śrutacintitadharmā*).
4. By abandoning concepts (*vikalpaprahāṇāt*), he arrives at no longer meditating (*manasikṛ-*), no longer conceiving (*viklp-*) any object (*nimitta*) directly present (*purataḥ sthitam*) or prepresented in concentration (*sthāpitam*). Here is a stanza

(cf. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XIX, 50):

*purataḥ sthāpitaṃ yac ca nimittaṃ yat sthitaṃ svayaṃ /
sarvaṃ vibhāvayan dhīmān labhate bodhim uttamām //*

“By not conceiving any object formed in concentration or present by itself, the sage comes to superior enlightenment.” [142c13]

6. Comm. Bh 350c25-351a18, bh 193b6-194a3, U 414c12-22, u 297a8-197b6.

“Now the author explains the abandonment of the four blockages (*catuḥsthānaprahāṇa*) [mentioned in § 4]. *By abandoning reflection*: he rejects the thoughts customary to the Vehicles of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. *By suppressing perplexity and hesitation*: he suppresses perplexity (*vimati*), error (*viparyāsa*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*) concerning the depth (*gāmbhīrya*) and vastness (*vaipulya*) of the Greater Vehicle. [Bh gives as example the philosophical perplexities about the doctrine of the three natures.] *By abandoning adherence*: in regard to dharmas heard and thought, he cuts through the belief in ‘me’ and ‘mine’ (*ātmatmīyagrāha*). Adherences expressed by saying: “I hear, I think; this is what I have heard, this is what I have thought”, all these adherences (*abhiniveśa*) do not exist, for the bodhisattva has attained full realization (*abhisamaya*) of the Absolute (*paramārtha*). *By abandoning concepts*: whether it is a matter of objects directly present (*purataḥ sthitam*) or fabricated objects like the skeletons (*kāṅkāla*) created (*sthāpita*) in concentration (*samādhi*), the bodhisattva has neither reflection (*manasikāra*) nor concept (*vikalpa*) about all the objects that he perceives

(*ālambanaviṣaya*). He even arrives at cutting all adherence to and all concepts about the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, the pāramitās and other similar things.” (U)

7. (Translated according to H).

Why and how does the bodhisattva enter (*kena katham praviṣati*)?

1) He enters as a result of mental discourse (*manojalpa*) derived from the hearing-propensity (*śrutavāsanānvaya*) resulting from correct attention (*yonīśomanasikāra saṃgrhīta*), which has the appearance of texts and theses (*dharmārthābhāsa*) that are equipped with vision (*sadarśana*).

2) He enters by four investigations (*paryeṣaṇā*):

nāmārthasvabhāvaviśeṣaprajñaptiparyeṣaṇā

(i) *nāmaparyeṣaṇā*: discovering that the name is simply a mental word;

(ii) *arthaparyeṣaṇā*: discovering that the thing is simply a mental word;

(iii) *nāmārthasvabhāvaprajñaptiparyeṣaṇā*: discovering that the self-nature attributed to the name or the thing is only a designation;

(iv) *nāmārthaviśeṣaprajñaptiparyeṣaṇā*: finding that the characteristics attributed to the name or the thing are only designation.

3) He enters by means of four precise knowledges (*yathābhūtaparijñāna*):

nāmavastubhāvaviśeṣaprajñaptiyathābhūtaparijñāna: [to be analyzed as above]

(i) *nāmayathābhūtaparijñāna*: correct knowledge that the name is simply a mental word, etc., because all of that does not exist (*anupalabdha*).

Thus the bodhisattva who makes the effort (*prayuṅkte*) to enter into Concept-only (*vijñaptimātra*) understands (*saṃpratīpadyate*), with regard to mental words (*manojalpa*) that appear as phonemes and theses (*akṣarārthābhāsa*), that the name-phoneme (*akṣaranāman*) is only a mental word; he understands that the entity based on this name-phoneme

(akṣaranāmanīśritārtha) is only a mental word; he understands that the self-nature (svabhāva) and the specifications (viśeṣa) attributed to this name or this entity are mere designations (prajñapti).

When he sees the name and phoneme as merely a simple mental word, he sees that the self-nature and characteristics attributed to this name or this entity are purely designations (prajñapti): since the self-nature and the characteristics are without objective nature (arthalakṣaṇa), they are also nonexistent. It is by means of these four investigations and by means of these four correct knowledges that, within these mental words of the appearance of phonemes and theses, the bodhisattva enters into Concept-only (vijñaptimatratā). [142c26]

7. Comm. Bh 351a20-351b17, bh 194a3-194b1, U 414c23-415b5, u 297b6-298b3.

"Why and how does he enter? The author asks this question in order to explain the reason and manner of entering .

1) Here he explains the reason for entering: as a result of mental words *that are derived from the hearing propensity*, i.e., that have as cause the hearing-propensity. Since the stages of entering of which we have spoken above (§ 1, 3), come from the propensity of the Greater Vehicle, we know that they come from (*saṃgrhīta*) the absolute nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*).

2) He explains the manner of entering: by four investigations ... and by four correct knowledges ... This is to know correctly that the self-nature and characteristics attributed to the name or the thing are simply designations, that there is no real object there that exists. That is why it is said that all of that is also non-existent. First, one finds (tch'ouei k'ieou = *nirūpaṇa*) that the self-nature and the characteristics attributed to the name or the thing are mererly designation; next, one knows correctly that all of that is non-existent absolutely. At the moment of the discovery (*nirūpaṇa*), there is *examination (paryeṣaṇā)*; at the moment one knows correctly that that does not exist, there is the fourfold correct knowledge (*yathābhūtaparijñāna*).” (Bh)

In Bh and U there is a series of valuable definitions: “Paryeṣaṇā is *yaṇ dag par dpyod pa* = *samyagvicāra*, correct reasoning. Yathābhūtaparijñāna is *mi dmigs pa* = *anupalabdhi*, non-perception” (bh). “Paryeṣaṇā is *tch'ouei k'ieou hing kien* = *nes par rtog paḥi rnam paḥi lta ba* = *nirūpaṇākāradarśana*, vision in the form of analysis. Yathābhūtaparijñāna is *kiue ting hing tche* = *nes paḥi ye śhes* = *viniyata* or *niścitaññāna*, certain knowledge. ‘Name’ is words such as 'matter', 'sensation', etc. (*rūpavedanādipada*); ‘artha or ‘vastu’ is the aggregates (*skandha*), the elements (*dhātu*), the bases of consciousness (*āyatana*), etc., designated by these words (*padakāya*); *viśeṣas* are the general characteristics, i.e., permanence, suffering, etc., attributed to *nāma* and *artha*.” (U).

8. How is this entry into Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātratā*) made and what is it like?

1) One enters into unity (*tanmātra*), into duality pertaining to image and vision (*sanimitadarśanadvaya*) and into multiplicity (*nānātva*). Indeed, name (*nāman*), entity (*artha*), self-nature (*svabhāva*), specific characteristics (*viśeṣa*), - these six things (*artha*) are non-objective (*anarthaka*); they appear in the nature of an object and a subject of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhakabhāvena*) and they arise simultaneously in the appearance of multiform objects (*nānāvidhārthābhāsenā*).

2) One enters in the same way that one identifies a rope (*rajju*) which seems in the darkness (*andhakāra*) to be a snake (*sarpa*). Since it does not exist, the snake seen in the rope is an illusion (*bhrānti*). Those who have recognized that it does not exist (cf. H) reject the notion of snake (*sarpabuddhi*) and keep the notion of rope (*rajjubuddhi*). But the rope itself, if reduced to its subtle elements (*sūkṣmākāra*), is an illusion itself, for it has color (*raṅga* or *rūpa*), smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*) and tactile (*spraṣṭavya*) as specific characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*).

Thus, when any reality (*bhūtārtha*) has been denied (*nirhṛtya*) to the six types of mental words (*manojalpa*) which appear as phoneme or as thing (*akṣarārthābhāsa*) - just as the notion of snake is abandoned by means of the notion of rope - the notion of Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātratābuddhi*)

underlying the mental words should be abandoned by means of the notion of the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāvabuddhi*), just as the notion of rope is abandoned by means of the notion of color, etc. [143a8]

8. Comm. Bh 351b28-351c10, bh 194b1-5, U 415b16-415c14, u 298b3-299a6.

“Here the author asks about the entry itself and about an example to which it can be compared.

1) *Unity (tanmātra)* is the vijñaptimatratā, the fact that there is Concept-Only. *Duality of image and vision (sanimitadarsānavaya)* means the consciousness (*vijñāna*) furnished with image and vision. That which appears as the cause or the object of the consciousness is called image (*nimitta*). *Multiplicity (nānātva)*: this consciousness, which is single, manifests in the form of various aspects (*nānākāra*). These manifestations are simultaneous; it is not a question of separate manifestations in accordance with an accelerated process (sou tsi = *āśutaravṛtti*). These three points constitute the entrance.” (Bh) - All this is explained in chap. II, § 11.

“2) *In the way in which one identifies a rope which in the darkness seems to be a snake:* by this comparison (*dṛiṣṭānta*) the author shows how one penetrates (*pratividh-*) the three natures (*svabhāvatraya*). - (i) Thus, in the rope the snake is an illusion (*bhrānti*), because there is no snake. Similarly, in the paratantra (mental discourse appearing as phoneme and thing), there is really no parikalpita (the six objects, name, etc.), because the parikalpita does not exist. - (ii) The notion of snake is abandoned by means of the notion of rope. Similarly, the notion of parikalpita, i.e., the six objects, is abandoned by means of the notion of paratantra which is defined as Concept-Only (cf. chap. II. § 3). - (iii) Finally, the notion of rope is abandoned by means of the notion of the subtle elements (*sūkṣmabhāga*) that make up the rope, color, etc. Similarly, the erroneous notion (*viparītabuddhi*) of paratantra is abandoned by means of pariniṣpanna. A verse says: One takes a rope to be a snake; then one examines the rope and one understands that it is not a snake; finally, when one examines the parts constituting the rope, one knows that it itself is just as false as the snake.” (U)

9. Thus, by entering into the mental speech (*manojalpa*) which is the apparent object (*nirbhāsārthalakṣaṇa*), the bodhisattva has entered into the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*); by entering into Concept-Only (*viññaptimātra*), he has entered into the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*); how does he enter into the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*)? - He enters by abandoning (*nirākaraṇa*) even the notion of Concept-Only (*viññaptimātrasaṃjñā*). Then, for the bodhisattva who has destroyed (*vidhvams-*) the notion of object (*arthasaṃjñā*), the mental words (*manojalpa*) resulting from the propensity of the dharmas that have been heard (*śrutadharmavāsanānvaya*) have no possibility (*avakāśa*) of arising in the appearance of an object and consequently no longer arise as an idea either. When the bodhisattva abides in name-without-concept in regard to all objects (*sarvārtheṣu nirvikalpakanāma*), when he abides in the fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*) by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣayogena*), then he attains the nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) in which the object (*ālambana*) and the subject of consciousness (*ālambaka*) are completely identical (*samasama*). This is how the bodhisattva enters into the absolute nature. [143a16]

9. Comm. Bh 351c20-352a4, bh 194b5-195a3, U 415c23-416a15, u 299a6-299b8.

“By entering into the mental speech which is the apparent object, the bodhisattva has entered into the imaginary nature: he understands that it is the mental speech that appears as object and that the imaginary object does not exist; thus he has entered into the imaginary nature. By entering into Concept-Only, he has entered into the dependent nature: he understands that Concept-Only, in contact with ignorance (avidyā), although not an object, appears as object; thus he has entered into the dependent nature. To explain how he enters into the absolute nature, the author says: For the bodhisattva who has destroyed the notion of object, mental words have no possibility of arising in the appearance of an object: they have no power to arise in the appearance of an object. And consequently no longer arise as idea either, because if the object of consciousness (grahya) does not exist, the subject of consciousness (grāhaka) does not exist either; Concept-Only in turn cannot develop an object. When the bodhisattva abides in name-

without-concept in regard to all objects, etc. All objects, i.e., the sūtras etc. The domain (gocara) where names are applied is here called all objects. There are ten kinds of names (cf. the following paragraph): the first nine deal with concepts (savikalpaka), the tenth is free of concept (nirvikalpaka) about all dharmas. The bodhisattva abides in name-without-concept in regard to all dharmas. Thus it is said that everything is but a name and that this name can produce everything. Here the ideas (vijñapti) that appear as object are metaphorically (upacāra) called 'name'. He abides by direct perception in the fundamental element: he adheres (adhimukti) to the dharmadhātu by means of introspection (pratyātmagati).

Object and subject of consciousness are *completely identical* for conceptual knowledge because, just as the object (*ālambana*) does not exist, the subject (*ālambaka*) does not exist either. That is why object and subject are identical. Thus the bodhisattva has entered into the absolute nature.” (U)

10. Here is a stanza:

Entities (*dharma*), individuals (*pudgala*), texts (*dharma*), theses (*artha*), generalities (*saṃkṣepa*), particularities (*vistara*), phonemes (*gotra*), impure beings (*aśuddha*), pure beings (*śuddha*), summit (*anta*): these are the various domains (*gocara*) of name. [143a19]

10. Comm. Bh 352a8-26, bh 195a3-195b1, U 416a19-28, u 299b8-300a5.

“It was said above (§ 9) that the bodhisattva abides in name-without-concept in respect to all objects (*sarvārtheṣu nirvikalpakanāma*). Now the author explains in this stanza the various objects belonging (*viśayaprabheda*) to name.

1) *Dharmanāman* (things): form (*rūpa*), sensation (*vedanā*), etc.

2) *Pudgalanāman* (individuals): names occurring in the Buddhist teachings (*buddhadeśanā*), e.g. Devadatta, etc., Dharmānusārin (Dīgha, III, p. 105, 254; etc.), etc.

- 3) *Dharmanāman* (texts): sūtra, geya, etc. [These are the Buddhist scriptures in nine or twelve divisions, cf. Majjhima, I, p. 133; Ānguttara, II, p. 103, 178; III, p. 86 seq.; 177 seq.; Puggala, p. 43; Milinda, p. 344; Mahāvvyut., 1266-1278; Siddhi, p. 614.]
- 4) *Arthanāman* (theses): that which is enunciated in these scriptures, e.g., (Dhammapada, v. 294): Having killed his mother and father and two kṣatriya kings, having destroyed the kingdom and its subjects, the brahmin is innocent (*mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā, rājāno dve ca khattiye, raṭṭhaṃ sānucaraṃ hantvā, anīgho yāti brāhmaṇo*). - See chap. VII, § 11.
- 5) *Samkṣepanāman* (generalities): e.g. (Vinaya, V, p. 86; Saṃyutta, III, p. 133: IV, p. 28, 401; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVIII, 101: Kośa, IX, p. 252): All dharmas are not a self (*sabbe dhammā anattā; sarve dharmā anātmāna iti*).
- 6) *Vistarānāman* (particularities): e.g. (Vinaya I, p.13): Form in particular is not a self (*rūpaṃ anattā*).
- 7) *Gotranāma* (phonemes): the vowels and consonants (*akṣharavyañjana*) that are the cause of language.
- 8) *Asuddhanāman* (impure beings), e.g. ordinary people (*prthagjana*) defiled by the stains of the afflictions (*kleśamala*).
- 9) *Śuddhanāman* (pure beings), e.g., the āryas who have effaced the stains (*vigatamala*).
- 10) *Antanāman* (climax): the mixed objects (*samsṛṣṭālambana*), e.g. prajñāpāramitā, the ten bhūmis, etc., which have as object a mixture (*samsṛṣṭārtha*).” (U)

11. Thus this bodhisattva, by entering into Concept-Only (*viññaptimātrata*), has entered into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*). By means of this entry, he has entered into the first bhūmi, the Joyous (*pramuditā*), he penetrates thoroughly (*supravīdhyati*) the fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*), he is born into the family of the Tathāgatas (*tathāgatagotra*), he acquires the mind of equality (*samatācitta*) in regard to all beings (*sattva*), in regard to all the bodhisattvas and in regard to all the Buddhas. Such is the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). [143a23]

11. Comm. Bh 352b3-13, bh 195b1-4, U 416b4-19, u 300a5-300b4.

He is born into the family of the Tathāgatas: “he causes his Buddha-family to be unbroken.” (Bh) – “By *family of the Tathāgatas* is meant the dharmadhātu of the Buddha. To realize it, to become integrated into it, is called *to be born into the family*. Because the bodhisattva has the excellent knowledge concerning the dharmadhātu, because he transforms his former individuality (*āśraya*) and acquires a new one, he causes his seeds (*bīja*) of Buddha to be unbroken ... (U)

He acquires the mind of sameness in regard to all beings, because he sees that all these beings are alike without 'self' (*anātmāna*). Thus it is said in the Tathāgatarabhasūtra, Taishō 666, p. 457c8, that all beings are embryos of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatarabha*). *He acquires the mind of equality with regard to all the bodhisattvas*, because he knows the identity of their predispositions (*āśayasamatā*). These bodhisattvas are all prepared to bring about the welfare and happiness of all beings (chap. II, § 34). *He acquires the mind of equality with regard to all the Buddhas* because he knows their identity of dharmakāya (cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 3; § 33). *Such is his path of seeing*, because he sees the excellent dharmadhātu which he has not seen previously (*apūrvadṛṣṭa*).” (U)

12. Again, for what reason does he enter into Concept-Only (*viññaptimātra*)? By means of a supramundane (*lokottara*) cognition of tranquility and discernment (*śamata vipaśyanājñāna*) concerning mixed dharmas (*saṃsṛṣṭadharmāmbaka*), by a subsequent cognition (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) of every type of concept (*nānāvijñapti*), cutting (*prahāṇya*) all the seeds (*bīja*) of the store-consciousness with their images (*sanimitta*), the bodhisattva cultivates the seed of contact (*sparśabīja*) with the dharmadhātu. Transforming his support (*parāvṛttāśraya*), securing all the attributes of the Buddha (*buddhadharma*), he attains omniscience (*sarvajñājñāna*): for this reason he enters into Concept-Only.

This subsequent cognition (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*), which considers every creation (*prabhava*) coming from the store-consciousness and every object of concept (*viññaptinimitta*) as a magic show (*māyā*), etc., is, in its essence, free of errors (*prakṛtyaviparīta*). Thus, in the same way that the magician (*māyākāra*) is free of doubt about the things produced by magic (*māyākṛtadharma*), so this

bodhisattva is always unmistaken (*viparyāsa*) when he speaks of cause (*hetu*) and result (*phala*). [143b2]

12. Comm. Bh 352b22-352c5, bh 195b4-196a3, U 416b27-416c28, u 300b4-301b2.

“The author asks about the usefulness (*prayojana*) of entry into Concept-Only. In the end, he answers that it is aimed at obtaining the omniscience needed to bring about the welfare and happiness of beings to be converted ...

By a supramundane cognition of tranquility and discernment concerned with mixed dharmas]: This cognition *concerns mixed dharmas* because it focuses on the correct (*prabhāvita*) true nature (*tathatā*), the shared nature (*samānanyalakṣhaṇa*) of all dharmas. The object of this cognition, i.e., all the dharmas contained in the teaching of the Greater Vehicle, have *tathatā* as self-nature (cf. chap. VIII, § 5). This cognition, concerning *tathatā*, penetrates the nature of all dharmas. Otherwise, nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*) would not be produced for a long time. This cognition is *supramundane* because it is pure (*anāsrava*) and free of concept (*nirvikalpaka*). It is a *cognition of tranquility and discernment*, i.e., a concentrated cognition free of error (*samāhitāvīparītajñāna*). *By means of a subsequent cognition of every type of concept*: he establishes that the dharmas with their nature of cause and result, whether of inferior or superior order, are merely concepts of *grāhya* and *grāhaka* ... *The bodhisattva cultivates the seed of contact with the dharmadhātu*, i.e., he cultivates the propensity of great hearing (*bahuśrutavāsana*) of the Greater Vehicle (cf. chap. I, § 45; chap. III, § 1) *Transforming his support*: because, by penetrating the *tathatā*, his mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*) become immaculate (*nirmala*), or because the *tathatā* itself is pure. *Securing all the attributes of the Buddha*: the powers (*bala*), the fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*) and the other attributes of the Buddha. *He acquires omniscience*, i.e., the immaculate unhindered knowledge (*vimalam apratihataṃ ca jñānam*) of the Buddha.

This subsequent cognition, etc.: the author explains the rôle of subsequent cognition. *Every creation coming from the store-consciousness*: in speaking of creation, the author mentions the cause. In speaking of *every object of concept*, he mentions result. It is a matter of *grāhaka* and *grāhya*. *The subsequent cognition that takes them as a magical*

show, etc., is free of error by essence, because by considering, in accordance with the truth, the dependent nature as a magical show, etc., one avoids error (cf. chap. II, § 27).

In the same way that a magician is free of all error about magical things: the magician is free of error about the plants (*tr̥ṇa*), trees (*vr̥kṣa*), etc., that are the causes of magic, because he sees them correctly; the magician is free of error about the elephant (*hastin*), the horse (*aśva*), etc., because he sees them correctly. In the same way the bodhisattva who has seen the truth (*dr̥ṣṭasatya*) correctly sees the non-existence of grāhya and grāhaka. When he attains the truth, he produces this subsequent cognition (*pr̥ṣṭalabdha*), generator of speech (*vāksamutthāpaka*), of conventional order (*saṃvṛti*), but pure. At the time when he knows cause and result and when he preaches the law, he is free of error. His listeners (*śrāvaka*) are subject to error, but when the propensity of the teachings (*śrutavāsanā*) has perfumed their mental series (*prabandha*), they are freed of error progressively (*anukrameṇa*) and by degrees (*śanais*) and thereby accomplish what they had to do (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*). This subsequent cognition is likewise free of concepts (*nirvikalpa*) and is unstained (*akliṣṭa*).” (U)

13. In the course of this entry into Concept-Only (*viññāptimātratāpraveśa*), there are four factors leading to penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) which rest on four concentrations (*samādhi*). How?

- 1) By the four investigations (*pariyeṣaṇā*) during the lesser patient acceptances regarding the non-existence of the object (*arthābhāve mṛduḥṣāntiḥ*), there is a concentration called acquisition of light (*ālokalabdhasamadhi*) which is the basis (*āśraya*) for the factor leading to penetration called heat (*uṣmagata*).**
- 2) During the greater patient acceptance regarding the non-existence of the object (*arthābhāve adhimātrakṣāntiḥ*), there is a concentration called increase of light (*ālokaṛddhisamadhi*) which is the basis of the summit (*mūrdhan*) state.**
- 3) In the course of the four correct cognitions (*yathābhūtaparijñāna*), the entry into Concept-Only (*viññāptimātratāpraveśa*) and the certainty of the non-existence of the object (*arthābhāvaniścaya*) constitute the concentration**

penetrating a part of reality (*tattvārthaikadeśanupraviṣṭasamādhi*): it is the basis of the patient acceptance furthering the truth (*satyānulomikī kṣāntiḥ*).

4) Next (*tadanantaram*), the abandonment of the concept of Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātrasaṃjñāvidhvamsa*) constitutes the concentration immediately preceding the path of seeing (*ānantaryasamādhi*): it is the basis of the highest worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*).

These four concentrations are close to the complete understanding (*abhisamaya*). [143b11]

13. Comm. Bh 352c15-27, bh 196a3-5, U 417a8-26, u 301b2-302a3.

“Everywhere, at the time of arriving at complete understanding (*abhisamaya*), there are four factors leading to penetration (*nirvedhabhāgiya*) ...

1) *By means of the four investigations*: as we have seen above (§ 7), they consist of finding that the name (*nāman*), the entity (*artha*), their self-nature (*svabhāva*) and their characteristics (*viśeṣa*) are merely designations (*prajñapti*). - *During the lesser patient acceptance regarding the non-existence of the object*: during this lower prajñā which delights in the non-existence of the object. – *There is a concentration called acquisition of light*: light, because it illumines the knowledge of the non-existence of the object; *acquisition* because it is in conformity with the desired result. This concentration, which begins to acquire the knowledge of the non-existence of the object, is called acquisition of light, as when one starts to get fire, etc. – *It is the basis of the factor leading to penetration called heat*: heat is the wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*) similar to heat. When fire is produced by rubbing (*manthana*) two sticks together, heat is the mark (*nimitta*) of fire; similarly here, these wholesome roots are the mark of knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*). Concentration is the *support*, i.e., the cause of this factor of penetration. Penetration (*nirvedha*) means complete understanding (*abhisamaya*); factor (*bhāgiya*) of penetration means the patient acceptance of the non-existence of self of dharmas (*dharmanairātmyakṣānti*)

2) *During the higher patient acceptance with regard to the non-existence of the object* (*arthābhāve adhimātrakṣāntiḥ*), there is a concentration called increase of brilliance

(*ālokavṛddhisamādhī*), which is the support of the highest state. It is called 'highest' (*mūrdhan*) because it reaches the highest point of activity of the wholesome roots [according to u: *rtse mo ni dge baḥi rtsa ba gyo baḥi rtse mor phyin paḥi phyir ro*].

3) *In the course of the four correct cognitions*: these are, as we have seen above (§ 7), certainty (*niścaya*) as to the non-existence of name, entity, etc. When this certainty is present, one enters into Concept-Only which appears like a name, etc.; one understands with certainty that there is no object. *The concentration penetrating a portion of reality; it has entered into a portion* (*ekadeśānupraviṣṭa*) because it penetrates (*pratividhyati*) only the non-existence of grāhya. Thanks to it, one knows that the object does not exist, but one is unable to abandon Concept-Only in its aspect of grāhaka. That is why this concentration is the basis of the patient acceptance furthering the truth. It *further*s the truth because it is close to it, because in leaving behind the existence of grāhya, one comes to understand the non-existence of grāhaka [according to u: *gzun ba med pa la brten nas ḥdzin pa yan med par rtogs par ḥgyur baḥi phyir ro*].”

14. Thus the bodhisattva has entered into the bhūmis, has acquired the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) and has entered into Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātratā*).

How does he practice the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*)?

In the ten bodhisattva bhūmis as they are described (*yathoktavyavasthāna*) and that are (*upasthita*) the totality (*saṃgraha*) of all the sūtras, the bodhisattva practices (*abhyasyate*), over the course of many thousands of cosmic periods (*saṃbahulaśatasahasranayutakoṭikalpa*), the supramundane (*lokottara*) gnosis of tranquility and discrimination (*śamathavipaśyanājñāna*) concerning mixed dharmas (*saṃsṛṣṭadharmāmbaka*), as well as the subsequent cognition (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*). In that way, he transforms his basis (*āśrayaparavṛtti*); then he exerts himself (*prayuṅkte*) to attain the three bodies (*trikāya*) of the Buddha.

[143b16]

14. Comm. Bh 353a5-13, bh 196a5-196b1, U 417b3-11, u 302a3-6.

“*In the ten bodhisattva bhūmis as they are described: in the ten bodhiattva bhūmis according to the decription given [in chap. V]. The cognition of tranquility and discernment concerns mixed dharmas: it concerns the general characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and does not have concepts (vikalpa) as object. It is a supramundane cognition, i.e., an nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpakajñāna). The subsequent cognition is a descriptive cognition (vyavasthānajñāna). We cannot say that it is simply mundane because it is not exercised in the world. Nor can we say that it is exclusively supramundane because it manifests in conformity with the world. That is why it cannot be defined with precision.*” (Bh)

“*In that way, the bodhisattva transforms his support: over the course of many periods (kalpa), he cultivates nonconceptual wisdom and subsequent cognition and thus reaches the transformation of the support (cf. chap. IX), i.e., the purification of his mental series (cittacaittasamtānapariśuddhi). Then he exerts himself to attain the three bodies of the Buddha: this will be explained at length below (chap. X).*” (U)

15. What is the difference (viśeṣa) between the two realizations (abhisamaya), that of the śrāvakas and that of the bodhisattvas? - The abhisamaya of the bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the śrāvakas by way of ten superiorities (viśeṣa):

- 1) *Ālambanaviśeṣa*, by its object, because it concerns the Greater Vehicle.
- 2) *Niśrayaviśeṣa*, by its basis, because it rests upon the great accumulations of merit and wisdom (*mahāpuṇyajñānasamhāra*).
- 3) *Prativedhaviśeṣa*, by its penetration, because it penetrates the non-existence of self of the individual and of entities (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*).
- 4) *Nirvāṇaviśeṣa*, by its nirvāṇa, because it takes possession of (*parigrhṇāti*) of the non-stable nirvāṇa (*apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*).
- 5) *Bhūmiviśeṣa*, by its levels, because it brings deliverance (*niḥsarāṇa*, *niryāna*) by means of the ten levels.

6) *Parīśuddhiviśeṣa*, by its purity, because it abandons the propensities of the passions (*kleśavāsanāsamudghāta*) and purifies the buddhafi elds (*buddhakṣetraparīśodhana*).

7) *Svaparāsamacittatāprāptiviśeṣa*, by the acquisition of the mind of equality with respect to self and others, because it never ceases to endeavor to ripen (*paripāka*) beings.

8) *Janmaviśeṣa*, by its arising, because it arises in the tathāgata family (*tathāgatagotra*).

9) *Upapattiviśeṣa*, by its appearances, because it always appears in the assemblies surrounding the Buddhas (*buddhaparṣanmaṇḍala*).

10) *Phalaviśeṣa*, by its results, because it bears fruit having innumerable qualities (*apramāṇaguṇa*): the ten powers (*bala*), the fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), the attributes special to the Buddha (*āveṇikabuddhadharma*).

[143b28]

15. Comm. Bh 353a26-29, bh 196b1-3, U 417b23-417c20, u 302a6-303a4.

“There are ten or eleven kinds of differences between the abhisamaya of the śrāvakas and that of the bodhisattvas, [ten in the Tib B Dh, eleven in P H, which considers the sixth viśeṣa as a twofold superiority]:

1) *Ālambanaviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva abhisamaya has the dharmas of the Greater Vehicle as object of the threefold wisdom, wisdom born from learning (*śrūtamayī prajñā*), etc. The śrāvaka abhisamaya has the dharmas of the Lesser Vehicle as object .

2) *Niśrayaviśeṣa*. The accumulation of merit (*puṇyasamḥāra*) consists of the threefold practice (*prayoga*) of generosity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*) and patience (*kṣānti*). The accumulation of wisdom (*jñānasamḥāra*) consists of the practice of zeal (*vīrya*), meditation (*dhyāna*) and the wisdom (*prajñā*) of hearing, etc. [In fact, zeal belongs to both accumulations, cf. below, § 18a, comm.] We say 'accumulation' (*samḥāra*) because accumulation takes place over innumerable kalpas.

3) *Prativedhaviśeṣa*. The śrāvaka abhisamaya penetrates the pudgalanairātmya only, the bodhisattva abhisamaya penetrates both the pudgala- and the dharmanairātmya.

4) *Nirvāṇaviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva abhisamaya, using both compassion (*karuṇā*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) as means (*upāya*), has, as nirvāṇa, the fact of not dwelling in either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa (cf. chap. IX, § 1). The śrāvaka abhisamaya has, as nirvāṇa, simply the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) (cf. Kośa, I, p. 7).

5) *Bhūmiviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva abhisamaya bases itself on the ten bhūmis in order to obtain deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa*, *niryāṇa*). There is nothing in the Lesser Vehicle about these levels.

6) *Pariśuddhiviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva abhisamaya cuts through the afflictions (*kleśa*) with their predispositions (*savāsana*); it is able to purify all the buddhafiēlds. The śrāvaka abhisamaya, while cutting through the afflictions, does not cut through their predispositions and does not purify the buddhafiēlds. Predisposition (*vāsanā*) here means an afflicted behavioral pattern without, however, there being afflictions (cf. chap. X, § 21).

7) *Svaparāsamacittatāprāptiviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva abhisamaya perceives (*sākṣātkr-*) the identity of self and other (*svaparāsādharmya*) and exerts itself uninterruptedly in ripening (*paripācana*) beings. On the other hand, the śrāvaka abhisamaya distinguishes between self and other; it pursues solely one's own interest (*svakārtha*) and not that of others (*parārtha*).

8) *Janmaviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva takes birth in the family of the tathāgata (*tathāgatagotra*), in the dharmadhātu (cf. above, § 11). He is a true son of Buddha. He is like a prince born into a family of a cakravartin and possessing the marks, wheel, etc. This is not the case for the śrāvaka: he is like the son of a slave (*dāsaputra*), born into a family of low extraction (cf. u: *ma rabs kyi rigs bran khol gyi bu bĕin no*).

9) *Upapattiviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva is always in the great assemblies surrounding the Buddhas, seated on a lotus throne with legs crossed (*padmamaṇḍe paryāṅkam ābhujya niṣaṇṇah*); until he becomes Buddha, he takes on apparitional births (*upapāduka*) (cf. chap. VI, § 5, no. 3). Great assemblies of the Buddha means a pure element (*anāsravadhātu*), a buddha-land (*buddhaviśaya*) (cf. chap. X, § 30). This is not so for the śrāvaka who is born in the womb of a mother (*mātuḥ kuḥṣau*), etc.

10) *Phalaviśeṣa*. The bodhisattva is adorned (*alaṃkṛta*) with innumerable qualities (*guṇa*): powers (*bala*), fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), etc.; he can effortlessly (*anābhoga*) bring about the welfare of all beings (*sarvasattvārtha*); he has access (*adhigama*) to the dharmakāya (cf. chap. X, § 3): this is his supreme fruit. The others have a suppression defiled by rebirths as fruit (acc. to u: *zag pa dan bcas paḥi skye ba med pa = sāsravānutpāda*).” (U)

16. Here are some verses:

- i) *āgantukatvaparyeṣā anyonyaṃ nāstavastunoḥ /*
prajñapter dvividhasyātra tanmātratvasya caiṣaṇā //

Investigation concerns the mutual independence of name and entity. In their twofold aspect as well, it finds a simple single designation.

- ii) **By correct cognition (*yathābhūtaparijñāna*), we see that the object does not exist, that there is just a threefold concept (*kalpatraya*).**

The object being non-existent, the threefold concept does not exist either, and we enter into the three natures. [143c4]

16. Comm. Bh 335b6-22, bh 196b4-197a4, U 417c26-418a15, u 303a4-303b4.

“In these two stanzas the author recapitulates the investigations (*paryeṣaṇā*) and their results, the *yathābhūtaparijñāna*, in order to facilitate understanding.

i) *Investigation concerns the mutual independence of the name and the entity*: the name is independent (*āgantuka*) of the entity and likewise, the entity is independent of the name (cf. chap. II, § 24). This is not the theory of those who want the word (*śabda*) and the entity (*artha*) to be always joined (*nityasambaddha*), arising simultaneously [acc. to u: *ji ltar kha cig sgra dan don rtag ḥbrel pa ni lhan cig skyes paḥo ſes bya la sogs par sems pa lta bu ni ma yin no*]. *In their twofold aspect as well, he finds a simple single designation*: in the self-nature (*svabhāva*) and the specifications (*viśeṣa*) attributed to name and entity, he finds only a simple concept (*prajñaptimātra*). How is that? Self-

nature and specifications lead to a simple concept, to the expression of a simple designation. There is neither real self-nature nor real specifications.

ii) *By means of correct cognition*: This is a matter of the four correct cognitions (*yathābhūtaparijñāna*) resulting from the four investigations (*paryeṣaṇa*). *We see that there is no object*: we see that the object is non-existent from the beginning; *that there is only threefold concept*: the concept of name (*nāmaṅkalpa*), the concept designating a self-nature (*svabhāvaprajñaptivikalpa*) and the concept designating specifications (*viśeṣaprajñaptivikalpa*). The latter being non-existent, the former *does not exist either*, i.e., the object (*artha*) being non-existent, the threefold concept does not exist either. *And we enter into the three natures*: as was said above (§ 8), we enter into the three natures (*svabhāvatraya*).

Stanza i) (1): By seeing that the name (*nāman*) and the entity (*vastu*) are independent (*āgantuka*) of each other, we enter into the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*).

Stanza i) (2): By seeing that their self-nature (*svabhāva*) and their specifications (*viśeṣa*) are mere concept (*vikalpamātra*), mere designation (*prajñāptimātra*), we enter into the dependent nature (*aparatantrasvabhāva*).

Stanza ii): It deals with the entry into the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*). First we reject as imaginary (*parikalpita*) just the object of mind (*cittaviṣaya*) distinct from the mind. Then, we abandon concept (*vikalpa*) itself. The latter does not exist since its object does not exist. Otherwise, bondage (*bandhana*) and deliverance (*vimokṣa*) would not take place, purity and defilement would not exist.” (U)

17. Stanzas (*avavāda*) of instruction taken from the Yogavibhaṅgaśāstra:

i) The concentrated (*samāhita*) bodhisattva sees that images (*pratibimba*) are merely mind (*manas*). Driving away the notion of object (*arthasaṃjñā*), he understands (*avadhārayate*) that just his mind exists (*svasaṃjñā*).

ii) Abiding thus in the inner mind (*antaścitta*), he knows (*pratilabhate*) that the cognized object (*grāhya*) does not exist; consequently he knows that the cognizing subject (*grāhaka*) does not exist either. Later, he experiences (*spṛśati*) non-perception (*anupalambha*). [143c9]

17. Comm. Bh 353b28-353c9, bh 197a4-197b3, U 418a21-418b3, 303b4-304a2.

“Who is able to investigate and obtain the result in that way? To answer this question, the author has two stanzas:

i) *The concentrated bodhisattva sees that images are merely mind*: he sees that the images perceived in concentration (*samādhigocarapratibimba*) in the appearance of texts (*dharma*) and theses (*artha*) are just his inner mind. As the sūtra comments: I have said that the object of consciousness (*vijñānāmbana*) is formed by a mere concept (cf. chap. II, § 7). Here, 'bodhisattva' means the one who sees. He is *concentrated*: his mind is one-pointed. *Driving away the notion of object*: excluding the notion of object from these images, *he understands that just his mind exists*. He concludes: These objects (*nimitta*) that have the appearance of texts and theses are merely a development (*pariṇāma*) of my concentrated mind.

ii) *Thus he abides in the inner mind*: i.e., at this moment his mind dwells in mind itself. *He understands that the cognized object does not exist: consequently he knows that the cognizing subject does not exist either*: First he understands that the grāhya is non-existent, that if the svabhāva of the grāhya is non-existent, the svabhāva of the grāhaka, superimposed on the svabhāva of the grāhya, is itself non-existent. *Later, he experiences non-perception*: after that, he penetrates tathāta where perception of both svabhāvas are absent.” (U)

These two stanzas are cited in Siddhi, p. 581: The concentrated bodhisattva sees that the images are mind only: [this is uṣmagata]. The notion of things having been expelled, he sees that only his mind exists: [this is mūrdhāna]. Abiding thus in inner mind, he knows that grāhya does not exist: [this is lesser kṣānti]; then when grāhaka as well does not exist: [this is the other two kṣāntis]; later he contacts anupalambha: [this is the entry into tattvādarśanamārga].

18. Now, drawn from the Mahāyanasūtrālaṅkāra (VI, 6-10), here are other stanzas on clear understanding (realization) (*abhisamaya*):

i) *saṃbhr̥tya saṃbhāram anantapāraṃ jñānasya puṇyasya ca bodhisattvaḥ /
dharmeṣu cintāsuvinīścitavāj jalpānvayām arthagatiṃ paraiti //*

“Having collected a limitless accumulation of wisdom and merit, having reached complete certainty of the texts by reflection, the bodhisattva understands that the object has its origin in speech.”

ii) *arthān sa vijñāya ca jalpamātrān saṃtiṣṭhate tannibhacittamātre /
pratyakṣatām eti ca dharmadhātus tasmād viyukto dvayataḥ saṅgāna //*

“Having recognized that objects are nothing other than words, he settles into Concept-Only appearing as object. The fundamental element is present to his eyes; this is why he is free of duality.”

iii) *nāstīti cittāt param etya buddhyā cittasya nāstivam upaiti tasmāt /
dvayasya nāstivam upetya dhīmān saṃtiṣṭhate 'adgatidharmadhātau //*

“By means of his intellect he understands that that which is other than mind is not so; this is why he recognizes the non-existence of the mind itself. The wise person who has understood the non-existence of duality settles into the fundamental element that is beyond this duality.

iv) *akalpanājñānabalena dhīmataḥ samānuyātena samantataḥ sadā/
tadāśrayo gahvaradoṣasaṃcayo mahāgadeneva viṣaṃ nirasyate //*

“In the wise person, by the power of the concept-free cognition that always accompanies equality everywhere, the basis, a mass of errors like a thicket, is driven out just as poison is expelled by a powerful antidote.”

v) *munivihitasudharmasavyavastho matim upadhāya samūladharmadhātau /
smṛtigatiṃ avagamya kalpamātrāṃ vrajati guṇārṇavapāram āśu dhīraḥ //*

“Established in the good law prescribed by the Sage, fixing his mind in the fundamental-element-root, understanding that the activity of memory is only concept, the brave bodhisattva rapidly reaches the other shore of the ocean of qualities.” [143c20]

18. Comm. Bh 353c22-354b6, bh 197b3-198b8, U 418b16-419a16, u 304a2-305b3.

“i) *Having collected a limitless accumulation of merit and wisdom (saṃbhṛtya saṃbhāram anantapāram jñānasya puṇyasya ca)*. The first three perfections (*pāramitā*), generosity (*dāna*), etc., are the *accumulation of merit*. The sixth, the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), is the *accumulation of wisdom*. Zeal (*vīrya*), effort, penetrates both accumulations. It is the same for trance (*dhyāna*): when it concerns the infinite (*apramāṇa*) practices, it enters into the accumulation of merit; otherwise, it enters into the accumulation of wisdom. *Having accumulated (saṃbhṛtya)* means having fulfilled (*paripūrya*). This fulfilling (*paripūraṇa*) which extends over portions of incalculable time (*asaṃkhyeyakālaprabheda*) is *limitless (anantapāra)*. The bodhisattva, *having reached perfect certainty in the texts (dharmeṣu cintāsuvinīścitatvāt)*: by means of a cognition subsequent to concentration (*samādhipṛṣṭalabdhajñāna*), he understands perfectly (*niścaya*) all the dharmas, sūtra, etc., and he has suppressed all hesitation (*vicikitsā*). *He understands that the object has its origin in words (jalpānvayām arthagatiṃ paraiti)*: he understands that all objects (*artha*) are only mental words (*manojalpa*) and have concepts (*vikalpa*) as cause. [Acc. to u: *tshigs su bcad pa ḥdis ni tshogs kyi lam bstan to*: this stanza explains the saṃbhāramārga].

ii) *Having recognized that objects are just words, he settles into Concept-Only of the appearance of object (arthān sa vijñāya ca jalpamātrān saṃtiṣṭhate tannibhacittamātre)*: when he has recognized that all objects are just mental words (*manojalpa*), he settles his mind and dwells in Concept-Only of which the many developments (*nānāpariṇāma*) in the semblance of an object. Indeed, the bodhisattva has attained certainty (*vinīścaya*). The first part of stanza ii) deals with the nirvedhabhāgiyāvasthā of the bodhisattva. Stanza i) dealt with the prayogāvasthā.

The fundamental element is present before his eyes; that is why he is free of duality (pratyakṣatām eti ca dharmadhātus tasmād viyukto dvayalakṣaṇena). Having penetrated the non-existence of the object, being settled in Concept-Only, he is able to suppress the duality of grāhya and grāhaka and directly perceive non-duality (*advaya*), the absolute (*paramārtha*), the dharmadhātu, because the arising of the certainty of his cognition (*vinīścitajñāna*) is based on the dharmadhātu. This second part of stanza ii) and stanza iii) which follows deal with the darśanamārgāvasthā.

iii) Now it is necessary to explain how the dharmadhātu is present before his eyes (*pratyakṣatām eti*). *By means of his intellect he understands that that nothing other than his mind exists; that is why he recognized the non-existence of mind itself (nāstīti cittāt param etya buddhyā cittasya nāstitvam upaiti tasmāt)*. He knows that nowhere is there any perceived object (*ālambanaviṣaya*) outside of the mind. Since this object does not exist, the mind which perceives it (*ālambakacitta*) does not exist either. *The wise person who has understood the non-existence of duality (dvayasya nāstitvam upetya dhīmān)*. The wise person (*dhīmat*) is the person endowed with great wisdom (*prajñā*). To know with certainty (*vinīścaya*) the non-existence of duality (*dvayasya nāstitvam*) is to penetrate (*pratividh-*) the imaginary nature (*parikalpita*). The *non-existence of duality* is called the original non-existence of object and subject (*ālambanālambakayor ādināstitvam*). *He settles into the fundamental element that is beyond this duality (saṃtiṣṭhate 'tadgatidharmadhātau)*. *Saṃtiṣṭhā-* means to rest (*sthā*) in equality (*samatā*). Completely free of grāhya and grāhaka, the dharmadhātu *is beyond duality*. The dharmadhātu perceived in this way is not false; it is a true dharmadhātu.

iv) *In the wise person, by the power of nonconceptual cognition (akalpanājñānabalena dhīmataḥ: by the power (anubhāva) contained in this nonconceptual cognition (nirvikalpakajñāna) of the bodhisattvas. This wisdom accompanies equality always and everywhere (samānuyātena samantataḥ sadā)*. It accompanies *everywhere (samantataḥ)*, i.e., inwardly and outwardly (*adhyātmabahirdhā*). It accompanies *equality (sama)*, because if grāhya does not exist, then grāhaka does not exist either. Seeing an identity of nature (*svabhāvasamatā*) like space (*ākāśā*) in the dharmas, sūtras, etc., this knowledge accompanies equality. It accompanies it *always (sadā)*, i.e., throughout all time. – *The support, a heap of faults like a thicket, is expelled (tadāśrayo gahvaradoṣasaṃcayo nirasyate)*. By support (*āśraya*) is meant the cause (*hetu*) of defiled (*saṃkleśika*) dharmas. It is a *heap of faults (doṣasaṃcaya)* because the propensities (*vāsanā*) of the faults (*doṣa*), i.e., the defiled dharmas, are piled up there. It is like a thicket (*gahvara*) because it is hard to penetrate (*duranupraviṣṭa*). *As poison is expelled by a powerful antidote (mahāgadeneva viṣam)*. This phrase is easy to understand. Since it drives away faults (*doṣa*), this knowledge is like an antidote (*agada*). Stanza iv) deals with the bhāvanāmārgavasthā.

v) *Established in the good law prescribed by the Muni (munivihitasudharmasuvyavasthaḥ): established in the holy dharma proclaimed by the venerable Muni, the Buddha. Fixing his mind on the fundamental-element-root (matim upadhāya samūladharmadhātu. He fixes his mind on the holy dharma that is well-taught (suvyavasthāpite dharme), taught by the Buddha, and on the dharmadhātu-root. Root (mūla) because it is the cause of awakening (avabodha), or because it bears on all the dharmas. Indeed, all dharmas have the ten bhūmis as root. It is called dharmadhātu because all dharmas exist by means of it. It is the emptiness (śūnyatā) of dharmas. Understanding that the activity of memory is nothing but concept (smṛtigatim avagamyā kalpamātrām). Subsequent cognition (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna) functions by being based on the dharmadhātu. He understands that the activity of memory is mere concept (vikalpa), that, apart from concept, there is no dharma committed to memory. Memorized dharmas, such as sūtras, etc., and the memorized pāramitās with their results, have an imaginary nature (parikalpita) and do not exist. The brave bodhisattva rapidly attains the other shore of the ocean of qualities (vrajati guṇārṇavapāram āśu dhīraḥ): by means of realization (abhisamaya) which is gradually developed, by nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna) and subsequent cognition (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna), the bodhisattvas rapidly attain the perfection of all the qualities (sarvagūṇapariṇī), i.e. buddhahood (buddhatā).” (U)*

CHAPTER III NOTES

Preliminary Note:

Chapters III to X make up a whole; they could be entitled 'the process of purification in the Greater Vehicle'. - Chap. III is dedicated to the path (*mārga*) and its five stages (*avasthā*); this path seems to be an ever more profound penetration into the three natures (*svabhāva*) or the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of things. This chapter is entitled 'entry into the characteristics of the knowable' (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa*). - The path has as cause the mundane practice of the six virtues (*pāramitā*); it has as result the possession of the same virtues in the supramundane state. Chap. IV, which deals with these virtues, is rightly called 'cause and result of entry' (*praveśahetuphala*). - The cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the six supramundane virtues involves ten progressive stages called *bhūmis* which constitute the strictly-called career of the bodhisattva. Chap. IV, dedicated to these *bhūmis*, is entitled 'the various developments of the cause and the result'. (*hetuphalabhāvanāprabheda*). - The ten *bhūmis* in the development of the six virtues are

modelled on the threefold training (*śikṣā*): morality, concentration and wisdom. Chap. VI deals with excellent morality (*adhiśīla*), chap. VII with excellent mind (*adhicitta*) and chap. VIII with excellent wisdom (*adhiprajñā*). This excellent wisdom is none other than nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) acquired on the entry into the first bhūmi and perfected during the course of the following bhūmis up to full blossoming. - Coming out of the tenth bhūmi, the bodhisattva has attained the fruit of his practices; he has cut all the seeds of defilement. This is why chap. IX is called 'fruition-cutting' (*phalaprahāna*), i.e., the cutting of the defilements which is the result of the three trainings. This chapter briefly describes the state of Buddhahood: the old individuality of the bodhisattva is changed (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*); while remaining in saṃsāra in order to save beings, he himself is in nirvāṇa: this is what is called apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa. - An immaculate and unhindered wisdom (*vimalam apratihataṃ ca jñānam*) which is expressed in the three bodies (*trikāya*) of the Buddha corresponds to the fruit of Buddhahood. Chap. X is dedicated to it; it is entitled 'the wisdom of the fruit' (*phalajñāna*).

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Chap. III, which could be improved by being better organized, deals with the path (*mārga*) and its stages (*avasthā*) which are enumerated in § 3:

i) *Samḃhārāvasthā*, stage of gathering. The bodhisattva cultivates conviction (*adhimukti*) in the vijñaptimātratā of all dharmas (cf. § 2). He devotes himself to an infinity of excellent practices (*paramacaryā*) of which some are described in § 4-6. This period extends from the first production of the mind of enlightenment (*bodhicittotpāda*) up to the production of uṣmagata.

ii) *Prayogāvasthā*, the preparatory stage. The bodhisattva progressively tames the concepts of object and subject (*grāhyagrāhaka*) and thus 'prepares' the seeing of reality (*tattvadarśana*). To this effect he cultivates the nirvedhabhāgiyas of the Greater Vehicle and the coresponding samādhis (cf. § 7 and 13) of which the following is a comparative table:

Uṣmagata	Fourfold lower paryeṣaṇā	Ālokalabdha
Mūrdhan	Fourfold higher paryeṣaṇā	Ālokavṛddhi
Satyānulomikī- kṣānti	Fourfold lower yathābhūta- parijñāna	Tattvārthaika- deṣanānupra- viṣṭasamādhi
Laukikāgra- dharma	Fourfold higher yathā- parijñāna	Ānantarya- samādhi

This stage marks the end of the first asaṃkhyeyakalpa (cf. chap. V, § 6) and the end of the adhimukticaryābhūmi.

iii) *Prativedhāvasthā*, stage of penetration. In one moment the bodhisattva reaches full understanding (*abhisamaya*) of reality and produces nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). See § 9 and 11. This stage, which is instantaneous and constitutes the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) of the bodhisattva, marks the entry into the first bhūmi.

iv) *Bhāvanāvasthā*, the stage of meditation. The bodhisattva 'meditates' on what he has 'seen' in the third stage and perfects intuitive wisdom (cf. § 14). This stage lasts from the mind of residing in the first bhūmi (*sthiticitta*) until vajropamasamādhi at the end of the tenth bhūmi. It lasts for two asaṃkhyeyakalpas (cf. chap. V, § 6).

v) *Niṣṭhāvasthā*, final stage. The bodhisattva leaves the obstacles (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*) and dwells in anuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ. Having become buddha, he converts beings and causes them to enter into the vijñaptimātratā.

Some more- or less-developed accounts of the Greater Vehicle in Abhisamayālamkāra, chap. V, p. 27 seq.; Sūtrālamkāra, VI, 6-10 (= Saṃgraha, III, § 18); XIV, 1-22 (*sambhāra*), 23-27 (*prayoga*), 29-41 (*darśana*), 42-51 (*bhāvanā*); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, *tatrāvasthā*, p. 188-192; Abhisamayasamuccaya, T 1605, k. V, p. 682b21 seq.; Triṃśikā, p. 42 (12) seq.; Siddhi, p. 562-611; Bu-ston, I, p. 117.

On the path in the Lesser Vehicle, Kośa, V, p. IV-XI (résumé); L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Musīla et Nārada*, MCB, V, 1937, p. 192 sq.

Comparison of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva paths. E. Obermiller, *Coctrine of P. P.*, AO, XI, 1932, p. 13-47.

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§ 1. *Manojalpa*, mental discourse, synonym of manovijñāna. - Cf. Uttaratantra, p. 133; Sūtrālamkāra, ad XI, 7 (*manojalpair iti saṃkalpaḥ*); ad XIV, 23 (*tathābhūto bodhisattvaḥ samāhitacitto manojalpād vinirmuktām sarvadharmān na paśyati svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇākhyān manojalpamātram eva khyāti*); Triṃśikā, p. 32 (19) (*vitarkaḥ paryeṣako manojalpaḥ*); Siddhi, p. 385, 386, 586.

§ 2. *Sambhārāvasthā*: Triṃśikā, kār. 26, p. 42 (12); Siddhi, p. 564-574. *Sambhāra* in the Lesser Vehicle: Jātaka, I, p. 1 (*bodhi*); Theragāthā comm. p. 214 (*vimokkhhkas-*); Mahāvastu, I, p. 239 (5) *kuśalamūlas-*; II, p. 286 (7) (*sambhārato puṇyānām*); III, p. 250 (9) (*dharmas-*); Lalitavistara, p. 35 (12) (*puṇyas-*, *jñāns-a*, *śamathas-*, *vidarśanās-*); Saundarānanda, XVII, st. 15; Kośa, VII, p. 80. - *Sambhāra* in the Greater Vehicle: Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka, p. 104 (long list); Madh. vṛtti, p. 357 (1) (*prajñopāyamahākaruṇās-*, *Śikṣāsam.*, p. 191 (4) (*dharmas-*, *jñānas-*); Sūtrālamkāra, XVIII, 38-41 (types, essence, etymology, result); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 258 (25) (2 bodhis); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 213 (S. of the śrāvaka and the bodhisattva); Siddhi, p. 564.

Adhimukti, adherence, forms the essential of this stage and the following one. Beyond the references already given for chap. II, § 13, for the Hīnayāna, see Dīgha, I, p. 174; Aṅguttara, V, p. 36; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 124; Milinda, p. 161, 169; Vibhaṅga, p. 340, 341; Sumaṅgalavilāsīnī, I, p. 44, 103; Mahāvastu, I, p. 159 (15), II, p. 309 (14); Lalitavistara, p. 10 (11), 32 (20), 33 (6), 433 (11); Avadānaśataka, I, p. 8 (11), 112 (8), 285 (5); Kośa, I, p. 40; II, p. 204; VII, p. 70. 85. - For the Mahāyāna, see Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 25,

31, 49, 53, 110, etc. (see also *adhimucyate*, p. 187, 232, 255, etc.); *Bhadramāya*, p. 101 (ed. Régamey); *Samādhirāja* (ed. Régamey), XIX, 2-4, XXII, st. 44; *Laṅkāvatāra*, P. 42 (12), 172 (2), 194 (16); *Kāśyapa*, § 16, p. 35; *Daśabhūmika*, p. 7, 11, 14, 20, 29, 38, 40, 41, 56, 68, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78; *Samdhinir.*, index; *Madh. vṛtti*, p. 159 n., 268 n., 337 (6), 338 (11), 358 n., 443 (1); *Śikṣāsam.*, p. 171 seq. (*śūnayadh-*); *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, I. 13-18; *X* as a whole; *Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 95 (13), 195 (12); *Uttaratantra*, p. 158, 163, 164; *Triṃśikā*, p. 25 (20); *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, p. 190-192; *Siddhi*, p. 173, 563, 565, 572, 661, 731.

Adhimukticyābhūmi, which is the subject of the following §: *Kośa*, IV, p. 224; *Abhis. al. āl.*, p. 64 (6); *Samdhinir.* IX, v. 3; *Daśabhūmika*, introduction; *Madh. avatāra*, p. 13; *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, IV, 2; XI, 75; XIV, 1; XVI, 76; XX, 24-27, 41; *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, p. 130 (5), 190 (5), 204 (14), 205 (7); *Siddhi*, p. 731.

§ 3. See preliminary note.

§ 4 - 6. Deal with the four practices in the *Sambhāravasthā*:

i) Accumulation by gathering the roots of good: see references to *sambhāra* above and in § 2.

ii) Struggle against discouragement: *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, X, 11; *Siddhi*, p. 574.

iii) Elimination of the four stoppings: a) *srāvaka-pratyekabuddha-manasikāraparivarjana*, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XIII, 14-15; b) *vimativicikitsā-prahāṇa*, definition in *Kośa*, V, p. 2, 31; *Kāśyapa*, v. 7, p. 16; *Triṃśikā*, p. 29 (27); *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, p. 73 (19); *Siddhi*, p. 347; *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 117 (15), 118 (14-17); c) *dharmābhīniveśaprahāṇa* = suppression of *ātmātmīyagrāha*, *Samdhinir.*, p. 41, 161; *Siddhi*, p. 250; d) *vikalpaprahāṇa*, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XIX, 50 where the verse is commented on in a slightly different way.

iv. Continuous effort applied to *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, see below, § 12.

§ 7. Deals with the *prayogāvasthā* and is to be complemented by § 13.

Paryeṣaṇā: defined in *Triṃśikā*, p. 32 (19) (*paryeṣako manojalpaḥ kim etad iti nirūpanakārapravṛttaḥ vitarkaḥ*), *Siddhi*, p. 385, 389, 390. - The four *paryeṣaṇās* are defined in *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XIX, 47; *Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 53 (6-16); *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, T 1606, k. XI, p. 745b28 seq.; *Siddhi*, p. 576-577. - See the definitions in *Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 53: *tatra nāmaparyeṣaṇā yad bodhisattvo nāmnī nāmamātraṃ paśyati. evaṃ vastuṇi vastumātradarśanaṃ vastuparyeṣaṇā. svabhāvaprajñaptausvabhāvaprajñaptimātradarśanaṃ svabhāva-prajñaptiparyeṣaṇā. viśeṣaprajñaptau viśeṣaprajñaptimātradarśanaṃ viśeṣaprajñaptiparyeṣaṇā. sa nāmavastuno bhinnam ca lakṣaṇam paśyaty anuśliṣṭam ca. nāmavastvanuśleṣasamṇisritām ca svabhāvaprajñaptiṃ pratividhyati.*

Yathābhūtaparijñāna: *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XIX, 48-55; *Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 53 (17) -55 (3); 294 (14 - 20); *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, T 1616, k. XI, p. 475c20 seq.; *Siddhi*, p. 577 (*nāmaiṣeṇāgatam yathābhūta-parijñānam*, etc.).

§ 8. This paragraph has been studied by E. Obermiller, *Nirvāṇa according to Tibetan Tradition*, IHQ, X, 1934, p. 242-244.

For singleness, duality and multiplicity, see notes to chap. II, § 11.

The example of the rope mistaken for a snake has already been encountered in chap. II, § 16. See also Kośa, VI, p. 258; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 327 (10); Madgyāntavibhaṅga, p. 14 (6), 28 (17); Madh. vṛtti, p. 220 (8), 523 (1); Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, st. 68-69. - Example also used by Śaṅkara in comm. to Māṇḍukyop., Ānandāśrama, p. 8: *yasya dvaitaprapaṅcasyopaśame 'dvaitapratipattī rajjvām iva sarpādivikalpopaśame rajjutatvaparipattih;* p. 40: *sarpādivikalpa-pratiśedhenaiva rajjusvarūpapratipattivat avasthasyevātmanas tuīyatvena pratipipādayiṣitatvāt;* comm. on the Brahmasūtras, I, 1, 4, p. 60: *syād etad evaṃ yadi rajjusvarūpaśravaṇa iva arpabhrāntih nivarteta.* See also O. Lacombe, *L'Absolu selon le vedānta*, 1937, p. 209.

§ 9. Describes the arrival at darśanamārga by means of the practice of the nirvedhabhāgīyas. This passage, obscured by its extreme conciseness, should be compared with Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 26 (20) - 27 (18), of which the following is the text and translation:

viśayānupalabdhim āśritya vijñaptimātrasyāpy anupalabdhir jāyata iti / yathā na vijñanād bahiḥ parikalpitaṃ grhyam astīti vijñaptimatātratābalena manogrhyābhāvaṃ praviśati tathā grhyābhāvabalena vijñaptimātrasyāpy abhāvaṃ pratipadyate / grāhyam eva hy apekṣya tadgrāhakaṃ vyavasthāpyate / grāhyābhāve grāhkāsaṃbhavāt / evam asallakṣaṇaṃ grāhyagrāhakayoḥ parikalpitarūpayoḥ praviśati / nābhūtaparikalpasyeti darśanām bhavati / kim arthaṃ pnuah prathamata eva vijñaptimātrasyaivābhāvaṃ na vibhāvayati / grāhyapratibaddhatvād dhi grāhakasyāḷambanīyārthābhāve āḷambanasvabhāvavināśat sukhaṃ praviśati / anyathā bhāvāpavādam eva kuryāt / grāhyagrāhakayoḥ parasparanirapekṣatvāt / imāṃ ca grāhyagrāhakavikalpātītāṃ jñanabhūmiṃ saṃbhāreṣu nirantaraṃ pravartamānaḥ prathamakalpāsamkhyeya-parisamāptau praviśati / evaṃ vijñaptimātram idaṃ niśritya rūpādyabhāvabhāvnaālokottaramārgasya prathamavabhāva uśmagatākhyāḥ saparivāraḥ samādhir āmukhībhavati / tasyānantaraṃ mūrdhākhyāḥ / tasyānantaram aśeṣagrāhyānupalambhād grāhakānupalambhānukūlaḥ kṣāntyākhyāḥ samādhiḥ / tasyāmanataram arthānupalabdhim niśritya vijñaptimātrasyāpy anupalabdhim bhāvantaḥ laukiāgradharmākhyāḥ prajñadisahitā saparivāraḥ samādhirāmukhībhavati / tadanantaram darśanamārgaḥ / tatraiva ca sarvatragadharmadhātavadhigamāt prathamāṃ bhūmiṃ praviśati /

“By virtue of non-perception of the object, the non-perception of Concept-only is also engendered. Just as the bodhisattva penetrates the object of mind thanks to the notion of Concept-only - a notion expressed by saying that the imagined object does not exist outside the consciousness - in the same way he discovers the non-existence of Concept-only thanks to the notion of the non-existence of the object. Indeed, it is by correlation with the object that the subject is assumed: if the object does not exist, neither does the subject. Thus it is established that the bodhisattva penetrates the unreal character of object and subject which are essentially imaginary, but not the unreal nature of false imagination. Why does the bodhisattva not recognize the non-existence of Concept-only right from the start? Because subject is linked to object; it is only when the non-existence of the perceived object is demonstrated that the reality of the object of consciousness disappears, and then the bodhisattva penetrates safely into a purely spiritual universe. On the contrary, if the bodhisattva recognized the non-existence of the subject from the start,

he would proceed to the complete negation of all reality by being unaware of the interdependence of subject and object. The bodhisattva who has uninterruptedly practiced the path of preparation attains, at the end of a first incalculable period, the stage of knowledge that transcends the distinction between object and subject. Thus, thanks to this notion of Concept-only, a concentration called 'heat' along with its retinue is brought about, a realization of the nonexistence of matter, etc., the first stage in the supramundane path. After that comes the concentration called 'the highest state'. Then come the concentrations called 'patience' which, by non-perception of any object whatsoever, furthers the non-perception of the subject. Then follows, along with its associates and accompanied by wisdom, the concentration called 'the highest of worldly dharmas', a concentration which, being based on the non-perception of objects, produces the non-perception of Concept-only as well. Immediately after this is the path of seeing; this is where the bodhisattva, attaining the omnipresent fundamental element, penetrates into the first bhūmi.”

A similar explanation will be found in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, 33-35: Pañjikā, p. 414 seq.

§ 11. Describes the darśanamārga. This marks the beginning of the practice of the bhūmis, the beginning of dharmadhātuprativedha (cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 101 (11); 252-253), birth into the buddhagotra (cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 78 (23)); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 56 (3), 195 (15), the beginning of the nirvikalpajñāna here called the 'mind of sameness' (*samacitta*) and in chap. X, § 5, no. 5, the 'knowledge of equality' (*samatācitta*).

That equality is one of the main characteristics of nirvikalpakā-jñāna comes under chap. VIII, § 5, where it is said that tathatā, the shared nature of all dharmas, is the object of nirvikalpakajñāna. This is why Triṃśikā, p. 43 (18), defines this knowledge as *samam anālambyālabakam nirvikalpakam lokottaram jñānam*.

On *samatā*, equality, *samatājñāna*, knowledge of equality, *samatācitta*, the mind of equality or unified state of mind that considers all beings as equal universally, without mind of attachment or aversion, see Abhiṅkramaṇasūtra, T 190, k. XXXIII, p. 805c; T 261, k. IX, p. 905a-c; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 147 (3 - 4), 168 (144) - 169 (3); Sūtrālaṅkāra, IX, 70-71; Siddhi, p. 743 seq.; four samatās, (*akṣara, vāk, kāya, dharma*) in Laṅkāvatāra, p. 141-142; four samatās (*sattva, dharma, bodhi, prajñā*) in Saṃdhinir., VIII, v. 21; five samatās in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 286 (11) and Sūtrālaṅkāra, XIV, 30-31; ten samatās in Avataṃsakā, T 279, k. XXX, p. 164b; k. XXXVI, p. 191b; k. XXXVII, p. 193c; in Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra, T 1530, k. V, p. 313c1.

Here the mind of equality concerns all beings, 1) because they are equally *anātmāna* (cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 100 (8-11): *svaparāsamatām pratilabhate. yo 'ham sa paro ya vā paraḥ so 'ham iti paratrātmani ca śūnyatāyā abhedadarśanāt svaparātmani ca śūnyatāyā adhedadarśan at svaparātmanor abhedam manyate*), 2) because all beings are the tathāgatagarbha, cf. Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, T 666, p. 457c8; Adhyardhaśarikā, T 241, k. I, p. 780b26; T 242, p. 783a11; Sūtrālaṅkāra, IX, 37; Laṅkāvarāra where the the tathāgatagarbha, which is *prakṛtiprabhāsvara, nitya, dhruva, śiva, śaśvata*, dwells in the body of all beings (*sarvasattvadehāntargata, p. 77 (16)*) has the name ālaya (*ālayavijñānasamśabdita, p. 220 (14)*) and transmigrates (*saṃsāraṭi, p. 242 (2)*); E.

Obermiller, *Doctrine of the P. P.*, p. 331, 32, 45, 99; Uttaratantra, p. 82, 89, 104, 108, 114; Siddhi, p. 30, 110, 754-757; Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, in Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, p. 94. - Concerning the āśayasamatā of the bodhisattvas and the dharmadhātusamatā of the Buddhas, see Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIV, 30.

§ 12. Śamatha-vipaśyanā. In the Hīnayāna, Majjhima, I, p. 494; III, p. 289, 297; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 194-195, 295, 350, 352; V, p. 52; Aṅguttara, II, p. 157; Dhammasaṅgani, p. 60; Lalitavistara, p. 35 (14-15) (śamatha-vidarśanā); Dīvyā, p. 95; Kośa, V, p. 99; VI, 280, 301; VII, p. 21; VIII, p. 131, 146, 157. - In the Mahāyāna, Saṃdhanir. VIII, v. 1-18; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 344 (1); Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVIII, 66-68; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 209(2) (*ś.-v. pakṣyaṃ dhyānam*); p. 260 (1) -261 (5) (four kinds of śamatha); Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 151 (20), 214 (2), 215 (8), 272 (19); Siddhi, p. 334, 370, 383, 596; E. Obermiller, *Doctrine of the P. P.*, p. 16, 17, 20, 27, 68.

Knowledge of mixed object (*samsr̥ṣṭadharmāmbanaṃ jñānam*): below, chap. VII, § 4; chap. VIII, § 19, no. 3; Saṃdhanir. VIII, § 13-16.

The ideas have been summarized by L. de la Vallée Poussin in Siddhi, p. 597: After reflecting (*cintanā*), which is the discursive understanding of the Buddha's teaching, śamatha, which is 'linking the mind with the ineffable reality', enters into contact with the true nature of the dharmas, *dharmatā*; śamatha makes vipaśyanā possible. The mind, perfumed by śamatha, discerns and cognizes the dharmas according to dharmatā, according to the preceding *cintanā*.

Example of the magician is developed at length in Saṃdhanir., I, § 4; Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 21.

§ 13. See the synoptic table of the paryeṣaṇā--yathābhūtaparijñānas, nirvedhabhāgiyā and samādhi in the preliminary note to this chapter.

Nirvedhabhāgiyā. In the Hīnayāna: Dīgha, III, p. 251, 277; Saṃyutta, V, p. 345; Aṅguttara, III, p. 427; Vibhaṅga, p. 330; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 21, 48, 143 seq., 153 seq.; Visuddhimagga, p. 15, 88; Divya, p. 50 (8); Kośa, VI, p. 164-177; Kośavyākhyā, p. 97 (14), 247 (25), 678 (6).; Treatise on the Sects by Vasumitra, Asia Major, II, 1925, p. 26, 56. - In the Mahāyāna: Abhis. alaṃkāra, I. st. 26, p. 5; V, st. 1-4, p. 27; Abhis. al. āl, p. 36 (25), 63 (22), 663 (12) seq.; E. Obermiller, *Doctrine of the P. P.*, p. 73, 78, 84, 86; *Analysis of the Abhis. alaṃkāra*, COS no. 27, 1933, p. 8-9, 63; Madh. vṛtti, p. 362 n.; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 426 (5); Sūtrālaṃkāra, VI, 9; XIV, 23-26; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. VIII, p. 734c6; Uttaratantra, p. 86; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 27 (8-18), 78 (16), 156 (18), 178 (23), 179 (2, 6, 20), 180 (7); Siddhi, p. 575-584, 602-603. Abhis. al. āl., p. 63 (22) seq. should be cited: *evaṃ kṛtadharmapṛavicayaḥ kṛtadharmapṛavicayaḥ samāhutacittaś ca sarvadharmanirātmyaṃ bhāvayan krameṇa yadā pṛthagbhūtārth-ābhiniveśābhāvād īṣarspaṣṭajñānālokena manomātram eva paśyatitadāsyosmagatāvasthā. sa evātrālokalabdho nāma saādhir ucyate mahāyāne. – yadā tasyaiva dharmālokasya vṛddhyarthaṃ nirātmya-bhāvanāyāṃ viryārambheṇa madhyaspaṣṭo jñānāloka bhavati mūrdhāvasthā. sa eva vṛddhāloko nāma smamādhiḥ. – yadā tu cittamātrāvasthānena spaṣṭataro bāhyārthābhiniveśābhāvo jñānāloko jāyata tadā kṣāntyavasthā.*

grāhyākārābhāvānupraveśat tattvārthi aikadeśapraviṣṭo nāma samādhiḥ. – yadāpunar arthagrāhakavikṣepānābhāso jñānāloka niṣpadyate tadā laukikāgradharmāvasthā. sa evānantaryo nāma samādhiḥ. Sarvś caitā avasthā dṛdhādhimuktito 'dhimukticaryābhūmir ucyate.

§ 14. Bhāvanamārga. See the references to the path of the Mahāyāna above.

§ 15. Fifteen differences between the abhisamaya of the śrāvakas and the bodhisattvas, cf. Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1605, k. 7, p. 690c2 seq.; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 13, p. 757a seq.

For abhisamaya in general, see Kośa, VI, p. 122, p. 185 (various modalities); Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 70; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 71 (21), 123 (6), 163 (17); Triṃśikā, p. 42 (9); Siddhi, p. 601-605; E. Obermiller, *Dotrine of P. P.*, p. 7-9, 13, 15, 49, 52; Uttaratantra, p. 94. - List of six abhisamayās in Vikhyāpanā, T 1602, k. 17, p. 562c13; Siddhi, p. 602. - List of ten abhisamayās in Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 13, p. 756c1. - List of eighteen abhisamayās in Vikhyāpama, T 1602, k. 17, p. 562c27.

§ 16. The relationships between name and thing have already been studied in chap. II, § 24. They will be taken up again in chap. VIII, § 7. On this difficult question, see Tattvasaṃgraha, XVI *Śabdārtha-parikṣā*, I, p. 274-366; Vighrahavyāvartani, French trans. By S. Yamaguchi, JA, 1929, p. 1-86; Tibetan text and English trans. In G. Tucci, *Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist texts on Logic from Chinse Sources*, 1929; Sanskrit text, reently discob=vered and pub. By K. P. J Jayaswal and R. Aamkrṭyāyana, in appendix, JBORS, XXIII, 1937, part III.

17. Stanzas cited in Siddhi, p. 581.

CHAPTER IV

CAUSE AND RESULT OF ENTRY

(*praveśahetuphala*)

1. In Chapter III, the entry into the natures of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa*) has been explained; how should the cause (*hetu*) and result (*phala*) of this entry be conceived? - By means of the six mundane virtues (*pāramitā*): generosity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), zeal (*vīrya*), meditation (*dhyāna*) and wisdom (*prajñā*).

How does one enter into Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātratā*) by means of these six virtues; how do the six virtues result from this entry?

1) The bodhisattva is not attached to pleasures (*bhogeṣv asaṃraktaḥ*), does not transgress against morality (*śīleṣv anāpattikaḥ*), is not disturbed by suffering (*duḥkheṣv akṣobhyaḥ*), is not lazy in practice (*bhāvanāyām akusīdaḥ*); abandoning the causes of distraction (*vikṣepahetu*) and fixing his mind one-pointedly (*cittam ekāgrīkṛtya*), he correctly analyzes dharmas (*yoniśo dharmān pravacinotī*) and, based on these six virtues, he enters into Concept-Only.

2) Having entered into Concept-Only, the bodhisattva acquires the six virtues contained (*parigṛhīta*) in the high pure aspiration (*śuddhādhyāśraya*). Thus, without even making an effort to practice (*vinam api samudācāra-prayogena*) the six virtues, the bodhisattva develops (*bhāvayati*) the six virtues in a continuous uninterrupted manner (*satatasamītayogena*) by means of his adherence to the teachings (*deśaanādhimukṭi*), by means of his contemplation (*manasikāra*) of kindness (*āsvādanā*), acceptance (*anumodanā*) and rejoicing (*abhinandanā*), and arrives at perfection (*paripūri*). [144a4]

1. Comm. Bh 354b23-354c4, bh 198b8-199a3, U 419b7-419c1, u 305b3-306a6.

“At the time of the preparatory practice (*prayoga*), the cause (*hetu*) of entry into Concept-Only (*vijñaptimātra*) is the six mundane virtues (*laukikapāramitā*) ... By means of these six virtues, the bodhisattva enters into Concept-Only. Having entered, he acquires an excellent result (because they are supramundane) contained in the high pure aspiration (*śuddādhyāśaya*).

Thus, even without exerting himself in practicing the six virtues, the bodhisattva cultivates the six virtues in a continuous and uninterrupted way and reaches perfection.

Objection: If the bodhisattva does not make an effort to practice the virtue of morality, is he not immoral (*duḥśīla*)? - This objection is not valid because the bodhisattva neglects only the coarse effort (*stūlaprayoga*). If he neglected every effort at morality, the objection would be valid. But since he neglects only coarse effort, the objection is invalid.

By his adherence to the teaching: even though the relative teaching on the six virtues is very profound (*gambhīra*), the bodhisattva has faith in it.

Reflection of acceptance (āsvādanāmanasikāra): this is to think of the virtues as qualities. [Cf. u: *pha rol tu phyin pa rnams la yon tan blta ba*].

Reflection of approbation (anumodanāmanasikāra): this is to rejoice (*pramud-*) in the virtues located in one's own mental series (*svasaṃtāna*) or in the mental series of the other beings (*parasaṃtāna*) in all the universes (*lokadhātu*) of the ten directions (*daśadiś*).

Reflection of rejoicing (abhinandanāmanasikāra): this is to say 'In the future, I hope that I and others will never abandon these virtues and will bring them to perfection.' “ (U)

2. Here are some stanzas:

a. (1) The bodhisattvas accumulate (*saṃbibhṛatī*) pure dharmas (*śukladharma*).

(2) They obtain keen acceptance (*tīkṣṇakṣānti*).

(3) In the profound (*gambhīra*) and vast (*vipula*) doctrine (*deśana*) of their vehicle,

b. (4) they see merely a simple concept (*kalpamātra*).

(5) They acquire nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpakajñāna*).

(6) Their zeal (*chanda*) and their faith (*adhimukti*) being pure (*śuddha*), their aspiration (*āśaya*) is pure.

c. (7) Previously and at present, in the unfolding of the law (*dharmaniṣyanda*) they see the Buddhas. -

(8) They understand that enlightenment (*bodhi*) is close, and they attain it without difficulty (*akisaralābhin*).

These stanzas explain the group of characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the pure aspiration (*śuddhāśaya*) in its eight aspects (*ākāra*), namely, accumulation (*saṃbhāra*), patient acceptance (*kṣānti*), object (*ālambana*), reflection (*manasikāra*), antidote (*pratipakṣa*), self-nature (*svabhāva*), prediction (*liṅga*) and advantages (*anuśaṃsa*). The lines of the stanzas should be understood in this order. [144a15]

2. Comm. Bh 354c16-355a10, bh 199a3-199b5, U 419c12-420a1, u 306a6-306b8.

“Here the author explains the pure high aspiration (*śuddhādhyāśaya*), of which he indicates the accumulation (*saṃbhāra*), higher patient acceptance (*adhimātrakṣānti*), object (*ālambana*), reflection (*manasikāra*), counteragent (*pratipakṣa*), self-nature (*svabhāva*), prediction (*liṅga*) and quality (*guṇa*).

(1) *The bodhisattvas accumulate the pure dharmas*: first, at the stage where faith is practiced (*adhimukticyabhūmi*), they gather the accumulations (*saṃbhāra*). The accumulation of pure dharmas (*śukladharmaparipūraṇa*) is the equipment.

(2) *They attain a keen patient acceptance*: abandoning lower (*mṛdu*) and medium (*madhya*) patient acceptance, they retain only superior (*adhimātra*) patient acceptance, the dharmanidhyānakṣānti. When this kṣānti is present, there is superior patient acceptance.

(3) *In the profound and vast doctrine of their vehicle ...* : the object (*ālambana*) of the high aspiration is the profound and vast doctrine (*āryadeśana*) of the Greater Vehicle. It is profound (*gambhīra*) because its object (*artha*) is subtle (*sūkṣma*): this is the non-existence of self of dharmas (*dharmanairātmya*). It is vast (*vipula*) because it is endowed with power (*anubhāvasaṃprayukta*): these are the concentrations called 'embryo of space' (*gaganagarbhādisamādhī*). (Cf. chap. VII, § 3). Such is the object of the high aspiration.

(4) *They see only a simple concept*: they understand that all dharmas are nothing but concept (*vikalpamātra*): this is the reflection (*manasikāra*).

(5) *They acquire nonconceptual wisdom*: this is the counteragent (*pratipakṣa*).

(6) *Their zeal and adherence being pure, their aspiration is pure*: such is the self-nature (*svabhāva*) of the high aspiration that has faith (*śraddhā*) and zeal (*chanda*) as self-nature.” (U)

“(7) *Previously and at present, in the unfolding of the law they see the Buddhas*. *Previously*, i.e., prior to the purity of aspiration (*prāg āśayaviśuddhyavasthāyaḥ*); *now*, i.e., during this purity of aspiration. *They see the Buddhas*: this is the prediction (*liṅga*). *In the unfolding of the law*: i.e., in the state of absorption (*samāpattyavasthā*).

(8) Finally, the quality (*guṇa*) of the aspiration: they *understand that enlightenment is close, for they attain it without difficulty*. In this state, they see that enlightenment (*bodhi*) will soon be acquired. Using superior means (*upāya*), they attain it without difficulty.” (Bh)

3. (Cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 1):

saṃkhyātha tallakṣaṇam anupūrvī niruktir abhyāsaguṇas ca tāsāṃ /

prabhedanaṃ saṃgrahaṇaṃ vipakṣo jñeyo guṇo 'nyonyaviniścayaś ca //

[The sections of this chapter are]: number (§ 4), nature (§ 5), order (§ 6), etymology (§ 7), development (§ 8), subdivisions (§ 9), content (§ 10), opposing vices (§ 11), benefits (§ 12), mutual inclusion (§ 13).

4. [Number of pāramitās]: **Why are there only six pāramitās? - There are six because they were established (i) to counteract the opposing vices (*vīpakṣapratipakṣavyavasthita*), (ii) because they are the source of acquiring all the Buddha attributes (*sarvabuddhadharmasamudāgamapadasthāna*) and (iii) because they promote the ripening of all beings (*sarvasattva-paripākānulomika*).**

(i) The virtues of generosity (*dāna*) and morality (*śhīla*) counteract (*pratipakṣa*) the causes of not setting out on the journey (*aprasthānahetu*), which are attachment to pleasures (*bhogasaṅga*) and attachment to one's family (*gṛhasaṅga*).

The virtues of patience (*kṣānti*) and zeal (*vīrya*) counteract the causes of drawing back (*vivartanahetu*) after having set out. The causes of withdrawing are the pain resulting from the bad treatment imposed on transmigrating beings (*samsārasattvamithyāpratipattyutpannaduḥkha*) and the fatigue resulting from the long practice of the good (*cirakālasukla-pakṣaprayogaparikheda*).

The virtues of meditation (*dhyāna*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) counteract the causes of destruction (*vipraṇāśahetu*) after setting out and withdrawing. The causes of destruction are distraction (*vikṣepa*) and false wisdom (*duṣprajñā*).

Thus the virtues are established as six in number in order to counteract the opposing vices.

(ii) 'Non-distraction' (*avikṣepahetu*) in the virtues or the virtue of meditation is ensured by the first four virtues, the causes of non-distraction. As a result of this non-distraction, one understands completely and perfectly (*yathābhūta-samyagavabodha*) the reality of dharmas (*dharmatattva*): this is the virtue of wisdom; thus one acquires (*samudāgama*) the attributes of Buddha. Since these virtues are the source (*padasthāna*) of acquiring (*samudāgama*) all the attributes of Buddha, therefore they are fixed in number as six.

(iii) The virtue of generosity helps beings (*sattvopakāra*), the virtue of morality keeps them from being tormented (*sattvānupaghāta*), the virtue of

patience endures torment (*upadhātamarṣaṇa*), the virtue of zeal accomplishes duty (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*): thus, by these beneficial causes (*upakārahetu*), beings gain the aptitude for maturation (*paripākakarmaṇyatā*). Next, by the virtue of meditation, which concentrates the unconcentrated mind (*asamāhitacittasya samādhānāt*), and by the virtue of wisdom, which liberates the concentrated mind (*samāhitacittasya vimocanāt*), these beings who have listened to the preaching are ripe (*paripakva*). Thus, since these virtues promote the maturation of all beings (*sarvasattvapariṇāka*), they are fixed as six in number. [144b7]

4.Comm. Bh 355b4-16, bh 199b5-200a4, U 420a22-420b18, u 306b8-307b4.

The explanation is unnecessary.

5. Nature of the pāramitās.

How is their nature (*lakṣaṇa*) to be thought of? - As consisting of six excellences (*paramatā*). (Cf. Abhis. al āl, pg. 246 (23)).

- i) Excellence of support (*āśrayaparamatā*), because they have the mind of enlightenment as basis (*bodhichittāśrayatvāt*).
- ii) Excellence of means (*vastuparamatā*), because they put all the means to work (*sākalyavastusamudācārāt*).
- iii) Excellence of function (*adhikāraparamatā*), because they have as their duty the welfare and happiness of all beings (*sarvasttvahitasukhādhikāratvāt*).
- .
- iv) Excellence of skilful means (*upāyakaūśalyaparamatā*), because they are contained in intuitive wisdom (*nirvikapajñāna-parigrahāt*).
- v) Excellence of application (*pariṇāmaparamatā*), because they are applied to supreme perfect enlightenment (*anuttarasamyak-saṃbodhipariṇatatvāt*).

vi) Excellence of purity (*viśuddhiparamatā*), because they ensure the suppression of the obstacle of desire and the obstacle to wisdom (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇanivāraṇasamudāgamāt*).

Is all generosity virtue and is all virtue generosity? – Four alternatives (*cātuṣkoṭika*) are possible: there may be generosity without there being virtue, etc. These four alternatives apply in turn (*yathāyogam*) to the other virtues in the same way as to generosity. [144b17]

5. Comm. Bh 355b27-355c15, bh 200a4-200b7, U 420b28-420c11, u 307b5-308a3.

“As a result of what nature is generosity, etc., called virtue? Ordinary people, śrāvakas as well, etc., are also familiar with generosity; this is why it is absolutely necessary to clarify what nature makes generosity a virtue.” (Bh)

ii) Excellence in resource: “Not everyone puts to work all inner (*ādhyātmika*) and outer (*bāhya*) resources. Only the bodhisattva can put them to work.” (Bh) – “By generosity, etc., one gives (*parityāga*) all kinds of inner and outer resources.” (U)

(iv) “*Because they are contained in nonconceptual wisdom.* Thus generosity is triply pure (*trimaṇḍalapariśuddha*), because it rejects any concept (*vikalpa*) about the thing given (*deya*), the donor (*dāyaka*) and the receiver (*pratigrāhaka*).” (U) - See Notes to this chapter.

Here are the four envisaged alternatives (*cātuṣkoṭika*): “(a) There can be generosity without there being virtue: generosity lacking the six excellences. (b) There can be virtue without there being generosity: for example, morality provided with the six excellences. (c) There can be generosity and virtue at the same time: generosity endowed with the six excellences. (d) There can be neither generosity nor virtue: for example, morality lacking the six excellences.” (U)

6. Order of the pāramitās.

Why are the virtues given in this order (*anukrama*)? - Because the earlier ones promote the arising of the later ones. [144b19]

6. Comm. Bh 355c18-19, bh is lacking, U 420c14-17, u 308a3-5.

“Because the earlier ones promote the arising of the later ones: the bodhisattva detached from wealth engages in morality (*bhogeṣv asakto hi śīlaṃ samātte*); once into discipline, he becomes patient (*śīlavān kṣamo bhavati*); once patient, he endures adversity and undertakes zeal (*kṣamāvān pratikūlasaho vīryam ārabhate*); having undertaken zeal, he concentrates his mind (*ārabdhavīryaś cittam samādhatte*); having concentrated his mind, he understands correctly (*samāhitacitto yathābhūtaṃ prajñāti*).” (U) Cf. comm. to Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 14.

7. [Etymology of the pāramitās]. What is the etymology (*nirukti*) of these virtues? - By transcending (*paramībhūta*) all the wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*), generosity (*dāna*), etc., of ordinary people (*laukika*), of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, they come to the other shore (*pāramita*): these are the virtues (*pāramitā*).

i) It drives away (*apanayati*) avarice (*mātsarya*) and poverty (*dāridrya*); it brings great wealth (*mahābhoga*) and an accumulation of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*): this is generosity (*dāna*).

ii) It calms (*śamayati*) immorality (*dauḥśīla*) and the bad destinies (*durgati*); it brings good destinies (*sugati*) and the concentrations (*samādhi*): this is morality (*śīla*).

iii) It destroys (*kṣayati*) anger (*kruddhi*) and enmity (*vaira*); it accomplishes good (*kṣemaṅkara*) for self and others (*svapara*): this is patience (*kṣānti*).

iv) It frees (*vimocayati*) from laziness (*kausīdya*), from wrong-doing (*pāpa*) and unwholesome dharmas (*akuśaladharmā*); it ensures the growth (*vṛddhi*) of innumerable wholesome dharmas (*apramāṇakuśaladharmā*): this is zeal (*vīrya*).

v) It drives away (*vidhamati*) distractions (*vikṣepa*); it ensures the return of the mind to itself (*antaścittavihara*); this is meditation (*dhyāna*).

vi) It suppresses all erroneous views (*dr̥ṣṭigata*) and all wrong knowledge (*duṣprajñā*); it understands dharmas correctly and in all ways (*samyak sarvaśo dharmān prajñānti*): this is wisdom (*prajñā*). [144c1]

7. Comm. Bh 356a3-13, bh 200b7-201a5, U 420c28-421a4, u 308a5-308b1.

“The author explains the general etymology (*sāmānyanirukti*): by transcending all the roots of good of ordinary people, of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, they reach (*mita*) the other shore (*pāra*). This is why they are called pāramitā. Pāramitā is synonymous with excellence. Then the author explains the particular etymologies. Thus generosity, at the moment of cause (*hetu*), drives away avarice and poverty; at the moment of fruit (*phala*), it brings great riches and an accumulation of merit. The other specific etymologies are easy to understand.” (u)

8. [Cultivation of the pāramitas]. How should the development (*bhāvanā*) of these virtues be thought of? In brief (*samāsataḥ*), there are five cultivations:

- i) cultivation preparatory to practice (*samudācāra-prayogabhāvanā*),
- ii) development of faith (*adhimuktibhāvanā*),
- iii) development of contemplation (*manasikārabhāvanā*),
- iv) development of skill in means (*upāyakauśalyabhāvanā*),
- v) development of the accomplishment of the virtues to be practiced (*kr̥tyānuṣṭhānabhāvanā*).

For the first four cultivations, see above.

The development of accomplishment of duty: the spontaneous activity of the Buddhas (*anābhogabuddhakriyā*) is uninterrupted (*asamucchinna*); they cultivate the virtues even when their virtues are perfected (*pāramitāparipūrīkāle*).

The development of contemplation consists of cultivating the contemplations of kindness (*āsvādanā*), of sympathetic joy (*anumodanā*) and of rejoicing

(*abhinandanā*), by incorporating (*parigrah-*) them into the six dispositions (*āśaya*): insatiable disposition (*atrptāśya*), disposition lasting for a long time (*dīrghaprabandhāśaya*), joyous disposition (*muditāśaya*), beneficent disposition (*upakārāśaya*), magnanimous disposition (*māhātmyāśaya*) and holy disposition (*kalyāṇāśaya*).

i) (a) Considering all the incalculable periods that extend up until the attainment of supreme complete enlightenment as one single moment, the bodhisattva would like to sacrifice his own body at every moment; filling universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges with the seven jewels, the bodhisattva would like to offer them as a gift to the Tathāgatas: such is his conduct until he is seated on the throne of enlightenment, because the disposition for generosity of the bodhisattva is insatiable (*yad bodhisattva yāvanto 'saṃkhyeyakalpā yair anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhāv abhisambudhyate tāvata ekakṣaṇīkṛtya pratikṣaṇam ātmabhāvaṃ parityajet / evaṃ ca gaṅgānadīvālukāsamān lokadhātūn saptaratnaparipūrṇān kṛtvā tathāgatānāṃ pratipādayed ā bodhimaṇḍaṇiṣadanāt/ atrpta eva bodhisattvasya dānāśaya iti*. - For the same length of time, at every moment, he would wish to adopt the four postures in the trichiliomegachiliocosm filled with fire; even deprived of every resource, he would wish to keep the thought of morality - patience - zeal - meditation - wisdom in his mind: such is his conduct until he is seated on the throne of enlightenment, for the bodhisattva's disposition for morality - patience - zeal- meditation - wisdom is insatiable. Such is the bodhisattva's insatiable disposition (*yat tāvatkālam eva trisāhasramahā-sahāsralokadhātāv agniparipūrṇe caturvidham īryāpathaṃ kalpayet / evaṃ ca sarvopakaraṇavisamyukto 'pi śīlakṣāntivīryadhyānaprajñācittaṃ sākṣātkuryād ā bodhimaṇḍaṇiṣadanāt / atrpta eva bodhisattvasya śīlakṣāntivīryadhyānaprajñāśaya iti / ayaṃ bodhisattvasyātrptāśayaḥ*).

(b) Until he sits on the throne of enlightenment, the bodhisattva does not abandon this insatiable disposition. Such is his long-enduring disposition (*yad bodhisattvas tam atrptāśayam ā bodhimaṇḍaṇiṣadanān na sraṃsayatīti / ayaṃ tasya dīrghaprabandhāśayaḥ*).

(c) By helping beings by means of the six virtues, the bodhisattva is more joyful than the beings whom he has helped. It is not the same for the latter. Such is the bodhisattva's joyful disposition (*muditatarāś ca bodhisattvo bhavati śadbhiḥ pāramitābhiḥ sattvān upakurvan / na tv eva te sattvā upakriyamāṇā iti / ayaṃ bodhisattvasya muditāśayaḥ*).

(d) The bodhisattva considers the beings whom he helps by means of the six virtues as more beneficent than himself, and thinks of himself as less beneficent than them. Such is the beneficent disposition of the bodhisattva (*upakārakatarāṃś ca bodhisattvas tān sattvān ātmanaḥ samanupaśyati / yeṣāṃ tathā śadbhiḥ pāramitābhir upakaroti nātmānam iti / ayaṃ bodhisattvasya upakārāśayaḥ*).

(e) The bodhisattva applies all the roots of good that he has thus accumulated by means of these six virtues to beings so that they may obtain the reward they wish for. Such is the bodhisattva's magnanimous disposition (*yad bodhisattva evaṃ śatpāramitopacitakuśalamūlāni sattveṣv iṣṭaphalavipākatvena pariṇāmayatīti / ayaṃ bodhisattvasya mähātmyāśayaḥ*).

(f) The bodhisattva shares all the roots of good that he has thus accumulated by means of the six virtues among all beings and applies them to supreme complete enlightenment. Such is the holy disposition of the bodhisattva (*yad bodhisattva evaṃ śatpāramitopacitakuśalamūlāni sarvasattvasādhāraṇāni kṛtvānuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau pariṇāmayatīti / ayaṃ bodhisattvasya kalyāṇāśayaḥ*).

This is how the bodhisattva cultivates the contemplation of kindness (*āsvādanāmanasikāra*) incorporated (*parigrhīta*) into the six dispositions.

ii) The bodhisattva is in agreement with (*anumodate*) the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*) of the innumerable bodhisattvas who devote themselves to developing these six dispositions. This is how the bodhisattva cultivates the contemplation of sympathetic joy (*anumodanāmanasikāra*) incorporated into the six dispositions.

iii) Finally, the bodhisattva rejoices in seeing all beings cultivate the six virtues contained in these six dispositions (*sarvasattvānāṃ ṣaṭpāramitābhāvanāṃ ṣaḍāśayaparighītām abhinandati*) and wishes that he himself will never abandon the development of these six virtues as long as he is not seated on the throne of enlightenment (cf. H). This is how the bodhisattva cultivates the contemplation of rejoicing (*abhinandanāmanasikāra*) incorporated in the six virtues.

All who hear about the development of contemplation (*manasikārabhāvanā*) by the bodhisattva - a development incorporated in the six dispositions - and who produce a mind of faith (*śraddhācitta*), acquire infinite merit (*apramāṇapuṇya*) and destroy all the obstacles of their wrong-doings (*duṣkṛtāvaraṇa*). What then could be said of the bodhisattvas themselves?

[145a11]

8. Comm. Bh 356b24-356c10, bh 201a5-201b5, U 421b14-421c23, u 308b1-309b1.

“Cultivation (*bhāvana*) is repeated practice (*abhyāsa*). There are five kinds of cultivation:

i) *Cultivation prepratory to practice*: This is the non-erroneous practice (*aviparītāpravṛtti*) of generosity, etc. A stanza says: That donor (*dānapati*) is excellent who, endowed with faith (*śraddhāvanta*), gives with respect (*satkṛtya*), at the desired time (*kāle*), with his own hand (*svahastena*), etc. (Cf. Kośa, IV, p. 235; Aṅguttara, III, p. 172: *saddhāya dānaṃ deti, sakkaccaṃ det, kālena dānaṃ, anuggahitacitto dānaṃ deti, attānañ ca parañ ca anupahacca dānaṃ deti*) ...

ii) *The development of aspiration* is to produce aspiration (*adhimukti*) by means of faith (*śraddhā*) and zeal (*chanda*), by adhering trustfully (*abhisampratyaya*) to the holy doctrine (*āryadeśanā*) of the Buddha, and by showing zeal (*chanda*). A stanza says: Even though he may be unable to benefit, he adheres to the Buddha's doctrine. Endowed with faith and zeal, his good intentions (*āśaya*) are always active and know no laziness (*kausīdya*).

iii) *The development of contemplation* is the cultivation contained in the contemplations of acceptance (*āsvādanā*), approbation (*anumodanā*) and rejoicing (*abhinandanā*), as was said above (§ 1).

iv) *The development of skillfulness in means* is the development contained in nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*), as was said above (§ 5).

v) *The development of accomplishment of the virtues to be practiced*: The virtues are complete (*parpūrna*) in the Tathāgatas. But for the welfare of others (*parārtha*) and by the power of an earlier vow (*pūrvapraṇidhānānvedha*), they practice the virtues of generosity, etc., that they have to practice effortlessly (*anābhoga*) and according to feasibility (*yathākalpam*).” (U)

The end of the paragraph is modeled after the commentary on the Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 16.

9. [Subdivisions of the pāramitās]. What are the subdivisions of these virtues? -

Each is of three types:

- i) (1) Generosity of the Dharma (*dharmadanā*), (2) material generosity (*āmiṣadāna*) and (3) generosity of safety (*abhayaadāna*).
- ii) (1) Morality of abstention (*saṃvaraśīla*), (2) morality of collecting the wholesome dharmas (*kuśaladharmasaṃgrāhakaśīla*) and (3) morality for the service of others (*sattvārthakriyāśīla*).
- iii) (1) Patience to bear abuse (*apakāramarṣaṇakṣāntī*), (2) patience to accept suffering (*duḥkhādhivāsanākṣāntī*) and (3) patience to contemplate the Dharma (*dharmanidhyāna-kṣāntī*).
- iv) (1) Zeal with which to arm oneself (*saṃnāhavīrya*), (2) zeal to exert oneself (*prayogavīrya*) and (3) zeal without timidity, stepping back or satiety (*akīnam akṣobhyam asaṃtuṣṭi vīryam*).
- v) (1) Meditation of abiding (*vihāradhyāna*), (2) meditation of production (*abhinirhāradhyāna*) and (3) meditation for the service of others (*sattvārthakriyadhyāna*).

vi) (1) Preparatory nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpikā prāyogikā prajñā*), (2) fundamental nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpikā prajñā*) and (3) subsequent nonconceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpikā pṛṣṭhalabdhā prajñā*).

[145a19]

9. Comm. Bh 356c20-357a27, bh 201b5-202b7, U 422a3-422b4, u 309b1-310a5.

“Each virtue is subdivided into three types and the author explains their specific characteristics.

i) (1) *Generosity of the Dharma (dharmadāna)*: to preach the law, the sūtras, etc. with an undefiled mind (*akliṣṭacitta*). Generosity of the Dharma serves to strengthen (*upastambha*) the roots of good in others.

(2) *Material generosity (āmiṣadāna)*: to offer vital provisions (*jīvitapariṣkāraparityāga*) with an undefiled mind. Material generosity serves to strengthen the body (*kāya*) of others.

(3) *Generosity of safety*: to stop violent people (*ghātakanivāraṇa*) and to save timid people (*bhīruparitrāṇa*).

Generosity of the Dharma serves to strengthen (*upastambha*) the roots of good (*kuṣalamūla*) in others; material generosity serves to strengthen the body of others, and generosity of safety serves to strengthen the minds (*citta*) of others.

ii) (1) *Morality of abstention (saṃvaraśīla)*: to engage in abstaining from unwholesome dharmas (*akuṣaladharmasaṃvarasamādāna*). Insofar as it abstains from evil (*pāpa*), from unwholesome actions of body, speech, etc., (*akuṣalakāyavāgādikarma*), it is abstention (*saṃvara*), and this abstention is a discipline (*śīla*). It supports the following two moralities, because by abstaining, one is able to cultivate the roots of good (*kuṣalamūla*) such as worship of the Buddha (*buddhapūjana*), etc., and do good for others (*sattvārthakriyā*).

(2) *Morality collecting wholesome dharmas (kuṣaladharmasaṃgrāhakaśīla)*: serves to acquire all the attributes of the Buddha (*buddhadharma*) such as the powers (*bala*), the fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), etc.

(3) *Morality for the service of others (sattvārthakriyāśīla)*: supporting the activity of beings in conformity with the Dharma, sharing irreproachable actions equally (*niravadyakarma*), it ripens (*vipācayati*) beings.

iii) (1) *Patience to bear abuses (apahāramarṣaṅakṣānti)*: the cause for the maturation of beings (*sattvavipākapravṛttihetu*).

(2) *Patience to accept suffering (duḥkhadhivāsanākṣānti)*: the cause for the quality of Buddha because, without withdrawing, it bears the various sufferings, e.g., cold (*śīta*), heat (*uṣṇa*), hunger (*bubhiskṣā*) thirst (*pipāsā*). -

(3) *Patience to contemplate the Dharma (dharmanidhyānakṣānti)*: the basis (*āśraya*) for the two preceding patiences. It is the patience with regard to the profound (*gambhīra*) and vast (*vipula*) Dharma.

iv) (1) *Zeal to arm oneself (saṃnāhavīrya)*: at the beginning, one encourages oneself by saying: "I am going to do something." This explains the first word of the sūtra (Dīgha, III, p. 237, etc.; commentary to Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 68), 'Sthānavān', i.e., vigorous.

(2) *Zeal to exert oneself (prayogavīrya)*: at the time of acting (*prayoga*), to develop the effort conforming to aspirations (*yathāśayam*). This explains the next word of the sūtra, 'Vīryavān', i.e., energetic.

(3) *Zeal without timidity, stepping back or satiety (alīnam akṣibhyam asaṃtuṣṭi vīryam, cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 68b)*: not to abandon the action undertaken in conformity with one's aspirations until one sits on the throne of enlightenment (*ā bodhimaṇḍaniṣadanāt*). It is without timidity (*alīna*) because it does not step back in the face of fatigue; it is without withdrawal because its courage does not yield before the insults of another (*parāpakāra*); it is insatiable (*asaṃtuṣṭa*) because in the interval leading up to enlightenment, it energetically develops the wholesome (*kuśalapakha*) without yielding to laziness (*kausīdya*). These three expressions, respectively, explain the words of the sūtra: 'Utsāhi dṛdhaparākramo anikṣiptadhuraḥ kuśalehu dharmeṣu', i.e., courageous, firm in its march, not rejecting the the yoke of accomplishing wholesome dharmas.

v) (1) *Meditation of abiding (vihāradhyāna)*: it aims at attaining a present fortunate abode (*dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra*). Free of pride (*māna*), wrong views (*dṛṣṭi*) and thirst (*trṣṇā*), it is pure (*śuddha*).

(2) *Meditation of production (abhinirhāradhyāna)*: aims at producing higher qualities (*guṇa*), such as the superknowledges (*abhijñā*), etc.

(3) *Meditation of accomplishing duty (kṛtyānuṣṭhānadhyāna)*: aims at rendering service (*arthakriyā*) to all categories of beings because it suppresses (*nivṛṇoti*) the sufferings of famine (*durbhikṣa*), sickness (*vyādhi*), fear (*bhaya*), etc.

vi) (1) *Preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpikā prāyogikā prajñā)*: precedes realization (*abhisamaya*); it is the knowledge of superior means (*upāyajñāna*).

(2) *Properly called nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpikā prajñā)*: the knowledge of *abhisamaya*.

(3) *Subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpikā pṛṣṭhalabdhā prajñā)*: follows *abhisamaya*; it is a conventional cognition (*saṃvṛttijñāna*) giving rise to all kinds of predictions, etc. (*nānādharmadeśanāsamutthāpaka*).” (U) - For this threefold wisdom, see chap. VIII.

10. [Content of the pāramitās]. What is the content of these virtues (tāsaṃ saṃgrahaḥ kathaṃ draṣṭavyaḥ)? - These virtues contain (saṃgrhṇanti) all the wholesome dharmas (kuśaladharmā) insofar as they have virtue as their nature (lakṣaṇa); they promote (ānulomika) the virtues and are their outcome (niṣyanda). [145a21]

10. Comm. Bh 357b1-8, bh 202b8-203a3, U 422b6-18, u 310a6-310b3.

"*What is the content of these virtues?* It is asked how these virtues (*pāramitā*) and the wholesome dharmas (*kuśaladharmā*) are mutually inclusive (*anyonyasaṃgrhīta*). *Because they include all the good dharmas*: i.e., the virtues suffice to include all the good dharmas and in turn these good dharmas include the virtues. Here, by wholesome dharmas is meant all the factors of awakening (*bodhipāḥṣikadharmā*). *They have virtue as their nature*: thus, faith (*śraddhā*), truth (*praśrabdhi*), etc., promote virtue. *They are its result*: thus, the six superknowledges (*abhijñā*), the ten powers (*bala*) and the other qualities (*guṇa*) are derived from the virtues.” (Bh)

11. [Vices opposing the pāramitās]. How do the vices opposing (*vipakṣa*) the virtues include (*saṃgrhṇanti*) all the defilements (*saṃkleśa*)? – Insofar as they have these vices as their nature (*lakṣaṇa*), that they are their cause (*hetu*) and their fruit (*phala*). [145a23]

11. Comm. Bh 357b11-15, bh 203a3-6, U 422b20-24, u 310b3-5.

“The vices opposing (*vipakṣa*) the virtues are avarice (*mātsarya*), immorality (*dauḥśīla*), anger (*krodha*), laziness (*kausīdya*), distraction (*vikṣepa*) and faulty wisdom (*duṣprajñā*).” (U)

“Having explained how the virtues include all the pure dharmas (*śukladharma*), the author is now going to explain how the vices opposing these virtues include all the defiled dharmas (*saṃkleśikadharmā*). *The defilements have these vices as their nature*: they have desire (*rāga*), etc. as their characteristic. *They are the cause of these vices*: they are the cause of avarice, etc.; i.e., lack of faith (*aśraddhā*), wrong views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*), etc., are the cause of avarice, etc. *They are the fruit of these vices*: they are the fruit of avarice, immorality, anger, etc.” (Bh)

12. [Benefits of the pāramitās]. What are the benefits (*anusamsa*) of these virtues? - In the course of transmigration (*saṃsāra*), the bodhisattvas take possession (*parigrhṇanti*) of the following benefits: mastery (*aiśvarya*), high birth (*mahājanma*), great entourage of followers and servants (*mahāpakṣaparijana*), successful efforts in a great work (*mahākarmānte*), absence of torment (*anupaghāta*) and the weak afflictions (*mṛdukleśa*), skill in the arts, letters and classical sciences (*śilpaśāstra-vidyāsthānakauśalya*): this happiness (*abhyudaya*) is impeccable (*niravadya*), lasts until the attainment of the throne of enlightenment (*ā bodhimaṇḍaniṣadanāt*), is devoted to the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārthakriyopasthita*); it constitutes the benefits of the bodhisattvas. {145b1}a

12. Comm. Bh 357b23-357c1, bh 203a6-203b1, U 422c2-17, u 310b5-311a4.

“Now the author will explain the benefits (*anūsamsa*) and the qualities (*guṇa*) of the virtues. *Mastery* (*aiśvarya*) is the advantage coming from the virtue of generosity (*dānapāramitā*). The final phrase: '*this happiness is impeccable*' up to: '*and constitutes the benefits of the bodhisattva*' should be applied to the entire passage. - *High birth* (*mahājanma*) is the benefit coming from the virtue of morality (*śīlapāramitā*). High birth means a good destiny (*sugati*). - *Great entourage of followers and servants* (*mahāpakṣaparijana*) is the benefit coming from the virtue of patience (*kṣāntipāramitā*). *Follower* (*pakṣa*) is synonymous with *family* (*kuṭumba*) and *servant* (*parijana*) is synonymous with server (*dāsa*). - *Success in efforts in a great work* (*mahākarmānte prayogasiddhiḥ*) is the benefit coming from the virtue of zeal (*vīryapāramitā*). The *great work* (*mahākarmānta*) is that of a cakravartin, etc. The efforts (*prayatna*) dedicated to it are called *prayoga*. The resultant success (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*) is called *siddhi* because the benefit which it brings encounters no obstacles (*apratigha*). - *Absence of torment and weak passions* are the benefit coming from the virtue of meditation (*dhyānapāramitā*) because meditation weakens (*vidhamati*) the power (*prabhāva*) of the torments and passions. - *Skill in the arts, letters and classical sciences* (*śilpaśāstravidyāsthānakauśalya*) is the benefit coming from the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*).” (U) – “*This happiness is impeccable*: this is not so for the heretics (*tīrthika*); they have happiness but it is reprehensible (*sāvadya*). Moreover, their happiness is transitory (*anitya*) whereas the fruits of the virtues are eternal; it is affirmed that they last until the attainment of the throne of enlightenment (*ā bodhimaṇḍaṇiṣadanāt*). Furthermore, in the heretics, happiness is concerned solely with personal interest (*svārtha*) and not with the interest of all beings (*parārtha*); they are not dedicated to the service of all beings. By contrast, the marvelous fruits which come from the virtues *are dedicated to the service of all beings* (*sarvasattvārthakriyopasthita*). Thus the virtues bear fruits of marvellous benefits, irreproachable fruits, etc.” (Bh)

13. [Mutual inclusion of the pāramitās]. How is the mutual inclusion (*anyonyaviniścaya*) of these virtues to be understood? The Bhagavat designated all the virtues sometimes by the name of generosity (*dāna*), sometimes by the name of morality (*śīla*), sometimes by the name of patience (*kṣānti*), sometimes

by the name of zeal (*vīrya*), sometimes by the name of meditation (*dhyāna*) and sometimes by the name of wisdom (*prajñā*). What was his intention (*saṃdhi*)? - He wanted to say that, in the practice (*prayoga*) of each virtue, there is the intervention of all the virtues. [145b8]

13. Comm. Bh 357c10-16, bh 203b1-4, U 422c24-423a7, u 311a4-311b1.

“In the Trimśatikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra it is said: When one speaks of one virtue, one is speaking of all the virtues. What does that mean? It means that in the practice of one single virtue, all the other virtues are involved. Thus, when one practices generosity (*dāna*), one disciplines (*saṃvṛ-*) the body (*kāya*) and the speech (*vāc*); thus there is the involvement of the virtue of morality (*śīla*), and so on up to: when one practices generosity, one understands the cause (*hetu*) and the fruit (*phala*); thus there is the involvement of the virtue of wisdom (*prajñā*). It is the same for the other involvements.”
(Bh)

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Preliminary Note.

References on the pāramitās:

In the Hīnayāna: *dasa pāramīyo*, Jātaka, I, p. 73 (32); *Cariyāpiṭaka*, collection of short tales illustrating the seven pāramitā, trans. B. C. Law, *Anthologies of the Pāli Canon*, III, 1938, p. 95 sq.; R. C. Childers, *Dict of Pāli*, s.v. pāramī, p. 334 sq.; B. C. Law, *Concepts of Buddhism*, 1938, p. 5; Mahāvastu (with many examples from the Jātakas), III, p. 226 (2) seq.; Lalitavisatara, p. 2 (5), 8 (2), 34 (29) seq., 274 (21), 414 (19), 427 (17), 435 (10).; numerous examples of the virtues in Jātakamālā, Avadānaśataka, Avadānakalpalatā; Divya, p. 95, 127, 490; Kośa, IV, p. 11, 231; VIII, p. 78, 82.

In the Mahāyāna: Mahāvvyut. 913-924; Dharmasaṃgraha, XVII, XVIII; Pañcaviṃśatisahasrikā (ed. N. Dutt), p. 187-190; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 17 seq., 142, 256, 259, 264, 332, etc.; Daśabhūmika, p. 63, 72, 81, 04; Bhadramāyākāra, p. 80. 94, 103; Lañkāvatāra, p. 236 seq.; Saṃdhinir. IX, v. 9-27 (lengthy developments of the first six p., of the last four p., order, subdivisions, name, opposing vices, retribution, defiled p., *visuddhi* shared and special to the p., permanence, *vipākaphala*, *prabhāva*, *hetu*, *phala* and *artha*, *niḥsvabhāva* and p., *pāramitā*, *upapāramitā* and *mahāpāramitā*); Madh. avatāra (treats one p. by means of bhūmi); Śikṣāsam. p. 187 et passim; Bodhicaryāvatāra and Pañjikā entire; Sūtrālamkāra, XVI (with the same subdivisions as the Saṃgraha), Bodh. bhūmi, p. 114-216; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XI and XII, p. 746c17 seq.; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 205-208; Siddhi, p. 620-638.

1. We must distinguish: the cause of entry, namely the improperly-called mundane pāramitās, practiced prior to abhisamaya, before the bhūmis; the fruit of entry, namely the properly-called virtues of the supramundane (*lokottara*) state, purified by means of nirvikalpakajñāna and cultivated in the bhūmis. On this subject:

Bodhicaryāvatārapañjika, p. 345 (8-10): *evam ete dānādayaḥsatkṛtya saṃbhṛtā api prajñam antareṇa na saugatapapādhigamahetavo bhavanti n api pāramitāvyadeśaṃ labhante. prajñakṛtapariśuddhobhājah puṇar avyāhatodārapravṛttitayā tadanūkala, anuvartamānās taddhetubhāvam adhiḡacchanti. pāramitānāmadhheyam ca labhante.*

Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 204 (22): *prathamāyāṃ bhūmau dharmadhātoḥ sarvatragatvābodhāl lokoyyatāḥ pāramitāḥ pratilabhante. pūrvām tu prathamabhṃuiprayogasamgrhītā laukikā evety ataḥ prathamāyāṃ bhūmau pratilambhaparamatety ucyate.*

Comm. on Nāmasaṃgīti, cited in Siddhi, p. 627: *ete dānādayaḥ saṃbodhicittapūrvakāḥ sarvasattveṣu maitrāśayapariṇamitāḥ pāramitānāma labhante. tāḥ punar laukikā lokottarāś ca. tatrānivāritātmāadyupalambhā laukikāḥ. skandhādiṣv anātmādyadhimokṣapravṛttāḥ tattvādhigama-paribhāvitāś ca.* - See also Madh. avatāra, p. 30-31. Also the distinction between upapāramitā and pāramitā in Saṃdhinir. IX, v. 27; Lañkāvatāra, p. 236-237; Siddhi, p. 637.

2. Each supramundane virtue is itself incorporated into the excellent pure proclivity: *śuddhādhyāśaya*. This proclivity is a quality of the bodhisattva in the first seven bhūmis (Sūtrālamkāra, IV, 2). The bodhisattva who possesses it is *madhyapāka* (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 86 (5)). It is of five types (Sūtrālamkāra, XX, 6) or of fifteen types (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 313 (7) sq.). It constitutes the sixth *paramatā* of the pāramitās (below, § 5). It is essentially altruistic (*sarvasattvahitasukhādhyāśaya*).

4. The number of the p. is fixed at six for many reasons: Saṃdhanir., IX, v. 9, no. 4 (two reasons); Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 2-7 (six reasons: *asamkleśam aviparītakṛtyārambhaṃ cādihikṛtya, parārtham ātmārtham cārabhya, sakalaparārthādhikārat, samastamahāyanasamgrahādhikar at, sarvākāramārgādhikārāt, śikṣātrayaṃ adihikṛtya*); Siddhi, p. 627 (four reasons).

5. Paragraph reproduced textually, with the indication of its author (*ity āryāsaṅgaḥ*), by Haribhadra in his Abhisamayālamkāraloka, ed. Wogihara, p. 245 (23). It is a question of the six excellences (*paramatā*) of the p.

The fourth *paramatā*, upāyakaśalya, has the effect of making the p. triply pure (*trimaṇḍalapariśuddhaka*) by incorporating them into the nirvikalpakajñāna. Thus the generosity of the bodhisattva is triply pure because he makes no distinction between the gift given (*deya*), the donor (*dāyaka*) and the recipient (*pratigrāhaka*). On *trimaṇḍalapariśuddhi* or *trikoṭīśuddhi*, cf. Mahāvvyut., 2547: Śatasāhasrikā P.P., p. 92 (5) - 93 (1); Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, p. 264 (16-22); Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, st. 168; - Saṃpañjikā, p. 604 (5-6); Uttaratantra, p. 120, 254; Siddhi, p. 629 n.; Saṃgraha, below, chap. VII, § 9, no. 1. - Cf. Kośa, IV, p. 234-238.

Siddhi, p. 626, has seven *paramatās* instead of six: *pratiṣṭhā-*, *āśraya-*, *adhyāśaya-*, *vastu-*, *upāyakaśalya-*, *pariṇāma-*, *pariśuddhi-*. Cf. the seven *paramatās* of the Paramā bodhiḥ, Bodh. bhūmi, p. 89 (12).

Twelve *paramatās* in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 202-209: *audārya-*, *āyatatva-*, *adhikāra-*, *nairantaryā-*, *akṛcchratva-*, *vittatva-*, *parigraha-*, *ārambha-*, *pratilambha-*, *niṣyanda-*, *niṣpatti-*.

6. Order of the p.: Saṃdhanir., IX, v. 11; Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 214; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XI, p. 747b26; Siddhi, p. 628.

7. Etymology of the p.: Kośa, IV, p. 231; Madh. avatāra, p. 30; Saṃdhanir., IX, v. 13; Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 15; Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XI, p. 747c21 seq.; Siddhi, p. 628. – F. W. Thomas, JRAS, 1904, p. 547.

8. Cultivation of the p. Two theories presenting some differences: on the one hand, the Saṃgraha, on the other hand the Sūtrālamkāra, XVI, 16, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XII, p. 748b21 seq. and Siddhi, p. 629. The Sūtrālamkāra distinguishes:

- i. *upadhisamṇisritā* bhāvanā which is fourfold: *hetu-*, *vipāka-*, *praṇidhāna-*, *pratisamṅkyānasamṇisritā*.
- ii. *manasikārasamṇisritā* bhāvanā which is fourfold: *manasikāra* being of *adhimukti*, of *āsvādanā*, of *anumodanā* and of *abhinandanā* cf. Saṃgraha).
- iii. *āśayasamṇisritā* bhāvanā which is sixfold: the *āśaya* being *atṛpta*, *vipula*, of *muditā*, *upakāra*, *nirlepa* and *kalyāṇa* (cf. Saṃgraha).
- iv. *upāyasamṇisritā* bhāvanā which is threefold, each virtue before being triply pure (*trimaṇḍalapariśuddhi*).
- v. *vibhūtvamṇisritā* bhāvanā which is threefold: *kāya-*, *caryā-* and *deśanāvubhūtvā*.

For more information, see Siddhi, p. 629.

9. Subdivisions of the p.:

Division into three types (with some differences): Dharmasaṃgraha CV-CX; Saṃdhinir., IX, § 12; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 17-18 (*dāna*); XVI, 37 (*śīla*); XVI, 38 (*kṣānti*); xvi, 39, 68 (*vīrya*); XVI, 25 (*dhyāna*); XVI, 27 (*praññā*); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 200-201 (*vīrya*); p. 207 (10) (*dhyāna*); p. 212 (*praññā*); Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XII, p. 749c3-10); Siddhi, p. 620-624 (p. 621, correct *alīna*, *avivartya*, *analaṃtā* to *alīna*, *akṣobya*, *asaṃtuṣṭivīrya*).

Division into seven types: Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XII, p. 749c23-750a6.

Other subdivisions in Bodh, bhūmi.

Vīrya is always defined by the sūtra: *Sthānavān kuṣaleṣu dharmeṣu*. This sūtra is found everywhere: Dīgha, III, p. 237, 268, 285; Majjhima, I, p. 356; II, p. 95, 128; Samyutta, V, p. 197 seq.; Aṅguttara, I p. 117, 244-246; III, p. 2, 11, 65, 152 seq.; IV, p. 3, 110, 153 seq., 234, 352-353, 357; V, 15, 24, 27-28; Udāna, p. 36; Sūtrālaṃkāra, ad XVI, 68; Siddhi, p. 330. – Cf. W. Geiger, Pāli Dhamma, 1920, p. 111.

10. Content of the p.: Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 29; Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XII, p. 750a7 seq.

11. Vices opposing the p.: Saṃdhinir. IX, § 14; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 30-36 (seven *sakti* opposite to each p.); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 94-96; Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1606, k. XII, p. 750a25.

12. Benefits of the p., Saṃdhinir., IX, 15; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 36-70; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XII, p. 750a29 seq.; Siddhi, p. 630.

13. Mutual inclusion of the p.: Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 71; Siddhi, p. 630.

Excluding any error, the Triśatikā P.P. cited here by the Bāṣya, cannot be found either in the original or in Chinese or Tibetan translation. It is mentioned in Mahāvyut. no. 1374 and in the Nāmasaṅgiti, cf. P. Vaidya, Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuṣṣataka, 1923, p. 44.

CHAPTER V

THE VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS OF CAUSE AND FRUIT

(*hetuphalabhāvanaprababheda*)

1. A) In Chapter IV the cause and result of entry into the characteristics of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśahetuphala*) has been explained. How should the diverse cultivations (*bhāvanāprababheda*) of this cause and fruit be understood? - As the ten stages (*bhūmi*) of the bodhisattva. What are they?

- i) *Pramuditā bhūmiḥ*, the joyous level.
- ii) *Vimalā bhūmiḥ*, the stainless level.
- iii) *Prabhākarī bhūmiḥ*, the shining level.
- iv) *Arciṣmatī bhūmiḥ*, the blazing-wisdom level.
- v) *Sudurjayā bhūmiḥ*, the difficult to conquer level.
- vi) *Abhimukhī bhūmiḥ*, the revealed level.
- vii) *Dūraṅgamā bhūmiḥ*, the far-gone level.
- viii) *Acalā bhūmiḥ*, the immovable level.
- ix) *Sādhumatī bhūmiḥ*, the excellent-intelligence level
- x) *Dharmameghā bhūmiḥ*, the cloud of Dharma level.

B) Why is their number fixed as ten? - Because they counteract (*pratipakṣa*) the ten opposing (*vipakṣa*) kinds of ignorance (*avidyā*). In fact, ten kinds of ignorance arise opposing the tenfold dharmadhātu that is to be known (*daśavidha jñeyadharmadhātu*).

What is the tenfold dharmadhātu that is to be known?

- i) In the first *bhūmi*, the dharmadhātu should be known as universal reality (*sarvatragārtha*).

- ii) In the second bhūmi, as excellent reality (*agrārtha*).
- iii) In the third bhūmi, as reality with excellent outcome (*niṣyandāgrārtha*).
- iv) In the fourth bhūmi, as ungraspable reality (*aparigrahārtha*).
- v) In the fifth bhūmi, as reality with no difference in series (*saṃtānābhinnārtha*).
- vi) In the sixth bhūmi, as reality beyond defilement and purification (*niḥsaṃkleśaviśuddhyārtha*).
- vii) In the seventh bhūmi, as reality free from multiplicity (*anānātvārtha*).
- viii) In the eighth bhūmi, as reality free from decrease and increase (*anapacayopacayārtha*), as reality supporting mastery of characteristics (*nimittavaśitāśrayārtha*) and as reality supporting mastery of the buddhafields (*kṣetravaśitāśrayārtha*).
- ix) In the ninth bhūmi, as reality supporting mastery of knowledges (*jñānavaśitāśrayārtha*).
- x) In the tenth bhūmi, as reality supporting mastery of action (*karmavaśitāśrayārtha*) and as reality supporting mastery of dhāraṇīmukha and samādhimukha (*dhāraṇīsamādhimukha-vaśitāśrayārtha*).

Here are some stanzas (cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, kārikā XIV-XVI, p. 97 seq):

- a) Universal reality and excellent reality, reality with excellent outcome, ungraspable reality, reality with no difference in series,
- b) Reality beyond defilement and purification, reality free of multiplicity, reality free of decrease and increase and support of the fourfold mastery.
- c) The ignorances relative to the dharmadhātu constitute the ten undefiled obstacles (*akliṣṭāvaraṇa*). The bhūmis counteract the ignorances opposing the ten bhūmis.

These ignorances are undefiled (*akliṣṭa*) for the śrāvakas but defiled (*kliṣṭa*) for the bodhisattvas. [145c13]

1. Comm. Bh 358a16-358c1, bh 203b4-204b4, U 423b6-424a2, u 311b1-312b8.

“Questions and answers relating to the various cultivations of the cause and result. What is the tenfold dharmadhātu that is to be known? *In the first bhūmi, it should be known as universal reality ... and in the tenth, as reality supporting mastery of action and mastery of dhāraṇī- and samādhi-mukha.* Being of ten types, this dharmadhātu is to be known (*jñeya*); that is why it is called the tenfold dharmadhātu to be understood (*daśavidha jñeyadharmadhātu*). In each bhūmi there is a special dharmadhātu to be understood but the power of ignorance does not allow it to be known. In order to counteract these ignorances, the ten bhūmis are established. The opposing obstacles (*vipakṣāvaraṇa*) being of ten types, ten bhūmis are established. What are these ten opposing obstacles?

(1) *Prthagjanatva*, the quality of the ordinary person.

(2) *Mithyāpratipatti*, bad behavior in respect to beings: reprehensible physical acts, etc.

(3) *Dhandhatva*, slowness or failure of memory (*muṣitasmṛtitā*) in regard to the dharmas of hearing (*śruta*), contemplating (*cintā*) and meditating (*bhāvanā*).

(4) *Sūkṣmakleśasamudācāra*, the activity of subtle desire coming from the erroneous innate view of self (*sahajasatkāyadr̥ṣṭisamgrhīta*). Since this desire is of a lower category, since it is not the object of a spontaneous act of attention (*manasikāra*) and since it has been practiced for such a long time, it is subtle (*sūkṣma*).

(5) *Hīnayānaparinirvāṇa*, complacency with the nirvāṇa of the Lesser Vehicle.

(6) *Sthūlanimittasamudācāra*, adhering to the existence of the coarse marks of defilement and purification.

(7) *Sūkṣmanimittasamudācāra*, adhering to the existence of the subtle marks of arising and cessation.

(8) *Nirmittābhisaṅskāra*, the need for the practice of will in order to produce contemplation free of concept.

(9) *Sattvārthakriyānabhisamskāra*, the lack of application in the service of beings,

(10) *Dharmeṣu vaśitāpratilambhaḥ*, the absence of mastery of the dharmas. [For the exact meaning of these technical terms, cf. Siddhi, p. 639 seq.]

In Tibetan, these ten obstacle-ignorances are: (1) *so soḥi skye bo ñid*; (2) *bden pa la lus la sogs pas phyin ci log tu sgrub pa*; (3) *bul ba ñid*; (4) *ñons moñs pa phra ba kun tu rgyi ba*; (5) *theg pa dman pas mya ñan las ḥdah ba*; (6) *mtshan ma rgya chen po la kun tu spyod pa*; (7) *mtshan ma phra mo la kun tu spyod pa*; (8) *mtshan ma med par mñon par ḥdu byed pa*; (9) *sems can gyi don byed pa la mñon par ḥdu byed pa med pa*; (10) *thob par byad baḥi chos la gtso bor bya med pa*].

(i) *Sarvatragārtha*: this dharmadhātu of the first bhūmi is omnipresent because there is no dharma that is non-substantial (*anātman*). The person who knows this enters into the first bhūmi.

(ii) *Agrārtha*: this dharmadhātu of the second bhūmi is excellent in all its qualities. The person who knows this enters into the second bhūmi.

(iii) *Niṣyandārtha*: The doctrine (*deśanā*) of the Greater Vehicle which follows from this dharmadhātu of the third bhūmi is excellent. The person who knows this enters into the third bhūmi.

(iv) *Aparigrahārtha*: this dharmadhātu of the fourth bhūmi cannot be conceived of as 'mine' (*ātmiya*) or taken as one's own; it is like an individual from Uttarakuru who cannot be imprisoned. When one attains (*adhiḡama*) this dharmadhātu, one cannot say "It is mine." The person who knows this enters into the fourth bhūmi.

(v) *Samtānābhinnārtha*: in this dharmadhātu of the fifth bhūmi there is no difference in nature; it is like the eye, etc., which, in the various series of beings (*sattvasamtānaviśeṣa*) separately, shows no differences. The person who knows this enters into the fifth bhūmi.

(vi) *Niḥsaṃkleśavisuddhyārtha*: in this dharmadhātu of the sixth bhūmi there is no defilement from the beginning because it is naturally nondefiled (*akliṣṭa*). Since it is not at first defiled, it is not later purified. The person who knows this enters into the sixth bhūmi.

(vii) *Anānātvārtha*: although the texts, sūtras, etc., (*sūtrādhidharma*) may have given all kinds of definitions (*vyavasthāna*) for this dharmadhātu of the seventh bhūmi, nevertheless, it is without differences. The person who knows this enters into the seventh bhūmi.

(viii) *Anapacayopacayārtha*: this dharmadhātu of the eighth bhūmi does not diminish when the defilement (*saṃkleśa*) decreases and does not increase when the purity (*viśuddhi*) increases. *Nimittavaśitāśrayārtha*: this dharmadhātu is the support of the mastery over characteristics. The mastery over characteristics that is obtained is called *mastery of marks* because the characteristics of gold, silver, etc., appear at will (*yathākāmam*). - *Kṣetravaśitāśrayārtha*: this dharmadhātu is the support of mastery of the buddhafiels. The mastery which one obtains over the buddhafiels is called *mastery in kṣetra*: if one wishes that the kṣetra be transformed into jewels, etc., it occurs as one wishes (cf. chapter I, v. 60; chapter II, § 14). The person who knows this enters into the eighth bhūmi.

(ix) *Jñānavaśitāśrayārtha*: this dharmadhātu of the ninth bhūmi is the support of the mastery of analytical knowledge (*pratisaṃvid*). [According to U: one realizes the virtue of knowledge (*jñānapāramitā*); with regard to all texts, one does not stick to them literally (*yathārutam*) but one grasps the hidden meaning (*abhisamḍhi*); one ripens all beings correctly and one experiences the supreme happiness of the Dharma.] The person who knows this enters into the ninth bhūmi.

(x) *Karmavaśitāśrayārtha*: this dharmadhātu of the tenth bhūmi is the support of the mastery of action, physical activities, etc. (*kāyadikarman*), and the support of the mastery of dhāraṇi- and samādhi-mukha. The person who knows this enters into the tenth bhūmi.

These ignorances are undefiled in the śrāvakas, because they do not wish to enter into the bhūmis.” (Bh)

2. i) Why is the first bhūmi called Joyous (*pramuditā*)? Because, thanks to it, for the first time (*prathamata eva*) one obtains for the first time the faculty (*sāmarthya*) of ensuring one's own interest and that of others (*svaparārthasiddhi*).

ii) Why is the second bhūmi called Stainless (*vimalā*)? Because it avoids the stains of immorality (*dauḥśīlyamala*).

iii) Why is the third bhūmi called Shining (*prabhākarī*)? Because, with the immutable (*acyuta*) meditative stabilizations (*samādhi*) and absorptions

(*samāpatti*) as support (*āśraya*), it is the support of the great brilliance of the Dharma (*mahādharmaprabhā*).

iv) Why is the fourth bhūmi called Blazing Wisdom (*arcismāti*)? Because the auxiliary dharmas of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣyadharmā*) burn away (*dahanti*) all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇa*).

v) Why is the fifth bhūmi called Difficult to Conquer (*sudurjaya*)? Because it is difficult to realize on account of the mutual opposition between knowledge of the truth (*satyajñāna*) and mundane knowledge (*laukikajñāna*).

vi) Why is the sixth bhūmi called Revealed (*abhimukhī*)? Because it makes the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) present (*abhimukhī*) with the knowledge of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) as support.

vii) Why is the seventh bhūmi called Far-Gone (*dūraṅgamā*)? Because it reaches the end (*niṣthāgata*) of the practice of effort (*prāyogikī caryā*).

viii) Why is the eighth bhūmi called Immovable (*acalā*)? Because it is not disturbed by any sign (*nimitta*) or any exercise of will (*abhisamskaraṇa*).

ix) Why is the ninth bhūmi called Excellent Intelligence (*sādhumāti*)? Because it attains the higher liberated knowledges (*pratisamvijñāna*).

x) Why is the tenth bhūmi called Cloud of Dharma (*dharmameghā*)? Because it attains a combined knowledge of all the dharmas (*samsṛṣṭālabhāna sarvadharmajñāna*) which includes all the dhāraṇi- and samādhi-mukhas, hides (*chādayati*) the broad obstacles (*viśalāvaraṇa*) as the cloud (*megha*) hides space (*ākāśa*) and fulfills (*paripipartī*) the dharmakāya. [145c28]

2. Comm. Bh 358c18-359a19, bh 204b4-205b6, U 424a17-424c3, u 312b8-314a5.

Here the author justifies the use of the terms (*śabdapravṛttihetu*).

“i) *Pramuditā*, Joyous, because, thanks to it, for the first time the faculty of ensuring one's own interest and that of others. At the moment of full realization (*abhisamaya*), the bodhisattvas obtain the higher faculty of ensuring their own personal interest and that of others and thereby experience great joy (*pramoda*). The śrāvakas, etc., who, at the

moment of full realization, obtain only the faculty of ensuring their own personal interest, do not experience such joy; that is why there is no question of the Joyous bhūmi for them. If this joy is absent in the first bhūmi, it will be absent also in the following bhūmis, because it is the first (*pūrvamgama*).

ii) *Vimalā*, Stainless, *because it avoids the stains of immorality*. In this bhūmi, since morality is present naturally (*prakṛtyā*), it avoids all the stains of immorality.

iii) *Prabhākarī*, Shining, *because with the meditative stabilizations and absorptions as support ...* In this bhūmi extraordinary (*adbhuta*) meditative stabilizations are evidenced, the brilliance of knowledge (*jñānaprabhā*) shines forth. Because it illumines the dharmas, it is called blazing (*prabhākarī*). That which does not perish after having been obtained is called immutable (*acyuta*). The meditative stabilizations of the order of concentration (*dhyāna*) are called 'samādhi', the meditative stabilizations of the formless realm (*ārūpya*) are called 'samāpatti'. Or rather, samādhi is the one-pointed fixing of the mind (*cittaikāgratā*) and samāpatti is the concentration (*samādhāna*), the realization (*sākṣātkāra*). This bhūmi is the *support of the great brilliance of the Dharma*: on this bhūmi, the bodhisattvas are endowed with concentrations and, because they do not lose them, they obtain the brilliance of knowledge (*jñānaprabhā*) of the dharmas of the Greater Vehicle, sūtras, etc. Being the causal support (*āśrayahetu*), this bhūmi is called shining.

iv) *Arciṣmatī*, Blazing Wisdom. Since the fire (*arcis*) of wisdom (*mati = prajñā*) occurs on this bhūmi, it is called the bhūmi of blazing wisdom. In this expression, all the auxiliary dharmas of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣyadharmā*) are called 'fire' (*arcis*) because they burn away the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*). When these auxiliaries of enlightenment are abundant, the defilements (*kleśa*) are entirely consumed.

v) *Sudurjayā*, Difficult to Conquer. The knowledge of the absolute truth (*paramārthasatyajñāna*) is free of concepts (*nirvikalpa*); mundane knowledge (*laukikajñāna*) which deals with writing (*lipi*), gestures (*mudrā*), crafts (*śilpa*), sciences (*śāstra*), etc., is conceptual (*savikalpa*). As the knowledge of absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*) and the knowledge of contingent truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) are in opposition (*viruddha*), it is difficult to produce them by bringing them together. This

bhūmi, which joins them so that they do not contradict each other in any way, is very difficult to overcome.

vi) *Abhimukhī*, the Revealed bhūmi, because the supreme virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) is present here (*abhimukhī*). In this bhūmi, the absorption on dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādavihāra*) is attained (*adhigama*); the power of the knowledge bearing on dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādajñāna*) makes the virtue of wisdom, nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*) and supreme (*anuttarā*), manifest in its sovereignty. One knows that all dharmas are neither defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*) nor purified (*viśuddha*).

vii) *Dūraṅgamā*, the Far-Gone bhūmi, because it reaches the limit of the exertion of effort. In this bhūmi the exertion of effort (*prayogikī caryā*) is complete (*paripūrṇā*). But even though all the marks (*nimitta*) of the dharmas are immobilized (*acala, āniñjya*), there is still effort (*ābhoga*) in the signless (*animitta*).

viii) *Acalā*, the Immovable, because all the marks (*nimitta*) and all the practices of will (*abhisamskaraṇa*) cease to disturb the mind. In this seventh bhūmi, one is no longer disturbed by any notion (*nimitta*) because all notions are no longer active (*asamudācārāt*, but that does not take place easily or spontaneously (*svarasena*) because one no longer strives (*prayoga*). In the eighth bhūmi, since there is no further striving, there is no more ābhoga. This is the difference between the seventh and the eighth bhūmis.

ix) *Sādhumatī*, Excellent Intelligence, because it attains the four liberated higher knowledges (*pratisamvid*) (cf. chap. X, § 14). The knowledge of the *pratisamvids* is the best of all the knowledges. This knowledge is wisdom (*mati = prajñā*), hence the name 'sādhumatī'. The four *pratisamvids* are those of the Dharma, of meaning (*artha*), of etymology (*nirukti*) and of prophecy (*pratibhāna*). By means of *dharmapratīsamvid*, one completely knows (*abhijñāna*) the phrases (*pada*) of all the texts (*dharmā*); by *arthapratīsamvid*, one completely penetrates (*pravedha*) the value (*naya, vidhi*) of every meaning (*artha*); by *nirukti-pratīsamvid*, one completely discerns (*pravīcaya*) all languages (*ghoṣa*); by *pratibhānapratīsamvid*, one can preach the Dharma in all ten directions as is needed (*yathāyogam*). Because in this bhūmi one acquires for the first time the knowledge of the *pratisamvids* not yet acquired, it is called the bhūmi of excellent intelligence.

x) *Dharmameghā*, Cloud of Dharma, *because it attains the combined knowledge of all Dharma, sūtras, etc.* This knowledge bears on all dharmas, sūtras, etc., which are not separate from tathatā, in a combined way. This knowledge, which has as object (*viśaya*) the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas, is like a great cloud (*megha*). (a) The dhāraṇi- and samādhi-mukhas are like pure water. This knowledge contains them like the cloud contains water, for it has the excellent faculty (*sāmarthyā*) of giving rise to them. (b) Moreover, like a great cloud hides (*chādayati*) space (*ākāśa*), this combined knowledge of all dharmas hides the two obstacles, the obstacle of the passions and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśāvaraṇa*) which are broad (*viśāla*) and infinite (*ananta*) like space. Here 'hide' (*chādayati*) means to suppress (*nirharati*), to cut (*prahanti*).

c) Finally, just as a great cloud causes clear fresh water to rain down which fills (*paripiparti*) space (*ākāśa*), so this combined knowledge of all dharmas emanates innumerable excellent qualities (*aprameyaguṇa*) which fill the dharmakāya.” (U)

3. How are these bhūmis acquired (*bhūmilābdha*)? - In four ways (cf.

Sūtrālaṃkāra, XX-XXI, 41):

i) By acquiring convinced adherence (*adhimuktilābdha*), by adhering to the bhūmis.

ii) By acquiring the practices (*caritalābdha*), by acquiring the ten textual practices (*daśa dharmacarita*) relating to these bhūmis.

iii) By acquiring penetration (*prativedhalābdha*), for when the fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*) is penetrated in the first bhūmi, all the other bhūmis are penetrated.

iv) By acquiring the achievement (*niṣpattilābdha*), by reaching the summit (*niṣṭhāgamana*) of the development (*bhāvanā*) of these bhūmis. [146a4]

3. Comm. Bh 395a25-26, bh 205b6-7, U 424c8-20, u 314a5-314b1.

“The author says that there are four ways of acquiring the bhūmis:

i) *By acquiring convinced adherence, by adhering to the bhūmis*: one affirms (*avadhāraṇa*) that the doctrine (*deśanādharmā*) relating to the bhūmis is correct.

ii) *By acquiring the practices, by acquiring the ten textual practices relating to these bhūmis*: one acquires the ten textual practices relating to the doctrine: these consist of copying (*lekhanā*), veneration (*pūjanā*), making known (*dāna*), hearing (*śravaṇa*), reciting (*vācana*), reading (*udgrahaṇa*), explaining (*prakāśanā*), studying (*svādhyāyana*), meditating on (*cintanā*), putting into practice (*bhāvanā*) the doctrine (*deśanādharmā*) relating to the bhūmis (cf. Mahāvvyutpatti, 903-9120).

iii) *By acquiring penetration, for all the other bhūmis are penetrated, when the fundamental element has been penetrated in the first bhūmi*: When one has completely understood (*samyagavabodha, pratipatti*) the first bhūmi, one quickly penetrates all the following bhūmis. A stanza says: When the first knot of bamboo is broken (*veṇusaṃdhi*), the other knots are quickly broken; in the same way, if one acquires correct knowledge of the first bhūmi, the others bhūmis will be quickly gained.” (U)

“iv) *By acquiring the achievement, by reaching the summit of development of these bhūmis*: when one has cultivated the bhūmis, one reaches the summit.” (Bh)

The commentary to Sūtrālaṃkāra XX-XXI, 41, is even more precise: *caturvidho bhūmīnāṃ lābdhaḥ / adhimuktilābho yathoktādhimuktito 'dhimukticyābhūmau / caritalābho daśau dharmacariteṣu vartanāt tasyām eva / paramārthalābhaḥ paramārthapravedito bhūmipraveṣe / niṣpatti-lābhaś cāvinivartanīyabhūmipraveṣe /*

4. How should the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of these bhūmis be understood? The bodhisattva who, bhūmi by bhūmi, cultivates tranquility (*śamatha*) and discernment (*vipaśyanā*), cultivates them in five ways (*pancavidhā*). What are these five ways? He cultivates them:

i) by combined cultivation (*saṃsṛṣṭabhāvanā*),

ii) by signless cultivation (*animittabhāvanā*),

iii) by effortless cultivation (*anābhogabhāvanā*),

iv) by intensive cultivation (*uttaptabhāvanā*),

v) by insatiable cultivation (*asaṃtuṣṭabhāvanā*).

By means of this fivefold cultivation, the bodhisattva produces (*abhinirvartayanti*) five results (*phala*) (cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XX-XXI, 31):

(1) At each moment, the bodhisattva melts away the support of all the weaknesses (*pratikṣaṇaṃ sarvadauṣṭhulyāśrayaṃ drāvayati*).

(2) He achieves the suppression of multiple concepts and thus achieves pleasure in the garden of Dharma (*nānātvasaṃjñāvigatiṃ ca dharmārāmarariṃ pratilabhate*).

(3) He understands completely the brilliance of the Dharma, immense and of limitless aspect (*aparicchinnākāraṃ ca sarvato 'pramāṇaṃ dharmāvabhāsaṃ saṃjñānīte*).

(4) The marks, auxiliaries of purity and unfabricated, make their appearance in him (*avikalpitanī cāsya viśuddhibhāgiyāni ninimittāni samudācaranti*).

(5) For the fulfillment and attainment of dharmakāya, he takes possession of the always most perfect cause (*dharmakāyaparipūripariṣpattaye ca uttarād uttarataraṃ hetusaṃparigrahaṃ karoti*). [146a11]

4. Comm. Bh 359b6-25, bh 205b7-206a7, U 424c28-425a29, u 314b1-315a7.

“From *bhūmi* to *bhūmi*: the *bhūmis* being many (*aneka*), the author repeats the word. Tranquility (*śamatha*) is the concentration (*samādhi*) that counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) distractions (*vikṣepa*); discernment (*vipaśyanā*) is a wisdom (*prajñā*) that counteracts errors (*viparyāsa*). In the *bhūmis*, both practices are cultivated by five kinds of repeated practice (*abhyāsa*). These five types are combined cultivation, etc.:

i) *Combined cultivation*: is the cultivation of the *bhūmis* after having joined them all together in a single heap (*rāśi*).

ii) But other objects of meditation, skeletons (*kaṅkama*), etc., are likewise joined together in a single heap in order to be cultivated. - To reply to this objection, the author adds: *signless cultivation*, because by avoiding all distinctions, the dharmadhātu, which is free of all signs, is cultivated.

iii) Although there may be cultivation of the signless, there could be effort (*ābhoga*). In order to show that this cultivation does not require effort (*ābhoga*) and functions spontaneously (*svarasena*), the author then says: *effortless cultivation*, because it functions spontaneously beyond any effort.

iv) Although the cultivation may occur without effort and spontaneously, it may eventually be superior (*vara*) or inferior (*avara*). That is why the author adds: *intensive cultivation*, intensive meaning 'strong' (*adhimātra*).

v) Although the cultivations may be intensive, one might feel satisfied after a minor result (*saṃtuṣṭi*) and say to oneself: "I have practiced everything, why should I do anything else?" - That is why the author adds finally: *insatiable cultivation*. Signless, effortless and intensive cultivation are not enough. Why? Because in order to attain buddhahood, it is necessary to practice zealously.

* * *

(1) *At each moment the bodhisattva melts away the support of all the weaknesses.* The store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is called support of the weaknesses (*dauṣṭhulyāśraya*). [According to bh, the eternal propensity-seed of the obstacle of the passions and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇayor anādikālikā vāsanā*) is called weakness (*dauṣṭhulya*)]. To decrease the mass of the ālaya is to cause it to melt (*drāvayati*). This is the way an elixir (*bhaiṣajya, rasāyana*) causes a mass of illnesses (*vyādhi*) to melt.

(2) *He achieves the suppression of multiple concepts and in this way the pleasure of the garden of the Dharma.* He suppresses the notions of ātman, of Dharma, of Buddha, etc. The *garden* is a place where one can walk about. The *Dharma* is the dharmadhātu. This Dharma being a garden, one may speak of the *garden of the Dharma*. The satisfaction (*trpti*) found there is called *pleasure in the garden of the Dharma*. To feel this pleasure is to *find pleasure in the garden of the Dharma*. It is like a king who has a garden (*ārama*) and a marvellous forest (*vana*) near his palace (*prāsāda*) and who experiences great satisfaction in walking there; the dharmadhātu is like this garden.

(3) *He understands completely the brilliance of the Dharma, immense and of limitless aspect.* He penetrates (*pratividhyati*) precisely the brilliance of the infinite (*ananta*) teaching which is without limit in the ten directions (*dasadiś*). Because he illumines the

practices (*caryā*), he is called the *brilliance of the law*. He is like the light derived from the study (*svadhāyana*) of a text (*grantha*).

(4) *The signs, auxiliaries of purity, non-fabricated, manifest in him.* The future buddhahood (*buddhatā*) is called *purity*. The marks that bring it along are called *auxiliaries of purity*. These unfabricated marks manifest in him like the white parasol (*sitachattra*), etc., of a Buddha or a cakravartin.

(5) *For the fulfillment and the attainment of dharmadhātu, he makes use of the ever most perfect cause.* The tenth bhūmi is called *fulfillment* (*paripūri*) of the dharmadhātu; abiding in the Buddha bhūmi is called *attainment* (*pariniṣpatti*) of the dharmadhātu. The cause that produces this bhūmi of the Buddha, being excellent (*bahvantaraviśiṣṭa*), is called the perfect (*uttara*) cause. Being an accumulation (*upacaya*) of earlier causes, it is called the ever most perfect (*uttarād uttarataraḥ*).

These five cultivations (*bhāvanā*) in the appropriate order (*yathākramamam*) produce these five results (*phala*).” (U)

5. As the main statement (*pradhānataḥ*), ten virtues are cultivated in the ten bhūmis, one main virtue for each bhūmi. In the first six bhūmis the six virtues, referred to in chapter IV, § 1, are practiced; on the last four bhūmis, the four following virtues:

i) The virtue of skill in means (*upāyakauśalyapāramitā*). Sharing amongst all beings the roots of good accumulated by the six virtues, they are applied to supreme perfect enlightenment (*ṣatpāramitopacitakuśalamūlāni sarvasattvasādhāraṇāni kṛtvā anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau pariṇāmayati*).

ii) The virtue of vow (*prañidhānapāramitā*). By formulating various vows (*nānāprañidhānāny abhinirvṛtya*), one unites (*saṃgrhṇāti*) the causes (*pratya*) of the virtues for a later time (*amutra, āyatyām*).

iii) The virtue of power (*balapāramitā*). The six virtues are ceaselessly active (*satataṃ samudācatanti*) by the power of contemplation (*pratisaṃkhyāna*) and of meditation (*bhāvanā*) (cf. *Ānguttara*, I, p. 52).

iv) The virtue of knowledge (*jñānapāramitā*). The six virtues establish (*vyavasthāpayanti*) the knowledge by means of which enjoyment of the Dharma (*dharmasambhoga*) is experienced (*anubhavati*) and beings are ripened (*paripācayati*).

Furthermore, these four virtues come from (*saṃgrhīta*) the nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) and subsequent knowledge (*tatprṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) of the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāparamitā*).

But it is not true that in each bhūmi all the virtues are not cultivated. This teaching is contained in the Pāramitāpiṭaka. [146a24]

5. Comm. Bh 359c10-360a29, bh 206a7-207b4, U 425b13-425c20, u 315a7-316a5.

“As the main statement, the ten virtues are cultivated in the ten bhūmis. Does the author speak of these different cultivations (*bhāvanāprabhedā*) strictly (*niyamena*) or in general? In each bhūmi in particular, the ten virtues are cultivated at one and the same time; this is why it cannot be said strictly that each particular bhūmi cultivates one particular virtue alone. But as the author says: *as main heading*, he avoids this error (*doṣa*). Here he is thinking of only the main development which does not exclude the cultivation of the other virtues. Thus a sūtra says: In the first bhūmi, the virtue of generosity (*dānaparamitā*) is the main pāramitā, but all the other virtues are also being cultivated. And so on for the other bhūmis.

The six virtues which have been considered are cultivated in the first six bhūmis: in the first six bhūmis, Pramuditā, etc., the six virtues, generosity (dāna), etc., are cultivated. In the last four bhūmis, the following four virtues: in the next four bhūmis, Dūraṅgamā, etc., the following four virtues: skillfulness of means (upāyakauśalya), etc.

i) *Skillfulness of means*. To seek for nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇaprārthana*) without abandoning saṃsāra (*saṃsārāparityāga*): this is what is called skillfulness of means. To share amongst all beings the roots of good accumulated by the first six virtues - in the interest of beings (*sattvārthāya*), not to abandon them - this is 'not to abandon saṃsāra'. To apply these roots of good to supreme perfect enlightenment in order to acquire the supreme enlightenment of the buddhas (*anuttarā buddhabodhiḥ*): this is 'to seek for nirvāṇa'. [Cf.

Bh: Skillfulness in means demonstrates wisdom (*prajñā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*). To share amongst all beings the roots of good accumulated by the first six virtues is to show great compassion. To apply these roots of good to supreme perfect enlightenment, to not seek the opulent happiness of a Śakra, etc., to not incur afflictions (*kleśa*) by means of complete knowledge: this is wisdom. Endowed with skill in means, one remains in saṃsāra but one is not stained by it. This is why we speak of skillfulness in means.]

ii) *By formulating various vows, one unites the causes of the virtues for a later time.* One seeks the causes (*pratyaya*) of the virtues in the world to come (*anāgataloka*). Also, in the interest of beings (*sattvārtha*) and in order quickly to acquire buddhahood (*buddhatā*), nirvāṇa, one formulates the following vow: "I formulate the vow to go later and be reborn there where there are virtues." Such vows being innumerable (*apramāṇa*) and infinite (*ananta*), we speak of them as *various*.

iii) *By the power of contemplation and meditation.* In this virtue of power, it is said that there is a twofold power, and the other powers are included in it as well. [Bh: Another sūtra (cf. Aṅguttara, I, p. 52) says: There are two powers, namely, the power of contemplation and the power of meditation (*dve 'māni balāni ... paṭisaṅkhānabalān ca bhāvanābalañ ca*). And even if the power of meditation were lacking, one cultivates the virtues energetically by means of the power of contemplation. By saying that, thanks to it, the virtues are endless in activity, the rôle of the virtue of power is demonstrated.]

iv) *The six virtues establish the knowledge by means of which one experiences the joy of the Dharma and one ripens beings.* The six virtues, generosity, etc., establish this knowledge and, in turn, this knowledge establishes the six virtues ... This is what is called *experiencing the joy of the Dharma*. By means of this wonderful knowledge, one knows perfectly: 'This is generosity (*dāna*); this is morality (*śīla*); this is patience (*kṣānti*); this is zeal (*vīrya*); etc'. Such teachings encourage all kinds of beings and this is what is called *ripening beings*.

Moreover, these four virtues, etc., up to: come from subsequent knowledge: the four virtues in question, the virtue of skillfulness of means, etc., come from (*saṃgrhīta*) nonconceptual knowledge and subsequent knowledge. If ten virtues are posited, the sixth, wisdom (*prajñā*), is only fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalpakajñāna*); if six virtues are posited, the sixth (or wisdom) gives rise

(*saṃgrhīta*) at one and the same time to both nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) and subsequent knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) because, in the course of the subsequent knowledge, the last four virtues occur equally in the sixth virtue (or wisdom) that contains them.

This teaching is contained in the Pāramitāpiṭaka. The entire doctrine (deśanādharmā) of the Greater Vehicle is called the piṭaka of the virtues. From that, we know that, at one and the same time, all the virtues are cultivated in all the bhūmis.” (U)

6. How long a time (*kiyatkālam*) does it take to reach the completion of the development (*bhāvanāparipūri*) of the ten bhūmis? - Five individuals (*pudgala*) reach the completion (*paripūri*) after three incalculable periods (*kalpāsaṃkhyeya*). (Cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra), XIX, 63).

The person who adheres to the Dharma (*ādhimokṣika pudgala*) reaches the completion of his development after the first incalculable period. The person who is inspired by excellent pure proclivity (*śuddhādhyāśayika*), whether he courses in the signs (*nimittacārin*) during the first six bhūmis or whether he courses in the signless (*animittacārin*) during the seventh, reaches the completion of his development after the second incalculable period. Finally, the person who courses in spontaneous activity (*anabhisamskāracārin*) comes to the completion of his development after the third incalculable period, going from the eighth to the tenth bhūmi.

Here is a stanza:

When he is endowed with pure strength (*śubhabala*) and with excellent power (*prañihitabala*), when he is of strong mind (*dṛḍhacitta*) and of advancing progress (*viśeṣagamana*), it is said that the bodhisattva energetically cultivates the three incalculable periods. {146b4}

[Addition by Paramārtha]:

The bodhisattva career may require seven or thirty-seven incalculable periods. What are the seven asaṃkhyeyakalpas? Prior to the bhūmis, there are three; during the bhūmis there are four. The three asaṃkhyeyas prior to the

bhūmis are the asaṃkhyeya of the indeterminate (*aniyata*) bodhisattva, the asaṃkhyeya of the determined (*niyata*) bodhisattva and the asaṃkhyeya of the bodhisattva who has received the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*). The four asaṃkhyeyas during the bhūmis are the asaṃkhyeya of bhūmis one to three, based on the three *ti* (149 and 9; cf. Taishō 1595, p. 230c23), the asaṃkhyeya of bhūmis four to six based on equanimity (*upekṣā*), the asaṃkhyeya of bhūmis seven and eight based on pacification (*vyupaśama* ?) and the asaṃkhyeya of bhūmis nine and ten based on wisdom (*prajñā*).

What are the thirty-seven asaṃkhyeyas? The three asaṃkhyeyas of the upāyabhūmi: the asaṃkhyeya of the śraddhācaryā, the asaṃkhyeya of the udyogacaryā (?) and the asaṃkhyeya of ts'iu hiang hing (*pratipādanacharyā* ?). Then three asaṃkhyeyas for each of the ten bhūmis, entrance, abiding and emerging. These are the asaṃkhyeyas necessary to arrive at completion (*paripūri*) of the development of the ten bhūmis.

6. Comm. Bh 360b11-360c2, bh 207b4-208a7, U 426a1-22, u 316a5-316b8.

“Five individuals arrive at completion after three incalculable periods. This is a question here of different states (*avasthāprabheda*) assumed by one and the same person (*pudgala*). These states are five in number: state of ādhimokṣika, etc., as is said below:

i) The ādhimokṣika: he has not yet realized the true nature (*tathatā*) and bases himself only on adherence to the Dharma (*adhimokṣa*) in order to zealously cultivate the practices (*caryā*). He reaches the completion of his development (*bhāvanāparipūri*) after the first incalculable period.

ii) The śuddhādhyāśayika: he has obtained the excellent pure proclivity (*śuddhādhyāśaya*) and zealously cultivates the practices. When he abides on the first six bhūmis, he is called nimittacārin; when he abides on the seventh bhūmi, he is called animittacārin. These two types of individuals reach the completion of their development after the second incalculable period.

iii) The person who is above that, from the eighth to the tenth bhūmi, is called anabhisamṣkāracārin. He reaches completion of his development after the third

incalculable period. On the eighth bhūmi, effortless practice (*anabhisamṣkāracaryā*) has not been achieved (*niṣpanna*). In the ninth and tenth bhūmi, this practice has come to its achievement.

It is a matter here of one and the same individual (*pudgala*) who, associated (*samprayukta*) with different states, takes on five different aspects. It is like the aspects of *srotaāpanna*, etc., assumed by one and the same individual (cf. Kośa, II, p. 134-136). But *saṃsāra* has been going on (*prabandhena pravartate*) since all eternity (*anādhikālāt*); to what extent (*kiyāta*) do we speak of an excellent development (*bhāvanā*) going on for three incalculable periods? - In order to reply to this question, the author cites the stanza:

When he is endowed with pure strength and excellent power. The power of the roots of good (*kuśalamūlabala*) is called *pure power* (*śubhabala*); i.e., the bodhisattva is endowed with the power of the roots of good. The power of great vows (*mahāpraṇidhānabala*) is called *excellent power* (*praṇihitabala*); i.e., the bodhisattva is endowed with the power of great vows. Endowed with the power of the roots of good, he is able to conquer (*abhibhu-*) the opposing roots (*vipakṣa*); endowed with the power of great vows, he is always attached to spiritual friends (*kalyāṇamitra*).

When he is of strong mind and advancing progress. While skilfully abandoning bad friends (*pāpamitra*), he never abandons (*parityaj-*) the great mind of enlightenment (*mahābodhicitta*). The good dharmas (*kuśaladharmā*) which he cultivates in the present and the future continue to increase (*vr̥dh-*), never diminishing (*praṇaś-*). When the bodhisattva is endowed with the power of the roots of good (*kuśalamūlabala*) and the power of great vows (*mahāpraṇidhānabala*), when his great bodhicitta is solid (*dr̥ḍha*) and irreversible, when the good dharmas that he has cultivated increase (*vr̥dh-*) from moment to moment (*pratiksāṇam*), when he is not satisfied (*saṃtuṣ-*) with what he has already obtained, then it is said that he cultivates the three incalculable periods in an excellent way." (U)

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

Preliminary Note:

References to the bhūmis or levels:

Innumerable documents analyzed by J. Rahder, *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, Intro., p. iii-xxviii; *La carrière du Saint bouddhique*, BMFJ, II, 1929, p. 1-22; art. *Chi* in Hoboggin, p. 283 sq.; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Les degrés de la carrière du Bodhisattva*, append. to Siddhi, p. 726-730; N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1930. chap. IV, p. 238-289. Some important texts: Mahāvastu, I, p. 64 (2), 76 (11), 77 (140 seq., 84 (12) seq., 436 n.; Lalitavistara, p. 35 (22); Mahāvvyut., 1140-1147; 886-895; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXIV-LXV; Śatasāhasrikā P.P., chap. X, p. 1454 (ten bhūmis); p. 1473 and 1520 (seven bhūmis); Pañca-vimśatisāhasrikā (ed. N. Dutt), p. 214-225; Abhis. alaṃkāra, I st. 48-70 (*parikarman* in order to reach the ten bhūmis); Abhis. al. āl, p. 99-104; E. Obermiller, The Doctrine of P.P., p. 51-57; Avataṃsaka, T 278, k. XXIII, p. 542a seq.; Saṃdhanir. IX, v. 1-7; Laṅkāvatāra, *abhisamayaparivarta*, p. 211-216 (treats especially the ten bhūmis); entire Daśabhūmikasūtra; Madh. avatāra (systematic study of the bhūmis and pāramitās, p. 249-317; Sūtrālaṃkāra, IV, 2 (*bhūmi* and *cittotpāda*); XIX, 11 (*āryabhūmi*); XX-XXI (*aniṣpannāniṣpannā bhūmiḥ*); XX-XXI, 32-40 (etymology); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 97-107 (*bhūmiṣv āvaraṇam*), p. 204-205 (*bhūmi* and *paramatā*); Bodh. bhūmi, *vihārapaṭala*, p. 317-358 (seven bhūmis which make up thirteen *vihāras*); Siddhi, p. 164-166, 273, 330, 510, 547, 613-619, 655, 662, 726, 729, 732; Yogacaryābhūmi, T 1579, LXXIX, p. 737b29-738a3.

1. The tenfold dharmadhātu that is to be cognized in the ten bhūmis is studied in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 100-107 and, under the name of tathatā, in Siddhi, p. 658-660 (where, for the most part, the restored terms should be corrected according to the Madhyānta-vibhaṅga).

The ten (eleven) opposing obstacles are studied in Siddhi, p. 639-657. Here are some references on this subject:

i. Pṛthagjanatva (involves essentially the error of adherence to the ātman and to dharmas): Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, I, p. 59; Mrs. Rhys-D., *Buddh. Manual of Psychological Ethics*, p. 258; S. Z. Aung, *Compendium of Phil.*, p. 49, 50; Mahāvastu, I, p. 78, 102, 437; Divyāvadāna, p. 133 (9), 419 (17), 429 (17); Kośa (opinions of different sects), I, p. 79-80; II, p. 191-193, 204; III, p. 128; VI, p. 232, 235, 241, 250; Treatise on the sects of Vasumitra in J. Masuda, p. 24, 26, 30, 38, 42, 49, 50, 52, 59, 68; Daśabhūmika, p. 11, 12, 16, 17, 43, 65; Madh. vṛtti, p. 489; D. T. Suzuki, Index to the Laṅkāvatāra, 1934, p. 124, s.v. *bālapṛthagjana*; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 59 (22), 60 (20), 188 (13 -14), 196 (12) (*pṛthagjanatvasthā*); Siddhi, p. 58, 71, 112, 639-644.

iii. Dhandhatva: Abhis. al. āl., p. 670 (5); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 9 (19), 15 (22), 175 (12). 176 (6-19), 218 (9), 322 (26); Siddhi, p. 645. A list of eleven *dauṣṭhulyas* and twenty-two *saṃmohas* corresponds to these eleven *āvaraṇas* in Saṃdhanir., IX, § 5; Yogacaryābhūmi, T 1579, k. 78, p. 730a7 sq.

2. Names of the bhūmis: besides the Daśabhūmika and Madh. avatāra, see Saṃdhanir., IX, v. 4; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVIII, 67-68; XX-XXI, 32-40; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 97 (11) - 98 (10); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 332-355.

On ābhoga, effort, which disappears in the eighth bhūmi, Dīgha, I, p. 37 (= *manasikāro samannāhāro*); Sumaṅgalavilāsanī, I, p. 122; Vibhaṅga, p. 321; Kathāvatthu, II, p. 349;

Milinda, p. 97; Visuddhimagga, p. 164, 325, 354; Mahāvastu, II, p. 358 (7), 360 (9), 550 n.; Kośa, II, p. 154; III, p. 200; VI, p. 154; VII, p. 88, 90; VIII, p. 148; Abhis. al. āl., p. 102 (17), 125 (16); Daśabhūmika, p. 64, 67; Saṃdhinir., IX, v. 4. 5; Laṅkāvatāra (*anābhoga*), p. 42 (8), 161 (1),

181 (1), 266 (8), 299 (2), 351 (5); Madh. vṛti, p. 335 n.; Śikṣasam., p. 267, 271; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 88 (22), 346 (14), 350 (12); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 98 (7), etc.; Triṃśikā, p. 20 (12), 28 (5); Siddhi, p. 146, 335, 616-617.

3. Acquisition of the bhūmis: Sūtrālaṃkāra, XX-XXI, 41.

The ten dharmacaritas: Mahāvvyut., 903-912; Saṃdhinir., VII, v. 19, 31.; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 211 (13) seq. (good definitions); Abhis. al. āl., p. 219.

4. Cultivation of the bhūmis and their five fruits: Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIV, 19-22; XX-XXI, 31.

On the distinction between the paripūri and pariniṣpatti (or viśuddhi) of the dharmakāya in the tenth and eleventh bhūmis respectively, cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIV, 22; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 206 (4): *bodhisattvaparinipatti*, etc.

5. All the pāramitās are present in the bhūmis, but each bhūmi had a predominant pāramitā: Madh. avatāra, p. 23 (Muséon, 1907, p. 272).

The last four pāramitās in general: Saṃdhinir., IX, v. 10; Siddhi, p. 623-624. - In particular:

i. Upāyakauśalya- : Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVIII, 69-70; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 261-264 (twelve aspects); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 94 (21), 95 (24), 97 (3), 208 (4).

ii. Praṇidhāna- : Involves five vows, of which the fifth is tenfold: cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 274 (23) - 276 (1); Siddhi, p. 623-624; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 94 (23), 96 (6), 97 (3), 106 (3), 208 (11); Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVIII, 74-76; Daśabhūmika, p. 14-17. - The ten *praṇidhānas*, Śikṣasam., p. 291-295.

iii. Bala- : Siddhi, p. 624 (correct *cintanābala* to *pratisaṃkhyānabala*), Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 94 (23), 97 (3), 106 (11) and especially 208 (16). - On the two *balas*, Aṅguttara, I, p. 52; Dīgha, III, p. 213.

iv. Jñāna- : Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 94 (24), 97 (3), 106 (19), 208 (23), 251 (15).

Why the four last pāramitās are included in the sixth, Saṃdhinir., IX, § 10; Siddhi, p. 630.

6. See L. de La Vallée Poussin, Durée de la carrière du Bodhisattva, Sidhi, p. 731-733; Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, I, p. 119-124.

Without being complete, the following may be mentioned:

Three asaṃkhyeyas: Kośa, III, p. 188; IV, p. 224; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIX, 64; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 255 (15)-356 (2).

Four asaṃkhyeyas and one hundred kalpas: Pāli sources, Cariyāpiṭaka, I, p. 1; Jātaka, I, p. 2; Aṅguttara, II, p. 142; Milinda, p. 232, 289.

Seven asaṃkhyeyas: Lalitavistara, p. 10 (4), Madh, vṛtti, p. 321(4).

Ten asaṃkhyeyas: Nikāyabheda of Vinītadeva, Tg. Mdo XC. Thirty-three asaṃkhyeyas: Saṃgraha, Paramārtha' version.

Three, seven or thirty-three asaṃkhyeyas: Abhis. al. āl., p. 988 (14) sq.

CHAPTER VI

THE OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT MORALITY

(*adhiśīlaṃ śikṣā*)

1. The various cultivations (*bhāvanāprabheda*) of the cause (*hetu*) and the result (*phala*) have been explained. How should the superiority (*viśeṣa*) of excellent morality (*adhiśīla*) be conceived? - As it is said in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, in the chapter on Acceptance of the Bodhisattva Discipline (*bodhisattvasaṃvarasamādāna*). In brief (*samāsataḥ*), it is superior because of four superiorities (*viśeṣa*):

- i) superiority of types (*prabhedaviśeṣa*),
- ii) superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules (*sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇaśikṣhāviśeṣa*),
- iii) superiority of extent (*vaipulyaviśeṣa*),
- iv) superiority of depth (*gāmbhīryaviśeṣa*). [146b10]

1. Comm. Bh 360c13-18, bh 208a8, U 426a28-426b2, u 316b8-317a2.

“That which one observes (*śikṣate*) by basing oneself on excellent morality (*adhiśīla*) is called observance of excellent morality (*adhiśīlaṃ śikṣā*). As it is said in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in the chapter on acceptance of the bodhisattva discipline: as this text explains it at length in the chapter on the śīlapāramitā (cf. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, śīlapāṭala, p. 137-188”; [but Lamotte thinks this reference is not correct]. “Because of four superiorities: these superiorities are explained at length below.” (U)

2. Superiority of types (*prabhedaviśeṣa*), because it consists of the morality of abstention (*saṃvaraśīla*), the morality of gathering the good dharmas

(kuśaladharmasamgrāhakaśīla) and the morality of service to beings (sattvārthakriyāśīla).

The morality of abstention is the basis (*niśraya*) of the other two moralities.

The morality of gathering good dharmas is the basis for acquiring the attributes of Buddha (*buddhadharmasamudāgama*).

The morality of service to beings is the basis for ripening of beings (*sattvapariṇāna*). [146b15]

2. Comm. Bh 360c27-29, bh 208a8-208b1, U 426b7-16, u 317a2-6.

“*Superiority of types* is the fact that the bodhisattvas possess the three kinds of morality all at the same time (cf. chap. IV, § 9), namely, the morality of abstention, the morality of gathering good dharmas and the morality of service to beings, whereas the vehicle of the śrāvakas, etc., possesses only the first, namely, morality of abstention. This is why the bodhisattvas are superior to the śrāvakas. The *morality of abstention* consists of the commitment (*samādāna*) to abstain (*virati*) from bad dharmas of all kinds. *The morality of gathering good dharmas* consists of acquiring (*samudāgama*) all the buddha attributes, the powers (*bala*), the fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), etc. *The morality of service to beings* consists of not desiring one's own happiness (*svasukha*), but introducing beings as much as one can into the three vehicles (*triyāna*), destroying (*prahāṇa*) the suffering of transmigration (*saṃsāraduḥkha*) and realizing (*adhigama*) the happiness of nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇasukha*). *The morality of abstention is the basis of the other two moralities*: it is the cause (*hetu*) of the other two moralities because, when one has disciplined the body (*kāya*), speech (*vāc*) and mind (*manas*), one can unmistakably (*viparyāsa*) be assured (*samudāgama*) of all the pure buddha attributes (*viśuddhabuddhadharma*), one can ripen (*pariṇāna*) all beings by introducing them into the three vehicles. This is not the case for the śrāvakas, etc.” (U)

3. Superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules:

i) The rule (*śikṣa*) of the bodhisattvas is shared (*sādhāraṇa*) with the śrāvakas insofar as it is forbidden to the bodhisattvas to commit (*samudācar-*) natural (*prakṛtisāvadya*) wrongdoings.

ii) The rule of the bodhisattvas differs (*asādhāraṇa*) from that of the śrāvakas insofar as the bodhisattvas can commit wrongdoings of disobedience (*pratikṣepaṇasāvadya*). According to this latter rule, there where the śrāvaka commits a wrongdoing (*āpatti*), the bodhisattva does not; there where the bodhisattva commits a wrongdoing, the śrāvaka does not.

iii) The morality (*śīla*) of the bodhisattva is on the physical (*kāyayika*), vocal (*vācika*) and mental (*mānasa*) levels; that of the śrāvakas extends only to the physical and vocal levels. For this very reason, the bodhisattva commits wrongdoings of mind (*cittāpatti*) whereas the śrāvaka does not.

In summary (*samāsataḥ*), the bodhisattva can accomplish (*samudācar-*) and observe (*śikṣ-*) any physical, vocal or mental action (*kāyavāgmanaskarma*) favorable to beings (*sattvopakāra*) provided that he is blameless (*niravadya*). This is how the superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules is to be conceived. [146b23]

3. Comm. Bh 361a9-20, bh 208b1-209a1, U 426b24-426c2, u 317a6-317b8.

“i) Killing (*prāṇātipāta*), theft (*adattādāna*), illicit sex (*kāmamithyācāra*), etc., resulting from lust, etc., are natural wrongdoings (*prakṛtisāvadya*). They are forbidden to both bodhisattvas and śrāvakas.

ii) Cutting plants (*tṛṇachedana*), etc., which is not the result of concupiscence, is a wrongdoing of disobedience (*prakti-kṣepaṇasāvadya*). The bodhisattva who sees in these wrongdoings of disobedience the benefit of beings (*sattvārtha*) is blameless (*niravadya*) on committing them and can accomplish all of them. This is not so for the śrāvaka.” (U)

According to this last rule, there where the śrāvaka commits a wrongdoing, the bodhisattva does not: thus the śrāvaka who leaves during the rainy season commits a wrongdoing. On the contrary, when he sees a benefit for beings in leaving and does not leave, the bodhisattva commits a wrongdoing; if he does leave, he does not commit a

wrongdoing. [According to bh: *ñan thos kyi ltuñ bar hgyur ba de la byañ chub sems dpañi ltuñ ba med do Ēes bya ba ni ji ltar dbyar gyi nañ du ñan thos rñams soñ bar gyur na ltuñ ba yin no / sems can gyi don mthoñ la ma soñ na byañ chub sems dpañ rñams kyi ltuñ ba yin la / soñ na ni ltuñ ba med do.*]

“iii) *For this very reason, the bodhisattva commits wrondoings of mind whereas the śrāvaka does not: they are guilty only of inwardly producing bad thoughts of desire (kāma), of killing (vyāpāda), etc., even without arousing (samutthā-) actions of body or speech following these thoughts.*

*In summary, the bodhisattva can accomplish and observe any physical, vocal or mental action favorable to beings, provided that he is blameless, i.e., any action that ensures the welfare (hita) and happiness (sukha) of beings, without thereby arousing (samutthā-) the passions, lust, etc. (rāgādikleśa) in himself or in others. The bodhisattva is able to accomplish all these acts. (U)” – “It may happen that, while favoring beings, the action is not blameless; for example, having illicit sex with a woman belonging to someone else. To avoid this type of action, the author says: *provided that he is blameless.*” (Bh)*

4. Superiority of scope (vaipulyaviśeṣa), which is fourfold:

i) Scope consisting of many immense rules (nānāpramāṇa-śikṣāvaipulya).

ii) Scope consisting of increase of immense merits (apramāṇa-puṇyaparigrahavaipulya).

iii) scope consisting of the increase of inclinations to work for the benefit and happiness of all beings (sarvasattvahita-sukhakriyāśayaparigrahavaipulya).

iv) scope consisting of establishing supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyakṣambodhiniśrayavaipulya). [146b27]

4. Comm. Bh 361a25-361b5, bh 209a1-6, U 426c7-15, u 317b8-318a4.

“i) *Scope consisting of numerous and immense rules: the rules (śikṣāpada) observed by the bodhisattvas are both many and immense; by means of them they ensure the ripening (paripāka) and service (upakāra) of all beings.*

ii) *Scope consisting of increase of immense merits*: the bodhisattvas gain an immense accumulation of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*). This is lacking in the śrāvakas.

iii) *Scope consisting of increase of inclinations to work for the benefit and happiness of all beings*: encouraging beings to practice the wholesome is called 'inclination to work for the benefit' (*hitakriyāśaya*); wishing that a certain person (*pudgala*), by means of this benefit, will gain a higher fruit is called 'inclination to work for the happiness' (*sukhakriyāśaya*).

iv) *Scope consisting of establishing supreme complete enlightenment*: by this morality the bodhisattvas establish supreme perfect enlightenment. This is lacking in the śrāvakas.”
(Bh)

5. i) Finally, superiority of depth (*gāmbhīryaviśeṣa*) is the fact that by virtue of his skillful means, even if he commits the ten types of evil actions, the bodhisattva does not incur any blame but gains immense merit and quickly attains complete perfect enlightenment (*tatra gāmbhīryaviśeṣo yad bodhisattva evaṃvidhenopāyakaśalena daśavidhaṃ prāṇātīpātādīkarma samudācarati tenānavadyaś ca bhavati, apramāṇaṃ ca puṇyaṃ prasūyate, anuttarāyāṃ ca samyaksambodhau kṣipram abhisambudhyate*).

ii) Moreover, fabricated actions of body and speech (*nirmāṇa-kāyavākkarman*) should be thought of as the profound morality (*gāmbhīraśīla*) of the bodhisattva. By means of these actions, the bodhisattva exerts kingship (*rājya*) and by imposing (*saṃdarśana*) all kinds of torments (*viheṭhana*) on beings, he introduces (*nikṣipati*) them into the discipline (*vinaya*).

iii) Exhibiting all kinds of Jātakas, he causes torment (*bādhana, upadrava*) to some beings, grants his favors (*upakāra*) to others and, having inspired faith (*śraddhā*) in them, he assures their maturation (*paripāka*). Such is the superiority in depth (*gāmbhīryaviśeṣa*) of the bodhisattva's morality (*śīla*).

[146c6]

5. Comm. Bh 361b15-361c6, bh 209a6-209b7, U 426c24-427a10, u 318a4-318b6.

“i) *Superiority in depth is the fact that, by virtue of his skillful means, the bodhisattva, etc.* Here the power (*sāmarthya*) of the skillful means (*upāyakaśālyā*) belonging to the bodhisattva is explained. For example, a bodhisattva knows that a certain person (*pudgala*) is about to commit an evil (*akuśala*) deed, an action of immediate retribution (*ānantaryakarman*), etc. The bodhisattva knows the evil intention of this person by means of his knowledge of others' minds (*paracittajñāna*, cf. chap. X, § 15). Having no other method of deterring this person from this action and knowing well that the person in question, by this action, is going to fall away from his good destiny (*sugati*) and fall into an unfortunate destiny (*durgati*), the bodhisattva says to himself: “I am going to commit this action [i.e., kill this person]. Without a doubt, I shall fall into an unfortunate destiny, but I prefer to go there myself and deliver this person. By killing him, I will cause him a small suffering (*kiṃcitka duḥkha*) for a moment, but I will do it so that later on (*samparāya*) he will experience much joy (*sukha*).” Then the bodhisattva, like a physician (*vaidya*), arms himself with courage and kills this person. By doing that, he incurs not the slightest blame. Indeed, he earns much merit and, by means of this merit, quickly arrives at supreme complete enlightenment. Such a discipline is profound.” (Bh)

[This case is explained even more clearly in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 165-166: *asti ca kiṃcit prakṛtisāvadyam api yad bodhisattvas tadrūpeṇopāyakaśālena samudācarati yenānāpattikaś ca bhavati bahu ca puṇyaṃ prasūyate. yathāpi tad bodhisattvaḥ coraṃ taskaraṃ prabhūtānāṃ prāṇiśatānāṃ mahātmanāṃ śrāvakapratyekabuddhabodhisattvānāṃ vadhāyodyatam āmiṣakiṃcitkahetoḥ prabhūtānantaryakarmakriyāprayuktaṃ paśyati. drṣṭvā ca punar evaṃ cetasā cittam abhisamskaroti. yady apy aham eṇaṃ prāṇinaṃ jīvitād vyaparopya narakeṣūpapadyeya. kāmaṃ bhavatu me narakopapattiḥ. eṣa ca sattva ānantaryaṃ karma kṛtvā mā bhūn narakaparāyaṇa iti. evamāśayo bodhisattvas taṃ prāṇinaṃ kuśalacittam avyākṛtacittam vā veditvā rṭīyamānaḥ anukampācittam evāyatyām upādāya jīvitād vyaparopayati. anāpattiko bhavati bahu ca puṇyaṃ prasūyate].*

“ii) *Furthermore, the fabricated actions of body and speech should be thought of as profound morality.* By means of them, the bodhisattva exerts kingship and, while causing all kinds of torment to beings, he introduces them into the discipline. That which has change (*nirmāṇa*) as self-nature is called fabricated. Here we should know that the king,

the rôle which the bodhisattva is playing, ceaselessly reproduces in his governing the actions of Sudhanakumāra (see Notes).

iii) *Manifesting all kinds of jātakas*: e.g., the Viśvantarajātaka where the Bodhisattva gives his son and daughter to the brahmin (see Notes). This is a matter of a fabricated action (*nirmāṇa*). *He causes torment to some beings and grants his favors to others*: in the final analysis, bodhisattvas do not torment some and favor others [cf. chap. X, § 36, commentary]. This is what is called superiority in depth.” (Bh)

6. In brief (*samāsataḥ*), it is by virtue of the fourfold superiority (*viśeṣa*) that the bodhisattva's moral discipline (*śīlasamvara*) is superior (*viśiṣṭa*). By virtue of these aspects (*prabheda*), the various observances (*śikṣāprabheda*) of the bodhisattva are infinite (*apramāṇa*), as is said in the Vinayaghoṣavaipulyasūtra. [146c9]

6. Comm. Bh 361c10-11, bh 209b7-8, U 427a14-16, u 318b6-8.

Here we have spoken of the four kinds of superiorities. But in the Vinayaghoṣavaipulyasūtra the hundred thousand kinds of superiorities are explained in detail. (Bh)

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

Preliminary Note:

Chapters VI to VIII are dedicated to the three śikṣās, well-known in the Pāli sources. Cf. *tisso sikkhā*, Saṃyutta, III, p. 83; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 46 seq.; Milinda, p. 133, 237; Mahāniddeśa, p. 39; explained as *adhisīla-*, *adhicitta-*, and *adhipañña-sikkhā*, Aṅguttara, I, p. 234 seq; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 126; with the synonyms *samvara*, *samādhi* and *pañña*, Visuddhimagga, p. 274; P. V. Bapat, Vimuyyimagga and Visuddhomagga, 1937, p. 70. - Sanskrit sources in Kośa, VI, p. 225, 230-231; VIII, p. 130.

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For śīla, morality, in the Pāli sources, see references in Davids-Stede, Pāli Dictionary. For śīla in the Mahāyana, *bodhisattvaśīla*, see Śikṣasamuccaya with many sūtra references; Bodhicaryāvatāra and Pañjikā, Ādikarmapradīpa in L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme, études et matériaux*, 1898, p. 186 sq.; Bodh. bhūmi, *śīlapaṭala*, p. 137-188;

adhiśīlavihāra, p. 333-335; Yogacaryābhūmi, T 2579, k. XL-XLII, p. 510 seq.; Bodhisattvaprātimokṣasūtra, ed. N. Dutt, IHQ, VII, 1931, p. 259-286, etc.; Brahmajālasūtra in J. de Groot, *Le Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, 1893; *Das tibetische Brahmajālasūtra*, trans. F. Weller, ZII, 10, 1935, p. 1-61 (This has nothing in common with the preceding reference); Hobogitin, art. *Bosatsukai*, p. 142 sq.

Also: L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Le Vinaya et la pureté d'intention*, BCLS, 1929, p. 201-217; *Morale bouddhique*, 1927, p. 64; *Bouddhisme, opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, 1925, p. 302, 334; P. Oltramare, *Hist. des idées thosophiques*, II, 1923, p. 379; N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddh.*, 1930, p. 290: The Vinaya of the Mahāyānists; E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa*, 1926.

2. The three kinds of śīla or the three 'masses of protection': Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVI, 37; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 138(24) - 140 (27); Siddhi, p. 621, 631; Yogacaryābhūmi, T 1570, k. XI-XLII, p. 510 seq.; Daśabhūmivyākhyāna, T 1522, k. IV, p. 145. – see Hobogirin, art. *Bosatsukai*, p. 143-146.

3. The natural sins (*prakṛtisāvadya*), (cf. Kośa, IV, p. 83; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 164 (20), 165 (2), 165 (25), are forbidden to bodhisattvas as well as to śrāvakas. Natural sin means acts evil in themselves: above all, the ten *akuśalakarmapatha*, killing, theft, etc. (cf. Mahāvvyut., 1687-1698).

By contrast, the sins of disobedience (*pratikṣepaṇasāvadya*) forbidden to the śrāvakas, are allowed for the bodhisattva if the welfare of beings requires them to be committed. "It is a matter of certain actions not evil in themselves, but forbidden to the monastic by the Buddha who meticulously regulated the monastic regime: the monk should have only one robe, only one begging bowl; he should not eat after the noon meal; he should not sit down with dangling legs; he should not use perfumes or ointments, etc." (L. de la Vallée Poussin). These precepts number about 250. See H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, 1896, p. 73-76; M. Nagai, *Buddhist Vinaya discipline or buddhist commandments*, in *Buddhistic Studies* by B. C. Law, 1931, p. 365-382; J. Przyluski, *Le concile de Rājagṛha*, 1926, p. 71, 86. - On the altruistic nature of the precepts of the Mahāyāna, hobogirin, p. 142.

5. In view of the excellence of his upāyakaśālyā, the bodhisattva can commit murder, etc., in the service of beings. This crime is, for him, meritorious. Cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 164 (20) - 167 (26); L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Le Vinaya et la pureté d'intention*, p. 212, sq. - The story is known of the Jyotis who commit lust out of charity. Upāyakaśālyasūtra in Śikṣam., p. 167 (3-10); Bodhisacaryāvatārapañjikā, V, 84, p. 138-139.

The fabricated actions of body and speech by which the bodhisattva practices his sovereignty over beings are studied in the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 63-65. This concerns the nairmāṇiki ṛddhiḥ involving *kāya*- and *vāgnirmāṇa*. It is distinguished from the pāriṇāmiki ṛddhiḥ which will be studied in chap. VII, § 7. - The Bhāṣya gives the example of the act of the bodhisattva Sudhanakumāra which is related at length in the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra. Finally, the bodhisattvas appear in all forms of possible existence in order to aid and save beings. See especailly Vimalakīrtinirdeśa in Śikṣāsam. - The

bibliography of the Viśvantarajātaka is considerable: Jātaka, no. 547, VI, p. 479-596; Jātakamālā, no. 9, p. 51-67; Avadhānakalpalatā, no. 93.

Finally, the bodhisattvas appear in all possible sorts of forms of existence in order to aid and save beings. See especially the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa in Śikṣāsam., p. 324-327 (trans. Bendall-Rouse, 1922, p. 290-91; M. Winternitz, *Der Mahāyāna Buddhismus*, 1930, no. 19, p. 37-39); Hobogirin, art. *Bosatsu*, p. 139. – There is a large bibliography on the Viśvantarajātaka: Jātaka, no. 547, VI, p. 479-596; Jātakamālā, no. 9, p. 51-67 (trans. J. S. Speyer, p. 71-93); Avadhānakalpalatā, no. 93, ed. S. C. Das-H. M. Vidhyābhūṣaṇa, p. 645-661; F. A. Schiefner-W. R. S. Ralston, *Tibetan Tales*, no. 16, p. 257-272; Cariyāpiṭaka, I, np. 9 (trans. B. C. Law, p. 100-105); G. P. Malalasekera, *Dict. of Pāli Proper Names*, II, 1938, p. 944; E. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues*, III, no. 500, p. 362; IV, p. 247-248; R. Gauthiot, *Une version sogdienne du Vessantara Jātaka*, JA, 1912, p. 193-193, 429-510; L. Finot, BEFEO, 1903, p. 320-334; A. Foucher, BEFEO, I, 365; J. Bacot, Drimedkundan, *Une version tibétaine dialogue du Vessantara Jātaka*, JA, 1914, p. 221-305; A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Some early Buddhist reliefs identified*, JRAS, 1928, p. 390-398; O. Sirén, *An Exhibition of early Chinese sculptures*, 1928, p. 127-134; T. N. Ramachandran, *Buddhist sculptures from a stūpa near Goli village, Guntur District*, Bull. Madras Govt. Museum, vol. 1, no. 1, 1929; S. Karpeles, *Chronique de l'école Française d'Extrême-Orient*, BEFEO, 1931, p. 331.

CHAPTER VII

OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT MIND

(*adhicittam śikṣā*)

1. The superiority of excellent morality (*adhiśīlaviśeṣa*) has been explained in chapter VI. How should the superiority of excellent mind (*adhicittaviśeṣa*) be conceived? - In brief (*samāsataḥ*), it should be thought of as being of six types (*prabedha*).

The *adhicitta* is superior:

- i) in its object (*ālambanaprabhedha*),
- ii) in its variety (*nānātvaprabhedha*),
- iii) in its quality of counteragent (*pratipakṣa-prabhedha*),
- iv) in capability (*karmaṇyaprabhedha*),
- v) in product (*abhinirhāraprabhedha*),
- vi) in actions (*karmaprabhedha*). [146c15]

1. Comm. Bh 361c18, bh 209b8, U 427a26-427b2, u 318b8-319a1.

“Just as the excellent morality of the bodhisattva differs from the morality of the śrāvaka, so his excellent mind differs from the mind of the śrāvaka; that is why the author asks this question. *Superiority of six types*: this is the general answer to the question; the types are explained separately below.” (U) – “In the expression *excellent mind*, the word 'mind' is used in the sense of mental concentration (*caittasika samādhi*).” (u)

2. Superiority of object (*ālambanaviśeṣa*) because the *adhicitta* concerns (*ālabate*) the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyānadharma*). [146c15]

2. Comm. Bh 361c20-21, bh 209b8-210a1. U 427b4-4, u 319a1-2.

“The doctrine of the Greater Vehicle, i.e., the profound and vast doctrine(*gambhīravipuladeśanā*) contained in the Bodhisattva-piṭaka. The adhicitta is superior to the concentrations (*samādhi*) of the śrāvakas who do not have such an object.” (U)

3. Superiority in variety (*nānātvaviśeṣa*), because there is an infinite (*apramāṇa*) variety of concentrations (*samādhinānātva*), such as the Mahāyānāloka (Brilliance of the Greater Vehicle), the Sarvaṇyasaṃuccaya (Accumulation of all merit), the Samādhirājapālā (King of concentrations, Good Protector), the Śūraṅgama (Heroic march), etc. [146c17]

3. Comm. Bh 361c24-26, bh 210a1-2, U 427b7-9, u 319a2-5.

“The types of samādhi acquired by the bodhisattvas are infinite, but here, in brief, those that are at the top of the list (*pūrvavaṅgama*) are cited here, the word *etc.* designating all the others. In the vehicle of the śrāvakas, etc., the names are unknown, still less the possession of them.” (U)

In u are found the definitions of the four samādhis, which is missing in U: *gañ la sñoms par ĕugs na theg pa chen poñi chos mthañ dag snañ ba de theg pa chen po snañ bañi tiñ ñe ðdzin to // gañ du bsod nams thams cad yañ dag par bsags te / bdag gir byas par gyur pa de ni bsod nams thams cad yañ dag par bsags pa ĕes byaño // tiñ ñe ðdzin gyi rgyal po bzañ skyoñ ni / ðjig rten gyi rgyal po bĕin du tiñ ñe ðdzin thams cad kyi bdag po ste / gañ yod na phyogs bcu rnams su da ltar nyuñ bañi dus kyi sañs rgyas bcom ldan ðdas rnams mñon sum du mthoñ bar ðgyur baño // dpañ bar ðgro ba ni tiñ ñe ðdzin rnams kyi mchog ste / dmag mi rnams kyi nañ na dmag dpon dpañ bo bĕin du bdud kyi tshogs ðjoms par nus paño. - This means: “The concentration in which the entire doctrine (*sakaladharmā*) of the Greater Vehicle shines brilliantly is the Mahāyānāloka. - That in which all merits (*puṇya*) are gathered (*saṃcita*) and appropriated (*svīkṛta*) is called Sarvaṇyasaṃuccaya. - The Samādhirāja-bhadrapālā, like a king of the land (*lokarāja*)*

is the chief one of all the samādhis. By means of its presence, the Buddha Bhagavats of the present time (*pratyutpannakāla*) and of the ten directions (*daśadiś*) are seen face to face (*abhimukha*). - The Śūraṅgama is the best (*vara*) of the samādhis; like a hero (*śūra*), the head of the army (*akṣauhiṇīpati*) in the midst of his soldiers (*kaṭaka*), he is able to cut the troops of Māra to pieces (*pramardana*).”

4. Superiority as counteragent (*pratipakṣaviśeṣa*), because the knowledge that bears on all the dharmas in a combined way (*sarvadharmasamsrṣṭālambana jñāna*), just as one nail is driven out by another nail (*āṇīpratyāṇīnirhārayogena*, cf. Mahāvvyut., 6865), eradicates (*niḥsārayati*) all obstacles and weaknesses (*āvaraṇadauṣṭhulya*) occurring in the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).

[146c19]

4. Comm. Bh 361c29-362a3, bh 210a2-4, U 427b12-15, u 319a5-8.

“Knowledge in regard to the combined object (*samsrṣṭadharmālambana jñāna*) appears as the antidote to all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇapratipakṣa*). It is like a thin nail (*sūkṣmāṇī*) that drives out a thick nail (*sthūlāṇī*). Indeed, the propensity seeds (*vāsanābīja*) of the defiled dharmas (*sāṃkleśikadharmā*) that reside in the store-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna* = *ālayavijñāna*) are coarse (*stūla*) and the counteracting path (*pratipakṣamārga*) able to eradicate them is subtle (*sūkṣma*).” (Bh)

“The true nature (*tathatā*), the object of nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) is made up (*prabhāvita*) of the nature common to all dharmas (*sarvadharmasāmānyalakṣaṇa*). That is why this nonconceptual knowledge is called knowledge in regard to the combined object (*samsrṣṭālambana*). The concentration (*samādhi*) producing this counteracting knowledge (*pratipakṣajñāna*) is also called antidote (*pratipakṣa*). The noble path (*āryamārga*), which is subtle (*sūkṣma*), is like a thin nail, whereas the seeds that are counteracted (*vipakṣabīja*), which are coarse, are like a thick nail.” (U)

5. Superiority of capability (*karmaṇyatāviśeṣa*) because, while abiding in the bliss of dhyāna (*dhyānasukha*), the bodhisattva takes birth (*janma pariḡḥṇāti*) wherever he wishes. [146c21]

5. Comm. Bh 362a6-8, bh 210a4-5, U 427b17-19, u 319a8-319b2.

Cf. u: *las su ruñ ba ñid kyis rab tu dbye ba ni bsam gtan gyi bde ba dag gis gnas nas bsam gtan las yoñs su ma ñams pa bñin du ji ltar ḥdod pa gañ du sems can gyi don mton ba der skye ste / tiñ ñe ḥdzin las su ruñ bañi phyir ro // ḥdi ḥdra bañi tiñ ñe ḥdzin gyi las su suñ ba ñid ni ñan thos la sogs pa ñid la med do*: "Superiority of capability (*karmaṇyatāviśeṣa*) because, while abiding in the bliss of dhyāna (*dhyānasukha*) and without falling away from bliss, he takes birth according to his choice (*yathākāma*) wherever he sees usefulness for beings (*sattvārtha*), for his samādhi lends itself to action. Such capability of concentration (*samādhikarmaṇyatā*) does not occur in the śrāvakas, etc.

6. Superiority in products (*abhinirhāraśeṣa*), because the adhicitta produces (*abhinirharati*) the unobstructed (*apratihata*) superknowledges (*abhijñā*) in all the universes (*lokadhātu*). [146c23]

6. Comm. Bh 362a11-12, bh 210a5-6, U 427b21-22, u 319b2.

"Superiority in products, because the power of concentration (*samādhibala*) produces all types of unobstructed superknowledges (*nānāpratihatabhijñā*) in all the universes." (U). - Cf. Chap. X, § 15.

7. Superiority in actions (*karmaśeṣa*), because the adhicitta produces (*abhinirharati*) the great magical powers (*mahāṛddhi*, cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 58-63):

1) causing something to shake (*kampana*),

2) flaming (*jvalana*),

- 3) illuminating (*spharaṇa*),
- 4) making visible (*vidarśana*),
- 5) transforming (*anyathābhāvakaraṇa*),
- 6) going and coming (*gamanā*),
- 7) concentrating and developing (*saṃkṣepaprathana*),
- 8) introducing all *rūpa* into his body (*sarvarūpakāyapraveśana*),
- 9) taking on the ways of those whom he meets (*sabhāgatopasaṃkrānti*),
- 10) appearing and disappearing (*āvīrbhāvatirobhāva*),
- 11) subjugating to his will (*vaśītvakaraṇa*),
- 12) subduing the magical power of others (*paraṛddhyabhibhava*),
- 13) giving the light of intellect (*pratibhādāna*),
- 14) giving memory (*smṛtidāna*),
- 15) giving bliss (*sukhadāna*),
- 16) emitting light rays (*raśmipramokṣa*). [146c26]

7. Comm. Bh 362a17-362b7, bh 210a6-210b7, U 427b26-427c3, u 319b2-8.

The pāriṇāmiki ṛiddhiḥ, studied in detail in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 58-63, is summarized as follows by L. de La Vallée Poussin in Siddhi, Appendix, p. 892-793.

The magical power of transformation manifests in sixteen ways:

- 1) *kampana*, causing to shake. - The Tathāgata or the bodhisattva who possesses either mastery in concentration or agility of mind (fitness, *karmaṇyatā*), causes a monastery, a house, a village and city (*grāmagara*), a field, hell, the realm of animals, pretas, human, gods ... up to ... an infinite number of great chiliocosms, to shake.
- 2) *jvalana*, to blaze. - He blazes at the upper part of his body while at the same time the lower part emits streams of cold water, and vice versa. He is completely on fire and emits blue, green, red, white, light red (*mañjiṣṭha*), crystal-clear (*sphaṭikavarṇa*) rays of light.

- 3) *spharaṇa*, to illumine. - He fills monasteries, etc., as in 1) with light.
- 4) *vidarśana*, to make visible. - He makes all the classes of beings (*śramaṇa ... mahoragāḥ parśadah*) see the realms, the buddha fields with their inhabitants, etc.
- 5) *anyathībhāvakarāṇa*, transmutation. - By means of *adhimukti*, i.e., 'intense application of the mind, excellent action of will', he changes the great elements (earth, water, etc.) one into another, and also changes color-shape (*rūpa*) into sound, etc.
- 6) *gamanāgamana*, going and coming. - He passes through obstacles, walls, etc.; he rises up to the Akaniṣṭha heaven in his material body formed by the four great elements.
- 7) *saṃkṣepaprathana*, concentrating and developing. - He reduces mountains to the size of atoms and inversely.
- 8) *sarvarūpakāyapraveśana*. - He introduces all *rūpa* (villages, mountains, etc.) into his body (*sarvarūpakāyam ātmakāye praveśayati*), in the presence of a large company that recognizes itself as having entered into his body.
- 9) *sabhāgatopasaṃkrānti*. - He takes on the appearance, the ways of speaking, etc., of any company that he meets, kṣatriya, etc. (cf. Dīgha, II, p. 109).
- 10) *āvīrbhāvatirobhāva*. - He appears and disappears a hundred times, a thousand times, etc., in the presence of a numerous company.
- 11) *vaśītakaraṇa*. - He causes the creatures of all the realms to come, go, stop, speak according to his will.
- 12) *paraṛddhyabhibhava*. - He 'controls' the magical power of others. The Tathāgata surpasses the magical power of all the magicians. The same for the bodhisattva who has arrived at the summit (*niṣṭhā*), who is living his last or next-to-last existence, with the exception of the Tathāgata and the bodhisattvas of rank equal or superior to his.
- 13) *pratibhādāna*. - He gives the light of intellect to creatures who are deprived of it.
- 14) *smṛtidāna*. - The same for memory.
- 15) *sukhadāna*. - For a time, he gives material comfort (*pratiprasrabhisukha*), thanks to which creatures, freed from obstacles, are able to hear the Dharma, obstacles that are produced by the turmoil of the elements (that cause sickness, *dhātuvaīṣamika*), by demons' attacks (*amanuṣya*), etc.

16) *raśmipramokṣa*.- He emits rays of light that pacify (*pratipraśrambh-*) the sufferings of hell beings, summon the Buddhas and bodhisattvas ... in a word, realize the benefit (*artha*) of creatures.

8. Superiority in actions (*karmaviśeṣa*) as well, because the adhicitta comprises (*saṃgrhṇāti*) and produces (*abhinirharati*) the ten achievements (*duṣkaracaryā*) as well. These ten achievements are:

- i) The achievement of vows (*pratijñāduṣkaracaryā*), because he undertakes (*upagacchati*) the vows of great enlightenment (*mahābodhipraṇidhāna*).
- ii) The achievement of not withdrawing (*avivartana-duṣkaracaryā*), because he does not withdraw before the sufferings of transmigration (*saṃskāraduḥkha*).
- iii) The achievement of not turning his back (*aparāṇmukhībhāvaduṣkaracaryā*), because he does not turn his back on the bad conduct (*mithyāpratipatti*) of all beings.
- iv) The achievement of devoting himself (lit., facing up to, (*abhimukhībhāvaduṣkaracaryā*), because he devotes himself to doing whatever benefit is possible (*sarvārthakriyā*) to evil beings (*ghātakasattva*).
- v) The achievement of being unstained (*anutpalepaduṣkara-caryā*) because, while living in the world, he is unstained (*upalipta*) by human circumstances (*lokadharmā*).
- vi) The achievement consisting of convinced adherence (*adhimuktiduṣkaracaryā*), because even without understanding (*avabudh-*) it, he adheres (*adhimucyate*) to the vast and profound (*vaipulyagāmbhīrya*) doctrine of the Greater Vehicle.
- vii) The achievement consisting of penetrating (*prativedha-duṣkaracaryā*), because it penetrates (*pratividhyati*) the non-existence of self of the individual and of things (*pudgala-dharmanairātmya*).

viii) The achievement consisting of understanding (*avabodhaduṣkaracaryā*), because he understands (*avabudhyate*) the profound enigmatical words (*gambhīra saṃdhābhāṣya*) of the Tathāgatas.

ix) The achievement of not quitting and not being defiled (*aparityāganiḥsaṃkleśaduhkaracaryā* ?), because he does not abandon (*parityajati*) saṃsāra, but is not defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*) by it.

x) The achievement of effort (*prayogaduṣkaracaryā*), because the Buddhas who are established in the removal of all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇamukti*) exert themselves (*prayuṅkte*) until the end of saṃsāra (*ā saṃsāraḥ*) to spontaneously (*anābhogataḥ*) render service to all beings (*sarvasattvārthakriyā*). [147a10]

8. Comm. Bh 362b21-25, bh 210b7-211a1, U 427c16-428a7, u 319b8-320a7.

“i) Not to take vows for one's own happiness but to commit oneself to rendering service (*arthakriyā*) to all beings is very difficult....

ii) Not to withdraw before the sufferings of lengthy saṃsāra, wind (*vāyu*), cold (*śīta*), etc., is very difficult....

iii) Some beings behave badly towards their parents ... To render them service without considering their mistakes (*doṣa*) is very difficult ...

iv) To lend oneself to the service of others even if one fears them greatly is very difficult ...

v) While still living in the world, not to be stained by the eight human situations (*lokadharmā*), gain (*lābha*), etc. (cf. chap. II, § 33; VIII, § 14) is very difficult ...

vi) To grant one's faith (*śraddhā*) and one's convinced adherence (*adhimukti*) to a subtle (*sūkṣma*) and very powerful doctrine when one does not understand it is very difficult

vii) The words 'prativedha', 'abhisamaya' and 'samyagavabodhi' are synonymous (*ekārtha*). To penetrate the non-existence of self of the individual and of things (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*) that are imaginary (*parikalpita*) is very difficult ...

viii) Rejecting the obvious meaning (*śrutārtha nirākaraṇa*) of the enigmatic (*saṃdhābhāṣya*) words of the Buddha in order to grasp the hidden (*aśrutārthānvaya*) meaning is very difficult

ix) Dwelling in saṃsāra without entering into error is very difficult.

x) Having cut through and loosened the obstacle of the emotions and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*), devoting oneself always to the service of all beings, going to the final end without stopping and delighting in this effort is very difficult.” (U)

9. Concerning the avabodhaduṣkaracaryā (the 8th achievement in § 8), what is the nature (*kīdrś*) of these enigmatic words (*saṃdhābhāṣya*) of the Buddhas that the bodhisattva comes to understand (*avabudh-*)? - A sūtra says the following:

- i) How does the bodhisattva practice generosity (*dānam upaiti*)? When, without giving anything, he practices generosity widely in the innumerable universes (*apramāṇalokadhātu*) of the ten directions (*daśadīś*).
- ii) How does he love generosity (*dānaṃ rocate*)? When he does not love any gift.
- iii) How does he believe in generosity (*dānam adhimucyate*)? When he practices generosity without having faith (*śraddhā*) in the Tathāgatas.
- iv) How does he activate generosity (*dānam pravartayati*)? When he does not activate generosity, i.e., when he gives naturally (*svabhāvataḥ*).
- v) How does he delight in generosity (*dāne 'bhiramate*)? When he does not give anything (*na kadā chit*) ever.
- vi) How is his generosity widespread (*viśala*)? When his mind for generosity is not solidified (*asārasaṃjñā*).
- vii) How is his generosity pure (*śuddha*)? When he produces (*utpādayati*) avarice (*mātsarya*).
- viii) How does his generosity come to an end (*niṣthāgata*)? When he does not stop at the end (*niṣthā*).

ix) How is he master (*adhipati*) of generosity? When he has no sovereignty (*vaśita*) over generosity.

x) How is his generosity indestructible (*akṣaya*)? When he is not fixed in the indestructible.

What is said here about generosity should be applied likewise (*yathāyogam*) to the other virtues from morality (*śīla*) to wisdom (*prajñā*). [147a24]

9. Comm. Bh 362c15-363a11, bh 211a1-211b4, U 428a23-428b21, u 320a7-321a2.

“i) *When, without giving anything, he practices generosity widely.* The bodhisattvas include all beings in their own self-nature (*svabhāva*) because they have penetrated (*pratividh-*) the identity of themselves and others (*svaparasamatā*). When others practice generosity, it is the bodhisattvas who are giving; that is why it is said that they practice generosity when they give nothing. Moreover, they have given all the wealth that they possessed to the whole world; that is why it is said that they give nothing. Finally, as the gift given (*deya*), the donor (*dāyaka*) and the receiver of the gift (*pratigrāhaka*) do not exist, their generosity is of threefold purity (*trimaṇḍalapariśuddha*) (cf. Notes chap. IV, § 5); that is why it is said that they give nothing.

ii) *When he does not love any gift.* This phrase is the exact opposite of the question, i.e., that the bodhisattva loves a gift by not loving it at all. All thoughts such as "I am giving to the supplicant so that he will give to me later on" or, "I am giving if he has already given to me" are repugnant to the bodhisattva. He practices generosity by loving and seeking only the blissful abode (*sukhavihāra*), nirvāṇa.

iii) *When he practices generosity without having faith in the Tathāgatas.* The bodhisattva practices generosity with this personal knowledge and this intimate conviction that allows him to directly perceive (*sākṣātkṛ-*) the true nature of things (*dharmatā*). He is not content with believing others.

iv) *When he does not activate generosity.* The bodhisattva practices generosity spontaneously (*svarasena*). He does not have to make an effort in order to compel others and encourage them to give.

v) *When he never gives anything,* i.e., when he has always given everything.

vi) *When his mind for generosity is without solidity.* The word *asāra* has as its evident meaning (hien mou), 'solidity', and as its hidden meaning (*abhisam̐dhi*), 'distraction' (*vikṣepa*). [For *sāra* and *asāra*, cf. chap. II, § 31]. Taken in its hidden meaning, the phrase means that the bodhisattva practices generosity with a mind free of distraction (*avikṣiptasam̐jñā*), i.e., in samādhi or mind concentration (*cittasamādhāna*).

vii) *When he produces avarice.* The word *utpa-* has as its obvious meaning 'to produce' (*samutpāda*) and as its hidden meaning 'to eradicate' (*utpaṭ-* = *unmūlana*). Taken in its hidden meaning, the phrase means that the bodhisattva practices generosity by suppressing (*samudghāta*) avarice.

viii) *When he does not quit at the end.* Not like the śrāvakas who have tranquility as the one vehicle (*śamathaikayānika*, cf. Sam̐dhinir. VII, § 15, p. 74), the bodhisattva does not stop at the end, at nirvāṇa-without-residue (*nirvikalpadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*). [This point is developed in chap. IX, § 1].

ix) *When he has no sovereignty over generosity,* i.e., when avarice (*mātsarya*) and the other vices opposing generosity (*dānavipakṣa*) do not dominate him.

x) *When he is not fixed in the indestructible.* Having arrived at perfection (*saṃpad*), at indestructible sovereignty (*akṣayādhipya*), at definitive buddhahood (*ātyantikabuddhatā*), the bodhisattva is not fixed there. How is that? Creating fabricated (*nirmāṇa*) bodies in the interests of others (*parārtha*), he continues to practice generosity.

What has been said about generosity should be applied likewise to the other virtues from morality to wisdom. That applies to the other five virtues. Thus a sūtra says: How does the bodhisattva have morality (*śīla*)? When he observes no discipline. This means that the bodhisattva sees the identity of himself and others. Also when the others observe pure discipline, the bodhisattva is himself endowed with morality.” (U)

10. [Here is another example of enigmatic language where the technical expressions must be taken in their etymological sense. In order to find the term explained etymologically, just join up the letters printed in roman letters, i.e. those not italicized].

i) How is the bodhisattva the killer of living beings (*prāṇatipātīn*)? When he takes beings out of transmigration (*yadi prāṇinaḥ saṃārato 'tipātayati*).

- ii) How is he the thief who takes what has not been given (*adattādāyin*)? When, without anyone having given him anything, he appropriates to himself all beings (*yady adattam apy ātmanā sarvattvān ādadāti*)
- iii) How does he misbehave in love (*kāmamithyācārin*)? When he acts by saying that all love is bad (*yadi kāmā mithyā iti carati*).
- iv) How is he a teller of lies (*mṛṣāvadin*)? When he calls a lie a lie (*yadi mṛṣam mṛṣam iti vadati*).
- v) How is he a slanderer (*paśūnyavādin*)? When he always abides in the supreme dwelling of emptiness (*yadi parama śūnyavihāre nityam viharati*).
- vi) How does he have harmful speech (*pāruṣyavādin*)? When he is on the other bank of knowledge (*yadi jñeyapārausitaḥ*).
- vii) How does he have thoughtless speech (*saṃbhinna-pralāpin*)? When he preaches the Dharma by analysing dharmas correctly (*yadi sarvadharmān saṃbhidyā pralapati*).
- viii) How is he full of envy (*sa-abhidhyā*)? When he attains supreme dhyāna many times (*yady abhīkṣam aṇuttaram dhyānam pratilabhate*).
- ix) How is he full of wickedness (*sa-vyāpāda*)? When he suppresses all the defects of his mind (*yadi sarvacittakleśān vyāpādayati*).
- x) How is he full of wrong views (*sa-mithyādrṣṭi*)? When he shows clearly the omnipresent falsehood (*yadi sarvatragam mithyātvaṃ yathābhūtaṃ darśayati*). [147b5]

10. Comm. Bh 363a22-363b4, bh 211b4-7, U 428c2-20, u 321a2-321b2.

“Cf. the sūtra where it is said: ‘O monks, I am a murderer, etc.’ Here the author explains the hidden meaning (*abhiprāya*) of these texts.

i) *When he takes beings out of transmigration.* ‘To take out’ is synonymous with ‘to kill’, and so the answer is in accord with the question.

ii) *When, without anyone giving him something, he appropriates beings.* Without someone inviting him (*udyuj-*), he personally takes on (*ādadāti*) the interests of the other person (*parārtha*).

iii) *When he acts knowing that all love is bad.* He knows full well (*yathābhūtaṃ prajānati*) that love of sensate objects (*viṣayakāma*) and love of imaginary things (*parikalpakāma* ?) are depraved. A stanza says: The Buddha has said that desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and ignorance (*moha*) come from the imagination (*parikalpasamutpanna*). The pure (*śubha*) and the impure (*aśubha*) also come from error (*viparyāsa*) which is their condition (*pratyaya*). Pure and impure, both of which have this error as condition for their arising, do not exist in themselves (*svabhāvataḥ*). Thus desire (*kāma*) in regard to them is futile (*asaṃbhava*).

iv) *When he calls a lie that which is a lie.* It is because he calls a lie a lie that he is called *mṛṣāvādin*. A verse says: The Bhagavat has indeed defined all deceitful dharmas. Among these, the *saṃskāras* are the most deceitful.

v) *When he always dwells in the supreme abode of emptiness.* This answer to question v) rests on a popular etymology (*nirukti*). *Paiśūnya* has 'slandering words' (li kien yu = *paiśūnyavāda* according to Mahāvvyut. 8422) as its obvious meaning (hien mou). Its hidden meaning is 'eternal supreme emptiness' (*nityaparamaśūnya*); indeed, *pai* (Ch. pei, classification 154) stands for *parama*, *śu* (Ch. siu, 62 and 2) stands for *śūnya* and *ni* (Ch. ni, 44 and 2) stands for *nitya*. If this hidden meaning is adopted, the answer is in accordance (*saṃprayukta*), whereas if one keeps to the obvious meaning, it is not in accordance.

vi) *When he is on the other bank of the knowledge.* *Pāruṣya* is also taken in its etymological sense. As its obvious meaning, *pāruṣya* is 'harmful speech' (*pāruṣyavāda*); as hidden meaning, 'to be on the other shore' (po ngan, 85 and 5; 46 and 5, = *pāra* acc. to Mahāvvyut. 2663). Adopting this hidden meaning, the author is saying: *when he is on the other shore of knowledge.* The other shore of knowledge (*jñeyapāra*) is omniscience (*sarvajñāna*). That is where the Buddha dwells in peace.

vii) *When he preaches the Dharma by analyzing dharmas correctly.* This explanation of *saṃbhinnapralāpa* is easy to understand.

viii) *When he obtains supreme dhyāna many times.* As above, an explanation of the etymological type. The dhyāna that is in the Buddha's body (*buddhakāya*) is supreme (*anuttara*).

ix) *When he suppresses all the defects of his mind.* 'Destroy, cut' are synonyms of suppress.

x) *When he sees the omnipresent falseness very well, i.e., when he sees that everything has deceit, imagination, falseness as nature.'* (U)

11. The 'profound attributes of the Buddha' (*gambhīra buddhadharma*) are spoken of. What are they?

i) The eternal dharmas (*nityadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha because the dharmakāya of the Buddha is eternal (*nitya*).

ii) The dharmas of abandonment (*prahāṇadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha because the Buddha has cut all the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*).

iii) The dharmas of arising (*utpādadharma*) are attributes of the Buddha because the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) of the Buddha takes birth.

iv) The dharmas of acquisition (*upalabdhidharma*) are attributes of the Buddha because the 84,000 behaviors of beings (*sattvacarya*) and their antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) are acquired (or perceived, *upalabdha*) by the Buddha.

v) The dharmas connected with lust (*sarāgadharma*) are attributes of the Buddha because the Buddha recognizes (*abhyupagacchati*) his fundamental equality in respect to lustful beings (*sarāgasattva*).

vi - viii) For the same reason, the dharmas connected with hatred (*sadveṣadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha, the dharmas connected with ignorance (*samohadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha and the dharmas of ordinary people (*prthagjanadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha.

ix) The dharmas free of stains (*alīptadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha because the true nature (*tathatā*) fully realized (*niṣpanna*) by the Buddha is not stained by any obstacle (*āvaraṇa*).

x) The dharmas free of stains (*anupalīptadharmā*) are attributes of the Buddha because, while dwelling in the world, he is not soiled (*upalīpta*) by any human situation (*lokadharmā*).

That is why the dharmas of the Buddha are profound. [147b17]

11. Comm. Bh 363b18-26, bh 211b8-212a4, U 429a12-429b1, u 321b2-322a4.

“What is the meaning of profound attributes of the Buddha of which the sūtra speaks? It is a matter here of another sūtra saying that *the eternal dharmas are the attributes of Buddha*, and so on up to *the dharmas free of dirtiness are the attributes of the Buddha*. There is a hidden meaning which the author is going to explain.

i) *Because the dharmakāya of the Buddha is eternal.* The dharmakāya has the transformation of the support (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). (Cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 1) as its nature (*lakṣaṇa*). It is the true nature (*tathatā*) freed of all obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇavimukta*), eternal (*nitya*) because immutable (*avikāra*). Or indeed, it is supreme immaculate unhindered knowledge (*vimalam apratihataṃ cānuttarajñānam*). It is not of the order of retribution (*vipāka*) like the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) because it is pure (*anāsrava*). It also pertains to the eternal dharmakāya because it is undifferentiated (*nirviśiṣṭa*) and is not conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) by actions (*karman*) and afflictions (*kleśa*).

iv) *Because the 84,000 behaviors of beings and their antidotes are acquired by the Buddha.* The 84,000 sections of the Dharma (*dharmaskandha*, cf. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 254, transl. Kern, p. 241; Burnouf, Introd., p. 34, seq.; Kośa I, p. 46-47; Uttaratantra, p. 184) are the remedies (*pratipakṣa*) for the 84,000 behaviors of beings (cf. chap. II, § 31) dominated, some by desire (*rāgacarita*), some by hatred (*dveṣacarita*), some by ignorance (*mohacarita*), and some by pride. (Cf. Kośa I, p. 47; VI, p. 297). This makes up four groups each consisting of 21,000 units.

ix) *The dharmas free of stains are the attributes of the Buddha*, because the pure tathatā is not stained by any obstacle (*āvaraṇa*). The rest is easily understood; there is no need to explain it.

What are the results (*phala*) of these enigmatic words (*sāṃdhābhāṣya*) of the Buddha? They easily allow the speaker (*śāstrī*) to explain (*vyavasthāp-*); by condensing the meaning (*artha*), he addresses himself easily to others. Thus they allow the listener (*śrāvaka*) to understand easily, to complete (*paripūr-*) his accumulations (*saṃbhāra*) easily by grasping the teaching (*deśana*), by penetrating (*pratividh-*) the nature of things (*dharmatā*) by completing his accumulations. The listener acquires intelligent faith (*avetyaprasāda*) with respect to the Buddha whose magnanimity (*māhātmya*) he understands. Similarly with respect to the Dharma and the Saṃgha, both of which are superior. In this way, he acquires the truly fortunate abodes (*dr̥ṣṭadharmasukhavihāra*) by virtue of his awareness of the Three Jewels, Buddha, Dharma and Saṃgha. In the company of wise ones, his information (*upadeśa*) is sharpened and he enters into the category of the wise ones. Such are the ten advantages of the enigmatic words.

There are also enigmatic words in the Vehicle of the śrāvakas, such as the stanza: 'Having killed his father and his mother,' etc. They also present these ten advantages.' (U) –

[This probably concerns stanza 294 of the Dhammapada, which has already been mentioned in chap. III, § 10, no. 4: *mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā, rājano dve ca khattiye, raṭṭhaṃ sānucaraṃ hantvā, anīgho yāti brāhmaṇo*. This stanza literally means: 'Having killed his mother and father and two kings of the kṣatriya class, having destroyed the kingdom with its subjects, the brāhmin is innocent,' But according to the commentary, it should be understood thus: ' Having killed the thirst (*taṇhā*) and the pride of self (*asmimāna*), and the false views of eternity and annihilation (*sassatucchedadiṭṭhi*), having destroyed the twelve sense-fields (*dvādasāyatana*) with sensual desire (*nandirāga*), the khīṇāsava is without suffering (*niddukkha*).' See also the explanations of the Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā, III, p. 454:

tattha sānucaran ti āyasādhakena āyuttakena sahitam, ettha hi "taṇhā janeti purisan" ti vacanato tīsu bhavesu sattānaṃ jananato taṇhā mātā nāma; "ahaṃ asukassa nāma rañño vā rājamahāmatassa vā putto" ti pitaraṃ nissāya asmimānassa uppajjanato pitā nāma; loko viya rājanaṃ yasmā sabbadiṭṭhigatāni dve sassatucchedadiṭṭhiyo bhajantī,

tasmā sassatucchedadiṭṭhiyo dve khattiyarājāno nāma; dvādasāyatanāni vitthaṭaṭṭhena raṭṭhasadisattā raṭṭhaṃ nāma, āyasādhako āyuttakapuriso viyo taṃ nissito nandirāgo anucaro nāma, anīgho tu niddukkho, brāhmaṇo ti khīṇāsavo, etesaṃ taṇhādīnaṃ arahattamaggañāsinaṃ hatattā khīṇāsavo niddukkho hutvā yāti ti ayam ettha attho.]

The stanza *mataraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā* (Dhammapada, no. 294) and the stanza *asāre sāramatino* (Dhammapada, no. 11, considerably altered in the Saṃgraha, chap. II, § 31, and the Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 82) are often given as examples of enigmatic language; cf. Abhidharma-samuccaya, T 1605, k. 7, p. 694a21.

12. Finally, the development of the virtues (*pāramitābhāvana*), the ripening of beings (*sattvapariṭācana*), the purification of the buddhafiels (*buddhakṣetrapariśodana*) and the production of the attributes of the Buddha (*buddhadharmābhinirhāra*) should be considered as so many special actions (*karmaprabheda*) belonging to the bodhisattvas' samādhis. [147b18]

12. Comm. Bh 363c1-7, bh 212a4-8, U 429b4-9, u 322a4-7.

“The concentrations obtained by the bodhisattvas have, moreover, a fourfold activity. By being themselves based on these concentrations, they are able to cultivate all the virtues and ripen all categories of beings because, utilizing the means (*upāya*) they have at their disposal, magical powers (*ṛddhi*), etc., they establish beings in the holy Dharma (*saddharma*). They can also purify the buddhafiels by transforming them into gold (*suvarṇa*) and other precious substances according to their wishes. They are able to acquire (*samudāgama*) all the Buddha attributes, such as the powers (*bala*), the fearlessnesses (*vaiśhārya*), etc. Outside of these concentrations in question, this fourfold activity consisting of the cultivation of the virtues, etc., cannot be exercised. Thus the śrāvakas, etc., do not have them.” (U)

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Adhicitta, the superior mind, the great samādhi, characterizes the third bhūmi in particular cf. Bodh. bhūmi, *adhicittavihāra*, p. 335-338; Saṃdhinir, IX, § 2; Siddhi, p.

730. This is the second of the three śikṣās: *adhicittam śikṣā*: Saṃdhinir., IX, § 9; Uttarantra, p. 121; Siddhi, p. 313, 632.

2. Object of adhicitta: the law of the Mahāyāna contained in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. The latter is defined (Bodh, bhūmi, p. 96(6)): *tatra dvādaśhāṅgād vacogatād yad vaipulyam tadbodhisattvapiṭakam. avaśiṣṭam śrāvakaapiṭakam veditavyam*. See also Bodh. bhūmi, p. 160 (26), 173 (214), 274 (21). 330 (16), 336 (11); *bodhisattvapiṭakadeśanā*, Bodh. bhūmi, p. 298 (4); *-mātrkā*, p. 157 (4), 180 (16), 332 (23); *-vaipulya*, p. 197 (10). See also Saṃdhinir., IX, § 9, 10, 18; Uttarantra, p. 227; J. Przyluski, La légende de l'empereur Aśoka, 1923, p. 100; Le Concile de Rajāgrha, 1926, p. 114, 120, 124, 357-359, 361.

3. The four samādhis. These samādhis are of the domain of the fourth dhyāna: they are exclusively pure (*anāsrava*): They cannot be attained before the bhūmis. These samādhis are infinite in number (cf. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, XXIII, p. 424 (7)). - There is a list of 118 s. in Mahāvut., no. 506-623; Śatasāhasrikā P.P., p. 825, 1412, 1531; Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka, p. 90. - Most frequently, as here, only the first four are cited: mahāyānaloka, sarvapūṇyasamuccaya, samādhirājabhadrāpāla and śūraṃgama: Siddhi, p. 632 (to be corrected according to the terms below, restored according to the

Tibetan Upanibandhana). Another tetrad in Dharmasaṃgraha, CXXXVI: gaganagañja, vimalaprabha, śiṃhavikrīḍita, śūraṃgama. - The second s. of Saṃgraha, sarvapūṇyasamuccaya, is cited in Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 424 (5). The śūraṃgamasamādhi is explained in Buddhahūmisūtraśāstra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 316a8; it has given its name to two sūtras: T 642, p. 629; T 945, p. 105. It exists as Sanskrit fragments published by R. Hoernle, Manuscript Remains, 1916, p. 125, sq; T 945, p. 105, partially trans. By S. Beal, A catena of Buddhist scriptures, 1871, p. 284-369.

4. On knowledge in regard to the combined object, see notes to chap. III, § 12

On the weakness (*dauṣṭhulya*) of the store-consciousness, refer to chap. I, § 61 and the references connected with it.

The example of the nail driven out by another nail occurs in Saṃdhinir., VIII, v. 36, no. 3.

5. For birth at will (*yathākāmapatti*) of the bodhisattva, cf. chap. VI, § 5. Otherwise, these births are fabricated: see chap. X, § 36, no. 1.

7. Pāriṇāmikī ṛddhi in the Mahāyāna: Bodh. bhūmi, p. 58-63; Siddhi, p. 792-793. We know that *ṛddhi* is concentration (*samādhi*) according to Kośa, VI, p. 285, VII, p. 98, 112; Paṭisaṃbhidhā, p. 205-206. The Hīnayāna counts ten types of *iddhi*: Dīgha, I, p. 78, 212; II, p. 87, 213; III, p. 112, 281; Saṃyutta, II, p. 121; V, p. 264, 303; Aṅguttara, p. 180, 255, III, p. 17, 28, 82, 425; V, p. 199; Paṭisaṃbhidhā, I, p. 111, II, p. 207; Visuddhimagga, p. 378 seq.; Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, I, p. 222; Atthasālinī, p. 91; limits of their power: Katthāvattu, p. 606 seq.

8. The ten duṣkaracaryās of the bodhisattva. - Cf. the d. of Śākyamuni, Lalitavistara, XVII, p. 243-260; heroism in the practice of the pāramitās and the saṃgrahavastus mentioned in Bodh. bhūmi: *dāna*, p. 183 (19);, *śīla*, p. 132 (3); *kṣānti*, p. 195 (21); *vīrya*, p. 202 (2); *dhyāna*, p. 208 (10); *prajñā*, p. 213 (4); *priyavāditā*, p. 218 (3); *arthacaryā*, p. 221 (27).

9 - 11. These paragraphs are an application of chap. II, § 31 which should be consulted in the Notes. Avabodhaduṣkaracaryā is the feat of understanding the enigmatic words (*saṃdhābhāṣya*) of the Tathāgatas. The Laṅkāvatāra recommends untangling the enigmatic meaning of all dharmas (*sarvadharmasaṃdhyarthaparimocana*, p. 160 (9) by avoiding being held up by the literal meaning (*yathārutābhīniveśa*, p. 161; it enumerates many samādhis. The same advice occurs in the Bhadramāyākāra, p. 95-102. We know indeed that, besides the sūtras of explicit meaning (*nītartha*), there are sūtras the meaning of which should be determined by reflecting (*neyartha*); see Kośa, IX, p. 246-248; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 77; Madh. avatāra, p. 195; Siddhi, p. 558. A good resumé of the doctrine in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 108: *iha bodhisattvaḥ arthapratisaranaś ca bhavati cintayan na vyañjanapratisaranaḥ ... arthaṃ pratiṣaran bodhisattvo na vyañjanam budhhānām Bhagavatām sarvasaṃbhyāyavacanāny anupraviśati.*

Lamotte says that he has not succeeded in identifying the sūtras of allegorical meaning proposed here as example: the first (§ 9) contains paradoxes on generosity; the second (§ 10) sets forth enigmas on the ten karmapathas (cf. Mahāvvyut., 1686-1698; the third (§ 11) deals with the profound buddhadharmas.

12. Other activities of the samādhis:

i. pāramitābhāvanā, cf. chap. IV, § 8

ii. sattvapariṣkāna, cf. the lengthy study in Bodh. bhūmi: *paripākapāṭala*, p. 78-87; Sūtrālaṃkāra, IX, 49-55; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 77 (4), 95 (1), 164(8), 209 (8).

iii. kṣetrapariśodana, cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, VII, 7; Madhyantavibhaṅga, p. 98 (8), 105 (16), 256 (17).

iv. buddhadharmābhīnirhāra, cf. chap. X, § 9.

CHAPTER VIII

THE OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT WISDOM

(*adhiprajñam śikṣā*)

1. The superiority of excellent mind (*adhicittaviśeṣa*) has been explained in Chapter VII . How should the superiority of excellent wisdom (*adhiprajñāviśeṣa*) be conceived? Nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) should be considered to be the superiority of excellent wisdom. We will examine:

- 1) The self-nature of nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñānasvabhāva*),
- 2) its basis (*āśraya*),
- 3) its cause (*gṛī*),
- 4) its object (*ālambana*),
- 5) its aspect (*ākāra*),
- 6) refutation of objections (*codyaparihāra*) raised against it.
- 7) Its role of maintenance (*adhiṣṭāna*),
- 8) its associates (*sahāya*),
- 9) its retribution (*vipāka*),
- 10) its necessary consequence (*niṣyanda*),
- 11) its deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa*),
- 12) its end (*niṣṭhāgamana*),
- 13) the advantages (*anuśaṃsa*) of preparatory (*prayogika*), nonconceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) and subsequent (*prṣṭhalabdha*) knowledge,
- 14) the types (*prabheda*) of nonconceptual knowledge,
- 15) examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) illustrating nonconceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) and subsequent (*prṣṭhalabdha*) knowledge,

- 16) the effortless accomplishment of its role (*anābhogakṛtyānuṣṭhāna*),
 17) its profundity (*gāmbhīrya*). [147b26]

1. Comm. Bh 363c15-22, bh 212a8-212b4, U 429b17-26, u 322a7-322b4.

“The author will now explain excellent wisdom (*abhiprajñā*). He affirms that nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*), excellent wisdom, is of three kinds: preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (*prāyogikanirvikalpakajñāna*) or speculative wisdom (*paritraprajñā*), fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalapakajñāna*) or wisdom of realization (*sākṣātkāraprajñā*), and subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhanirvikalpakajñāna*) or applied wisdom (*kriyāprajñā?*). Here the wisdom of investigation (*paryeṣanāprajñā*) is the first excellent wisdom, introspective wisdom (*pratyātmavedyaprajñā*) is the second excellent wisdom and sustaining (*ādhāraprajñā*) wisdom is the third excellent wisdom. Here nonconceptual knowledge is demonstrated. But this knowledge comprises a cause (*hetu*) and a result (*phala*); speculative wisdom is the cause of this knowledge, subsequent knowledge is the result of this knowledge. By demonstrating it, both of the others are demonstrated at the same time.” (Bh)

2. Nonconceptual knowledge avoids five characteristics. The avoidance (*vyapakarṣa*) of these five characteristics (*pañākāra*) constitutes the self-nature (*svabhāva*) of nonconceptual knowledge.

- i) It is not an absence of thinking (*amanasikāra*).
- ii) It excludes (*vyapakarṣati*) and surpasses (*atīkrāmati*) the stage equipped with investigation and analysis (*savitarka-savicārabhūmi*).
- iii) It is not a pacification consisting of cessation of identification and sensation (*saṃjñāveditanirodhapaśanti*).
- iv) It is not a substance (*rūpasvabhāva*).
- v) It is not a description of reality (*bhūtārthacitrīkāra*).

Nonconceptual knowledge escapes these five characteristics. The following stanza concerns this explanation of nonconceptual knowledge:

In the bodhisattva, the self-nature of nonconceptual knowledge avoids five characteristics. It is not a description of reality. [147c3]

2. Comm. Bh 363c28-364a22, bh 212b4-213a4, U 429c2-26, u 322b4-323a6.

“Dealing with the self-nature of this knowledge, the author says that it avoids five characteristics. The author defines the essential nature of this knowledge by way of negation (*nirākaraṇamukha*) because it cannot be defined (*nirabhilāpya*) in a positive way (*pratipattimukha*). It is necessary to rule out concepts (*vikalpa*) in order to understand (*pratipad-*) the self-nature of nonconceptual knowledge (lit. without concept); otherwise this knowledge would be furnished with concepts. What is intuition (wou fen pie = *nirvikalpa*)? It is defined above by saying: *It is not without thinking*, etc.

i) If absence of thinking (*amaniskāra*) were nonconceptual knowledge, sleep (*apasvāpana*) and drunkenness (*mada*) where one does not think would be nonconceptual knowledge. But that is inadmissible because one would then effortlessly (*paryatna*) arrive at absence of error (*aviparyāsa*).

ii) If the level surpassing investigation and analysis (*vitarkavicārātīkrāntabhūmi*, cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 183) were nonconceptual knowledge, all ordinary people (*prthagjana*), the śrāvakas, etc., in levels above the second dhyāna would possess nonconceptual knowledge, when in fact, they do not have this nonconceptual knowledge.

iii) If cessation of identification and sensation (*saṃjñāveditanirodha*) were nonconceptual knowledge, the essential characteristic of this knowledge, i.e., its 'mental factor' nature which makes it a knowledge, would be difficult to establish in the unconscious state (*asaṃjñin*), etc. In fact, without a mind (*citta*) that supports them, there are no mental factors (*caitta*). Now, in regard to the cessation of the mental consciousness (*manovijñānanirodha*), this state of unconsciousness, etc., is called a state without mind (*acittaka*), as has been said above (cf. chap. I, § 7).

iv) If matter were nonconceptual knowledge, there would be no nonconceptual knowledge because it would be like a substance derived (*bhautika*, *upādāyarūpa*) from the four great elements (*mahābhūta*).

v) If the description of reality (*bhūtārthacitrīkāra*) were nonconceptual knowledge, this knowledge would not be nonconceptual or without concept (*nirvikalpaka*) because, in the description of reality, recourse made to concepts by saying: "This is" or "This is not".

In the stanza, the first three phrases (*pada*) avoid five characteristics in order to explain nonconceptual knowledge. The fourth phrase defines its self-nature. *It is not description of reality*: the fact of not describing reality is its self-nature. Self-nature (*svabhāva*) and own-essence (*svakāya*) are synonyms; in the same way, the bracelet (*mudrikā*) is said to have gold (*suvarṇa*) as self-nature.” (U)

3. In the bodhisattva, the support (*āśraya*) of nonconceptual knowledge is neither mind (*citta*) nor non-mind (*acitta*) because it does not think and is not the result of thought (*cittānvaya*). [147c5]

3. Comm. Bh 364a22-364b3, bh 213a4-214b1, U 429c26-430a8, u 323a6-323b3.

“The self-nature (*svabhāva*) of this knowledge functions by depending on something. Hence another stanza (§ 3) ... This nonconceptual knowledge, someone may say, depends on a mind (*citta*) or on a non-mind (*acitta*). If one says that it depends on a mind, then it could think (*mananā*), and in its quality of mind functioning in dependence on a mind, it would not be nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*). On the other hand, if it depends on a non-mind, it is not a knowledge (*jñāna*). In order to avoid these two kinds of mistakes, the author gives the stanza: The support (*āśraya*) of this knowledge is not a mind (*citta*) because this knowledge does not think [read *pou sseu yi* (149 and 13) instead of *pou sseu yi* (123 and 7)]. It is not a non-mind (*acitta*) because it is induced by a thought: the support of its arising is a derivative of mind (*cittānvaya*).” (Bh)

“A stanza (§ 3) deals with the support of this knowledge ... Knowledge being a mental factor (*caitta*), it must depend on a mind (*citta*). But if it depends on a mind, it cannot be

nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*) because whoever says 'mind' (*citta*) says 'the action of thinking' (*mananā*). If it depends on a non-mind, it would be like a material thing (*rūpa*) and not be a knowledge (*jñāna*). In order to cut through this twofold difficulty, the author gives the half-stanza: *Because it does not think and is not the result of a thought*. The support of nonconceptual knowledge is not a thought because this knowledge does not think [same correction as above]; neither is it a non-thought because this knowledge is the result of a mind (*cittānvaya*), has a mind for cause. The power of repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) produces this state 'derived from mind'. This shows that the mind that serves as support for this knowledge transcends (*atīkrāmati*) all action of thinking (*mananā*) and all concept (*vikalpa*).” (U)

4. In the bodhisattva, the cause (*gēi*) of nonconceptual knowledge is the hearing-propensity coming from speech (*sābhilāpaśrutavāsanā*) and correct thinking (*yonīśomanasikāra*). [147c7]

4. Comm. Bh 364b3-11, bh 213b1-3, U 430a9-17, u 323b3-5.

“There follows a stanza on the cause (*hetupratyaya*) of this knowledge (§ 4) ... Cause (*gēi*) is synonymous with efficient cause (*kārahētipratyaya*). *The hearing-propensity coming from speech* (*sābhilāpaśrutavāsanā*): *sābhilāpa*, because it comes from the words of others (*parato ghoṣaḥ*) concerning the Greater Vehicle; *śruta*, because it listens to (*śravaṇa*) these words and nothing else; *vāsanā*, i.e., special potentiality (*śaktiviśeṣa*) produced by this hearing. [The expression *sābhilāpaśrutavāsanā*, therefore, means the particular potentiality produced by hearing others' words about the Greater Vehicle]. *Correct thinking* (*yonīśomanasikāra*) is the mental discourse (*manojalpa*) arising from this hearing-propensity which is its cause. This attention, being precise (*yukta*) and pure (*śuddha*), is called *correct* (*yonīśo*).” (U)

5. For the bodhisattva, the object (*ālambana*) of nonconceptual knowledge is the inexpressible nature of things (*anābhilāpyadharmatā*), the true nonsubstantial nature (*nairātmyadharmatā*). [147c9]

5. Comm. Bh 364b11-19, bh 213b3-6, U 430a17-26, u 323b5-7.

“What is the object of this knowledge? The following stanza (§ 5) explains ... *Inexpressible nature of things*: being imaginary in nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), all dharmas are inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*). What is this inexpressibility? It is the true nature (*tathatā*) consisting (*prabhāvita*) of self-nonexistence (*nairātmya*). The imaginary (*parikalpita*), the individual (*pudgala*) and the dharmas are without self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*): this is what is called self-nonexistence. And the essence (*sattā*) consisting of this self-nonexistence is called the true nature (*tathatā*) ...” (Bh)

- “This knowledge prior to having an object (*viśaya*), the following stanza deals with the object (*ālambana*) of knowledge ... The *inexpressible nature of things* is the absence of self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) of expressible dharmas. It is distinct from the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) of which one can speak. *The true non-substantial nature*: this makes the concept precise and clear; it is the true nature (*tathatā*) consisting (*prabhāvita*) of self-nonexistence (*nairātmya*) of every individual (*pudgala*) and every dharma. This true nature, which avoids the two extreme errors of imputation and negation (*samāropāpavādāntadvaya*), is the object (*viśaya*) perceived by nonconceptual knowledge.” (U)

6. For the bodhisattva, the aspect (*ākāra*) of nonconceptual knowledge is the absence of marks (*animitta*) inherent in its object of awareness (*jñeyālambana*).

[147c11]

6. Comm. Bh 364b19-28, bh 213b6-214a1, U 430a26-430b5, u 323b7-324a1.

“The following stanza (§portr 6) explains the aspect (*ākāra*) of nonconceptual knowledge inherent in its object (*ālambana*). For the bodhisattva, the aspect (*ākāra*) of nonconceptual knowledge is the absence of marks that manifest in its object (*ālambana*). That is to say, this knowledge is the same as (*sama*) the true nature (*tathatā*) and this identity marks it with the characteristic of absence of marks (*animittalakṣaṇa*) which is no different from *tathatā* and constitutes the very aspect (*ākāra*) of nonconceptual

knowledge. Thus, when the eye (*cakṣus*) grasps a color (*rūpa*), it takes on a blue mark (*nīlādinimitta*), and this blue mark is no different from the color grasped by the eye (see Kośa, IX, p. 280; Siddhi, p. 445). It is the same here: the nonconceptual knowledge does not have an aspect distinct from tathatā.” (Bh) - “The Dharma, furnished with object (*ālambana*), necessarily has an aspect (*ākāra*). Next follows a stanza on the aspect of knowledge ... That which behaves like its object (*ālambanaśadṛśyena*) is called the aspect (*ākāra*). Nonconceptual knowledge behaves like tathatā, its object. Its object is the *absence of marks inherent in its object of awareness*: i.e., this knowledge has the aspect inherent in tathatā which is its object. This means that nonconceptual knowledge concerns the tathatā, its object (*viśaya*), and has as aspect (*ākāra*) absence of attention (*amanasikāra*) of all concepts, or animitta.” (U)

7. a) Having the connection of phonemes (*saṃyoga*) as self-nature (*svabhāva*), the meaning is conceptual (*vikalpita*) and nothing else. When the phonemes (*akṣara*) are joined one with another (*paraṃparasam̐yoga*), there is a meaning of connection (*saṃyogārtha*).

b) Without a designation (*abhidāna*), knowledge about the thing designated (*abhideya*) does not operate (*pravartate*). Since there is a difference (*virodha*) between the two, there is no designation. Thus, everything is inexpressible (*sarvam anabhilāpyam*). [147c15]

7. Comm. Bh 364b28-364c19, bh 214a1-7, U 430b6-25, u 324a1-7.

“In order to reply to the objections (*codyaparihāra*), the author gives two stanzas.” (Bh) – “Next, the author gives two stanzas and refutes the objections concerning the object (*ālambana*) and the aspect (*ākāra*) of the knowledge discussed above.” (U)

a) “If all dharmas are inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*), what is conceived (*vikalpita*)? In order to explain this, the author says: *Meaning, having the connection of phonemes as self-nature, is conceptual and nothing else*. That is to say, meaning (*artha*), which has the joining of phonemes (*saṃyoga*) as self-nature (*svabhāva*) is conceived (*vikalpita*) and nothing other than that; this is why the author says: *and none other*. How to show that?

To establish his thesis, the author adds: *When the phonemes are mutually joined, there is a meaning of connection.* When the separate phonemes (*akṣara*) are pronounced in series (*prabandha, saṃtāna*), this gives a meaning (*artha*) that has a connection meaning (*saṃyogārtha*). Thus, the two phonemes *cha kṣus*, when they are not separated (*avichchhinna*), express the meaning 'eye'. This is the meaning of connection which is conceptual (*vikalpita*).” (Bh)

“If the conceived object (*vikalpītārtha*) does not exist in reality, what is it that is conceived (*vikalpita*)? The author answers: *The meaning having the union of the phonemes as self-nature is conceived, and nothing else*, etc. Thus when the phonemes (*akṣara*) are mutually joined (*paraṃparasāmyoga*), the expression forms a continuum (*asamuccheda*), and the imagining mind (*parikalpacitta*), concerning this conventional expression (*saṃketa*), makes up an imaginary object (*parikalpārtha*) that is conceptual (*vikalpita*); but beyond that, there is no real object (*sadārtha*) that is conceived. This is why the author says: *and nothing else*. If there were no serial expression formed by the phonemes (*akṣaraprabandhābhilāpa*), the concept (*vikalpa*) would not exist.” (U)

b) Why are we sure that all dharmas are inexpressible (*anābhilāpya*)? The author answers by saying: *Without a designation, knowledge on the thing designated does not operate*. If one does not know the designation (*abhidhāna*), the notion (*buddhi*) of the thing designated (*abhidheya*) is not produced. This is why all dharmas are inexpressible. But, one might say, the notion of the thing designated (*abhidheyabuddhi*) is produced in dependence (*apekṣya*) on the designation (*abhidhāna*). In order to refute that, the author adds: *Since there is a difference between the two, there is no designation*. Since the designation (*abhidhāna*) and the thing designated (*abhidheya*) are mutually different and have a different nature (*lakṣaṇa*) (cf. chap. II, § 24), the designation and the thing designated are inexpressible (*anābhilāpya*). For this reason, it is said that all dharmas are inexpressible.” (Bh)

“Why are dharmas inexpressible? To clarify this thesis, the author says: *Without a designation, the knowledge of the thing designated does not operate*. If truly there were an object (*artha*) of which one could speak, it would be that a knowledge similar to language would arise on this object independently of the name designating it (*abhidhānanām*). But if we do not know the expression designating it (*abhidhānābhilāpa*), such a knowledge concerning the thing designated (*abhidheyārtha*)

does not arise. This is why dharmas are inexpressible. But, one could say, even though the outer object (*bāhyārtha*) really exists, the knowledge of the thing designated (*abhidheyajñāna*) is produced in dependence on the designation (*abhidānam apekṣya*). To refute this, the author says: *Since there is a difference between the two, there is no designation.* This means: by virtue of the difference in characteristics, there really is no designation. Since the designation (*abhidāna*) and the thing designated (*abhidheya*) are of different natures (*bhinnalakṣaṇa*), their self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) differs. How could there be a real designation based on the reality of an object? *Everything is inexpressible:* the logical consequence is that every designation and everything is inexpressible.” (U)

8. Nonconceptual knowledge is the support (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the practices (*carya*) of the bodhisattva acquired subsequent to the insight (*tatpṛṣṭhalabdha*) because it tends to develop them (*varhana*). [147c17]

8. Comm. Bh 364c19-25, bh 214a7-214b1, U 430b25-430c4, u 324a7-324b1.

"Of what is nonconceptual knowledge the support (*adhiṣṭhāna*)? By the knowledge acquired subsequent to (*pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) the insight (*nirvikalpa*), the bodhisattva practices (*caryā*) are obtained; these practices rest on nonconceptual knowledge. *Because it tends to develop them:* because it makes these bodhisattva practices increase (*vṛddhi*), nonconceptual knowledge is the support (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of these practices." (Bh) - "Of what is nonconceptual knowledge the support? *The practices acquired subsequently,* these are the various bodhisattva practices acquired in the course of the knowledge subsequent to insight (*nirvikalpapṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*). These practices have this nonconceptual knowledge as support (*āśraya*). *Because it tends to develop them:* because it cultivates these bodhisattva practices: this expresses its role (*prayojana*) of support (*adhiṣṭhana*). Being free of error (*aviparīta*), it is able to support these practices." (U)

9. For the bodhisattva, the auxiliaries (*sahāya*) to nonconceptual knowledge are the two paths (*mārgadvaya*) that have as their nature (*svabhāva*) the first five virtues (*pāramitā*). [147c19]

9. Comm. Bh 364c25-365a5, bh 214b1-5, U 430c4-13, u 324b1-4.

“The two paths (*mārga*) are the path of accumulation (*saṃbhāramārga*) and the path of support (*āśrayamārga*). The path of accumulation consists of the virtues (*pāramitā*) of generosity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*) and zeal (*vīrya*); the path of support is the virtue of meditation (*dhyāna*). Because of the merits (*kuśala*) derived from these virtues and depending on the virtue of dhyāna, the nonconceptual knowledge is born and increases. This knowledge is called the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*).” (Bh)

“What are the auxiliaries (*sahāya*) of nonconceptual wisdom, because if it were alone, it would be powerless ... The two paths are the path of accumulation and the path of support. They have the first five virtues (*pāramitā*) as self-nature (*svabhāva*). Here, the first four virtues are the path of accumulation, and the fifth virtue, the virtue of dhyāna, is the path of support. When one abides in concentrated mind (*samāhitacitta*), the four above-mentioned virtues are skillful collaborators and thus one produces and develops nonconceptual knowledge. This knowledge is called the virtue of wisdom.” (U)

10. For the bodhisattva, the retribution (*vipāka*) of nonconceptual knowledge takes place in the two Buddha- assemblies (*buddhamaṇḍala*), in view of preparation (*prayoga*) and acquisition (*adhigama*). [147c21]

10. Comm. Bh 365a5-14, bh 214b5-8, U 430c14-24, u 324b4-7.

“As long as one has not attained buddhahood (*buddhatā*), where does nonconceptual knowledge produce (*abhinivṛt-*) its result of retribution (*vipākaphala*)? ... In the two Buddha-assemblies (*buddhamaṇḍala*), namely, in the assembly of the enjoyment body (*saṃbhogakāyamaṇḍala*) and in the assembly of the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāyamaṇḍala*). If nonconceptual knowledge is at the preparatory stage (*prayoga*), it is in the assembly of the apparitional body that one takes birth and one enjoys the fruit of retribution; but if one has already acquired (*adhigama*) nonconceptual knowledge, it is in the body of enjoyment that one takes birth and one enjoys the fruit of

retribution. In order to mark this idea, the author adds: *in consideration of preparation and acquisition.*” (Bh)

“*In the two assemblies, namely, in the two assemblies of the two bodies of the Buddha, the apparitional body and the enjoyment body. In view of the preparation and acquisition: this shows that nonconceptual knowledge can produce a fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), but it is not the cause of retribution (vipākahetu) because it counteracts it (prṭtipakṣa). Here the dominant result (adhipatiphala) is metaphorically (upacāra) called fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) because it predisposes (tse-hiun); and as other actions, impure actions (sāsravakarman), produce a retribution, it is given this name. When one practices nonconceptual knowledge (prāyogika-nirvikalpakajñāna), one is born and abides in the assembly of the apparitional body of the Buddha; but when one has acquired (adhigama) fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, one is born in the assembly of the enjoyment body of Buddha.*” (U)

11. For the bodhisattva, the outcome (niṣyanda) of nonconceptual knowledge is its progression (viśeṣagamana) in the course of successive existences (uttarottarajanma). [147c23]

11. Comm. Bh 365a14-21, bh 214b8-215a2, U 439c24-29, u 324b7-325a1.

“What is the outcome (niṣyanda) of nonconceptual knowledge? ... *For the bodhisattva, the outcome of nonconceptual knowledge is its progression in the course of successive existences: in the course of successive existences in the great assemblies (maṇḍala) of the two bodies of the Buddha which have been spoken of above. The progression of nonconceptual knowledge: the continuous progression of the nonconceptual knowledge practiced during these existences constitutes its fruit of outcome (niṣyandaphala).*” (Bh)

12. For the bodhisattva, the deliverance (niḥsaraṇa) of nonconceptual knowledge is to be sought in the ten levels (bhūmi): it is the nonconceptual knowledge as it is acquired (prāpta) and perfected (niṣpanna). [147c25]

12. Comm. Bh 365a21-365b2, bh 215a2-6, U 430c29-431a5, u 325a1-3.

“What is the deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa*) of nonconceptual knowledge? ... *For the bodhisattva, the outcome*, etc. That which goes to the end (*niṣṭhagama*) is called deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa*); it is the movement towards the great nirvāṇa. *Nonconceptual knowledge as it is acquired and perfected*: first this knowledge is gained and this is what is called *acquired*; then, after countless hundreds of thousands of great periods (*mahākalpa*), this knowledge is *perfected*. *This outcome is to be sought in the ten levels*: starting from the first bhūmi up to the tenth bhūmi in order (*yathākramam*). In the first bhūmi, this knowledge is *acquired* only; following that, it is *perfected* over a long time. This is why bodhisattvas spend incalculable periods (*kalpāsamkhyeya*) to attain nirvāṇa (cf. chap. V, § 6). After this time, they finally come to the end (*niṣṭhā*).” (Bh)

“In the first bhūmi, the Joyous (*pramuditā*), when the path of seeing is entered (*darśanamārga*), all the realms are seen and the insight attains a first deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa*), acquisition; then, in the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*), the bhūmis are attained and insight is perfected.” (U)

13. For the bodhisattva, the outcome (*niṣṭhā*) of nonconceptual knowledge is the attainment of the three bodies in the pure state (*śuddhatrikāya*) and the attaining of the excellent masteries (*agravaśitā*). [147c27]

13. Comm. Bh 365b2-11, bh 215a6-215b1, U 431a6-14, u 325a3-5.

“*The attainment of the three bodies in the pure state*, i.e., the attainment of the three pure bodies of the tathāgata. It is a question of *pure* body because, on the first bhūmi, the three bodies are obtained, but it is not until the tenth bhūmi that they are pure (*suviśuddha*). *The attainment of the excellent masteries*: this nonconceptual knowledge has as its outcome (*niṣṭhā*) not only the attainment of the three bodies in the pure state, but also the attainment of the ten kinds of mastery, self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*), of which we will learn more later (chap. X, § 3, no. 2).” (Bh)

- 14. a) Preparatory nonconceptual knowledge, which is not stained by any kind of heavy wrongdoing (*pāpa*) because of faith alone (*śraddhāmātra*) and adherence (*adhimukti*), is free of blemishes (*anupalipta*) like space (*ākāśa*).**
- b) Fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, which is liberated (*vimukta*) from any obstacle (*āvaraṇa*) insofar as it is acquired and perfected (*prāptiniṣpattyupeta*), is free of blemishes (*anupalipta*) like space (*ākāśa*).**
- c) Subsequent nonconceptual knowledge is free of blemishes (*anupalipta*) like space. While moving about (*vicaran*) in the world, the bodhisattva is never stained by human circumstances (*lokadharma*). [148a4]**

14. Comm. Bh 365b11-365c14, bh 215b1-216a3, U 431a14-431b4, u 325a5-325b1.

“What are the benefits (*anuśamsa*) of nonconceptual knowledge? First, there are three types of nonconceptual knowledge, namely, preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (*prāyogikanirvikalpakajñāna*), fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalpakajñāna*) and subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhanirvikalpakajñāna*).

a) First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (*prāyogika-nirvikalapakajñāna*). Initially, the bodhisattva listens to others talk about absence of concept (*nirvikalpanaya*). Next, unable himself to see this absence of concept, he accords it his adherence (*adhimukti*). Finally, with this adherence as support, he skillfully examines (*nitīraṇa*) absence of concept. This is what is called preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. Because it gives rise to fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, it too is given the name 'nonconceptual'. This preparatory nonconceptual knowledge has the advantage of immaculateness (*nirupalepānuśamsa*). Is there an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) for this? The śāstra gives verse 14 a). In order to show that which does not stain it, the author says: *by any kind of heavy wrongdoing*. In order to show the cause by means of which it is unstained, he says: *because of faith alone and adherence*, because by delighting in faith in the absence of concept, he accords it his adherence. That is why this knowledge can counteract (*pratipakṣa*) any kind of bad destiny (*durgati*), and this explains that wrongdoings (*pāpa*) do not soil it.

b) Secondly, the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalpakajñāna*) has the advantage of immaculateness. What is the example for this? The śāstra gives stanza 14 b). From what is it liberated? It is liberated from any kind of obstacle (*āvaraṇa*). How is it liberated? Insofar as it is perfected (*niṣpattyupeta*): in fact, in the bhūmis, it is only acquired (*prāptyupeta*) and it must be perfected (*niṣpattyupeta*) in order to be cause for the suppression of the obstacles. This shows that nonconceptual knowledge counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) obstacles.” (Bh)

[This explanation does not tally perfectly with the commentary of v. 12, but it is also proposed by Asvabhāva: “*It is liberated from all obstacles*: it is liberated from the obstacle of the passions and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*). *Insofar as it is acquired and perfected*: in the first bhūmi, it is acquired (*prāptyupeta*); it is necessary to reach the Buddha bhūmi (*buddhabhūmi*) in order for it to be perfected (*niṣpattyupeta*).” (U)]

“c) Finally, the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (*pr̥ṣṭhalabdha-nirvikalapakajñāna*) has the benefit of immaculateness. What is the example? The śāstra gives stanza 14c. By the power of this subsequent knowledge, the bodhisattva, considering the interest of beings (*sattvārtha*), thinks about coming down here and he takes birth here; but, having taken birth, he is not stained by human circumstances (*lokadharmā*). These human circumstances are eight in number: 1. gain (*lābha*), 2. loss (*alābha*), 3. praise (*praśamsā*), 4. blame (*nindā*), 5. honor (*yaśas*), 6. dishonor (*ayaśas*), 7. pain (*duḥkha*), 8. happiness (*sukha*). Because it comes from fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, this subsequent knowledge also takes the name 'nonconceptual'.” (Bh)

15 a) The three knowledges (*jñāna*) are like a mute person (*mūka*) trying to understand an object (*artha*), a mute person who has understood the object, a non-mute person who has understood the object.

b) The three knowledges are like an idiot (*mūḍha*) trying to understand an object, an idiot who has understood the object, an intelligent person (*amūḍha*) who has understood the object. c) The three knowledges are like the first five consciousnesses trying to understand an object, the first five

consciousnesses having understood the object, the manas which has understood the object.

d) The three knowledges, the preparatory knowledge (*prāyogika*), etc., are like a person who does not understand a treatise (*aviditaśāstra*) and tries to understand it; then by grasping the letter (*dharma*), tries to understand it; and finally, by grasping the meaning (*artha*), tries to understand it. [148a12]

15. Comm. Bh 365c14-366a12, bh 216a4-216b3, U 431b4-431c5, u 325b1-8.

“What is the difference (*viśeṣa*) among the three nonconceptual knowledges, preparatory (*prāyogika*), fundamental (*maula*) and subsequent (*prṣṭhalabdha*)? ... To show the different aspects (*ākāra-viśeṣa*) of these three, the author proposes the following examples (*drṣṭānta*):

a) *Like a mute person trying to grasp an object.* Just as a mute person, while trying to understand an object (*viśaya*) cannot understand it and cannot speak about it, so the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (*prāyogikanirvikalpakajñāna*), while trying to realize (*sākātkṛ-*) the tathathā, can neither realize it nor speak about it: this is similar. - *Like a mute person who has understood the object.* Just as a mute person who has understood the object cannot speak about it, so the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūla-nirvikalpakajñāna*), which has realized (*sākṣātkṛ-*) the tathatā, avoids all vain proliferation (*prapañca*): this is similar. - *Like a non-mute person who has understood the object.* Just as a non-mute person who has understood the object sets about to speak about it, so the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhanirvikalpakajñāna*), which has understood the tathatā and has realized its object (*viśaya*), sets out to teach it: this is similar.

b) The stanza about the idiot is explained in the same way. [Bh: The idiot (*mūḍha*) is a person of incoherent language (*avicchinna*).]

c) *Like the first five consciousnesses trying to understand an object.* The first five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., try to understand an object; but despite the attempt, they lack any concept (*vikalpa*). (Cf. chap. I, § 7). It is the same for the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. - *Like the first five consciousnesses that have*

grasped the object. The first five consciousnesses that have grasped the object are without concept. It is the same for the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge. - *Like the manas which has grasped the object.* The mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) which has grasped the object is also able to imagine it (*viklpa-*). It is the same for the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge.” (U)

“d) The stanza on the treatise. Like a man who does not understand a treatise but who seeks to understand it: such is the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. - When he has gone over it again, he grasps the letter (*dharma*) only: such is the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge. Here by 'letter' (*dharma*) is meant the phonemes (*akṣara*). - Like a man who has understood the treatise and has grasped the letters (*dharma*) and the meaning (*artha*): such is the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge ...” (Bh)

16 a) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like a man with his eyes closed (*nimiñjitacakṣus*); the subsequent knowledge (*tatpr̥ṣṭhalabdha*) is like the same man with his eyes open (*unmiñjitacakṣus*).

b) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like space (*ākāśa*); the subsequent knowledge is like the forms (*rūpa*) that manifest in this space.

[148a16]

16. Comm. Bh 366a12-27, bh 216b3-8, U 431c5-16, 325b8-326a3.

“The author is going to give various examples (*dr̥ṣṭāntaviśeṣa*) for the fundamental and the subsequent knowledge ...

a) The first stanza shows the difference (*viśeṣa*) between the two knowledges: their self-natures (*svalakṣaṇa*) can be known. Space (*ākāśa*) is all-inclusive (*vyāpaka*), unstained (*anupalīpta*), not conceptualizing and nonconceptual. It is the same for the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge: since it includes the emptiness having a single taste in all the dharmas (*sarvadharmāikarasaśūnyatā*), it is *all-inclusive*; since it is not stained by any dharma, it is *unstained*; since it itself is without concept (*vikalpa*), it is *non-conceptualizing*; since it is not conceived of by others, it is *nonconceptual*.

b) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like space. The forms manifested there, i.e., the forms that appear in space, are conceptualized. It is the same for the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge: it is both conceptualized and conceptualizing.” (Bh)

“These two stanzas show the difference between the fundamental and the subsequent knowledge. The examples of the eyes closed and the eyes open, of space and forms, show that these two knowledges are, respectively, without concepts (*nirvikalpa*) and furnished with concepts (*savikalpa*), identical (*sama*) and non-identical (*asama*). As for the preparatory knowledge (*prāyogikajñāna*) which is not represented here, it is not spoken of. Moreover, the preparatory knowledge (*prāyogikajñāna*) is the cause (*hetu*) of the fundamental knowledge (*mūlajñāna*); the subsequent knowledge (*prīṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) is its result (*phala*). And this leads us to the rôle fulfilled (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*) by nonconceptual knowledge.” (U)

17. Just as precious gems (*maṇi*) and celestial music (*tūrya*) accomplish their own activity (*svakarman*) without thought, so it is always without thought that the Buddhas accomplish their kinds of activity (*nānākarman*). [148a18]

17. Comm. Bh 366a28-366b9, bh 216b8-217a4, U 431c16-28, u 326a3-6.

This stanza is very close to that of Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 18-19:

aghaṭṭitebhyas tūryebhyo yathā syāc śabdhasambhavaḥ /

tathā jine vinābhogaṃ deśanāyāḥ samudbhavaḥ //

yathā maṇer vinā yatnaṃ svaprabhāvanidarśanam /

buddheṣv api vinābhogaṃ tathā kṛtyanidarśanam //

“Let us accept that this nonconceptual knowledge realizes the state of buddhahood (*buddhatā*); but if it is free of effort (*ābhoga*) and free of thought (*manasikāravikalpa*), how could it accomplish its activity of working for the benefit and happiness of beings (*sattvahītasukhakriyā*)? ... Even though it is without concept, it does fulfill its rôle (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*). In the stanza, the examples (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of the precious gem (*maṇi*) and celestial musical instrument (*tūrya*) show this. A cintāmaṇi [a precious gem that satisfies

all the wishes of its possessor], although without concepts (*vikalpa*), is able to fulfill the rôle desired by the beings who possess it. A celestial musical instrument (*tūrya*), even without being struck (*aghaṭṭita*), can produce all kinds of sounds (*śabda*) according to the aspirations (*āśaya*) of those close by. In the same way, the nonconceptual knowledge of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, although without concepts, can accomplish all kinds of rôles.” (Bh)

“Nonconceptual knowledge realizes the state of Buddha (*buddhatā*); but it is without concepts (*vikalpa*); how can it procure the interest of beings (*sattvārtha*)? ... In the stanza, the author brings in the examples of the precious gem and the celestial musical instrument to prove that, although without concepts, the nonconceptual knowledge is able to accomplish all kinds of rôles effortlessly (*anābhoga*). Thus the cintāmaṇi and the celestial musical instrument do not say: 'I am going to emit light, I am going to produce a sound', because they are both without thought (*acetana*). But, by the power of the meritorious actions (*puṇyakarman*) and aspirations (*āśaya*) of beings who have been born where they occur, and independently of being struck (*ghaṭṭhana-nirapekṣan*), they emit all kinds of light (*prabhā*) and produce all kinds of sounds (*śabda*). It is the same for the nonconceptual knowledge of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas: although without concepts, it fulfills its role which is to render all kinds of services (*nānārthakriyā*) in conformity with the merits (*puṇya*) and aspirations (*āśaya*) of beings to be converted (*vineyasattva*) by it.” (U)

18 a) Not concerning either here or elsewhere, it is neither non-knowledge (*ajñāna*) nor knowledge (*jñāna*) [acc. to H: without being a knowledge, it is knowledge.] Not being different (*viśiṣṭa*) from its object (*jñeya*), this knowledge is non-concept (*nirvikalpatā*).

b) All dharmas are without concept (*nirvikalpa*) from the beginning (*prakṛtaḥ*) because that which is conceived (*vikalpya*) does not exist. The nonconceptual knowledge is absent. [This last stanza is translated according to the Chinese versions of P Dh H; B and the Tibetan version are different.]

[148a22]

18. Comm. Bh 366b9-366c19, bh 217a4-218a5, U 431c28-432b3, u 326a6-327a1.

“a) Now the author will show the profundity (*gāmbhīrya*) of nonconceptual knowledge. This knowledge pertains to (*ālambate*) the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), the center of concepts (*vikalpa*), or it pertains to another object (*viṣayāntara*). What are the errors (*doha*) in these hypotheses? If it pertains to concepts, its nature of nonconceptual knowledge (literally, of knowledge free of concept) is not explained; if it pertains to another object, since this other object does not exist in any way, what would it then have as object (*ālambana*)? - The Śastra says ... *Bearing upon neither here nor elsewhere*. This knowledge does not bear *here*: on concepts, because it is without concept (*nirvikalpa*); it does not bear *elsewhere*: on another object, because then it would have as object (*viṣaya*) the Tathāgata, the dharmatā of dependent (*paratantra*) and imagined (*vikalpita*) dharmas. But one can state neither identity nor difference between these dharmas and their dharmatā. This means that the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalpakajñāna*) pertains to neither concepts (*vikalpa*) nor anything else.

Furthermore, the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge either is or is not a knowledge. What are the faults in these hypotheses? If it is a knowledge, then, as knowledge, is it without concepts (*nirvikalpa*)? If it is not a knowledge, why is it called nonconceptual knowledge? - The author replies to this question by saying: *Without being a knowledge, it is a knowledge* [according to the Tibetan version: *it is neither non-knowledge nor knowledge*]. This shows that the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalpakajñāna*) is not really a knowledge (*jñāna*) because it does not arise like preparatory conceptual knowledge (*prāyogikavikalpakajñāna*). Neither is it a non-knowledge (*ajñāna*) because it derives its birth from this preparatory conceptual knowledge.

There is yet another meaning to the phrase: *Neither here nor elsewhere, without being a knowledge, it is a knowledge*. Because *here*, i.e., in itself, concepts do not exist, it is called non-knowledge; but because it functions on the dharmatā of concepts and not *elsewhere*, it is a knowledge. In this explanation, the first and last members of the phrase are connected to each other. [The first member *fei yu ts'e* (neither here) explains the first member *fei tshe* (non-knowledge), and the second member *fei yu* (nor elsewhere) explains the second member *che tshe* (knowledge)].

Not being different from its object, this knowledge is intuition. It is not like the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (*prāyogikanirvikalpakajñāna*) which, although functioning with objects and subjects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhaka*), is called nonconceptual (*nirvikalpaka*). On the contrary, it is because it is not distinguished from its object (*grāhya*) and is completely identified with it (*samasama*), that the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is called nonconceptual: this knowledge does not set up the duality of object and subject (*grāhyagrāhaka*).

b) In another sūtra, the Bhagavat has said that all dharmas are without concept (*nirvikalpāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*). To explain this absence of concept, the author follows with stanza 18b ...

It should be known that all dharmas are originally free from concept, i.e., that all dharmas, in their original nature (prakṛtisvabhāva), are without concept. Why? Because the thing conceived does not exist. This shows that, the thing conceived being nonexistent, all dharmas are originally without concept.

But if all dharmas are originally without concept because the thing conceived does not exist, why do not beings (*sattva*) attain deliverance (*vimokṣa*) from the very beginning (*prakṛtaḥ*)? - In order to answer this question, the author says: *Nonconceptual knowledge is lacking, i.e., these beings do not have nonconceptual knowledge, and even though the dharmas in their original nature are without concepts, these beings are not liberated from the very beginning. But when the knowledge of the true nature (tathatājñāna) bearing on the absence of concept of the dharmas arises in them, when they realize (sākṣātkṛt-) the absence of concepts of dharmas, then they will attain deliverance. But if this knowledge does not arise, they will not attain deliverance. Knowledge of the true nature (tathatājñāna) is this same nonconceptual knowledge.*” (Bh)

19. i) First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge

(*prāyogikanirvikalpakajñāna*) is of three types according to whether it arises from (1) cause (*hetu*), (2) projection (*ākṣepa*), or (3) practice (*abhyāsa*).

ii) Fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*mūlanirvikalpak-ajñāna*) is of three types, according to whether it is intuition (*nirvikalpa*) of (1) satiation (*saṃtuṣṭi*), (2) non-error (*aviparyāsa*), or (3) non-proliferation (*niṣprapañca*).

iii) Subsequent intuitive knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhanirvikalpaka-jñāna*) is of five kinds, according to whether it is analysis (*vicāra*) of (1) penetration (*prativedha*), (2) memory (*anusmaraṇa*), (3) preaching (*vyavasthāna*), (4) combined (*saṃsarga*), or (5) success (*saṃṛddhi*). [148a28]

19. Comm. Bh 367a1-367b9, bh 218a5-219b1, U 432b5-432c13, u 327a1-327b6.

i) “First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge is of three kinds according to whether it arises from (1) the power of the lineage (*gotrabala*), (2) the projecting power of previous births (*pūrvajanmākṣepabala*), or (3) the power of present practice (*pratyutpannābhyāsabala*): (1) from *the power of the lineage*, when the lineage (*gotra*) is the cause of its arising; (2) from *the projecting power of previous births*, when practice (*abhyāsa*) carried out in the course of previous births is the cause of its arising; (3) from *the power of present practice*, when the power of individual activity (*puruṣakārabala*) in the course of the present existence is the cause of its arising.” (Bh) - There is a definition in U and u of *gotra*: “*Gotra* is an eternal excellence of the six faculties (*anādhikālikāḥ ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣa*), a natural capacity (*dharmatāsamārthya*) of acquiring buddhahood (*buddhatā*).” (U): “*rigs ni thog ma med paḥi dus kyi skye mched drug bye brag can saṅs rgyas kyi snod du gyur paḥo.*” (u) - Cf. Bodh bhūmi, p. 3, chap. X, § 3, no. 3.

ii) “(1) *Nonconcept of satiation (saṃtuṣṭinirvikalpa)*: one knows that it has reached the end of hearing and reflecting (*śrutacintāniṣṭhāgata*). When, out of satiation (*saṃtuṣṭi*), no further concepts (*vikalpa*) are formed, there is nonconceptual knowledge of satiation. Thus, the bodhisattvas who dwell in the realm of ordinary beings (*prthagjanabhūmi*) and who have reached the end of hearing (*śruta*), reflecting (*cintā*) and understanding (*avabodha*) experience satiation say to themselves: “The hearing and reflecting of fools (*bāla*) extend only so far.” It is in this sense that the nonconceptual knowledge of satiety is spoken of. There is yet another meaning, because we know that the world (*loka*) also has an nonconceptual knowledge of satiety. Thus, beings (*sattva*) who have reached the peak of existence (*bhavāgra*) and who see nirvāṇa, experience satiety for the rest and say to themselves: “There is no further sphere (*āyatana*) to be sought beyond this nirvāṇa.” This is what is called satiation.

(2) *Nonconcept of non-error (aviparyāsanirvikalpa)*. It is that of the śrāvakas, etc. We know that by penetrating (*prativedha*) the true nature (*tathatā*), they obtain the

knowledge free of the four errors (*aviparyāśajñāna*) that consists of taking the transitory as eternal, etc. (Cf. Prastāvanā, § 3, p. 8). The suppression of concepts (*vikalpa*) comprising this fourfold error about the eternal, etc., is called the nonconceptual knowledge of non-error.

(3) *Nonconcept of non-proliferation (niṣprapañcanirvikalpa)*. This belongs to the bodhisattvas. Indeed, the bodhisattvas who have attained enlightenment (*bodhi*) of all dharmas, avoid any vain proliferation. The true nature (*tathatā*) attested by their knowledge transcends the ways of discourse (*abhilāpapatha*) and surpasses the objects of worldly knowledge (*laukikajñānaviśaya*). As it cannot be expressed in words, no worldly knowledge (*laukikajñāna*) can understand it.” (Bh)

iii) Subsequent knowledge is of five types: (1) analysis of penetration, (2) analysis of memory, (3) analysis of preaching, (4) analysis of synthesis, and (5) analysis of success.

(1) *Analysis of penetration (prativedhavicāra)*. At the time of penetration (*prativedha*), one makes the following analysis: ‘I am penetrating (I understand)’. Here *penetration* has the sense of understanding (*avabodha*).

(2) *Analysis of memory (anusmaraṇavicāra)*. Emerging from (*vyutthāna*) this penetration, one remembers and says to oneself: ‘I have penetrated absence of concepts (*nirvikalpa*)’.

(3) *Analysis of preaching (vyavasthānavicāra)*. This is to preach to others what one has penetrated.

(4) *Analysis of combination (saṃsargavicāra)*. The knowledge of the combined object (*saṃsrṣṭālambanajñāna*) sees that all dharmas have one and the same nature (*ekalakṣaṇa*) and leads towards the transformation of support (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). When this support has been transformed, this knowledge is reproduced.

(5) *Analysis of success (samṛddhivicāra)*. Everything succeeds (*samṛddhyate*) according to aspirations (*yathāśayam*). By means of this analysis, earth, etc., is transformed (*pariṇam-*) into gold (cf. chap. I, § 60; chap. II, § 14). In order to obtain this success, this analysis is made; that is why the *analysis of success* is spoken of. Some say that it is because of this analysis that one obtains success.” (Bh)

20. Here are further stanzas proving nonconceptual knowledge:

i) Hungry ghosts (*preta*), animals (*tiryak*), humans (*manuṣya*) and gods (*deva*) have different notions of the same object according to their respective capabilities. Therefore it is concluded that objects (*artha*) do not exist.

ii) Thus, in the past (*atīta*), etc., in dream (*svapna*) and in the reflection in a mirror (*pratibimba*), there is no object of consciousness (*ālambana*) and yet perception (*upalabdhi*) takes place [acc. to H: the characteristics of an object (*viṣayalakṣaṇa*) are present].

iii) If the object were truly an object, there would be no nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*); if that were the case, the acquisition of buddhahood (*buddhatādhigama*) would be impossible.

iv) For bodhisattvas possessing the masteries (*vaśita*) and also for ecstasies (*dhyāyin*), earth, etc., is transformed into any substance they wish by the power of convinced adhesion (*adhimuktibala*).

v) For the bodhisattvas versed in analysis (*pravicaya*), for sages (*dhīmat*) in possession of tranquility (*śanta*), all dharmas appear as object (*artha*) to them when they reflect on it (*manasi kurvanti*).

vi) When nonconceptual knowledge is functioning (*carati*), not a single object appears. Thus we know that there is no object and, the object being absent, there is no concept (*viññapti*). [148b12]

20. Comm. Bh 367b23-367c25, bh 219b1-220b1, U 432c13-433b6, u 327b7-328b7.

This entire text of this paragraph is taken from chap. II, § 14b.

“How can it be proved that the imaginary object (*parikalpitārtha*) is truly non-existent? To establish its non-existence, the author cites some stanzas:

i) Hungry ghosts, animals, humans and gods, etc. There where humans see water (*udaka*), hungry ghosts see hills of dry earth (*sthala*). There where humans see dung (*mīḍha*), animals [Bh adds: pigs (*varāha*), etc.] see pure food (*śucyāhāra*). There where humans see an impure substance (*aśucidravya*), animals see a pure food. There where humans see pure food, gods see a rotten impure substance. But since it is impossible that

opposite (*viruddha*) things can be in the same place, we know that the imaginary object does not exist.

Objection: If there is no real object (*sadartha*), how is a consciousness without object (*nirālambanavijñāna*) produced (*samudācar-*)?

Answer: ii) For you, the Sautrāntikas, there is no past (*atīta*) or future (*anāgata*) object; then how can there be a consciousness in regard to them? Furthermore, in dream (*svapna*), the visions of the dream are non-existent; how then does one know them? The bedroom of the dreamer cannot really contain the mountains (*parvata*), rivers (*nadī*) and elephants (*hastin*) that are perceived by the consciousness of the dreamer ... Finally, the reflection (*pratibimba*) seen in a mirror (*ādarśa*) or seen in concentration (*samādhi*) does not exist in itself (*dravyasat*); how then does one know it?

Since all of that is a manifestation of the mind (*cittābhāsa*), one perceives only the image of the mind (*cittapratibimba*). *Nevertheless the characteristics of an object are present there:* in brief, even though the objects (*viṣaya*) past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*), etc., do not exist in themselves (*dravyasat*), the characteristics of an object (*viṣayalakṣaṇa*) do occur in the mind that perceives them.

iii) If the perceived object (*viṣayārtha*) were truly an object, there would be no nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*) because there would be concepts (*vikalpa*). *Intuitive knowledge being absent, the acquisition of Buddhahood would be impossible:* if the intuitive knowledge were truly lacking, it would be impossible to attain Buddhahood and this would be a very serious error. Therefore we know that the imaginary object (*parikalpitārtha*) has no reality.

iv) Furthermore, this object has no reality. Why? *For the bodhisattvas in possession of the masteries:* for the bodhisattvas who have attained the great masteries; *by the power of convinced adhesion, i.e., by the power of aspiration (āśayabala), earth is transformed into whatever substance they wish:* they change (*pariṇam-*) earth into gold (*suvarṇa*), etc. *And also for the ecstasies:* for persons other than the bodhisattvas, e.g., for the śrāvakas in possession of dhyāna.

v) *For bodhisattvas versed in analysis:* full of wisdom (*prajñā*); *for the sages:* endowed with well-tryed knowledge, the bodhisattvas are called *sages*; *in possession of tranquility:* endowed with samādhi (*samādhiprāpta*). *When they reflect on the dharmas:* when they

reflect on the dharmas, on sūtras, geya, etc. (cf. Mahāvīyut., 1267-1278), *these appear to them as object*: when they reflect in such and such a way on these dharmas, sūtra, etc., in their various aspects (*nānākāra*), non-substantiality, etc., (*nairātmyādi*), these objects appear to them in such and such a way. It should be known then that it is their mind in right thinking (*yonīśomanasikāracitta*) which appears to them like subjects and objects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhaka*) and that no external object (*bāhyārtha*) exists.

vi) *When nonconceptual knowledge is operating, no object whatsoever appears*. This is in relation to the preceding discussion concerning the non-reality of the object. When nonconceptual knowledge becomes active (*samudācarati*) in the bodhisattvas, no other object manifests; it should be known then that all perceived objects (*viṣayārtha*) are non-existent. *Thus there is no object and consequently no concept*: by way of conclusion (*nigamana*), there is no perceived object (*viṣayārtha*) and hence no notion cognizes (*vijñapti*). We have already discussed this argument previously (in chap. II, § 14) in the detailed explanation on the characteristics of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*).” (U)

21. There is no difference (*nirviśiṣṭa*) between the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) and nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). Thus the Bhagavat has said: “The bodhisattva who abides (*tiṣṭhati*) in the virtue of wisdom by means of non-abiding (*asthānayogena*) ensures the completion of the development (*bhāvanāparipūri*) of the other virtues (*pāramitā*).”

How, by the method of nonabiding (*asthānayogena*), does he ensure this fulfillment (*paripūri*)? By avoiding five kinds of abiding (*pañcavidhasthānāparityāga*). Because:

i) He avoids abiding in the belief in the self of the heretics (*tīrthikātmagrāhasthāna-parityāga*).

ii) He avoids abiding in the concepts of the bodhisattvas who have not seen reality (*adrṣṭatattvabodhisattvavikalpasthāna-parityāga*).

iii) He avoids abiding in the two extremes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (*saṃsāranirvāṇāntadvayasthānāparityāga*).

iv) He avoids the abiding that consists of being content with just cutting the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇaprahāṇa-mātrasaṃtuṣṭānāparityāga*).

v) He avoids abiding in the nirvāṇa-without-residue element with disregard for the interest of beings (*sattvārthanirapekṣanirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu-sthānāparityāga*). [148b20]

21. Comm. 368a5-26, bh 220b1-221a5, U 433b14-433c16, u 328b8-329b4.

“There is no difference between the virtue of wisdom and nonconceptual knowledge, i.e., they are identical (*sama*) because nonconceptual knowledge is the virtue of wisdom. In the sūtra it is said: *The bodhisattva who abides in the virtue of wisdom by means of nonabiding ensures the fulfillment of the development of the other virtues.* Why is that? *By avoiding five kinds of abiding:* by avoiding the abiding in belief in the self of the heretics, etc. Here, the place where one can live is called abiding (*sthāna*).

i) *He avoids abiding in the belief in the self of the heretics.* Heretics (*tīrtika*) dwell in the belief in self (*ātmagrāha*); they say: *Myself* I know; this is *my* wisdom (*prajñā*). The bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling, he does not conceive of a wisdom (*prajñā*) where one would believe in 'me' and 'mine' (*ātmātmīyagrāha*). Since the bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling (*sthāna*), the method of nonabiding (*asthānayoga*) is spoken of.

ii) *He avoids abiding in the concepts of the bodhisattvas who have not seen reality.* The bodhisattvas who have not seen reality arouse concepts concerning the virtue of wisdom and nonconceptual knowledge: this, they say, is the virtue of wisdom. Since the bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling, the method of nonabiding is spoken of. A stanza says: If you see some thing, you are bound by it; if you do not see it, you are liberated.

iii) *He avoids abiding in the two extremes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.* Worldly (*loka*) people dwell in the extreme of saṃsāra because they have the belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*); Buddhists (*āryaputrīya*) dwell in the extreme of nirvāṇa because they have cut through the afflictions (*kleśhaprahāṇa*). It is not the same for the bodhisattva; that is why it is said that by avoiding the two extremes (*antadvaya*), he observes the method of nonabiding.

iv) *He avoids the abiding which consists of being content with cutting just the obstacle of the afflictions.* The śrāvakas believe that the power of meditation (*bhāvanābala*) should be aimed only at cutting the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇaprahāṇa*) and that then they have done all there is to be done (*sarvakṛtakṛtya*). But the bodhisattva avoids such an abiding because it sets up an obstacle (*āvṛṇoti*) to the benefit and well-being of beings (*sattvahitasukha*). A stanza says: Dwelling in the unfortunate destinies (*durgati*) does not set up as great an obstacle to attaining supreme bodhi as does dwelling in the levels of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. Since the bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling, the method of nonabiding is spoken of.

v) *He avoids abiding in the nirvāṇa-without-residue element with disregard for the interest of beings.* The śrāvakas, etc., who do not care about the interest of beings (*sattvārtha*) dwell in the nirvāṇa-without-residue element (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*): complete extinction, like wood consumed by fire (*agniparidagdhakāṣṭhavad ātyantikanirvṛttiḥ*). The bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling: being endowed (*saṃpanna*) with both wisdom (*prajñā*) and great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), he abides in the nonabiding nirvāṇa (*apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*, cf. chap. IX, § 1). Since he avoids this dwelling of the śrāvakas, the method of nonabiding is spoken of.” (U)

22. What is the difference (*viśeṣa*) between the two knowledges, that of the śrāvakas (*śrāvakajñāna*) and that of the bodhisattvas (*bodhisattvajñāna*)? The knowledge of the bodhisattvas is distinguished by five aspects (*ākāra*):

i) It is distinguished by the absence of concepts (*nirvikalpaviśeṣa*) because it does not conceptualize (*vikalpayati*) the dharmas, viz., aggregates (*skandha*), etc.

ii) It is distinguished by its non-mediocrity (*aparīttaviśeṣa*) because, by fully understanding (*prativedha*) reality (*tattva*; H: *tathāta*), by penetrating all the aspects of the knowable (*jñeyākāra*) and by referring (*adhikṛtya*) to all beings (*sattva*), it is not mediocre.

iii) It is distinguished by its non-abidingness (*apraṭiṣṭhitatava-viśeṣa*), because it is fixed in nonabiding nirvāṇa (*apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*).

iv) It is distinguished by its infinitude (*ātyantikaviśeṣa*), because it does not become extinguished in the nirvāṇa-without-residue element (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*).

v) It is distinguished by its supremacy (*niruttaraviśeṣa*) because above it, there is no other vehicle (*yāna*) superior to it.

Here is a stanza:

With compassion (*karuṇā*) as nature and its five superiorities (*viśeṣa*), the knowledge of the bodhisattva is at the top of the worldly and supraworldly perfections (*laukikā lokottarā saṃpad*). (Stanza translated acc. to H). [148c1]

22. Comm. Bh 368b8-27, bh missing, U 433c27-434a23, u 329b4-330a8.

“Here the author is going to show that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the śrāvaka by five aspects:

i) *Nirvikalpaviśeṣa*. The knowledge of the śrāvaka is absence of concepts (*nirvikalpa*) relative to the four errors (*viparyāsa*); the knowledge of the bodhisattva is absence of concepts of all the dharmas up to enlightenment (*bodhi*).

ii) *Aparīttaviśeṣa*. It is of three types:

a. Non-mediocrity in the comprehension of the true nature (*tathatāpravedhāparīttaviśeṣa*). The śrāvakas, etc., enter into the seeing of reality (*tattvadarśana*), penetrating only the nonexistence of self of the individual (*pudgalanairātmya*). On the other hand, the bodhisattvas, having entered into the seeing of reality, are able to penetrate the nonexistence of self of the individual and of dharmas (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*).

b. Non-mediocrity of the object to be cognized (*jñeyaviśayāparīttaviśeṣa*). In the śrāvakas, etc., it is enough that the knowledge of the truths, viz., the truth of suffering, etc., (*duḥkhādisatyajñāna*) should arise in order to say that they have attained their goal (correct *sieou si* by *sieou yi* acc. to the Tib. *don byas pa = kṛtārtha*). On the other hand, for the bodhisattva, the knowledge of non-error on all objects to be known

(*sarvajñeyaviṣayāvīpariyāsajñāna*) must arise in order that it may be said that they have attained their goal (read *sieou yi*) and that they have done what had to be done.

c. Non-mediocrity with respect to beings (*sattvān adhikṛtyaparitaviśeṣa*). The śrāvakas, etc., who seek only their own personal interest (*svārtha*), zealously cultivate the knowledge of suppression of the afflictions and of non-production (*kṣayānutpādayñāna*, cf. Kośa, I, p. 82; IV, p. 180). On the other hand, the bodhisattva, by considering (*adhikṛtya*) all beings, seeks perfect enlightenment (*mahābodhi*). It is by these three types of non-mediocrity that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the śrāvaka.

iii) *Apratiṣṭhitvaviśeṣa*. The śrāvakas, etc., dwell solely in nirvāṇa. On the other hand, the bodhisattvas, by the dominant power (*adhipatibala*) of compassion (*karuṇā*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) with which they are endowed, dwell in the nonabiding-nirvāṇa (*apratīṣṭhitanirvāṇa*).

iv) *Ātyantikaviśeṣa*. This shows the great difference between the nirvāṇa of the śrāvakas and that of the bodhisattvas. In the śrāvakas who abide in the nirvāṇa-without-residue element (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*), body (*kāya*) and knowledge are extinguished (*kṣīṇa*) like the flame of a lamp (*dīpajvāla*) when it is put out. On the other hand, when the bodhisattvas become buddha, the body of the Dharma (*dharmakāya*) which they have realized (*sākṣātkṛta*) goes on until the end of saṃsāra (*āsamsārakoteḥ*) without being destroyed. Moreover, in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), the mental series (*saṃtāna*) does not cease. It is also by this difference that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished.

v) *Niruttaraviśeṣa*. Above the vehicle of the śrāvaka (*śrāvakayāna*) there is the vehicle of the pratyekabuddha (*pratyekabuddhayāna*) and above that is the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyāna*). The vehicle of the bodhisattva is the vehicle of the Buddhas (*buddhayāna*) and there is none higher (*niruttara*).

These are the five points on which the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the śrāvaka.

Finally, the stanza reviews these ideas. *Five superiorities*: this is a matter of the five types of differences already spoken of. *Worldly and supraworldly perfections*: the dhyānas and the formless (*ārūpya*) concentrations are called *worldly perfections*; the

nirvāṇa acquired by the śrāvaka, etc., is called *supraworldly perfection*. Since this knowledge transcends them, it is put at the head of the list.” (U)

23. If the bodhisattvas are thus endowed with the qualities (*guṇa*) and perfections (*saṃpad*) of excellent morality (*adhiśīla*), excellent mind (*adhicitta*), and excellent wisdom (*adhiprajñā*), if they have attained sovereignty over all riches (*sarvadhana-vibhutva*), why is it that there are beings (*sattva*) deprived of resources (*kṣīṇadhana*)? - This is because the bodhisattvas give nothing to some beings because they see that these beings feel loathing (*pratibaddhakarman*) for the riches; because they see some beings to whom riches (*bhoga*) have been granted who are setting up obstacles (*pratibandha*) to the arising (*utpāda*) of wholesome dharmas (*kuśaladharmā*); because they see some beings whose riches are exhausted who are turning towards dislike (*saṃvegābhimukha*); because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted who are accumulating unwholesome dharmas (*akuśaladharmā*); because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted who are causing suffering (*pīḍana, ghātana*) to innumerable other beings. That is why there are some beings deprived of riches.

Here is a stanza:

Seeing the disgust (*karman* = *pratibaddhakarman*), obstacle (*pratibandha*), turning away (*abhimukhatva*), accumulation (*caya*) and wickedness (*pīḍana*), we understand why some beings do not obtain any of the riches of the bodhisattvas. [148c11]

23. Comm. Bh 368c10-369a13, bh missing, U 434b6-434c4, u 330a8-331a5.

“Here the author is going to show why the bodhisattvas, although they have sovereignty over riches (*dhanavibhutva*), do not give anything to certain beings.

Because they see some beings feel disgust for the riches. When the bodhisattvas see some beings experience disgust for the riches, they do not give them any. They do not want to give in vain, uselessly (*niṣphalam*), for these beings would not accept even if they gave.

Thus a stanza says: The mother can suckle her child herself for months tirelessly; but if the child closes its mouth, what good is the nourishment?

Because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted set up obstacles to the arising of wholesome dharmas. The bodhisattvas see certain beings who experience no disgust for the riches but who, once in possession of abundant riches, become careless (*pramāda*) and produce no wholesome dharmas. Then the bodhisattvas have this thought: It would be better (*varam*) for these beings actually (*dr̥ṣṭadharmā*) to be poor (*daridra*) for a short time rather than to be poor for a long time in future existences (*janmāntara*). That is why the bodhisattvas do not give them the riches which they have at their disposal.

Because they see some beings whose riches have been exhausted turn towards disgust. The bodhisattvas see some beings whose riches are exhausted turn (*abhimukha*) towards disgust (*saṃvega*) for saṃsāra and seek deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa*). But if they have fortune (*vibhava*), they take to drunkenness (*mada*). That is why the bodhisattvas do not give them the riches they have at their disposal, thinking: It would be better (*varam*) for them to be poor (*daridra*) and turn their mind ceaselessly to disgust for saṃsāra rather than to be rich and give themselves up to pleasure (*sukha*), to carelessness (*pramāda*), without experiencing disgust for saṃsāra and without producing wholesome dharmas.

Because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted accumulate unwholesome dharmas. The bodhisattvas see that some beings to whom opulent wealth has been given, give themselves up to carelessness (*pramāda*) and accumulate (*ci-*) all sorts of unwholesome dharmas. That is why they do not give the riches which they have at their disposal. Thus a stanza says: It would be better (*varam*) to be poor (*daridra*) in riches and avoid the bad destinies (*durgati*) and bad actions (*duṣcarita*) than to be rich (*vibhavant*), disturbing the senses (*indriya*) and exposing oneself to becoming a receptacle (*bhājana*) for future suffering.

Because they see some beings to whom wealth has been given make trouble for countless other beings. The bodhisattvas see some beings, once in possession of fortune (*vibhava*), who trouble countless beings (*apramāṇasattva*). That is why they do not give them the riches they have at their disposal. They think: It would be better (*varam*) that a person

undergoes the suffering of poverty (*dāridryaduḥkha*) rather than trouble many other beings.

The stanza summarizes these ideas by saying: *Seeing the repugnance, obstacle, orientation*, etc. The text is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.” (U)

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

Preliminary Note: - Lamotte finds this is to be the most detailed study on the nirvikalpakajñāna. See L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Siddhi*, p. 633-635 and Rahder, Hobogirin, art. *Chi*, p. 296-297. - Other works contain only scattered information: Abhis. al. āl, p. 97 (6) seq.; Saṃdhinir., p. 52, 88, 96, 116, 135, 136, 141, 142; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 12, 19, 25, 56, 78, 119, 168, 231, 268, 269, 174, 175, 277, 284, 288, 352; Madh. vṛtti, p. 352 (5); Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, st. 33-35; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 38 (25), 44 (8); Sūtrālaṅkāra, XVI 41; XIX, 52; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 4 (5), 5 (12-13), 97 (2), 101 (12), 104(6), 115 (17), 133 (19), 180 (20), 204 (8), 217 (16), 220 (21), 222 (7), 225 (7), 229 (16), 235 (8), 244 (168), 249 (22), 271 (6); Uttaratantra, p. 225; Triṃśikā, p. 40 (24), 43 (18), 44 (4); Siddhi, p. 9, 17, 394, 407, 445, 585-588, 607-610, 634-625, 634, 663, 688-689, 751.

2. Nature of the n.j. - Defined in Sūtrālaṅkāra, appendix, p. 191 (22): tad anenārūpyanidarśanam apratiṣṭham anābhāsam avijñaptikam aniketam iti nirvikalpasya jñānasya yathāsūtram lakṣaṇam abhidhyotitaṃ bhavati. Same formula in Kāśyapaparivarta, v. 56, 57, p. 887.

3. Object of the n.j. - Abhis. al āl., p. 97 (6), sq.: Sūtrālaṅkāra, XIX, 52: *tathatālanbanam jñānam*. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 180 (20): n. j.: *tattvāvbodha*; p. 115 (17); the object of n. j. (*gocara*) is *bhāvābhāva-vimukta dvayābhāvasvarūpa*. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XIX, 52: n. v. = *tathatā-lambanam jñānam*. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 180 (20): n. j. = *tattvāvbodha*; p. 115 (17): the object of the n. j. is *bhāvābhāvavimukta dvayābhāvasvarūpa*. Saṃgraha, here: the object of n. j. is *anabhilāpyadharmatā*, the *nairātmyadharmatā*. - On *anabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*, cf. E. Obermiller, Doctrine of the P. P., p. 94; Saṃdhinir., chap. I; Viṃśikā, p. 6 (18), 10 (26); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 221 (17), 222 (1). - On pudgaladharmanairātmya, see E. Obermiller, *ibid.*, p. 16, 21; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 280 (18); Sūtrālaṅkāra, XVIII, 92-103 (*pudgalanairātmya*); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 133 (17), 200 (24); Uttaratantra, p. 138; Viṃśikā, p. 6; Triṃśikā, p. 271-273, 451, 668, 590. - All these expressions are synonymous, cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 49 (17) seq.: *tathatā bhūtakoṭiś cānimittam paramārthatā dharmadhātus ca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāstas ... etac ca paryāyapañcalam yathā pradhānam gāthāyām uktam anye 'pi paryāyā ihānuktāḥ. pravacanād upadhāryāḥ. tadyathā advayatā avikalpadhātuḥ dharmatā anabhilāpyatā anirodhaḥ asaṃskṛtam nirvāṇādi.*

7. The reply to the objections raised here depends on two principles:

Without designation, without concept of the thing designated, cf. Laṅkāvatāra, p. 187 (2): *abhidhānavinirmuktam abhidheyam na lakṣyate*.

No real relationship between designation and the thing designated, cf. Saṃgraha, chap. II, § 24, p. 118: the name is *paratantra*, the thing is *parikalpita*; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 227 (11): the name and the thing are imaginary (*nāma nimittam ca parikapitaḥ svabhāvo veditavyaḥ*); confrontation of theses in Siddhi, p. 538.

See also Notes to chap. III, § 16.

10. Buddhapaṣaṇmaṇḍala: below, chap. X, v. 1; Sūtrālaṅkāra, VII, 6; XX, 28: (*buddhapaṣaṇmaṇḍaleṣu cotpattiḥ sarvāḥ ity etāni aparāṇi liṅgāni bodhisattasya*); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 96 (20) (*sāmbhogika-paṣaṇmaṇḍala*), 191 (12).

14. On the eight lokadharmas which have been already mentioned in chap. II, v. 33; VII, v. 8, no. 6, see also Dīgha, III, p. 260; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 156 seq.; V, p. 53; Cullaniḍḍesa, p. 55; Paṭisaṃbhidā, I, p. 22, 122; Vibhaṅga, p. 387; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 162, Lalita, p. 8 (22), 435 (1); Kośa, IV, p. 25; Mahāvīyut., 2342-2348; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXI; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 193 (9); Buddhabhūmistraśāstra, T 1530, k. V, p. 315b18 sq. (good definitions).

17. Examples of cintāmaṇi and tūriya: below, chap. X.

Sūtrālaṅkāra, IX, 18-19; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 4 (3); Uttaraṅtra, p. 251.

20. See above chap. II, § 14b; Abhdharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. V, p. 715b19.

21. Similar ideas in Vajrachchedikā: *bhāṣiṣye 'haṃ ye yathyā bodhisattvayānasamprasthiteṇa sthātavyaṃ yathā pratpattavyaṃ yathā cittaṃ pragrahītavyaṃ*, etc.

22. A more reasonable explanation of evil in the world is given in Saṃdhir., IX, § 265: the evil in the world is due to the wrongdoings of beings and the bodhisattvas are unable to oppose the law of the retribution of actions.

CHAPTER IX

CUTTING OFF, FRUITION OF THE THREE TRAININGS

(*phalaprahāṇa*)

1. (Translated acc. to H). The superiority of excellent wisdom (*adhiprajñāviśeṣa*) has been explained in chapter VIII; how should one conceive of (*katham draṣṭavyaḥ*) the superiority of the cessation (*prahāṇaviśeṣa*) that is the fruition of the three śikṣās?

Cessation (*prahāṇa*) is the nonabiding-nirvāṇa (*apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*) of the bodhisattva; it has as nature (*lakṣaṇa*) this twofold transformation of support (*āśrayaprāvṛtti*) which consists of rejecting the defilements (*saṃkleśaparityāga*) and not abandoning transmigration (*saṃsārāparityāga*).

i) First, transmigration (*saṃsāra*) is the defiled portion (*saṃkleśabhāga*) of the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*).

ii) Nirvāṇa is the pure portion (*vyavadānabhāga*) of the dependent nature.

iii) The two aspects of the support (*āśraya*) is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) as it is included in both parts at the same time (*tadubhayabhāgapatita*).

iv) The transformation (*parāvṛtti*) of the support consists of the expulsion (*tchouan che = ldog = vivartana*) of the defiled portion (*saṃkleśabhāga*) of the dependent nature when its antidote (*pratipakṣa*) arises and it is reduced (*tchouan tö = gyur pa = pariṇāma*) to its pure portion (*vyavadānabhāga*).

[148c18]

1. Comm. Bh 369a22-28, bh missing, U 434c16-435a10, u 33116-331b6.

“Nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*), which counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) all that is opposed to it (*vipakṣa*), necessarily results in cutting off (*prahāṇa*); this is why,

immediately after it (*tadanantaram*), the writer speaks of the superiority of severance (*prahāṇaviśeṣa*).

Nonabiding-nirvāṇa: because the bodhisattva does not rest, like mundane people (*loka*), śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa. *It consists of rejecting the defilements and not abandoning saṃsāra*: it destroys the power (*anubhāva*) of the defilements as one would crush a cursed serpent (*śāpasarpa*) for, without abandoning saṃsāra, it is free of defilements. *It has as its nature the twofold transformation of the support ...*: the bodhisattva abides in this transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) as in a formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*); in his own personal interest (*svakārtha*), he is endowed with great wisdom (*prajñā*) and so does not yield (*avakāśaṃ kṛ-*) to the afflictions (*kleśa*); on the other hand, in the interest of others (*parārtha*), he is endowed with great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and thus does not cease to live in saṃsāra.

What are saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, the basis (*āśraya*) and its transformation (*parāvṛtti*)? All of these must be defined.

i) *Saṃsāra is the defiled part of the dependent nature*: this is the imaginary part (*parikalpitabhāga*) composed of a mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*) disturbed by afflictions (*kleśaskhalita*) and the uninterruptedness of the misery of birth and death (*jātimaraṇādīnavādamuccheda*). [In chapter II, § 29, we have seen that the imaginary nature forms the defiled part of the dependent nature.]

ii) *Nirvāṇa is the purity part of the dependent nature*: It is the absolute part (*pariniṣpannabhāga*) involving the transformation or complete suppression (*ātyantikaparāvṛtti*) of the imaginary (*parikalpita*). [In chapter II, § 29, we have seen that the absolute nature forms the purity part of the dependent nature.]

iii) *The support with two aspects is the dependent nature insofar as it is included in both portions at the same time*. The support with its two aspects is the dependent nature in all its complexity.

iv) The transformation (*parāvṛtti*) concerns the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*); the dependent nature of the mind and of the mental factors (*cittacaitta*) is the basis (*āśraya*) of the transformation that destroys the defilements (*saṃkleśa*); it is also the basis of all the buddha attributes (*buddhadharma*). Some actually say: The bhūmis and the virtues (*pāramitā*) are the support (*āśraya*) of the buddha attributes; the

transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is the fruit (*phala*), etc. [The Chinese text, badly punctuated, should be corrected according to the Tibetan: *sa dan pha rol phyin pa ni / sañs rgyas chos kyi gnas yin no / gnas gyur pa ni ḥbras bu ste*]. - What is the transformation of the basis? It concerns the dependent nature. *When its antidote arises*, i.e., when the nonconceptual knowledge arises, the dependent nature *expels its defiled part*: it destroys its disturbed part (*skhalitabhāga*), which is formed by all the objects and subjects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhaka*), *and is reduced to its purity part*: rejecting this imaginary nature which is formed by objects and subjects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhaka*), it is reduced to its very pure part (*suviśuddhabhāga*), completely free of subjects and objects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhakavivarjita*), cognizable by introspection (*pratyātmavedya*) and avoiding all empty proliferation (*prapañcocchedaka*).” (U)

2. In brief (*samāsataḥ*), this transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is of six types:

i) *Durbalīkaraṇopabṛṃhaṇaparāvṛtti*: the transformation that consists of weakening and strengthening. Indeed, by the stability (*sthiti*) of the hearing-propensity (*śrutavāsanā*) due to the power of convinced adherence (*adhimuktibala*), and by the presence of shame (*lajjā*), the afflictions (*kleśa*) are but slightly or not at all active (*samudācaranti*)

ii) *Prativedhaparāvṛtti*: the transformation of penetration. It is the transformation of the bodhisattvas who have entered onto the bhūmis (*bhūmipraviṣṭa*). Actually, the appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal (*tattvātattva-khyānākhyāna*, cf. *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, XIX, 54) takes place up to and including the sixth bhūmi.

iii) *Bhāvanāparāvṛtti*: the transformation of development. It is the transformation of the bodhisattvas fettered by obstacles (*sāvaraṇa*). Actually, there is the disappearance of all concepts (*sarvanimittākhyāna*) and appearance of the real (*tattvakhyāna*) up to and including the tenth bhūmi.

iv) *Phalaparipūrīparāvṛtti*: transformation of the fulfillment of the result. It is the transformation of the bodhisattvas freed from the obstacles (*anāvaraṇa*), because there is the disappearance of all concepts (*sarvanimittakhyāna*), appearance of the very pure reality (*ativiśuddhatattva-khyāna*) and attainment of mastery over everything (*sarvanimittavibhutvalābdha*).

v) *Hīnaparāvṛtti*: the lesser transformation. This is the transformation of the śrāvakas, etc. Actually, they penetrate (*pratividhyanti*) only the non-existence of self of the individual (*puḍgalanairātmya*); they turn their back completely (*ekāntena pṛṣṭhībhavanti*) on transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and completely abandon (*ekāntena parityajanti*) this transmigration.

vi) *Viśālaparāvṛtti*: extensive transformation. This is the transformation of the bodhisattvas. Actually, they penetrate (*pratividhyanti*) further the non-existence of self of dharmas (*dharmanairātmya*) and, considering saṃsāra as peace (*śānta*), they cut through the defilements (*saṃkleśa*) but do not abandon saṃsāra.

What disadvantages (*ādīnava*) do the bodhisattvas get from the lesser transformation (*hīnaparāvṛtti*)? By scorning (*anapekṣya*) the interest of others (*sattvārtha*), they go against (*atīkrāmantī*) their quality of bodhisattva and share in the deliverance (*vimokṣa*) of the practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle (*hīnayānika*): these are the drawbacks of this transformation.

What benefits (*anuśaṃsa*) do the bodhisattvas derive from the extensive transformation (*viśālaparāvṛtti*)? Having transformed their own basis, they obtain sovereignty over all the dharmas of saṃsāra (*saṃsāradharmavibhutva*). Appearing (*pradarśana*) in all the destinies (*sarvagati*) in the bodies of all kinds of beings (*sarvasattvakāya*), they exercise their skill in various disciplinary means (*vinayopāyakauśalya*) in order to discipline and establish beings who are to be converted into happiness (*abhyudaya*) and the three vehicles (*yānatraya*): these are the benefits of this transformation. [149a7]

2. Comm. Bh 369b19-369c16; bh missing; U 435a28-435b21; u 331b6-332b1.

i) *Durbalīkaraṇopabṛṃhanaparāvṛtti*. “It breaks (*samudghātayati*) the strength (*bala*) of the affliction-propensities (*kleśavāsanā*) contained in the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and increases (*vardhayati*) the power (*prabhāva*) which counteracts (*tatpratipakṣa*) them. This first transformation of the basis is obtained in this way. *By the stability of the hearing-propensity due to the power of confirmed adherence*: when one abides in the level where adherence (*adhimukticyābhūmi*) is practiced, the power of the hearing-propensity (*śrutavāsanā*) is stabilized (*sthāpayati*); this is how this transformation of support is obtained. *And by the presence of shame*: in this state (*avasthā* of *adhimukticyābhūmi*), when the afflictions (*kleśa*) are active (*samudācarantī*), one is completely ashamed, and then the afflictions are only slightly or not at all active.” (Bh)

“By the power of adherence (*adhimukti*) and the hearing-propensity (*śrutavāsanā*), one breaks (*samudghātayati*) the propensities of the afflictions (*kleśavāsanā*) contained in the retribution consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) and one increases (*vardhayati*) the power (*prabhāva*) of the pure dharmas (*vaiyavadānikadharmā*). By the stability of the hearing-propensity (*śrutavāsanā*) due to adherence (*adhimukti*) and by the presence of shame (*lajjā*), the afflictions are caused to act only slightly or not at all.” (U)

ii) *Prativedhaparāvṛtti*. “This is the transformation of the support obtained by entering into the bhūmis. *The appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal (tattvātattvakhyanākhyāna)*, etc.: this transformation extends up to the sixth bhūmi. Sometimes it is the cause for the appearance of the real (*tattvakhyanā*); sometimes, when emerging from (*vyutthāna*) concentration, it is the cause for the appearance of the unreal (*atavakhyanā*).” (Bh) – “When one has entered into the great bodhisattva bhūmis, *there is appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal*: according to whether the nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) functions mediately (*sottaram*) or immediately (*anantaram*), there is sometimes the appearance of the real (*tattvakhyanā*) when one enters into concentration, and sometimes the appearance of the unreal (*atattvakhyanā*) when one emerges from (*vyutthāna*) concentration. Thus the real and the unreal, in these two moments, appear and disappear respectively. This appearance and disappearance lasts until the sixth bhūmi.” (U)

iii) *Bhāvanaparāvṛtti*. “It is that of the bodhisattvas fettered by obstacles, i.e., fettered by the obstacle of knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). *There is the disappearance of every concept,*

etc.: this transformation of the basis lasts up until the tenth bhūmi. All concepts (*nimitta*) disappear; nonconcept (*animitta*), the true nature (*tathatā*) alone, appears.” (Bh)

iv) *Phalaparipūrīparāvṛtti*. “It is that of the bodhisattvas freed from the obstacles. They are free of the obstacles (*anāvaraṇa*) because they have no further obstacle. There is appearance of the very pure reality (*ativiśuddhatattvakhyāna*) for the same reason. The bodhisattvas obtain sovereignty over everything (*sarvanimittavibhutva*): with this transformation as support (*āśraya*), they gain mastery over things (*nimittavibhutva*) and according to their aspirations (*yathāśayam*), they procure the benefit and happiness of beings (*sattvahitasukha*).” (Bh)

v) *Hīnaparāvṛtti*. “This is that of the śrāvakas, etc.: by etc., one should understand the pratyekabuddhas. They penetrate (*pratividhyanti*) only one non-existence of self (*nairatmya*), that of the pudgala. This transformation, not being able to procure the interests of others (*parārtha*), is lower (*hīna*).” (Bh)

vi) *Viśālaparāvṛtti*. “This is that of the bodhisattvas, etc. Since they penetrate (*pratividhyanti*) both non-existences of self (*nairatmya*), that of the pudgala and that of dharmas at the same time, they become established in a place where they can cut through the defilements (*saṃkleśa*) without abandoning saṃsāra. This transformation which procures both the personal interest of the bodhisattva and that of others (*svaparārtha*) is extensive (*viśāla*).” (Bh) – “They cut through the defilements (*saṃkleśa*) but do not abandon saṃsāra. Penetrating (*pratividh-*) the two non-existences of a self (*nairatmya*), they cut the defilements; but seeing peace (*śanta*) in saṃsāra, they do not abandon it.” (U)

“What disadvantages do they incur in the lower transformation, etc.? This passage is easy to understand.

What benefits do they derive from the extensive transformation, etc.? Since the bodhisattvas have obtained mastery in all the destinies (*gati*) with the body appropriate (*sabhāgakāya*) to these destinies and their inhabitants, [cf. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, in Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 324 seq.; Hobogirin, art. Bosatsu, p. 139b]. By means of their skill in various disciplinary means (*vinayopāyakauśalya*), they confirm those beings [who are capable of entering the path (*yeou kan* = *bhavya*, cf. Kośa, IV, p. 201] into the discipline. They establish them (*nikṣipanti*) in happiness (*abhyudaya*) and in the three

vehicles (*yānatraya*). By *happiness*, the fortunate worldly existences (*laukikasukhajanna*) [or, acc. to Bh, the riches of the world (*laukikavibava*)] should be understood. This is what constitutes the benefits of the Dharma.”(U)

3. Here are some stanzas (cf. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XIX, 53-54):

a. tattvaṃ saṃcchādyā bālānām atattvaṃ khyāti sarvataḥ /

tattvaṃ tu bodhisattvānām sarvataḥ khyāty apāsya tat //

Amongst foolish people, the unreal, concealing the real, pushing aside the real, appears on all sides.

b. akhyānakhyānatā jñeyā asadarthasadarthayoḥ/

āśrayasya parāvṛttir mokṣo 'sau kāmacārataḥ //

The disappearance and appearance of the false and the real is the transformation of the basis, deliverance, for one acts as one wishes.

c. When the knowledge that knows the sameness (*samatājñāna*) of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa has been produced, then saṃsāra becomes nirvāṇa.

d. As a result, one does not give up (*tyajati*) or hold onto saṃsāra; one does not attain (*prāpnoti*) or miss nirvāṇa. [149a16]

3. Comm. Bh 369c26-370a19, bh missing, U 435c2-18, u 332b1-8.

“In order to explain the transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*), the author gives several stanzas:

a. Among foolish people: among fools (bāla), ignorance (avidyā) is not cut off (prahīṇa) and, since the real (tattva) does not appear (na khyāti), it is said that it is hidden (āchanna). By the power of ignorance, everything that is not real (atattva) appears (khyāti) in its entirety. Among bodhisattvas, it is not the same: ignorance being cut off, they understand (pratividhyanti) that the unreal is nonexistent; that is why it is said: avoiding the unreal. For bodhisattvas, the real appears everywhere (sarvataḥ khyāti).

[Cf. Sūtrālamkārabhāṣya: *etena yathā bālānāṃ svarasenātattvam eva khyāti nimittaṃ na tattvaṃ tathatā. evaṃ bodhisattvānāṃ svarasena tattvam eva khyāti nātattvam ity upadarśitam*].

b. As a result, *the appearance and disappearance of the real and the false*, etc.: when the absolute (*pariniṣpanna*), the real (*sadārtha*), appears and when the imaginary (*parikalpita*), the false (*asadārtha*), disappears, this is the transformation of the basis (*aśrayaparāvṛtti*). That is to say, the disappearance of the false (*asarthākhyāna*) and the appearance of the real (*sadarthakhyāna*) are called transformation of the support (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). This is *deliverance* (*mokṣa*): the transformation of the support is called deliverance. *For one acts as one wishes* (*kāmacārataḥ*): this transformation of the basis is deliverance, independence (*svātantrya*); one acts as one wishes in the world (*loka*), since by deliverance is meant a sovereignty in action in accordance with desires (*yathākāmakriyāvibhutva*) and not the fact of giving up the life of the body (*kāyajivita*) as if one were going to be beheaded (*śiraścheda*).

[Cf. Sūtrālamkāra: *asadarthasya nimittasyākhyānatā sadarthasya tathatāyāḥ khyānatā āśrayaparāvṛttir vediavyā. tayā hi tadakhyānaṃ ca. saiva ca mokṣo veditavyaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam. kāmacārataḥ. tadḥa hi svatanthro bhavati svacittaśavarti prakṛtyaiva nimittāsamudācārāt*].

c. *When the knowledge that knows the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is produced*, etc.: The imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is called saṃsāra. It is without self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). This absence of self-nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) is emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Emptiness is nirvāṇa, the absolute nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*).

d. *For this reason, one does not give up and one does not hold onto saṃsāra*, etc. Since saṃsāra is nirvāṇa, one does not abandon it; but since the notion of saṃsāra (*saṃsārasamjñā*) no longer applies (*pravṛti-*) to saṃsāra, one does not keep saṃsāra. Since nirvāṇa is not attained outside of saṃsāra, one does not acquire nirvāṇa; but since nirvāṇa is experienced (*sākṣātkṛta*) within saṃsāra, one does not lack nirvāṇa.” (U)

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Apratiṣṭitanirvāṇa. - Difficult grammatical explanation: *nirvāṇam yatra na pratiṣṭhīyate* (Note of J. Speyer in Muséon, 1914, 9. 33; Syntax, § 360); *apraṭiṣṭhito nirvāṇe* (Mahāvīyut., 406). - Aṣṭasāhasrikā P.P., p. 23: *api tu sthāsyati sarvajñatāyām asthānayogena*, comm. Abhis. al. āl., p. 105 (9): *tatra sthānam vastūpalambhaḥ. pratiṣṭhānam cetasaḥ. tatpratiṣedhād asthānam*; Aṣṭasāhastikā, p. 37: *apraṭiṣṭhitamānso hi thatāgato 'rham damyaksambuddhaḥ. sa naiva saṃskṛte fhātau sthito nāpy asaṃskṛte dh atau sthito na ca tato vyutthitaḥ*, comm. Abhis. al. āl., p. 151 (25): *saṃskṛta iti kāmādike. asaṃskṛta iti tathatāike. Tatra na sthas tattvato vastuvanupalambhāt. na ca tato vyutthota iti naiva tatrāsthitho nirviṣayasya naño 'prayogāt. saṃv rtyā tv sthānam asthānam vā prajñaptam Bhagavateti matiḥ*; Vajracchedikā, p. 27: *apraṭiṣṭhitahitta*; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 421 (16): *apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇatvena paramāmsāntiṃ gate ... bodhisattve*; Dharmasaṃgiti in Śikṣāsam., p. 322b seq.: *buddhā bhagavanto ... sarvasattvasamacittā niotyasaṃādhihogarh saṃ s arabirvāṇavimuktā yāvat sattvānām mātāpitrkalpāḥ samānamaitracittaḥ*; Sūtrālaṃkāra, III, 3; IX, 14 (*saṃsāranirvāṇāpratiṣṭhitatvāt saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtatvenādvayā vṛttiḥ*); IX, 45; IX, 70; XVII, 32; XVII, 42 (*tatrāpi ca niḥsnehānām śrāvakaḥpratyekabuddhānām sarvadukhopaśame nirvāṇe pratiṣṭhitam manah. Bodhisayyānām tu karuṇāviṣṭatvān nirvāṇe 'pi mano na pratiṣṭhitam*); XVIII, 70; XIX, 62; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 4 (1), 108 (14-15), 160 (17) (*dharmānirātmyaviṣayenāpratiṣṭhitanirvāṇāprāpakenāvikalpena jñānena svayaṃ niryānam mahāyānam ucyate*), 187 (14) (*kim tad apratiṣṭhitam nirvāṇam. bodhisattvāvasthāyām tāvat kāmopapattivaṣitāṃniśrayeṇa kāruṇikatvāt saṃsāropattiḥ, prajñabalena tatrāsaṃkleśaḥ*); Siddhi, p. 628, 771, 677, 683, 777, 810; Uttaratantra, p. 162, 173, 174. – Consult J. Masuda, *Der individualistische Idealismus*, 1926, p. 49, sq.; T. Stcherbatsky, *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, 1927, p. 185, 204; N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1930, p. 200; H. von Glasenapp, *Unsterblichkeit und Erlösung in den indischen Religionen*, 1938, p. 62.

Āśrayaparāvṛtti: see Notes to chap. I, v. 57. Also Laṅkāvatāra, p. 202 (2): *cittam drśyavinirmuktaṃ svabhāvadvyavarjitam āśrayasya parāvṛttim anutpādam vadāmy aham*; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIX, 54 (= *mokṣa = tathatāyaḥ khyānatā*); XIV, 29 (in the first bhūmi); XIV, 45 (final or *niṣṭhāgata*); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 404 (27) (*niruttarā and sōttarās*); Siddhi, p. 219 (fruit of *kleśaprahāṇa*); p. 600 (*parāvṛtti* of *rūpaskandha* and of *skandhacatuṣka*); p. 667 (its twofold fruit).

Nirvāṇa: cf. the definition of Laṅkāvatāra, p. 200 (4): *animittam iti vikalpasyāpravṛttir anutpādo nirvāṇam iti vadāmi. ttra nirvāṇam iti yathābhūtāryasthānadarśanam vikalpacittacaittakalāpasya parāvṛttipūrvakam tathāgatavapratyātmāryajñānādhiḡamaṃ nirvāṇam iti vadāmi*. - See Siddhi, p. 668-680.

2. Repeated and developed in Siddhi, p. 661-667.

3. The first two stanzas are taken from Sūtrālaṃkāra, XIX, 53-54. The third deals with the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, cf. Madh. vṛtti, XXV, 19-20, p. 535: *na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśe saṇam, na nirvāṇasya saṃskarāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam. – nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭḷḥ saṃs arasya ca, na tayor antaram kiṃcit susūksmam api vidyate*

(T. Stcherbaatsky, *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 205; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Réflexions sur le Madhyamaka*, MCB, II, 1933, p. 29); Laṅkāvatāra, p. 42 (7): *saṃsāranirvāṇasamatā*, p. 76; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 160 (11): *saṃsāranirvāṇayor anabhilāpyadharmatāprativedhād avikalpam jñānam*: Saṃgraha, chap. II, § 30.

CHAPTER X

KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESULT

(*phalajñāna*)

1. The superiority of the cessation that is the result of the three śikṣās (*tatphalaprahāṇaviśeṣa*) has been explained in Chapter IX; how should one conceive (*kathaṃ draṣṭavyaḥ*) the superiority of the knowledge concerning this result (*tatphalajñānaviśeṣa*)? - The three bodies of the Buddha (*buddhakāya*) - the essential body (*svābhāvīkākāya*), the body of enjoyment (*saṃbhogakāya*) and the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) - constitute the superiority of the knowledge of this result.

i) First, the essential body (*svābhāvīkākāya*) is the dharmakāya (body of the doctrine) of the Tathāgata, because it is the basis of sovereignty over all the dharmas (*sarvadharmavibhūta*).

ii) The body of enjoyment (*saṃbhogakāya*) is based on the dharmakāya and is characterized (*prabhāvīta*) by all the types of assemblies (*parśanmaṇḍala*) of the Buddha because it experiences (*anubhavati*) the very pure buddhafi elds (*pariśuddhakṣetra*) and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyānadharmasaṃbhoga*).

iii) The apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) also is based on the dharmakāya and manifests (*pradarśayati*) the following activities: [cf. the twelve acts of the Buddha in Lalitavistara analyzed by Bu-ston, II, p. 7-72; Daśabhūmika, p. 14]:

- 1-2: dwelling in the Tuṣita palace and then departing (*tuṣitabhavanāvasam ādiṃ kṛtvā cyavanam*);
3. entry into the womb (*garbhāvākṛānti*);
4. birth (*janma*);

5. youthful games (*kumārakrīḍā*);
6. abiding in the harem (*antaḥpuravāsa*);
7. leaving home (*abhiniṣkramaṇa*) and keeping company with the heretics (*tīrthikasamīpagamana*);
8. ascetic practice (*duṣkaracaryā*);
9. victory over Māra (*māradharṣaṇa*);
10. attainment of enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*);
11. turning the wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakra-pravartana*);
12. parinirvāṇa (*mahāparinirvāṇa*). [149a26]

1. Comm. Bh 370b1-9, bh missing, U 435c28-436a19, u 332b8-333a8.

“When one has cut off what needs to be cut off (*prahātavya*), immaculate unhindered knowledge (*vimalam apratihataṃ ca jñānam*) is obtained. This is why, immediately after (*anantaram*) the superiority of cutting off (*prahāṇaviśeṣa*), the author explains the superiority of the knowledge concerning the result (*phalajñāna-viśeṣa*).

i) The svābhāvikakāya does not contain anything created (*kṛtima*), this is why it is called essential (*svābhāvika*); it is the basis (*āśraya*), this is why it is called body (*kāya*). Being a body (*kāya*), the nature of things (*dharmatā*) is called dharmakāya; or rather, because it is the basis (*āśraya*) of the dharmas, it is called dharmakāya. [In Sanskrit: *dharmataiva kāya iti dharmakāyaḥ. athavā dharmāṇaṃ āśrayo bhavātīti dharmakāyaḥ*]. *Because it is the basis of sovereignty over all dharmas*: it is also the basis of attaining mastery over all dharmas and this is why it is the basis of mastery over all dharmas.

ii) *The saṃbhogakāya depends on the dharmakāya*: because there is a dharmakāya, there is a saṃbhogakāya. *It is characterized by all types of Buddha assemblies*: These are a collection (*caya*) of groups of the great bodhisattvas in these buddha bhūmis these are the bhūmis situated in the four directions, such as Sukhāvātī. *Because they experience the very pure buddhafiels and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle*: in the very pure buddhafiels, they experience the many joys of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle (sūtras, etc.), because they understand their meaning (*artha*). Or else, in the very

pure buddhafiends, they enjoy all sorts of jewels (*ratna*): gold (*suvarṇa*), silver (*rajata*), etc. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas mutually (*paraṃpara*) enjoy their bodies of wonderful colors, etc.; they enjoy texts (*dharma*), sūtras, etc. and many theses (*artha*) (cf. Chap III, § 1); they establish (*vyavasthāp-*) the specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). How is it the basis (*āśraya*) and of what is it the basis? Of *immaculate unhindered knowledge* (*vimalam aparatihataṃ ca jñānam*). By the dominant power (*adhipatibala*) of this wonderful knowledge, one is established in inconceivable liberations (*acintyavimokṣa*). A knowledge arises in the great bodhisattvas who have entered into the great bhūmis which manifests the very pure buddhafiends (*pariṣuddhabuddhakṣetra*) and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the Great Vehicle (*mahāyānadharmasambhoga*).

iii) *The nirmāṇakāya depends on the dharmakāya*: see what was said above. By the power of the knowledge of the result (*phalajñāna-viśeṣa*), he abandons the abode of the Tusitas, etc., and finally enters into nirvāṇa. But that is all pure fiction. This is how peculiar ideas having the aspect of a person (*manuṣyasabhāgavijñapti*), a person who is accomplishing the stereotyped career of the Buddha Śākyamuni, arise in the mental series (*saṃtāna*) of beings.” (U)

2. Here is a summary in one verse (*uddānaśloka*):

Characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*, § 3), achievement (*alābha*, § 4), sovereignties (*vibhutva*, § 5), basis (*āśraya*, § 6), constitution (*parigraha*, § 7), difference (*bhinnatva*, § 8), qualities (*guṇa*, § 9-27), profundity (*gāmbhīrya*, § 28), recollection (*anusmṛti*, § 29), actions (*karman*, § 31): these are the sections in regard to buddhahood. [149a29]

3. What is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the dharmakāya of the Buddhas? - In brief, (*samāsataḥ*) it has the following five characteristics:

i) **The transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛttilakṣaṇa*)**. Having destroyed (*viṣkambh-*) all the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) and the dependent nature in its defiled portion (*saṃkleśabhāgapatita paratantrasvabhāva*), it is free (*vimuc-*) of all

obstacles; it secures (*upasthāp-*) mastery of all the dharmas (*sarvadharmavibhutva*), and it is transformed into the purity portion of the dependent nature (*vyavadānabhāgapatita paratantrasvabhāva*).

ii) Its nature is that of being constituted of white dharmas (*śukladharmasvabhāvalakṣaṇa*) because it has attained the ten masteries (*vaśīta*) by means of the fulfillment of the six virtues (*ṣatpāramitā-paripūri*):

(a) Mastery of life (*āyurvaśīta*), mastery of mind (*cittavaśīta*) and mastery of provisions (*pariṣkāravaśīta*) have been acquired by means of fulfillment of the virtue of generosity (*dānapāramitāparipūri*).

(b) Mastery of action (*karmavaśīta*) and mastery of birth (*upapattivaśīta*) have been acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of morality (*śīlapāramitāparipūri*).

(c) Mastery of aspiration (*adhimuktivaśīta*) has been acquired by fulfillment of the virtue of patience (*kṣāntipāramitāparipūri*).

(d) Mastery of vow (*praṇidhānavaśīta*) has been acquired by fulfillment of the virtue of zeal (*vīryapāramitāparipūri*).

(e) Mastery of miraculous powers (*rddhivaśīta*) pertaining to (*saṃgrhīta*) the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*) has been acquired by fulfillment of the virtue of dhyāna (*dhyānapāramitāparipūri*).

(f) Mastery of knowledge (*jñānavaśīta*) and mastery of Dharma (*dharmavaśīta*) have been acquired by fulfillment of the virtue of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitāparipūri*).

iii) It is nondual (*advayalakṣaṇa*).

(a) It has the nature of nonduality of existence and nonexistence (*bhāvābhāvādvayalakṣaṇa*): in other words, it is neither existent nor nonexistent as, on the one hand, all dharmas are nonexistent (*niḥsvabhāva*) and, on the other hand, emptiness (*śūnyatā*) exists really.

(b) It has the nature of nonduality of being conditioned and unconditioned (*saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtādvayalakṣaṇa*): in other words, it is

neither conditioned nor unconditioned as, on the one hand, it is not fabricated (*abhisamṣkṛta*) by action (*karman*) or by afflictions (*kleśa*) and, on the other hand, it has the sovereign power (*vibhutva*) of appearing (*pradarśana*) in the aspect (*ābhāsa*) of the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).

(c) It has the nature of nonduality of plurality and singleness (*nānātvaiikatvādvayalakṣaṇa*): in other words, it is neither many nor one because, on the one hand, the basis of all the Buddhas (*sarvabuddhāśraya*) does not consist of divisions (*abhinna*) and, on the other hand, numberless mental series (*apramāna-saṃtāna*) reach enlightenment (*abhisambudhyante*).

Here are several stanzas:

(i) [Transl. according to H]. Since belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*) does not apply to the base, there are no different supports (*āśraya*) in the base; but as various entries into the possession of this support have taken place in the past (*pūrvādhigama-prabedha*) and are referred to (*anusara*), it is asserted (*vyavahryate*) that there are different supports.

(ii) (Cf. Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 77):

gotrabhedād vaiyarthyaṭ sākalyād apy anāditaḥ /

abhedān naikabudhatvaṃ bahutvaṃ cāmalāśraye //

“In view of the division of lineages, in view of needlessness, of totality, of non-beginning and of absence of divisions in the stainless support, there is neither uniqueness nor multiplicity of Buddha.”

iv) It is eternal in nature (*nityalakṣaṇa*), for it has purification of the true nature (*tathatāviśuddhi*) as nature; it is the result (*ābedha*) of an earlier vow (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*), and its activity (*kriyā*) is never exhausted (*paripūrṇā*).

v) It is inconceivable in nature (*acintyalakṣaṇa*), for this purification of the true nature (*tathatāviśuddhi*) is known by introspection (*pratyātmavedyā*), has no equal in the world (*loke 'nupamā*) and is not an object accessible to speculation (*tārkikagocarā*). [140b24]

3. Comm. Bh 370b17-371c5, bh mising, U 436b1-437b21, u 333b1-335b1.

“i) *Āsrayaparāvṛtilakṣaṇa*. *Having destroyed all the obstacles and the defiled portion of the dependent nature*: having rejected by means of revolution (transformation) (tchouan li), the defiled part of the dependent nature along with its pseudo-objects and -subjects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhakanimitta*) and having prevented them from rearing, it has acquired liberation from all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇavimokṣa*) by means of transformation (tchouan tß). - *It assures sovereignty over all the dharmas and is transformed into the pure part dependent nature*. It has acquired the stainless true nature (*amalā tathatā*) by means of transformation, the absolute nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) consisting of (*prabhāvita*) the absence of objects and subjects of consciousness (*grāhyagrāhakasvabhāva*). It is also transformed by attaining sovereignty (*vibhūtvā*) over all the dharmas...

ii) *Śukladharmasvabhāvalakṣaṇa*. The transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) acquired by the śrāvaka consists (*prabhāvita*) only of the cutting off of the defilements (*kleśaprahāṇa*) and its nature is not constituted by white dharmas (*śukladharma*). On the other hand, the transformation of the basis acquired by the bodhisattva, thanks to the complete development (*bhāvanāparipūri*) of the six virtues (*pāramitā*), has as its nature the ten masteries (*vaśita*) that are the very nature of the white dharmas. At that moment, there is not a single instant (*kṣaṇa*) that is indeterminate from the moral point of view (*avyākṛta*) or, *a fortiori*, defiled (*kiṣṭa*). [See the distinction between *hīna* and *viśālā parāvṛtīḥ*, chapter IX, § 2). - The author then goes on to explain the ten masteries (cf. Mahāvīyut., 771-780; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXXIV):

(a) *Mastery of life (āyurvaśita)* consists of abandoning life at will. - *Mastery of mind (cittavaśita)* consists of not being defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*) while in the midst of saṃsāra. Mastery of mind is also called the mastery which, knowing how to procure the provisions (*pariṣkāra*) for others according to their aspirations (*yathāśayam*), is also able to turn their minds away from these provisions. - *Mastery of provisions (pariṣkāraṇa)* consists of accumulating supplies at will: drink (*pāna*), food (*āhāra*), etc. Provisions (*pariṣkāra*) and accumulations (*saṃbhāra*) are synonymous. - [They are acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of generosity, because fulfillment of generosity of the Dharma

(*dharmadāna*), generosity of safety (*abhayadāna*) and material generosity (*āmiṣadāna*) have these three masteries respectively (*yathāyogam*) as result.

(*b*) *Mastery of activity (karmavaśita)* consists of acquiring great mastery over actions [acc. to Bh: bodily actions (*kāyakarman*) and vocal actions (*vākkarman*)]. It accomplishes only good actions (*kuśala*) and not bad (*akuśala*) or indeterminate actions (*avyākṛta*). Moreover, it encourages (*samādāpayati*) beings to establish good actions. - *Mastery of birth (upapattivaśita)* consists of being able to take birth at will in any destiny one wishes. - It is acquired by *fulfillment of the virtue of morality*: these two masteries are the result of the virtue of morality (*śīla*), because the ethical person (*śīlavat*) carries out only good actions and sees his vows (*praṇidhāna*) realized.

(*c*) *Mastery of aspiration (adhimukti vaśitā)*: it is enough that, on earth, he forms an aspiration (*adhimukti*) to change earth into gold, etc. (cf. chap. I, § 60; chap. II, v. 14). Earth, etc., gold, etc., are changed according to his aspirations. - It is acquired by the *fulfillment of the virtue of patience*: this mastery is the result of patience (*kṣānti*); it is because of having previously cultivated patience joyously and abiding by the wishes of beings that one is now able to change earth, etc., gold, etc. according to one's aspirations.

(*d*) *Mastery of vows (praṇidhānavaśitā)* consists of realizing everything according to the vows. - It is acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of zeal (*vīrya*); it is because of previously having cultivated zeal and never showing any laziness (*kausīdya*) in the service of others (*sattvārtha*) that one now acquires mastery of vows.

(*e*) *Mastery of miraculous powers (ṛddhivaśitā) pertaining to the five superknowledges*: it consists of accomplishing all kinds of astonishing miracles at will. - It is acquired by the *fulfillment of the virtue of dhyāna*: it is by previously having joyfully cultivated concentration and adjusting oneself to the interest of beings (*sattvaprayojana*) by entering into all kinds of dhyānas and concentrations (*samāpatti*) that one now attains this mastery of miraculous powers derived from concentration.

(*f*) *Mastery of knowledge (jñānavaśitā)* consists of realizing knowledge (*jñānasākṣātkāra*) in accordance with all types of speech (*vyavahāra*). - *Mastery of the Dharma (dharmavaśitā)* consists of preaching the twelve-membered doctrine: sūtra, geya, etc. at will (cf Mahāvvyutpatti, 1267-1278). - They are acquired by the *fulfillment of the virtue of wisdom*: these masteries are the result of wisdom (*prajñā*); it is by

previously having joyfully cultivated wisdom and having preached the good Dharma (*saddharma*) according to its twelve classes that one now attains supreme wisdom. The miraculous sounds (*sughoṣa*) are called the good Dharma (*saddharma*).

iii) (a) *Bhāvābhāvādvayalakṣaṇa*. It does not have a nature of existence (*bhāvalakṣaṇa*) because all dharmas are imaginary (*parikalpita*) and nonexistent; neither does it have a nature of nonexistence (*abhāvalakṣaṇa*), because the self-nature composed of emptiness (*śūnya*) exists. (Cf. the second quality of the Buddha, chap. II, § 33).

(b) *Samskṛtāsamskṛtādvayalakṣaṇa*. Because it is not conditioned (*samskṛta*) by action (*karman*) and afflictions (*kleśa*), it does not have the nature of the conditioned (*samskṛtalakṣaṇa*). Because it has acquired the mastery of appearing (*vibhūtvā*) as conditioned dharmas and because, repeatedly at many times (*abhīkṣṇam*), it appears as conditioned, it does not have the nature of the unconditioned (*asamskṛtalakṣaṇa*).

(c) *Nānātvaiikatvādvayalakṣaṇa*. Since the dharmakāya of the Buddhas is essentially one, it does not have the nature of plurality (*nānātvakṣaṇa*). Since innumerable persons (*apramāṇāśraya*) attain it (*adhigam-*) each in turn, it does not have the nature of uniqueness (*ekatvalakṣaṇa*). This absence of plurality and of singleness is called the nature of nonduality (*advayalakṣaṇa*). [See below, § 8, 33].

Two stanzas follow which summarize these ideas so that they may be easily understood:

(i) *Since the belief in a self does not apply to the basis*, etc. Wherever there is the belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*) that takes the inner (*ādhyātmika*) as self (*ātman*) and the outer (*bāhya*) as other, such divisions as self and other, this and that, are also imagined (*vikalpa*). But since belief in a self does not apply to the dharmakāya of the Buddhas, it is free of such divisions.

Objection. If that is so, why are there several Buddhas?

Reply. *Because it refers to various entrances into the possession of this basis* [= of this dharmakāya] *that have occurred in the past, it is asserted that there are various bases* [= different Buddhas]. Since various entrances into the possession of this basis by the bodhisattvas are referred to, it is asserted (*vyavahṛ-*) that there are different Buddhas. In conformity with mundane language (*laukikavyavahāra*), one says: "This one is Śākyamuni, that one is Vipāśvin", etc.

(ii) *In view of the division of lineages (gotrabhedāt)*: since the original cause has divisions, there is but one single Buddha. There are two types of lineages (*gotra*): 1) innate lineage (*prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ*), i.e., a superiority having no beginning and characterizing the six faculties (*anādikālikaḥ ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣaḥ*), a natural gift that is transmitted (*paramparāgato dharmatāpratilabdhaḥ*); 2) acquired lineage (*samudānītaṃ gotraṃ*), i.e., that which is realized by an earlier effort (*pūrvābhyāsa*): consorting with a spiritual friend (*kalyāṇamitra*), etc. (Cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 3). Since the innate lineage is indivisible (wou yeou fen pie), it may be said that there is but one Buddha. But the acquired lineage includes many kinds and, in view of the multiplicity of these lineages, it cannot be said that there is but one single Buddha and that the other Buddhas do not exist.

Because of needlessness (vaiyarthiyāt), there is but one single Buddha. Several Buddhas depending on the first lineage (*gotra*) accumulate (*sambhṛ-*), each separately, the accumulations of enlightenment (*bodhisambhāra*). If there were only one Buddha reaching enlightenment while the others do not, the accumulations (*sambhāra*) accumulated by these others would be vain (*śūnya*) and sterile (*niṣphala*). But that is impossible (*ayukta*).

In view of totality (sākalyāt), there is but one single Buddha. Embracing all beings to be converted separately, the Tathāgatas assure their welfare and happiness (*hitasukha*), i.e., they establish them in the three vehicles as appropriate. But if there were but one Buddha, they could not assure these beings or introduce them into the buddha-vehicles (*buddhayāna*), for there is not a second Buddha. [In other words, if by rights there is only one Buddha, what is the good of introducing beings into the vehicles destined to make Buddhas out of them?] Thus, the buddha activity (*buddhakriyā*) carried out by these Tathāgatas would never succeed. That is why it is necessary to admit that there are several Buddhas.

In view of non-beginning (anāditāḥ), there is not just one single Buddha. The appearances of the Tathāgatas on the earth (*prādurbhāva*) have had no beginning (*anādika*), just like saṃsāra. Since it is impossible to become Buddha spontaneously (*svataḥ*) without having accumulated the accumulations (*sambhāra*), since it is impossible to accumulate these accumulations without having been in the service (*upāsana*) of a Buddha, it is completely impossible that there be just one Buddha.

On the other hand, it cannot be asserted that there may be several Buddhas, given the *absence of divisions in the stainless basis (abhedād amalāśraya)*. Here the pure fundamental element (*anāsravadharmadhātu*) is called the stainless basis because the excellence of knowledge (*jñānaviśeṣa*) has definitively cut through the adventitious stains (*āgantukamala*). One cannot assert the presence of different Buddhas in this pure fundamental element. That is why the author says: There is neither singleness nor plurality of Buddha (*naikabuddhatvaṃ bahutvam*). - See below, § 33.

iv) *Nityalakṣaṇa*. The dharmakāya is immutable (*avikāra*) and its series (*saṃtāna*) is uninterrupted (*asamucchinna*); this is why it is stated that it has eternity as nature. This characteristic is attributed to it for three reasons (*hetupratyaya*):

It has the purification of the true nature as nature: this shows that the true nature (*tathatā*) is eternal (*nitya*) and immutable (*avikāra*). But the Buddha has acquired the dharmakāya as self-nature. If this dharmakāya changed, it would not be the true nature. That is why it is eternal.

It is the result of an earlier vow. Previously, the Tathāgatas have uttered the following vow: May I save (*uttr-*) numberless beings (*apramāṇasattva*) and thus lead them to nirvāṇa. But various categories of beings do not reach nirvāṇa and thus the result projected (*ākṣipta*) by this vow is never interrupted (*asamucchinna*). That is why it is eternal (cf. chap. II, § 33: the Buddha *aparāntakoṭiniṣṭha*). This projection of the vow would be impossible without the eternity of the series.

Its activity is never exhausted. The activity derived from this previous great vow is never exhausted because the categories of beings are infinite in number. As long as beings continue to exist, the activity carried out by the Buddhas is never interrupted. That is why the dharmakāya is proclaimed to be eternal.

v) *Acintyalakṣaṇa*. It has inconceivability as nature. The faculty of conceiving (*cintana*) is an imagining cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*), coming from reasoning (*yukti*), meditation (*nidhyāna*) and mental engagement (*manasikāra*); it is the result (*saṃgrhīta*) of speculation (*tarka*) and may be illustrated by comparisons (*dr̥ṣṭānta*). The Buddhas are not grasped (*gocara*) by it; that is why they are inconceivable. Since they transcend (*samatikram-*) all stages of speculation (*tarkabhūmi*), one can adhere to them only by means of faith (*śraddhādhimukti*); one cannot conceive of them (*cintana*).” (U)

4. How is this dharmakāya attained (*adhigata*) for the first time (*prathamam*) by contact (*sparśa*)?

i) By means of nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) and subsequent knowledge (*tatpṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) of the syncretic dharmas of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyāna-saṃsṛṣṭadharmāmbaka*), by means of the fivefold cultivation (*pañcavidhabhāvanā*).

ii) By means of fivefold development (*pañcavidhabhāvanā*).

iii) By means of the gathering of the accumulations (*saṃbhārasaṃcaya*) in all the bhūmis.

iv) By means of the diamond-like samādhi (*vajropamasamādhi*) which serves to break (*bhid-*) the subtle obstacles (*sūkṣmāvaraṇa*) that are so difficult to break (*durbheda*). Immediately after (*anantaram*) this samādhi, one is freed of all the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*).

By these means the transformation of the support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) is obtained.

[149b28]

4. Comm. Bh 371c10-14, bh missing, U 437b26-437c10, u 335b1-7.

“Adherence by means of faith (*śraddhādhimukti*) itself is the first acquisition of the dharmakāya, likewise the practice of the Dharma (*dharmacarya*). In order to exclude them, the author speaks of the actual acquisition [acc. to u: acquisition by contact (*sparśādhigama*)] of the dharmakāya. He speaks only about acquiring the dharmakāya and not about its production (*upapatti*) because the dharmakāya is eternal (*nitya*) in nature. *Bearing on the syncretic dharmas of the Greater Vehicle*: the meaning is easy to understand (cf. chap. III, § 12). The *fivefold development*: the five aspects are non-arising (*anutpāda*), unceasing (*anirodha*), calm from the beginning (*ādiśānti*), being nirvāṇized in essence (*prakṛtiparinirvṛti*) and absence of nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) (cf. chap. II, § 30). This fivefold development, syncretic cultivation (*saṃsṛṣṭabhāvanā*), etc. (cf. chap. V, § 4), realizes (*niṣpādayati*) five results (*phala*):

(1) the melting at each moment of the base of all the imperfections (*pratikṣaṇaṃ sarvadauṣṭhulyāśrayaṃ drāvayati*);

(2) the suppression of numerous notions and thus pleasure in the garden of the Dharma (*nānātvasaṃjñāvigatiṃ ca dharmārāmaratiṃ pratilabhate*);

(3) the complete understanding of the Dharma's brilliance in its immense and unlimited aspect (*aparicchinnākāraṃ ca sarvato 'pramāṇaṃ dharmāvabhāsaṃ saṃjānate*);

(4) the appearance of the marks, the auxiliaries of purity, non-imagined (*avikalpitāni cāsya viśuddhibhāgīyāni nimittāni samudācaranti*);

(5) the taking possession of the ever most perfect cause for the perfecting and achievement of the dharmakāya (*dharmakāya-paripūripariniṣpattaye ca uttarād uttarataṃ hetusaṃparigrahaṃ karoti*) (cf. chap. V, § 4; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XX-XXI, 31).

The diamond-like samādhi *that serves to break subtle obstacles that are so difficult to break*: this gives the reason why this concentration is like a diamond. Just as the diamond (*vajra*), hard (*dṛḍha*) by nature, is able to break things (*bhid-*) that are difficult to break (*durbheda*), in the same way this concentration surpasses the lower categories and is able to demarcate the supreme pure path of knowledge (*anuttaraviśuddhajñānamārga*); this is why it is like a diamond. [Acc. to u: this concentration, which breaks the non-defiled ignorance so difficult to break by the other knowledges, is the ānantaryamārga (cf. Kośa, V, p. vii) of knowledge; this is why it is like a diamond.] Since immediately after this concentration one is rid of all the obstacles, *one acquires the transformation of the basis*: by means of nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) and subsequent knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*), one acquires the transformation of the basis and one attains the dharmakāya of the Buddhas.” (U)

5. By how many masteries (vibhutva) does the dharmakāya acquire sovereignty?

In brief (samāsataḥ), it acquires it in five ways (pañcavidhā):

i) By the transformation of the form aggregate (*rūpaskandha-parāvṛtti*), it acquires sovereignty over the buddha fields (*kṣetra*), the body (*kāya*), the marks (*lakṣaṇa*), the minor marks (*anuvyañjana*), infinite phonemes (*anantarasvara*), the invisible cranial marks (*adṛiṣṭamūrdhalakṣaṇa*).

ii) By the transformation of the sensation aggregate (*vedanā-skandhaparāvṛtti*), it acquires sovereignty over the blissful abodes (*sukhavihāra*), irreproachable (*niravadya*), immense (*apramāna*) and vast (*viśāla*).

iii) By the transformation of the perception aggregate (*saṃjñāskandhaparāvṛtti*), it acquires the sovereign power of explaining every collection of words (*nāmākāya*), collection of phrases (*padakāya*) and collection of phonemes (*vyañjanakāya*).

iv) By the transformation of the formations aggregate (*saṃskāraskandhaparāvṛtti*), it acquires sovereignty over creation (*nirmāṇa*), transformation (*pariṇāma*), the reunion of assemblies (*parśatsaṃgraha*) and accumulation of white dharmas (*śukladharmasaṃgraha*).

v) By the transformation of the consciousness aggregate (*vijñānaskandhaparāvṛtti*), it acquires sovereignty over the mirror-like knowledge (*ādarśajñāna*), the knowledge of sameness (*samatajñāna*), the knowledge of contemplation (*pratyavekṣaṇajñāna*) and the knowledge of the accomplishment of what had to be done (*kr̥tyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna*). [149c7]

5. Comm. Bh 371c23-372a22, bh missing, U 437c18-438a26, u 335b7-336b4.

“By transformation of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandhaparāvṛtti*), five sovereignties are acquired. The śrāvakas, etc., fearful of suffering (*duḥkhabhaya*), cut through (*samucchid-*) the aggregates (*skandha*) like a foolish leper (*bāla kuṣṭhin*) who destroys (*jahāti*) the life of his own body (*kāyajīvita*) himself. But the bodhisattvas who are endowed with means (*parigrhītopāya*) destroy the blameful aggregates (*sāvadyarūpādiskandha*), form, etc., by transformation, and acquire the blameless aggregates (*niravadyarūpādiskandha*) by transformation, like a wise leper (*paṭu kuṣṭhin*) who looks for a good remedy (*oṣadi*), transforms his sick body (*āmayāvikāya*) and gets a healthy body (*nirāmayakāya*).

i) By means of transformation of the form aggregate,

(a) it acquires the sovereign power of manifesting the buddha-fields (*buddhakṣetrasaṃdarsana*) for, in accordance with the wishes (*yathākāma*) of beings, it manifests buddha-fields in gold (*suvarṇa*), silver (*rajata*), etc.;

(b) it acquires the sovereign power of manifesting its own body (*svakāya*) for, in accordance with the aspirations, it manifests in all kinds of great assemblies (*parśanmaṇḍala*) in conformity with the individual capacities (*bhavyatāviśeṣa*) of the beings who are to be disciplined (*vineyasattva*);

(c) it acquires the sovereign power of manifesting the major marks (*lakṣaṇa*) and minor marks (*anuvyañjana*) for, according to wishes (*yathākāma*), it manifests all the major marks and minor marks (cf. below, § 16);

(d) it acquires the twofold sovereign power of manifesting infinite sounds (*anatarasvara*) and invisible marks of the head (*adr̥ṣṭamūrdhalakṣaṇa*), for the sounds of the Buddha have an infinite range (cf. Hobogirin, art. *Button*, p. 215), and its cranial marks are invisible (cf. Hobogirin, art. *Bucchô*, p. 148).

ii) By means of the transformation of the sensation aggregate, it acquires sovereignty over the blissful abodes, irreproachable, immense and vast. These abodes are *irreproachable* because they are free of afflictions (*kleśa*); they are *immense* because there are many of them; they are *vast* because they surpass (*atikram-*) all the pleasures of the three worlds (*traidhātukasukha*).

iii) By means of the transformation of the discrimination aggregate, it acquires the sovereign power of expressing all the collections of words, phrases and phonemes. (Cf. Kośa, II, p. 238). Ideas have, as self-nature (*svabhāva*), the grasping of characteristics (*nimittagrahaṇa*, cf. chap. II, § 16). With such an accumulation (*saṃbhāra*) as cause, by means of the transformation it acquires this special power (*prabhāvaviśeṣa*) thanks to which it possesses mastery over the collections of words, etc., according to wishes (*yathākāma*). [Bh: The grasping of characteristics is called perception. It is by means of the collections of words, etc., that the characteristics are grasped. By changing the defiled discrimination aggregate (*kliṣṭasaṃjñā-skandha*), the pure discrimination aggregate (*viśuddhasaṃjñāskandha*) is attained].

iv) By means of the formations aggregate, it acquires sovereignty over creation, transformation, reunion of assemblies and accumulation of white dharmas. Volition

(*cetanā*) occupies the prime place in the formations aggregate (*saṃskāraskandha*). By means of this volition, sovereignty over creation, etc., can exist.

(a) Sovereignty over creation (*nirmāṇavibhutva*) consists of creating (*nirmā-*) according to wishes (*yathākāma*).

(b) Sovereignty over transformation (*pariṇānavibhutva*) consists of transforming things according to wishes, earth into gold, etc. (cf. chap. I, § 60; chap. II, § 14).

(c) Sovereignty over reunion of assemblies (*parṣatsaṃgraha-vibhutva*) consists of reuniting great assemblies of gods (*deva*), etc., according to aspirations (*yathāśāyam*).

(d) Sovereignty over accumulation of white dharmas (*śukladarmasaṃgrahavibhutva*) brings it about that the pure dharmas (*anāsravadharma*) may be present (*saṃmukha*) according to aspirations (*yathāśāyam*).

v) By means of the transformation of the eightfold consciousness aggregate, store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), etc., it acquires the four marvelous knowledges: the mirror-cognition, etc. According to the order (*yathākramam*) and the possibilities (*yathāyogam*), the transformation of the store-consciousness affirms the mirror-like knowledge (*ādarśajñāna*): even though the objects that are known (*vijñātaviṣaya*) may not be present (*abhimukha*), it cannot forget them (*muṣ-*); it is not limited in time and space. It is always free of error (*amūḍha*) in respect to all objects (*sarvaviṣaya*). Functioning without concepts (*nirvikalpa*), it is able to enjoy (*saṃbhuj-*) images (*bimba*) perceived by the wisdom of the Buddha.

The transformation of the afflicted manas (*kliṣṭamanas*, cf. chap. I, § 6) affirms the cognition of equality (*samatājñāna*). This cognition, having as its object the sameness of all beings, is acquired at the first moment of full understanding of the truths (*abhisamaya*), i.e., at the start of the path of seeing or *darśanamārga*, cf. chap. III, § 11); then it is transformed and purified in the course of the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārgāvastha*). From that, it is established in non-abiding nirvāṇa (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*). Ever endowed with great loving-kindness (*mahāmaṭṭri*) and great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), it manifests images of the Buddha (*buddhabimba*) in accord with aspirations (*yathāśāyam*).

The transformation of the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) assures the knowledge of contemplation (*pratyavekṣaṇājñāna*). Endowed with all the samādhi- and dhāraṇīmukhas, it is like a treasury of jewels (*ratnakōśa*); it manifests all the sovereign activities in the great assemblies; it is able to cut through doubt (*saṃśayachedana*) and cause the rain of Dharma (*dharmavarṣa*) to fall. The transformation of the five consciousnesses assures the cognition of the accomplishment of duty (*kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna*); in all the universes (*lokadhātu*) situated in the ten directions (*daśadiś*), it manifests creations (*nirmāṇa*) beginning with the going forth from the divine palace of the Tuṣitas (*tuṣitabhavana*) up to attaining nirvāṇa (cf. above, chap. X, § 1); it accomplishes its activity dedicated to the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārthakriyā*).”
(U)

6. Of how many things is the dharmakāya the basis (*āśraya*)? - In brief, it is the support of three things:

i) It is the support of the various abodes of Buddha (*nānābuddhavihāra*).

Here are some stanzas:

(a) Since the Buddhas have attained (*saṃprāpya*) their own element (*svadhātu*), they have gained the fivefold satisfaction (*tuṣṭi*). Those who have not attained this element are deprived of satisfaction. That is why those who desire this satisfaction must acquire this element.

(b) The power and accomplishment of duty (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*), the flavor of the texts (*dharmarasa*), the perfection of theses (*arthasaṃpad*) and the perfection of the qualities (*guṇasaṃpad*) are immense (*aprameya*). Seeing these ever non-perishable benefits (*nityākṣaya*), the Buddhas gain supreme (*vara*) irreproachable (*niravadya*) satisfaction.

ii) It is the support of the various bodies of enjoyment (*nānāsaṃbhogakāya*), for it assures the maturing (*paripācana*) of the bodhisattvas.

iii) It is the support of the various apparitional bodies (*nānānirmāṇakāya*), for it assures the maturation mainly (*prāyena*) of the śrāvakas. [149c15]

6. Comm. Bh 372b2-372c7, bh missing, U 438b6-438c15, u 336b4-337b5.

“Of how many things is the dharmakāya the basis? The author asks of how many dharmas is the dharmakāya the basis. *In brief, it is the basis of three things*: in general, it is the basis of innumerable qualities (*apramāṇagaṇa*), but now, in particular, it is said that it is the basis of three things:

i) *It is the support of the various buddha abodes*: the dharmakāya, attained by the Tathāgata, serves as basis for all kinds of abodes (*sukhavihāra*), *divyavihāra*, *āryavihāra* and *brāhmavihāra*. Among the *divyavihāras*, the Tathāgatas dwell especially (*bahulam viharanti*) in the fourth dhyāna; among the *āryavihāras*, they dwell especially in the door of deliverance called emptiness (*śūnyatāvimokṣamukha*); among the *brāhmavihāras* they dwell especially in compassion (*karuṇā*). These different abodes of the Tathāgatas surpass those of the śrāvakas, etc., and in order to show that the nirvāṇa attained by the Tathāgata surpasses the nirvāṇa attained by the śrāvakas, etc., the author says: *The Buddhas have gained the fivefold satisfaction*, etc., because they *have acquired their own element*, their own fundamental element (*svadharmadhātu*). They have properly realized it by cultivating the counteragent (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*) to the afflictions and wrong views: that is why they *have acquired it correctly* (*saṃprāpya*). *Those who have not acquired this element lack satisfaction*: the Tathāgatas who have acquired their own fundamental element abide in joy (*sukhaṃ viharanti*) in the five satisfactions (*pañcatuṣṭi*); but the śrāvakas, etc., who go to nirvāṇa as to a beheading (*śiraścheda*), are deprived of this higher satisfaction. *That is why those who desire this satisfaction must acquire this element*: the bodhisattas who eagerly seek the five satisfactions must secure (*samudāgama*) this real fundamental element. What is this fivefold satisfaction that they seek? The author then explains [in verse (b)]:

The power and accomplishing of duty, the flavor of the texts, etc. The satisfactions differ because their causes (*hetu*) differ.

(a) Power (*anubhāva*) means capability (*śakti*). Surpassing the numberless grains of sand of the Ganges (*apramāṇagaṅgāvālukāti-krānta*), the powers of the Buddhas and the Tathāgatas equally depend on the dharmakāya; they are syncretic (mixed together?) (*samsṛṣṭa*), equal (*sama*) and without differences (*abhinna*). The Buddhas have satisfaction seeing the immensity of this power.

(b) *And the accomplishment of duty (kṛtyānuṣṭhānaṃ ca)*. Here the word *and* indicates an enumeration (*caśabdaḥ samuccayārthaḥ*). Duty (*kṛtya*) means action (*kriyā*), the activity consisting of procuring the benefit of all beings (*sarvasattvārthakriyā*) by establishing them suitably (*samyakprasthāpana*) and according to their capabilities (*yathākalpam*) in the three vehicles (*yānatraya*). *Accomplishment (anuṣṭhāna)* means realization (*sādhana*). This accomplishment of what has to be done goes on without any obstacle (*apratigham*) for an immense length of time. Seeing that their power and the accomplishing of what has to be done are immense (*aprameya*), the Buddhas have great satisfaction.

(c) The flavor of the texts (*dharmarasa*), i.e., the supreme flavor of the Dharma (*anuttaradharmarasa*), such as the sūtras, etc. This concerns the flavor of the arguments (*yuktirasa*) that are tasted in realizing the absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*).

(d) *The perfecting of theses (arthasāmpad)*: the theses explained (*abhidheyārtha*) in the texts, sūtras, etc., are all perfect, for they appear according to aspirations (*yathāśayam avabhāsante*).

(e) *The perfecting of qualities (guṇasāmpad)*: that is, the perfection of qualities such as the superknowledges (*abhijñā*), etc. They gain great satisfaction in seeing the immensity of the flavor of the texts, the immensity of the perfecting of the theses and of the qualities.

Furthermore, some say that the word *artha* [translated here as thesis] means nirvāṇa and that the guṇas are the faculties that arise at will. Their perfection also produces a great satisfaction.

Seeing these ever-unperishing advantages, the Buddhas gain supreme and irreproachable satisfaction: the Tathāgatas see the unique flavor of the true nature (*tathataikarasa*), the great satisfaction resulting from their immense power, etc., in themselves. Even if they enter into nirvāṇa, all of this will never perish. This is why their satisfaction is supreme (*vara*) and irreproachable (*niravadya*); supreme because the obstacle of the defilements and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*) along with their traces (*savāsana*) have been completely cut off (*prahīna*).

ii) It is the basis of the various enjoyment bodies: the bodies of enjoyment (*nirmāṇakāya*, sic: *sambhogakāya*) exist with the dharmakāya as ruling condition (*adhipatipratyaya*).

That is why the dharmakāya is called basis, but not in the way that the sun (*sūrya*) is the basis of the rays (*raśmi*). [In u, the negative is missing: *de ni ñi ma dan ḥod zer gyi tshul lta bu yin no = sūryaraśmiyogena*].

iii) Likewise, it is the basis of the apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*): it is the same thing. *It ensures the maturation of the śrāvakas mainly*. The author says *mainly* (*prāyeṇa*) in order to include the bodhisattvas of the level where convinced adherence is practiced (*adhimukticyābhūmi*). Being of weak aspiration (*hīnādhimuktika*), the śrāvakas do not mature if they do not see (read *li kien* in place of *souei kien*) the Buddha's apparitional body; it is the same for beginning bodhisattvas (*ādhikārmikabodhisattva*). But the bodhisattvas who have already entered onto the great bhūmis have no need of seeing the Buddha's apparitional body in order to be ripened, because they themselves penetrate (*pratividhyanti*) the vast and profound Dharma (*gambhīravipuladharmā*). (U)

7. By how many Buddha attributes (*buddhadharma*) is the dharmakāya constituted (lit. grasped: *saṃgrhīta*)? - In brief, it consists of six kinds of attributes:

- i) **The attribute of purity (*viśuddhi*), for it is by transforming the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) that the dharmakāya is obtained.**
- ii) **The attribute of retribution (*vipāka*), for it is by transforming the material organs (*rūpīndriya*) that the knowledge of retribution (*vipākajñāna*) is obtained.**
- iii) **The attribute of abode (*vihāra*), for it is by transforming the abodes such as the life of pleasure, etc. (*kāmacaryādivihāra*) that the abode of immense knowledge (*apramāṇajñānavihāra*) is obtained.**
- iv) **The attribute of sovereignty (*vibhūti*), for it is by transforming the various profitable actions (*nānāparigraha-karman*) that the sovereignty consisting of abhijñā unimpeded in all the universes (*sarvalokadhātaṣv apratihataṃ abhijñājñānam*) is obtained.**
- v) **The attribute of conduct (*vyavahāra*), for the sovereignty consisting of a knowledge that charms the minds of all beings**

(sarvasattvacittasamtoṣaṇanirdeśajñāna) is obtained by transforming conduct, i.e., that which is seen heard, felt, understood (dṛṣṭaśrutamatavijñātavyavahāra, cf. chap. II, § 16).

vi) By the attribute of expelling (samudghāta), for the knowledge that drives away the torments and faults of all beings (sarvasattvopadravadoṣasamudghātajñāna) is obtained by transforming all the torments (upadrāva) and faults (doṣa).

The dharmakāya consists (saṃgrhīta) of these six Buddha attributes. [149c25]

7. Comm. Bh 372c18-373a10, bh missing, U 438c25-439a19. u 337b5-338a6.

“It is a matter here of the self-nature of the dharmakāya. The author explains the constitution the self-nature of the dharmakāya.

i) *Viśuddhi*. The Buddha attribute of 'purity' constitutes (*saṃgrhīti*) the self-nature of the dharmakāya, because the dharmakāya is pure by nature. What purifies it, what transforms it so that it is pure? Replying to this question, the author says: *By transforming the store-consciousness*. The store-consciousness appropriates (*upādādati*) all the defiled seeds (*sāmkleśikabīja*). When its counteragent arises (*pratipakṣa*), it suppresses all the defiled seeds by transformation and it acquires conformity with all the perfections (*paripūri*) and irreproachable (*niravadya*) qualities (*guṇa*) by transformation. In the same way, in the world, medicine (*agada*) is able to change a sick person (*āmayāvin*) into a healthy person (*nirāmaya*), and that is why transformation (revolution) is spoken of here.

ii) *Vipāka*. The Buddha attribute of 'retribution' constitutes the self-nature of the dharmakāya. *By transforming the material organs*, i.e., the organs endowed with matter, such as the eye, etc., *the knowledge of retribution is acquired*. Since that which was abandoned by transformation was 'of retribution', that which is acquired by transformation is, likewise, metaphorically (*prajñāpti*) 'of retribution'. By the example of the material organs 'of retribution' formerly obtained, the real knowledge actually obtained is also metaphorically called 'of retribution' (*vipākajñāna*).

iii) *Vihāra*. The Buddha attribute of 'abode' constitutes the self-nature of the dharmakāya. In the phrase: *by changing the abodes such as the life of pleasure*, etc., the word *etc.*

serves to include the practice of convinced adherence (*adhimukticyā*), etc. By transforming them, the knowledge that pacifies and suppresses the torments (*upadrava*) of all beings is acquired. [Acc. to u: by transforming them, the knowledge of the abodes (*vihārajñāna*) is acquired. *For the abode of immense knowledge is acquired* by means of which one resides in the various abodes (*nānāvihāra*) such as *divyavihāra*, etc.].

iv) *Vibhutva*. The Buddha attribute of 'sovereignty' constitutes the self-nature of the dharmakāya. Profitable actions (*parigrahakarman*) are commerce (*vāṇijya*), agriculture (*kṛṣikarmānta*), royal affairs (*rājakarman*), etc. By transforming them, the sovereignty of unhindered superknowledges (*apratihatābhijñā*) is acquired.

v) *Vyavahāra*. The Buddha attribute of 'conduct' constitutes the self-nature of the dharmakāya. By transforming worldly conduct (*laukikadr̥ṣṭādivyavahāra*), sovereignty over what is seen, heard, felt, understood (*dr̥ṣṭāśrutamataviññātavibhutva*) is acquired. By means of that, the wonderful knowledge which charms the minds of all beings is acquired.

vi) *Samudghāta*. The Buddha attribute of 'expulsion' constitutes the self-nature of the dharmakāya. *The torments, etc.:* e.g., sadness (*daurmanasya*), suffering (*duḥkha*) inflicted by a king's court (*rājakula*), etc., in the world. They can be pacified (*śanta*) by friends (*suhṛd*) or by wealth (*dhana*). In the same way, here the wonderful knowledge that pacifies all torments and all the faults of all beings is acquired by transforming these torments. By transformation, these six worldly attributes (*lokadharmā*) are abandoned and, by transformation, these six Buddha attributes are acquired (*buddhadharma*).” (U)

8. Should we say that the Buddha Bhagavats are different (*bhinna*), or should we say that they are identical (*abhinna*)?

Since their bases (*aśraya*), their intentions (*abhiprāya*) and their actions (*karman*) are identical, it may be said that the dharmakāyas are identical. But since numberless individuals (*apramāṇakmaya*) reach enlightenment (*abhisambudhyante*), it may be said that the dharmakāyas are different. What is said about the dharmakāyas is equally true for the bodies of enjoyment (*sambhogakāya*). Since their intentions (*abhiprāya*) and their actions (*karman*)

are identical, the saṃbhogakāyas are identical. But since their bases (*āśraya*) are different, the saṃbhogakāyas are different for they exist in numberless supports. It is the same for the apparitional bodies (*nirmānakāya*) as for the bodies of enjoyment. [150a2]

8. Comm. 373a17-22, bh missing, U 439a25-439b6, u 338a6-338b3.

“Since their bases, their intentions and their actions are identical, the dharmakāyas of the Buddhas are identical. Since the true nature (*tathatā*) of the Buddhas is identical, their bases (*āśraya*) are identical. Since all have the same intention of working for the benefit and happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvahitasukha*), their intentions (*abhiprāya*) are identical. Since all accomplish various activities likewise for the welfare of others (*parahita*) mainly, such as attaining enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*), entry into parinirvāṇa, etc., their actions (*karman*) are identical (cf. chap. II, no. 4). *But since numberless individuals reach enlightenment, it must be said that the dharmakāyas are different*: Since, in numberless different individuals, the bodhisattvas become Buddhas, the dharmakāyas are not different as has been explained at length above (chap. X, § 3, no. 3).

What is said about the dharmakāyas is also true for the bodies of enjoyment. The author asserts that in the saṃbhogakāya, the intentions (*abhiprāya*) and the actions (*karman*) are identical, but he denies that the bases (*āśraya*) are the same, for there are innumerable kinds of bases. Indeed, in each different universe (*lokadhātu*), the assembly (*parśanmaṇḍala*), the expression (*adhivacana*), the size of the body (*kāyapramāṇa*), the major marks (*lakṣaṇa*) and the minor marks (*anuvyañjana*), the enjoyment of the flavor of the Dharma (*dharmarasasaṃbhoga*), etc., are special to each. And it is the same for the apparitional bodies (*nirmānakāya*) of the Buddhas.” (U)

9. With how many qualities (*guṇa*) is the dharmakāya associated (*saṃprayukta*)?

- It is associated with the very pure (*parisuddha*) qualities, which are:

(1) the four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*),

(2) the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*),

- (3) the eight sovereign views of the object (*abhibhvāyatana*),
- (4) the ten totalities of the object (*kṛtsnāyatana*),
- (5) the power of preventing the arising of defilement in another (*araṇā*),
- (6) the knowledge resulting from resolve (*prañidhiñāna*).
- (7) the four liberated knowledges (*pratisaṃvid*),
- (8) the six superknowledges (*abhijñā*),
- (9) the thirty-two marks of the Great Man (*mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa*),
- (10) the eighty-four minor marks (*anuvyañjana*),
- (11) the four omniform (?) purities (*sarvākārapariśuddi*),
- (12) the ten powers (*bala*),
- (13) the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*),
- (14) the three things not requiring secrecy (*arakṣya*),
- (15) the three equanimities (*smṛtyupasthāna*),
- (16) the complete destruction of the propensities (*vāsanāsamudghāta*),
- (17) unfailing memory (*asaṃmoṣatā*),
- (18) great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*),
- (19) the eighteen unique attributes of the Buddha (*āveṇika buddhadharma*),
- (20) universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñatā*),
- (21) fulfillment of the six virtues (*pāramitāparipūri*). [150a7]

9. Comm. Bh silent , bh missoing, U 439b12-440b1, u 338b3-340b6.

“Here the author explains the pure excellences (*viśeṣa*) and qualities (*guṇa*) of the Buddha Bhagavats which are also found amongst the śrāvakas, etc. They are very pure (*pariśuddha*), and this shows that these qualities arise amongst those who have cut off the obstacle of the defilements and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*). The epithet 'very pure' should be applied to each of the qualities enumerated in § 9.

(1) The four apramāṇas: loving kindness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*) which have as their object an infinite number of beings (*apramāṇasattva*) (cf. below, § 10).

(2) The vimokṣas: the eight vimokṣas: *rūpī rūpāṇi paśyati*, etc. (cf. § 11).

(3) The abhibhvāyatanas: the eight abhibhvāyatanas (cf. § 11).

(4) The kṛtsnāyatanas: the ten kṛtsnāyatanas (cf. § 11).

(5-6) The araṇā and the praṇidhijñāna are identical (!) (cf. § 12 and 13).

(7) The four pratisaṃvids: dharmapratīsaṃvid, arthapratīsaṃvid, niruktiṃpratisaṃvid, pratibhānapratīsaṃvid (cf. § 14 and above, chap. V, § 2, no. 9).

(8) The six abhijñās, from ṛddhyabhijñā up to āśravakṣayajñāna. (cf. § 15).

(9) The thirty-two mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇas, such as *cakrāṅkitahastapādah*, etc. (cf. § 16 and the Notes).

(10) The eighty anuvyañjanas, such as *tungānāsah*, etc. (cf. § 16 and the Notes).

(11) The four sarvākārapariśuddhis: āśrayapariśuddhi, ālambanapariśuddhi, cittapariśuddhi, jñānapariśuddhi. (cf. § 17).

(12) The ten balas:

i. the power consisting of the knowledge of the possible and the impossible (*stānāsthānajñānabala*);

ii. the power consisting of the knowledge of the retribution of actions (*karmavipākajñānabala*);

iii. the power of the knowledge of the dhyānas, the concentrations and the meditative stabilizations (*dhyānavimokṣa-samādhisamāpattijñānabala*);

iv. the power of the knowledge of the extent of the moral faculties of beings (*indriyaparāparajñānabala*);

v. the power of the awareness of the various aspirations of beings (*nānādhimuktijñānabala*);

vi. the power of the knowledge of the various dispositions acquired by beings (*nānādhātujñānabala*);

vii. the power of the knowledge of the paths leading to the various destinies (*sarvatragāminīpratipajñānabala*);

viii. the power of the knowledge of former abodes (*pūrvanivāsajñānabala*);

ix. the power of the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings (*cyutyupapādajñānabala*);

x. the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (*āsravakṣayajñānabala*).

(13) The four vaiśāradyas:

i. The Buddha Bhagavat himself truly asserted (cf. Aṅguttara, II, p. 8-9; Kośavyākhyā, p. 645 30 seq.): "I am truly enlightened and if anyone objects that I have not clarified such and such dharmas, I find no validity in this criticism." This is the first fearlessness (*samyaksambuddhasya bata me sata dharmā anabhisambuddhāity atra me kaścic codayet, tatrāhaṃ nimittam api na samanupaśyāmi. idam prathamam vaiśāradyam*).

ii. He truly said: "I have truly destroyed the impurities, and if someone objects that such and such impurities have not been destroyed by me, I find no validity in this criticism." This is the second fearlessness (*kṣmāsravasya bata me sata ime āsravā aprahñā ity atra me kaścih codayet, tatrāhaṃ nimittam api ma mananupaśyāmi. idam dvitīyam vaiśāradyam*).

iii. He truly said: "I have preached to the śrāvakas the path of escape from suffering, and if anyone objects that this path, the practice of which does not lead to the final suppression of suffering, I find no validity in this criticism." This is the third fearlessness (*yo vā punar mayā śrāvakāñāṃ mārga ākhyāto nairyāñīkaḥ, tatkarasya samyakduḥkhaḥkṣayāya sa na niryāsyatīty atra māṃ kaścic codayet, tatrāhaṃ nimittam api na samanipaśyāmi. idam tṛtīyam vaiśāradyam*).

iv. He truly said: " To the śrāvakas I have revealed the dharmas that present an obstacle to the path and if anyone objects that these dharmas, which

should be abandoned, do not constitute an obstacle, I find no validity in this criticism." This is the fourth fearlessness (*ye vā punar mayā śravakāṇām āntarāyikā dharmā ākhyātāḥ. tān pratiṣevamāṇasya nālam anatarāyāyety atra māṃ kaścic codayet, tatrāhaṃ api na samanupaśyāmi. idaṃ caturthaṃ vaiśāradyam*).

Not finding any validity in these criticisms (*nimittam asamanupaśyan*) on these four points, the Buddha gained great confidence (*kṣemaprāpta*) and dispelled all fear by himself (*abhayaprāpta*). (cf. § 19)

(14) The three arakṣyas (for the orthography, see Notes). - [Acc. to Saṅgītisuttanata, Dīgha, III, p. 217; Saṅgītisūtra, R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in E. Turkestan*, Oxford, 1916, p. 21 and 23], the Tathāgata has very pure physical conduct; he does not have any physical conduct that he must hide for fear that somebody should come to learn about it. This is the first arakṣya. (*pariśuddhakāyasamudācāraḥ tathāgataḥ, nāsti tathāgatasya kāyaduścaritaṃ yat tathāgaḥ praticchādayet kaścīn me pare na vijānīyuh. idaṃ prathamam asakṣaṇīyam*). What has been said about physical conduct (*kāyakarman*) is also valid for the vocal action (*vākkarman*) and the mental action (*manaskarman*); thus there are three arakṣyas (cf. § 20).

(15) The three smṛtyupasthānas (acc. to Majjhima, III, p. 221; Kośavyākhyā, p. 646 34 seq). When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma ..., some listeners listen respectfully, lend an ear, establish the mind of perfect knowledge and seize upon the path of truth. Nevertheless, the Tathāgata feels neither contentment nor satisfaction nor jubilation towards them (*iha tathāgato dharmam deśayati ... tasya te śrāvakāḥ śuśrūṣante, śrotam avadadhāti, ājñācittam upasthāpayanti, pratipadyante dharmasyānudharmam prati ... tena tathāgatasya na nandī bhavati, na saumanasyaṃ na cetasa utplāvitatvam*). Other listeners do not listen respectfully, etc.; nevertheless, the Tathāgata feels no hostility or impatience or discontentment towards them (*tasya te śrāvakāḥ na śuśrūṣanta iti vistaraḥ. tena tathāgatasya nāghāto bhavati nākṣāntir nāpratrayo na cetaso 'nabhirāddhiḥ*). Still others both listen respectfully and do not listen respectfully, etc.: the Tathāgata feels neither contentment nor hostility towards them; in regard to all of them, he is settled in equanimity (*tasya te śrāvakāḥ śuśrūṣante naiva*

śuśrūṣanta iti vistaraḥ. tena tathāgatasya na nadī bhavati nāghāto bhavati. upekṣakas tatra tathāgato viharati smṛtaḥ saṃprajānan) (cf. § 20.)

(16) Vāsanāsamudghāta. - This is to have completely destroyed the signs of afflictions (*kleśadṛiṣaceṣṭā*) that remain even when there are no more afflictions, e.g., the habit of jumping about like a monkey, etc. (cf. § 21, the example of Maudalyāyana).

(17) Asaṃmoṣatā. - This is correct memory (*smṛti*) and knowledge (*jñāna*); not wasting time in which one could be of service to beings (*sattvārthakriyākālānatikrama*) (cf. § 22).

(18) Mahākaruṇā. - This is to aspire for the welfare of all beings (*sakalajanahitāśayatā*) (cf. § 23).

(19) The eighteen āveṇika buddhadharmas. - Āveṇika, unique, has the meaning of exclusiveness (*asādhāraṇa*).

i. The Tathāgata does not misstep (*nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam*). On the contrary, even though he has destroyed his impurities (*kṣīṇāsrava*), the arhat, when he goes out to a town to beg his food (*piṇḍapāta*), sometimes meets (*samāgacchati*) a wild elephant (*hastin*), a wild horse (*aśva*), a wild bull (*go*) or a wild dog (*kukkura*); sometimes he treads on sharp thorns (*gahvarakaṇṭaka*) underfoot and jumps with both feet together onto a venomous snake; sometimes he enters a house (*grha*) and the townswomen (*mātrgrāma*) speak to him in an inappropriate way; sometimes in the forest, he loses the right path and takes a wrong path; sometimes he meets up with brigands (*amitracaura*), madmen (*śvāpada*) or married women (*parakalatra*), etc. All these missteps (*skhalita*) of this type which occur to the arhat do not occur for the Buddhas.

ii. The Tathāgata does not shout (*nāsti ravitam*). On the contrary, the arhat who walks in the forest (*araṇya*) and loses his way, or who enters an empty house (*tyaktagrha*) raises his voice, calls out and utters loud cries (*ravita*). Or even, as a result of deep-rooted (*vāsaṇādoṣa*) but non-defiled (*akliṣṭa*) habits, he opens his lips, uncovers his teeth and bursts out into laughter (*hāsyā*). All these squallings (*ravita*) of this kind that occur among the arhats do not occur among the Buddhas.

iii. The Tathāgata has an infallible memory (*nāsti muṣitā smṛtiḥ*). On the other hand, the arhat, even though he is stainless, forgets what he has done or what he has said a long time ago.. The Buddhas forget nothing.

iv. The Tathāgata has no notion of multiplicity (*nāsti nānātvasaṃjñā*). On the other hand, the arhat produces exclusively (*ekānena*) the notion of disgust (*pratikūlasaṃjñā*) with respect to nirvāṇa-with-residue (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*); with respect to nirvāṇa-without-residue (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) he produces exclusively the notion of calmness (*śāntasaṃjñā*). With regard to both *sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* the Tathāgata produces the notion of identity (*abhedaśaṃjñā*) and is established in supreme equanimity (*upekṣā*).

v. The Tathāgata does not have an unconcentrated mind (*nāsty asaṃhitam cittam*). On the the other hand, the arhat concentrates his mind in order to enter into absorption and, when he emerges from it, (*vyutthita*) he is not longer concentrated. In every state (*avasthā*), the Tathāgata does not have an unconcentrated mind.

vi. The Tathāgata has no ill-considered renunciation (*nāsty apratisaṃkhyāyopekṣā*). The arhat practices equanimity without considering the welfare of beings (*sattvārtha*) by means of his intelligence (*mati*). The Tathāgata has no ill-considered equanimity (*apratisaṃkhyayopekṣā*) of this kind.

vii - xii. The Tathāgata does not experience the six losses, loss of zeal, etc. (*chandādihāni*). On the contrary, in the purification of the obstacle to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇapariśuddi*), the arhat experiences failure (*aprāpti*) and losses (*hāni*): loss of zeal (*chanda*), energy (*vīrya*), memory (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*) and liberation (*vimukti*). These six losses do not occur with the Buddhas.

xiii-xv.- In the Tathāgata, physical, vocal and mental actions are preceded by knowledge and are in accord with knowledge (*kāyavāgmanaskarma jñānapūrvamaṅgamaṃ jñānānuparivartī*). On the other hand, the arhat sometimes has good (*kuśala*) bodily actions, sometimes morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) bodily actions, and it is the same for vocal and mental actions. Since these three actions are preceded by knowledge and are in accord with knowledge in the Tathāgata, they are never indeterminate. That which is the outcome of knowledge (*jñānasamutthita*) is called

preceded by knowledge (jñānapūrvamgama); that which accompanies knowledge (jñānasahacārin) is called in accordance with knowledge (jñānānuparivartin).

xvi - xviii. In respect to the three times, the Tathāgata has a nonattached and unhindered knowledge and vision (*tryadhvany asaṅgam apratiharaṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate*). As the arhat is unable to grasp the things of the three times by means of a simple production of mind (*cittotpādamātra*), his knowledge (*jñāna*) and vision (*darśana*) are hindered (*āsakta*); as he cannot know everything absolutely, his knowledge and his vision are prevented (*pratihata*). On the contrary, with respect to the things of the three times, the Tathāgata knows absolutely every object in one simple production of mind. This is why his knowledge and his vision are unattached and unprevented. Consequently, these eighteen attributes individually are the attributes unique to the Buddha (cf. § 24).

(20) Sarvākāravarañāna, etc. This is to understand correctly all the aspects (*ākāra*) of all the aggregates (*skandha*), elements (*dhātu*) and bases of consciousness (*āyatana*). The word *etc.* designates the innumerable qualities (*apramāṇaḡuṇa*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the dharmakāya.” (U)

10. Here are some stanzas:

[The four apramāṇas, the four limitless ones, cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 43]:

anukampaka sattveṣu saṃyogaviḡamāśaya /

aviyogāśaya saukhyahitāśaya namo 'stu te //

“You have compassion for beings: you aspire to reunite, to separate; you aspire not to divide; you aspire for welfare and happiness! Homage to you!”

[150a9]

10. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440b7-15, u 340b6-341a2.

“In this stanza the author explains the four limitless ones (*apramāṇa*). *You have compassion for beings (anukampaka sattveṣu)* is the general theme (*sāmānyapada*). - *a*) *You aspire to reunite (saṃyogāśaya)*: explains the apramāṇa of loving kindness (*maitri*)

because he aspires that beings may be joined with happiness (*sukhasaṃyoga*). - *b) You aspire to separate (vigamāśaya)*: explains the apramāṇa of compassion (*karuṇā*), because he aspires that beings may be separated from suffering (*duḥkhaviyoga*). - *c) You aspire that they may not be divided (aviyogāśaya)*: explains the apramāṇa of joy (*muditā*) because he aspires that beings may not be separated from happiness (*sukhāviyoga*). - *d) You aspire for the welfare and happiness (saukhyahitāśaya)*: explains the apramāṇa of equanimity (*upekṣā*) because he aspires that beings may attain welfare (*hita*) and happiness (*sukha*). Equanimity (*upekṣā*) is disgust (*vaimukhya*): he aspires that beings may reject the agreeable feeling (*sukhavedanā*), etc., and the traces of the defilements (*klesānuśaya*), but he does not abandon beings. Furthermore, equanimity is called the fact of staying in the very middle. In view of this quality (*guṇa*), homage is paid to the dharmakāya of the Buddhas and this is why it is said: *Homage to you (namo 'stu te).*” (U)

11. [The eight vimokṣas (liberations), the eight abhibhvāyatanas (dominating views of the subject) and the ten kṛtsnāyatanas (views of totality of the subject), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXXI, 44]:

sarvāvaraṇanirmukta sarvalokādbhībhū mune /

jñānena jñeyaṃ vyāptaṃ te muktacitta namo 'stu te //

“You are liberated from all obstacles, you dominate the entire world, O Muni! Your knowledge penetrates the knowable; you are of freed mind! Homage to you!” [150a11]

11. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440b19-26, u 341a3-5.

“a) You are liberated from all obstacles (sarvāvaraṇanirmukta): this phrase shows that the vimokṣas of the Buddhas surpass those of the śrāvakas, etc. - *b) You dominate the entire world, O Muni (sarvalokādbhībhū mune)*: this phrase shows that the abhibhvāyatanas of the Buddhas surpass those of the śrāvakas, etc. - *c) Your knowledge penetrates the knowable (jñānena jñeyaṃ vyāptaṃ te)*: this phrase shows that the kṛtsnāyatanas of the Buddhas surpass those of the śrāvakas, etc. It is not like in the vehicle of the śrāvakas where there are only eight vimokṣas, eight abhibhvāyatanas and

ten kṛtsnāyatanas. The vimokṣas precede the abhibhvāyatanas and the abhibhvāyatanas precede the kṛsnāyatanas (cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 215). Thus, in his contemplations (*manasikāra*) and in his thinking (*cintana*), he is liberated from all obstacles, he dominates the entire world and his knowledge penetrates all things (*viśaya*); this is why he is of liberated mind (*muktacitta*): endowed with these three qualities, his mind is liberated from bonds (*bandhana*).” (U)

12. [Araṇā (the power of preventing the arising of defilements in others), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 45]:

aśeṣaṃ sarvasattvānāṃ sarvakleśavināśaka /

kleśaprahāraka kliṣṭasānukrośa namo 'stu te //

"You destroy all the afflictions of all beings completely; you crush the afflictions; you have compassion for afflicted beings! Homage to you!"

[150a13]

12. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440c1-16, u 341a6-341b3.

“This stanza explains the araṇā that is a wisdom of the mundane order (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) (cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 87). This araṇā is not like the araṇa obtained by the śrāvakas. Before entering a village (*grāma*) or a forest (*aṭavī*), the śrāvakas reflect (*vibhāvana*) and examine (*pratyavekṣaṇa*) as to whether someone might experience passion or 'raṇa' with respect to them, and if in the affirmative, they do not enter. The Tathāgatas, however, consider (*saṃpaśyanti*) things differently. Even if beings might experience passion (*kleśa*) with respect to the body of the Buddha (*buddhakāya*), if these beings are able to enjoy the appearance of a Buddha (*buddhanirmāṇa*), the Tathāgatas go to them and discipline them skillfully (*upāyena vinayanti*) in order to destroy the afflictions. *You completely destroy all the afflictions of all beings*: it is not like the śrāvaka who, resting in the concentration called araṇā (*araṇāsamādhivihārin*), suppresses in a few beings only the generating causes (*utpapattipratyaya*) of afflictions having as object his own person, and who subdues only the afflictions of the desire realm that have a real object (*kāmadhātusavastukakleśa*, cf. Kośa VII, p. 87) and not the others. [Cf. the comm.. of

Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 184: *anye hy araṇāvihāriṇaḥ sattvānāṃ kasyacid eva tadālabhanasya kleśasyotpattipratyayamātram pratiharanti*]. On the other hand, the Buddhas destroy all the passions of all beings without residue (*aśeṣam*). *You crush the afflictions (kleśaprahāraka)*: he crushes the afflictions (*kleśa*) only, but he does not crush the beings (*sattva*). You have compassion for afflicted beings (*kliṣṭasānukrośa*): if there are beings stained by the afflictions, the Buddha has compassion for them and does not torment them. A stanza says: Just as a good physician (*vaidya*) exorcist cures those possessed by a demon by tormenting only the demons and not the possessed, in the same way the Great Compassionate One cures the victims of the afflictions by tormenting only the passions and not the beings.” (U)

13. [Praṇidhijñāna (the knowledge resulting from from vow), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 46]:

anābhoga nirāsaṅga avyāghāta samāhita /

sadaiva sarvapraśnānāṃ visarjaka namo 'stu te //

“Your knowledge is spontaneous, detached, unfettered, always concentrated and resolves all questions! Homage to you!” [150a15]

13. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440c20-441a2, u 341b3-8.

“This stanza shows that the praṇidhijñāna of the Buddhas surpasses that of the śrāvakas, etc., by five aspects (*ākāra*), because it is spontaneous (*anābhoga*), detached (*nirāsaṅga*), unfettered (*avyāghāta*), always concentrated (*sadāsamāhita*) and cuts through all doubts (*sarvasaṃśayachedaka*). On the contrary, the praṇidhijñāna acquired by the śrāvakas presupposes entry into concentration (*samāpatti-praveśa*) according to a previous vow (cf. Kośa, VII, p. 89); it knows only one particular object and does not know others. It is not the same for the Buddha: *a*) His knowledge is spontaneous (*anābhogajñāna*), he makes no effort: like a precious jewel (*maṇi*) or a heavenly musical instrument (*tūrya*) (fulfilling their rôles spontaneously, cf. chap. VIII, § 17), the Buddha, according to his vow (*anupraṇidhim*), knows everything (*viśaya*). *b*) His knowledge is detached (*nirāsaṅgajñāna*), for it is without obstruction in respect to knowable things

(*jñeyaviṣaya*). *c*) His knowledge is unfettered (*avyāghātajñāna*), for he has cut the obstacle of defilements (*klesāvaraṇa*) along with its traces (*savāsana*). *d*) He is always concentrated (*sadā samāhita*), for the obstacles to concentration (*samāpattiyāvaraṇa*) have been cut. A stanza says (Aṅguttara, III, p. 436; Theragāthā, p. 70, v. 696; Kośa, IV, p. 41): The Nāga (or the Buddha) is concentrated when he walks, when he stands, when he lies down, when he sits (*gacchaṃ samāhito nāgo ṭhito nāgo samāhito / sayam samāhito nāgo nisinno pi asāhito / sabbattha samvuto nāgo esa nāgassa sapadā*). *e*) By virtue of the marvellous vow that he has taken, he is able to resolve all questions always.” (U)

14. [The four pratisamvids (infallible knowledges), cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXXI, 47]:

āśraye 'thāśrite deśye vākye jñāne ca deśike /

avyāhatamate nityaṃ sudeśika namo 'stu te //

“By virtue of the support and the supported which are the sermons, by virtue of language and knowledge which are the preacher, your intellect is without obstacle; you are always a kind preacher! Homage to you!” [150a17]

14. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441a6-18, u 341b8-342a5.

“This stanza explains the four pratisamvids. The *support* (*āśraya*) is the texts (*deśanādharma*), i.e., the sūtras, etc. The *supported* (*āśrita*) is the meaning expressed (*abhidheyārtha*) by these texts. Both are called the *preacher* (*deśya*), for they are the action accomplished (*kṛtakarman*) by the preacher. Language (*vākyā*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) are both the preacher (*deśika*), for they are the agent (*kāraka*) who emits the voice (*vāksamutthāpaka*). *Your intellect is without obstacle* (*avyāhatamati*) means that in their regard the Buddha has unfailing knowledge (*avivartyaṃ jñānam*). You are always a good preacher (*nityaṃ sudeśika*): because he is endowed with the four pratisamvids (cf. chap. V, § 2, no. 9), the Buddha can always teach well.

a) Intellect free of obstacle (*avyāhatanati*) with respect to the support (*āśraya*) is called unfailing knowledge of dharmas (*dharmaprati-samvid*), for it knows the religious texts (*dharmaparyāya*) without obstacle (*apratigham*).

b) Intellect without obstacle with respect to the supported (*āśrita*) is called unfailing knowledge of meaning (*arthapratīsaṃvid*), because it knows the self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the shared nature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas, or because it knows without obstacle the intentions dealing with something other (*arthānatarābhi-prāya*, cf. chap. II, v. 33) than what is found in the texts.

c) Intellect without obstacle in regard to language (*vākya*) is called unfailing knowledge of etymology (*niruktipratīsaṃvid*): it can express the varied expressions referring to the particular objects in all lands by conforming to the diverse notions arising in each of these lands. Or also, it knows without obstacle the etymology of all the dharmas.

d) Intellect without obstacle in the categorizing knowledge of the dharmas (*dharmaprabhedanajñāna*) is called infallible knowledge of preaching (*pratibhānapratīsaṃvid*), because it encounters no obstacles in its explanatory knowledge of the dharmas.” (U)

15. [The six abhijñās (superknowledges), cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 48]:

upetya vacanais teṣāṃ carijñā āgatau gatau /

niḥsāre caiva sattvānāṃ svavavāda namo 'stu te //

“For brings, you are the kind adviser who approaches them and knows their language, their behavior, their past, their future and their escape! Homage to you!” [150a19]

15. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441a22-441b3, u 342a5-342b3.

“This stanza explains the six abhijñās. *For beings (sattvānām)*: this is the general theme (*sāmānyapada*); *you are the kind adviser (svavavāda)*: this word is applied to each member of the stanza and should be repeated in front of each of them. In the expression *svavavāda*, *su* means 'fine' (*cāru*) and *avavāda* means 'speech' (*vac*); the person who says fine words in order to give good directions is called *kind adviser*.

a) *You are the kind adviser who comes close to beings (upetya svavavāda)*: this is the abhijñā called magical power (*ṛddhyabhijñā*). The Buddha comes close to beings by

conforming to those who must be disciplined (*anu vineyān*). Accomplishing great miracles (*prātihārya*), he gives good advice to beings.

b) *You are the kind adviser who knows the language of beings (vacanajñā svavavāda)*: this is the abhijñā called divine ear (*divyaśrotrābhijñā*). The Buddha hears the sounds (*śabda*) with their meanings and all sounds (*svara*) in general, even if they are far off (*dūrasthita*); he preaches the law as appropriate in the language of the beings to be converted.

c) *You are the kind adviser who knows the behavior of beings (carijñā svavavāda)*: this is the abhijñā called knowledge of others' minds (*cetaḥparyāyābhijñā*). Knowing the high or low qualities (*varāvāra*) of the minds of beings, the Buddha advises them well.

d) *You are the kind adviser who knows the past of beings (āgatijñā svavavāda)*: this is the abhijñā called memory of former existences (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛtyabhijñā*). Knowing beings' past (*atīta*), the Buddha advises them well.

e) *You are the kind adviser who knows the future of beings (gatijñā svavavāda)*: this is the abhijñā called knowledge of deaths and births (*cyutyupapādajñānābhijñā*). Knowing beings' future (*anāgata*), the Buddha advises them well.

f) *You are the kind adviser who knows beings' deliverance (niḥsārajñā svavavāda)*: this is the abhijñā called knowledge of destruction of the impurities (*āsravakṣayajñānābhijñā*). Knowing those who have destroyed the afflictions (*kleṣa*), the Buddha advises them well.” (U)

16. [The thirty-two lakṣaṇas (marks) and the eighty anuvyañjanas (minor marks), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 49]:

satpuruṣyaṃ prapayante tvāṃ dṛṣtvā sarvadehinaḥ /

dṛṣṭamātrāt prasādasya vidhāyaka namo 'stu te//

“All beings, when they have seen you, recognize in you the Human Being par excellence; just seeing you they have faith; you are the organizer! Homage to you!” [150a21]

16. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441b7-12, u 342b3-5.

“This stanza explains the lakṣaṇas and the anuvyañjanas, for the dharmakāya is the base (*āśraya*) for the appearance of the lakṣaṇas and anuvyañjanas. In view of these lakṣaṇas and anuvyañjanas, homage is paid to the dharmakāya. All beings, when they see you, recognize in you the Great Human Being par excellence (*satpuruṣyaṃ prapadyante tvāṃ drṣtvā sarvadehināḥ*): everyone (*loka*), seeing the Bhagavat endowed with the lakṣaṇas and the anuvyañjanas, recognizes in him the Great Human Being par excellence (*mahāpuruṣa*). *All beings* means those who, now or later, will see an appearance of the Buddha. Just seeing you, they have faith (*drṣtamātrāt prasādasya*): hardly have they seen that the Bhagavat is endowed with the lakṣaṇas and anuvyañjanas than they conceive pure faith and recognize in him the kind organizer of the world (*lokavidhāyaka*).” (U)

17. [The four sarvākārapariśuddhis (omniform purities), cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 50]:

ādānasthānasamtyāganirmāṇapariṇāmane/

samādhijñānavaśitām anuprāpta namo 'stu te //

“You have gained the mastery that consists of assuming, keeping and abandoning, the mastery that consists of creating and transforming, the mastery of concentration and the mastery of knowledge! Homage to you!”

[149a23]

17. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441b16-25, u 342b5-343a1.

“This stanza explains the four sarvākārapariśuddhis:

a) *The mastery that consists of assuming, keeping, abandoning* (*ādānasthānasamtyāgavaśitā*): this is the purity of basis (*āśraya-pariśuddhi*) or the power, based on dhyāna (*dhyānāśrita*), of assuming (*ādāna*), keeping (*sthāna*) or abandoning (*samtyāga*) existence (*ātmabhāva*) at will (*yathākāmam*) as long as one wishes (*yāvatkāmam*).

b) *The mastery that consists of creating and transforming* (*nirmāṇapariṇāmavaśitā*): this is the purity of the object (*ālamabamapariśuddhi*). The act of producing all kinds of

substances previously nonexistent (*apūrvajāta rūpa*) is called creation (*nirmāṇa*); the act of changing already existing substances in order to make gold (*suvarṇa*), silver (*rajata*), etc., is called transformation (*pariṇāma*). The Buddha has gained the mastery in all these types of transformation and creation.

c) *The mastery of concentration (samāpattivaśita)*: this is purity of mind (*cittapariśuddhi*); according to his wish (*yathākāma*), he has at his disposal mastery over the gates of concentration (*sāmadhimukha*); he can enter into concentration at each moment (*pratikṣaṇam*), according to aspirations (*yathāśayam*).

d) *The mastery of knowledge (jñānavaśita)*: this is the purity of knowledge (*jñānapariśuddhi*); according to wishes (*yathākāma*), he has the mastery of the dhāraṇīmukhas at his disposal. *Anugata* means that he has indeed arrived at (*samudāgata*) the four mentioned purities.” (U)

18. [The ten balas (powers), cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 51]:

*upāye śaraṇe śuddhau sattvānāṃ vipravādane /
mahāyane ca niryāṇe mārabhañja namo 'stu te //*

“You crush Māra who deceives beings by way of means, refuge, purity and escape in the Great Vehicle! Homage to you!” [150a25]

18. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441b29-441c25, u 343a1-343b4.

“This stanza explains the ten balas. Māra deceives beings:

i) in the way of actions and of going to a good or a bad destiny (*sugatatidurgatigamanopāyakarman*); ii) in the way of refuge (*śaraṇa*); iii) in the way of mundane and supramundane purity (*laukika-lokottaraśuddhi*); iv) by way of escape in the Great Vehicle (*mahāyānaniryāṇa*). Māra deceives beings on these four points. Here the stanza explains the action of the ten balas that subdue Māra:

a) *In the way of means (upāye)*: the way of going to a good destiny are good actions (*kuśalakarman*); the way of going to a bad destiny are bad actions (*akuśalakarman*). When it is a matter of going to these destinies, Māra attempts to cast confusion on this

doctrine. He says: "That is not true, it is the contrary." He says that bad actions are the means to going to a good destiny and that good actions are the means of going to a bad destiny. Or, in fact, he says that everything is without cause (*ahetuka*), or that everything has a creator (*iśvara*) for its cause, a god, etc. The strength consisting of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible (*sthānāsthānajñānabala*) crushes (*bhanakti*) Māra's claims. Etymologically, *sthāna* means that which can occur (*sopāya*), that which can take place (*sāvakāśa*). That which cannot occur (*anupāya*), that which cannot take place (*anavakāśa*) is called *asthāna*. To subdue Māra's claims, the Buddha says: "It is impossible, it cannot happen (*asthānam anavakāśaḥ*) that beings arise without a cause or from a bad cause. Why? Because if this is, that also is; if this arises, that arises also... Effects (results) have ignorance as their cause" (*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti imass' uppādā idaṃ upajjati, yadidaṃ avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā*, cf. Majjhima, I, p. 262-3; II, p. 32; III, p. 63; Saṃyutta, II, p. 65; Udāna, I, p. 1, etc.). It is not a creator, a god, etc., who produces them in succession.

b) *By way of refuge (śaraṇe)*: these are actions (*karman*), for it is said: "Beings are the result of their own actions, are the inheritors of their actions... have each their own actions for refuge" (cf. u: *hjug rten bdag git byas pa las gyi bgo skal la spyod pa*, fragmentary quotation from Majjhima, III, p. 203; Visuddhimagga, p. 301; Jātaka, IV, p. 128; Milinda, p. 65: *kamasakā, mānava, sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhū kammapaṭisaraṇā*). When it is a question of actions, Māra attempts to cast confusion on this doctrine, etc., as before. The second strength, which consists of the knowledge of retribution of actions (*karmavipākajñānabala*), subdues the claim of Māra, for it is irresistible (*apratigha*). In order to subdue Māra's claim, the Buddha says (Majjhima, III, p. 203): "It is action that divides beings into lower and higher categories (*kammaṃ satte vibhajati yadidaṃ hīnappaṇītātāyāti*). That does not take place without cause, neither by the act of a creator nor of a god, etc.," as before.

c) *By way of purity (śuddhau)*, i.e., by way of mundane purity (*laukikaśuddhi*) and supramundane purity (*lokottaraśuddhi*). Provisionally or definitively, it tames (*vidhamati*) the afflictions and suppresses (*samudghātayati*) the propensities (*anusāya*) of the afflictions by means of the dhyānas, the meditative stabilizations (*samādhi*), the absorptions (*samāpatti*) and the noble path (*āryamārga*). When it is a matter of purity, Māra attempts to cast confusion on this doctrine, etc., as before. The strength consisting

of the knowledge of the dhyānas, liberations, meditative stabilizations and absorptions (*dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāpattijñānabala*) subdues this claim of Māra.

d) *By way of escape in the great Vehicle (mahāyane ca niryāṇe)*: this shows the rôle (*prayojana*) played by the other powers (cf. chap. X, § 9, no. 12). When it concerns the Great Vehicle, the supreme result (*ātyantikaniryāṇa*) of which is buddhahood (*buddhatā*), Māra attempts to cast confusion on this doctrine. He says that supreme complete enlightenment (*anuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ*) is very difficult to attain (*sudurlabha*) and that definitive escape must be sought in the vehicle of the śrāvakas. The other seven strengths subdue this claim of Māra because they are irresistible.” (U)

19. [The four vaiśāradyas (fearlessnesses), cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 52]:

jñānaprahāṇiryāṇavighnakāraśika/

svaparārthe 'nyatīrthyānāṃ nirādhr̥ṣya namo 'stu te //

“In your own personal interest and that of others, you proclaim knowledge, cutting off, escape, and that which makes obstacles, without ever being attacked by others, by the heretics! Homage to you!” [150a27]

19. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441c29-442a8, u 343b4-8.

This stanza explains the four vaiśāradyas.

“a) *You proclaim knowledge (jñānadeśika)*: the Buddha says truly: ‘I am perfectly enlightened (*samyaksambuddha*).’ He knows that he has understood all dharmas completely.

b) *You proclaim cutting off (prahāṇadeśika)*: the Buddha affirms truly : ‘I am he who has truly destroyed his impurities (*samyakkṣīṇāsrava*). He has destroyed the impurities of the afflictions (*kleśa*). These two points refer to the fact that the Buddha proclaims in regard to himself (*svārtha*).

c) *You proclaim escape (niryāṇadeśika)*: the Buddha affirms truly: ‘For the śrāvakas, I proclaim the dharmas of escape (*niryāṇadharmā*), the true escape.’

d) *You proclaim that which creates obstacle (vighnakāradhesika)*: the Buddha proclaims truly: ‘For the śrāvakas, I proclaim the dharmas which create obstacles (*vighnakāradharma*), true obstacles.’ These two points refer to the fact that the Buddha proclaims in the interest of others (*parārtha*). *Without being attacked by others, by heretics (anyatīrthyānām nirādhr̥ṣya)*: this shows that vaiśāradya is synonymous with absence of fear (*nirbhaya*). The Buddha cannot be attacked by others, by the heretics. This is why he is fearless.” (U)

20. [The three arakṣyas (things not requiring secrecy) and the three smṛtyupasthānas (equanimities), cf. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XXI, 53]:

vigṛhyavaktā parṣatsu dvayasamkleśavarjita /

nirāraṁkṣa asaṁmoṣa gaṇakarṣa namo 'stu te //

“You speak independently in the assemblies; you are free of the twofold defilement. Having nothing to hide, free of failure of mindfulness, you attract the assemblies! Homage to you!” [150a29]

20. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442a12-18, u 343b8-344a3.

“This stanza explains the arakṣyas and the smṛtyupasthānas.

a) *You speak independently in the assemblies (vigṛhyavaktā parṣatu)*: in the great assemblies, the Buddha is able to criticize (*vigrah-*) the claims of others (*paravāda*), for in his physical, vocal or mental actions (*kāyakarmādi*) or in his posture (*īryāpatha*) there is nothing ugly (*virūpaka*) that he should hide (*āraṁkṣ-*) for fear of reproach (*nindā*); this is why the Buddha can criticize the claims of others in the assemblies. This explains the three arakṣyas.

b) *You are free of the twofold defilement (dvayasamkleśavarjita)*: in the midst of respectful (*śuśrūṣamāṇa*), disrespectful, or both respectful and disrespectful śrāvakas, the Buddha skilfully uses his mindfulness and thus avoids affection (*anunaya*) and aversion (*pratigha*) towards them. This explains the three smṛtyupasthānas. Having nothing to

hide (*nirāraṅka*), free of failure of mindfulness (*asaṃmoṣa*), the Buddha skilfully draws (*karṣati*) the assemblies (*gaṇa*) of śrāvakas.” (U)

21. [The *vāsanāsamudghāta* (complete destruction of the impregnations), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 54]:

cāre vihāre sarvatra nāsty asarvajñaceṣṭitam /

sarvadā tava sarvajña bhūtārthika namo 'stu te //

“Everywhere, while walking or standing still, you have no action that is not that of an omniscient one; you are always the omniscient one in the true sense! Homage to you!” [150b2]

21. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442a22-442b7, u 344a3-344b1.

“This stanza explains the *vāsanāsamudghāta*. *Everywhere, while walking or standing still* (*cāre vihāre sarvatra*): whether he goes (*ākram-*) and comes (*vikram-*) to beg (*piṇḍapātāya*) in the villages (*grāma*) or the towns (*nagara*), or whether he stays peacefully (*vihr-*) at the foot of a tree (*vrkṣatala*) etc., in one of the four bodily postures (*īryāpatha*), the Buddha has no action which is not that of an omniscient one (*nāsty asarvajñaceṣṭitam*). The śrāvakas, etc., although they may have destroyed their afflictions (*kṣīnakleśa*), still retain the persistence of the propensities of the afflictions (*kleśavāsanābandha*). Thus, the sthavira Maudgalyāyana, who for five hundred earlier existences (*jātaka*) had been a monkey (*markaṭa*), remained bound (*anubaddha*) to his monkey habits (*vāsanā*) and, although he had destroyed his afflictions, he leapt like a monkey (*markaṭapraskanda*) when he heard music. A pratyekabuddha, who for many previous existences had been a courtesan (*gaṇikā*), still kept those habits (*vāsanā*) and continued to decorate his face. Such ways of behavior are not the actions of the omniscient one (*sarvajñaceṣṭita*). They are not found in the Bhagavat, and that is a quality unique (*asādhāranaguṇa*) of the Tathāgata. - *You are always omniscient in the true sense* (*sarvadā sarvajña bhūtārthika*): the Buddha is not like the six heretic masters (*śāstr*), Pūraṇa, Kāśyapa, etc., who were not really omniscient (cf. Aṅguttara, IV, p. 428); this is why it is said that the Tathāgata is omniscient in the true sense (*bhūtārthike*)

sarvajñaḥ). Here, according to a rule for stanzas, the words *sarvajña* and *bhūtārthika*, which form an indissoluble expression, are cited out of order. Or else, these two words are to be separated; in this case, *sarvajña* means that the Buddha is omniscient, and *bhūtārthika* means that the Buddha possesses the real meaning (*bhūtārtha*), as when one says *dāṇḍika* to designate a man who possesses a *daṇḍa* (*club*).” (U)

22. [Asaṃmoṣatā (non-failure of mindfulness, cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 55]:

sarvasattvārthakṛityeṣu kālaṃ tvaṃ nātivartase /

avandhyakṛtya satatam asaṃmoṣa namo 'stu te //

“In your work dedicated to the interest of all beings, you do not waste time; your work is never sterile; your memory is ever unfailing! Homage to you!”

[150b4]

22. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442b11-18, u 344b1-4.

“This stanza explains the asaṃmoṣatā. *In your work dedicated to the interest of all beings, you do not waste time (sarvasattvārthakṛityeṣu kālaṃ nātivartase)*: if there is a being to be converted (*vineya*) at a given moment, the Buddha Bhagavat accomplishes his work (*kṛtya*) at his place and at the desired time without wasting any time. Thus a stanza says: Just as the water of the great ocean has its tides at the right time, so the compassion (*anukampā*) of the Buddha manifests without ever failing. *Your work is never sterile (avandhyakṛtya)*: the work of the Buddha is not in vain (*śūnya*) or without result (*niṣphala*). *Your memory is unfailing (asaṃmoṣa)*: he never forgets the time appropriate for acting.” (U)

23. [Mahākaruṇā (great compassion), cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 56]:

sarvalokamahorātraṃ śahaṭkṛtvaḥ pratyavekṣase /

mahākaruṇayā yukta hitāśaya namo 'stu te //

“Six times during the day and night, you think about the entire world; you apply yourself to great compassion; you aspire for the good! Homage to you!” {150b6]

23. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442b22-442c1, u 433b4-7.

“This shows that great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) has as nature (*svabhāva*) the aspiration to work for the benefit and happiness of all beings (*hitasukhāśaya*). It is called *great* because it is produced (*samudāgata*) by the accumulations of merit and wisdom (*punyañānasambhāra*), because it has the freeing from the threefold suffering (*duḥkhatraya*) as aspect (*ākāra*), because it has (*ālambana*) the beings of the threefold world (*traiḍhātukasattva*) as object, because it bears equally on all beings, because no compassion surpasses it (*tato 'dhimātratarābhāvāt*). (See Kośa, VII, pp. 77-68). *Day and night, you view the whole world (sarvalokamahorātram śaṭkṛtvaḥ pratyavekṣase)*: this explains the activity (*karman*) fulfilled by great compassion., In every part of the day and the night, in the three times (*tryadhvan*), the Buddha Bhagavat looks at the whole world and wonders: Which good dharma (*kuśaladharmā*) is increasing (*vardhate*); which good dharma is decreasing (*hīyate*); which root of good (*kuśalamūla*) is ripening (*vipacyate*); which root is not ripening; who is able to enjoy happiness (*abhyudaya*); who is able to enjoy predestination (*niyama*); who is a practitioner of the vehicle of the Buddhas (*buddhayānabhājana*); who is a practitioner of another vehicle, etc?” (U) - Cf. Bodh bhūmi, p. 90: *karuṇāvihāro yena tathāgatas triṣkṛtvo rātrau triṣkṛtvo rātrimdivena buddhacakṣuṣā lokam vyavalokayati ko vardhate ko hīyate kasyānutpanāni kuśalmūlani... vistareṇāgraphale 'rhattve pratiṣṭhāpayāmīti*.

24. [The eighteen āveṇika buddhadharmas (attributes unique to the Buddha), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 57):

cāreṇādhigamenāpi jñānenāpi ca karmaṇā /

sarvaśrāvakaḥpratyekabuddhottama namo 'stu te //

“In your deeds, your attainment, your knowledge, and your acts, you surpass all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas! Homage to you!” [150b8]

24. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442c5-13, u 344b7-345a3.

“This stanza explains the eighteen āveṇika buddhadharmas.

a) In your deeds (cāreṇa), i.e., in all your activity at the moment of action. This concerns the following attributes: *i) The Tathāgata does not take a wrong step (nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam). ii) He has no grumbling (nāsti ravitam). iii) He has no faulty memory (nāsti muṣitā smṛtiḥ). iv) He has no unconcentrated mind (nāsty asamāhitam cittam). v) He has no notion of multiplicity (nāsti nānātvasaṃjñā). vi) He has no thoughtless renunciation (nāsty apratisaṃkhyāyopekṣā).*

b) In your attainment (adhigamena), i.e., in the six things that he does not lose (*ahāni*) when he has acquired them: he has no loss of zeal (*chanda*), of energy (*vīrya*), of memory (*smṛti*), of concentration (*samādhi*), of wisdom (*prajñā*), or of liberation (*vimukti*).

c) In your knowledge (jñānena): the Tathāgata has unattached and unhindered vision and knowledge of the three times (*tryadhvany asaṅgam apratihataṃ jñānadarśanam pravartate*).

d) In your actions (karmaṇā): the bodily, vocal and mental acts of the Tathāgata are preceded by wisdom and are in accord with wisdom (*sarvakāyavāgmanaskarma jñānapūrvamaṅgamaṃ jñānānuparivartī*). - *You surpass all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas (sarvaśrāvakapratyeka-buddhottama)*: this shows that the Buddha far surpasses (*bahvantaraviṣiṣṭa*) the vehicles of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas because he is endowed with the eighteen unique attributes (*āveṇikaguṇa*).” (U)

25. [Sarvākārajñatā (universal wisdom), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 58]:

tribhiḥ kāyir mahābodhiṃ sarvākārām upāgata /

sarvatra sarvasattvānāṃ kāṅkṣācchida namo 'stu te //

“By means of the three bodies, you have attained great universal enlightenment; everywhere you cut off the doubts of all beings! Homage to you!” [150b10]

25. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442c17-443a5, u 345a3-7.

“This stanza explains the sarvākārajñatā. The true wisdom bearing on all the aspects (*sarvākāreṣu samyagjñānam*) is called sarvākārajñāna; the self-nature (*svabhāva*) of this wisdom is called sarvākārajñatā, It is essentially a higher knowledge bearing on all the aspects of every knowable object (*sarvajñeyaviṣayānām sarvākāreṣu viṣiṣṭam jñānam*). By means of the three bodies (*tribhiḥ kāyairi*): this concerns the essential body (*svabhāvikakāya*), etc. By means of these three bodies, the Buddha has attained (*upāgata*) the result of great universal enlightenment (*mahābodhiḥ sarvākārā*) which has an immaculate and unhindered wisdom (*vimalam apratihataṃ ca jñānam*) as its self-nature. This enlightenment is universal (*sarvākāra*), i.e., endowed with all the aspects. According to some, the expression 'all the aspects' means the sixteen aspects beginning with the transitory (*anitya*) aspect, (cf. Kośa, VI, p. 163; VII, p. 28) and enlightenment uses them as antecedent cause. According to others, the expression 'all the aspects' means that all others as well, namely, that all the dharmas are without self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), unborn (*anutpanna*), undestroyed (*aniruddha*), calm from the very beginning (*ādisānta*), nirvāṇic in essence (*prakṛtiparinirvṛta*) and of imperceptible nature (*anipalabdhalakṣaṇa*) [Cf. chap. II, § 30]. According to yet others, it is not a matter here of various aspects to counteract (*vipakṣa*) by means of their antidote (*pratipakṣa*) [i.e., to counteract by way of seeing the truths], but rather a completely beneficent perfection (*sarvārthasampad*) comparable to a cintāmani of universal efficacy [a precious stone assuaging all the desires of its possessor, cf. chap. VIII, § 17]. As for myself [Asaṅga], I see in this universal enlightenment (*sarvākāra*) a special cutting of all the obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇaprahāṇaparakāra*). Why? Because it cuts off all kinds of obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇaparakāra*); indeed, it cuts all the obstacles to knowledge (*sarvajñeyāvaraṇa*) and it cuts off all the propensities (*sarvavāsanā*). Moreover, this great enlightenment is a true knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) bearing on all objects (*viśaya*). This is why the Buddha cuts through (*chinatti*) all the doubts of others (*parakāṅkṣā*). Everywhere (*sarvatra*), i.e., in all the worlds (*sarvaloka*), he cuts off the doubts of others: all the doubts of men (*manuṣya*) and gods (*deva*). He cuts off these doubts completely. Thus, this activity of cutting off all the doubts of men and gods shows the superiority of this universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñāna*). (U)

26. [Pāramitāparipūri (completion of virtues), cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 59]:

niravagraha nirdoṣa niṣkāluṣyānavasthita /

āniṅkṣya sarvadharmeṣu niṣprapañca namo 'stu te //

**“You are without greed, without error, without turmoil, without fixedness,
without agitation, and without vain words on all dharmas! Homage to you!”**

26. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U silent, u 345a7-345b3.

Since this stanza has not been explained by U, here is the commentary of the Sūtrālaṃkāra:

*anena sakalaśatpāramitāvīpakṣanirmuktatayā śatpāramitāparipūrīr bhagavata
udbhāvitā / tatrānavagrahatvaṃ bhoganirāgrahatvād veditavyaṃ / nirdoṣatvaṃ
nirmalakāyādikarmatavāt / niṣkāluṣyatvaṃ lokadharmaduḥkḥābhyāṃ cittākaluṣīkaraṇāt
/ anavasthitatvatvaṃ alpāvaraṇamātrādhiḡamānavasthānāt / āniṅkṣyatvaṃ avikṣepāt /
niṣprapañcatvaṃ sarvavikalpaprapañcasamudācārāt /*

“Being freed from the vices opposed to the six virtues, the Bhagavat has reached the fulfillment of the six virtues. He is *without greed* because he is not attached to wealth. He is *without error* because his acts, bodily actions, etc., are immaculate. He is *without turmoil* because his mind is not disturbed by human situations (cf. chap. VIII, § 14) or by sadness. He is *without fixedness* because he is not limited to mediocre or inferior results only. He is *without agitation* because he is not distracted. He is *without empty words* because he does not use the empty language of all concepts.”

The Tibetan commentary u is even more clear: “He is *without greed (niravagraha)*: this is the virtue of generosity (*dānapāramitā*). He is *without error (nirdoṣa)*: this is the virtue of morality (*śīlapāramitā*). He is *without disturbance (niṣkāluṣya)*: this is the virtue of patience (*kṣāntipāramitā*). He is *without fixedness (navasthita)*: thanks to energy coming from previous effort (*pūrvaprayoga*), he does not stop. He is *without agitation (āniṅkṣya)*: this is the virtue of dhyāna (*dhyānapāramitā*); when he is concentrated (*samāhita*), he is neither distracted nor agitated. He is *without empty words on all the*

dharmas (sarvadharmeṣu niṣprapañcaḥ): this is wisdom (*prajñā*), nonconceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). This wisdom uses no empty words (*prapañca*).”

27. Such are the qualities (*guṇa*) with which the dharmakāya of the Buddhas is associated (*saṃprayukta*). Furthermore, it is associated with the following qualities: self-nature (*svabhāva*), cause (*hetu*), result (*phala*), action (*karman*), associated qualities (*yoga*), function (*vṛtti*). The dharmakāya of the Buddhas has supreme (*anuttara*) qualities.

Here are some stanzas (cf. Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 60-61):

a. *niṣpannaparamārtho 'si sarvabhūmiviniṣṛtaḥ /*
 sarvasattvāgratāṃ prāptaḥ sarvasattvavimocakaḥ //

“i) You have completely achieved the Absolute; ii) you have emerged from all the bhūmis; iii) you have attained the first place among all beings; iv) you are the liberator of all beings.”

b. *akṣayair asamair yukto guṇair lokeṣu dṛśyase /*
 maṇḍaleṣu apy adṛśyaś ca sarvathā devamānuṣaiḥ //

“v) You are endowed with inexhaustible and unequaled qualities; vi) you show yourself equally in the universes and in the assemblies, but you are completely invisible to gods and men.” [150b17]

27. Comm. Bh 373c10-22, bh missing, U 443a13-27, u 345b3-346a1.

"The dharmakāya which is associated with the aforesaid qualities is associated with six other qualities. Two stanzas explain them in summary:

i) *You have completely achieved the Absolute (niṣpannaparamārtho 'si):* the dharmakāya of the Buddha has completely achieved the Absolute: it consists of the true nature (*tathatāprabhāvita*). This indicates that the dharmakāya is associated with a quality of self-nature (*svabhāvagūṇa*)... in the way that fire (*agni*) is associated with the quality of heat (*uṣṇatvagūṇa*).

ii) *You have left behind all the bhūmis (sarvabhūminiḥṣṛtaḥ)*: you have emerged from the ten bhūmis, Pramuditā, etc. This is the cause (*hetu*) of why the dharmakāya has completely achieved the Absolute.

iii) *You have attained the foremost place among all beings (sarvasttvāgratām prāpta)*: this concerns omniscience which ensures supremacy (*viśeṣa*) among all beings. This is the fruit (*phala*) resulting from achievement of the Absolute.

iv) You are the liberator of all beings (*sarvasattvavimocakaḥ*): this is the activity of the dharmakāya which has achieved the Absolute.

v) *You are endowed with inexhaustible and unequalled qualities (akṣayair asamair yukto guṇaḥ)*: these are the qualities with which he is associated, for he is endowed with infinite (*ananta*) and unique (*asādhāraṇa*) qualities, powers (*bala*), fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), etc., which are inexhaustible and unequalled.

vi) *You show yourself in all the universes equally (lokeṣu dṛśyase maṇḍaleṣu api)*: by means of his apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*), he manifests in the universes (*loka*); by means of his enjoyment body (*saṃbhogakāya*), he manifests in the great assemblies (*maṇḍala*): these two bodies are visible. On the other hand, he is *completely invisible to gods and men (adrśyaś ca sarvathā devamānuṣaiḥ)*, for the dharmakāya of the Buddhas is not seen by men, gods, etc. This passage shows the difference (*viśeṣa*) between the three bodies of Bhagavat by noting their function (*vṛtti*). The function (*vṛtti*) is a special transformation (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*) of the self-nature (*svabhāva*). Among the three bodies, two are visible (*dṛśya*), the third is invisible (*adrśya*).” (U)

28. The dharmakāya of the Buddhas is profound (*gambhīra*), very profound (*atigambhīra*). How should this profundity (*gāmbhīrya*) be conceived? - Here are the verses:

i) The Buddha has non-arising (*anutpāda*) as arising (*utpāda*), non-dwelling (*apratiṣṭhā*) as dwelling (*pratiṣṭhā*); all his actions are done without effort (*anābhoga*); he has the fourth nutriment (*caturāhāra*) as food (*āhāra*).

ii) The Buddhas are one (*abhinna*) but innumerable (*aprameya*); their activity (*karman*) is immeasurable (*aprameya*), but one (*eka*); they have a

changeable (*adhruva*) and unchangeable (*dhruva*) action, for the Buddhas are endowed with three bodies (*trikāya*).

iii) The Enlightened One (*abhisambuddha*) does not exist, but all the Buddhas are not non-existent. At every moment (*pratikṣaṇam*), there are innumerable Buddhas consisting (*prabhāvita*) of existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*).

iv) The Buddha is not attached (*rakta*) and not unattached (*arakta*). It is by means of attachment (*rāga*) that he has attained certainty of release (*niḥsaraṇa*). Knowing attachment (*rāga*) and unattachment (*virāga*), he has penetrated the nature of attachment (*rāgadharma*).

v) The Buddha has transcended the aggregates (*skandhāti-krānta*), but dwells in the aggregates (*skandhavihārin*). The latter are neither identical to the first ones nor different from them (*naivyānyā nānanyaḥ*). Although not abandoning them, the Buddhas are completely pacified (*upaśānta*).

vi) The actions of the Buddhas are homogeneous (flow together) (*saṃsṛṣṭa*); they are like the waters of the ocean (*samudrajala*). The Buddhas do not worry themselves about serving beings (*sattvārtha*), saying: “I have done that, I am doing that or I will do that.”

vii) It is the fault of beings (*sattvadoṣa*) if the Buddha does not appear, like the moon (*candra*) which does not appear in a broken pot (*bhagnabhājana*). He penetrates (*vyāpnoti*) the entire world with his doctrine (*dharmaprabhā*) like the sun (*sūrya*).

viii) Sometimes the Buddha manifests enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*), sometimes he is nirvanized: it is like fire (*agni*). He is never non-existent, for the body of the Tathāgata is eternal.

ix) With regard to ordinary dharmas (*anāryadharmā*), with regard to human destinies (*manuṣyagati*) and the bad destinies (*durgati*), with regard to non-religious dharmas (*abrahma-caryadharmā*), the Buddha has a higher essence (*ātman*) and a higher abode (*vihāra*).

x) The Buddhas go everywhere (*sarvatra vicaranti*), but do not go anywhere. Although they appear everywhere, they are not perceived (*gocara*) by the six senses (*indriya*).

xi) Among the Buddhas, the defilements (*kleśas*) have been corrected (*hata*) but not cut off (*prahata*) like a poison (*viṣa*) corrected by a magical spell (*mantra*). It is by means of the afflictions that they attain the destruction of the afflictions (*kleśakṣaya*) and attain the omniscience (*sarvajñāna*) of a Buddha.

xii) [Cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 98]:

kleśo bodhyaṅga āpanno mahopāyaprayoginaḥ /

saṃsāro 'py upāsantyātmā tato 'cintyas tathāgataḥ //

“In the Buddhas endowed with great means, the defilements become auxiliaries of enlightenment and saṃsāra is identical with nirvāṇa. Thus the Tathāgata is inconceivable.”

These depths are twelve in number: (1) depth of arising, establishment, activity and subsistence (*utpādapratiṣṭhākarmasthitigāmbhīrya*); (2) depth of taking possession, of number and of activity (*vyavasthāna-saṃkhyākarmagāmbhīrya*); (3) depth of enlightenment (*abhisambuddhagāmbhīrya*); (4) depth of detachment (*vairāgya-gāmbhīrya*); (5) depth of elimination of the aggregates (*skandhaprahāṇagāmbhīrya*); (6) depth of the ripening activity used on beings (*sattvapariṣācanagāmbhīrya*); (7) depth of appearance (*āviṣkaraṇagāmbhīrya*); (8) depth of the manifestation and of nirvāṇa (*abhisambodhinirvāṇa-darśanagāmbhīrya*); (ix) depth of abode (*vihāragāmbhīrya*); (10) depth of manifestation of their self-essence (*ātmabhāva-saṃdarśanagāmbhīrya*); (11) depth in the cutting off of defilements (*kleśaprahāṇagāmbhīrya*); (12) depth of inconceivability (*acintyagāmbhīrya*). [150c19]

28. Comm. Bh 374a12-376a10, bh 221a5-225a3, U 443b6-445a6, u 346a1-348b5.

“The dharmakāya of the Buddhas is *profound*, i.e., the dharmakāya of the Buddhas has a self-nature (*svabhāva*) difficult to understand (*duravabodha*) and the intellect of the sages of this world (*lokakuśala*) is unable to comprehend it. It is *very profound*, i.e., the dharmakāya is particularly difficult to understand and the intellect of the śrāvakas, etc., cannot grasp it. This depth is described in brief in twelve stanzas.” (U)

“i) This stanza explains the profundity (*gāmbhīrya*) of arising (*utpāda*), establishment (*pratiṣṭhā*), activity (*karman*) and subsistence (*sthiti*).

The Buddha has non-arising as arising: although they have no arising, the Buddhas seem to have an arising. That is the profundity of arising (*utpādagāmbhīrya*).

He has non-establishment as establishment: his establishment consists of not being established in either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa; he is established in non-abiding nirvāṇa (*apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*, cf. chap. IX). That is the profundity of establishment (*pratiṣṭhitāgāmbhīrya*).

All his actions are carried out effortlessly: he accomplishes all his actions (*kriyā*) effortlessly (*prayatna*), like a precious jewel (*maṇi*) or a celestial musical instrument (*tūriya*). (Cf. chap. VIII, § 17). That is the profundity of activity (*karmagāmbhīrya*).

He has the fourth nutriment as food. The nutriments are four in number:

a. the nutriments that sustain an impure person (*aśuddhāśrayasthityāhāra*); thus, the person bound by all the bonds (*sakalabandhana*, cf. Kośa, II, p. 180) sustains his body by means of the four foods: food-by-the-mouthfuls, etc. (*kavaḍḍikārahāra*, cf. chap. I, § 37).

b. The nutriments that sustain a person who is both pure and impure (*śuddhāśuddhāśrayasthityāhāra*). Those who are born and dwell in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) or in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) sustain themselves by contact-food (*sparśāhāra*), mentally-operating food (*manaḥsaṃcetanāhāra*) and consciousness-food (*viññānāhāra*). Having no craving (*vitārāga*), they do not have food-by-the-mouthfuls. On the other hand, the srotaāpannas, in their quality as śaikṣas, are also both pure and impure (*śuddhāśuddhāśraya*) but are sustained by the four nutriments.

c. The nutriments that sustain a person who is exclusively pure (*ekāntaśuddhāśrayasthityāhāra*); thus, the arhats, etc., are sustained by these four foods.

d. The nutriments that sustain an obviously pure person (*saṃdarśakamātrāśryayasthityāhāra*); thus the Buddha Bhagavat evidently receives and uses the four foods, food-by-the-mouthfuls, etc., but when the Bhagavat eats, he does not, in reality, experience eating. Nor does he pretend to eat so that his body subsists. Conforming to the world, he seems to utilize eating and borrows eating so that his body subsists. By appearing to eat this fourth food, he obtains his subsistence. That is the profundity of subsistence (*sthitigāmbhīrya*).” (U) - Bh justifies the paradoxes of this stanza by means of four groups of ten reasons.

“ii) This stanza explains the profundity of taking possession (*vyavasthāna*), of number (*saṃkhyā*) and of activity (*karman*).

The Buddhas are one, but innumerable: this explains the profundity of taking possession (*vyavasthānagāmbhīrya*). Because the dharmakāya of the Buddhas is undivided (*asaṃbhinna*), the Buddhas are *one*; but as innumerable people (*apramāṇāśraya*) reach enlightenment (*abhisam-*

budh-) the Buddhas are *innumerable* (cf. above, chap. X, § 3, no. 3; § 8.; § 33).

Their activity is immense, but single: this explains the profundity of number (*saṃkhyāgāmbhīrya*). Although the Buddhas may be innumerable, they have the same single activity. Hence their profundity.

They have unstable and stable activity, for the Buddhas are endowed with three bodies. The Tathāgatas are endowed with three bodies: By way of their enjoyment body (*saṃbhogakāya*), their activity is stable; by way of their apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*), their activity is unstable. This is the profundity of activity (*karmagāmbhīrya*).” (Bh) - U differs: “The activity of the essential body (*svābhavakāya*) is stable; the activity of the other two bodies is unstable.”

“iii) This stanza explains the profundity of the Enlightened One (*abhisambuddhagāmbhīrya*). *The Enlightened One does not exist*, for the pudgala and the dharmas are non-existent; but, conventionally (*saṃvṛti*) it is said that all the Buddhas are enlightened. How do we know that the Buddhas are enlightened? *At every moment, there are innumerable Buddhas*. This shows that at each instant, innumerable Buddhas reach enlightenment. They are *constituted of existence and non-existence*: this shows that the

true nature (*tathatā*) is existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) and that the Buddhas are constituted (*prabhāvita*) by this true nature.” (Bh)

“*The Enlightened One does not exist*, for there is no imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) in the dependent nature (*paratantra*); but *all the Buddhas are not non-existent*, for the absolute nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) really does exist in the dependent nature (cf. chap. II, § 32). *At each instant, there are innumerable Buddhas*: in universes (*lokadhātu*) surpassing in number the numberless grains of sand of the Ganges (*gaṅgānadīvālukā*); from moment to moment and simultaneously (*samakāla*), innumerable Buddhas reach enlightenment. They are *constituted of existence and non-existence*: the Tathāgatas have attained a place (*pada*) consisting (*prabhāvita*) of the emptiness of existence and of non-existence (*bhāvābhāvaśūnyatā*).” (U)

“iv) This stanza explains the profundity of detachment (*vairāgyagāmbhīrya*). *The Buddha is not attached nor is he unattached*. Since sensual attachment (*kāmarāga*) is absent in him, it is said that he is not attached (*rakta*). Since he has no attachment, he is not unattached (*arakta*) either. Why? Because sensual attachment is necessary for one to be able to be detached from it. Since this attachment does not exist in him, he is not unattached. *It is by way of attachment that he has attained release*, for it is by eliminating the explosion of desire (*rāgaparyavasthāna*) but by keeping the traces of desire (*kāmānuśaya*, cf. Kośa, p. 3, 73) that he has attained definitive release (*ātyantikaniḥsaraṇa*). If he had not kept the traces of desire, he would have entered into parinirvāṇa like the śrāvakas, etc. Knowing attachment and unattachment, he has penetrated the nature of detachment. Understanding that this imaginary sensual attachment (*parikalpitakā-marāga*) has no nature of attachment, he has understood the true nature of attachment (*rāgadharmatā*).” (Bh)

“v) This stanza explains the profundity of elimination of the aggregates (*skandhaprahāṇagāmbhīrya*). The Buddhas have gone beyond all the imaginary aggregates (*parikalpitaskandha*), the aggregate of form, etc., (*rūpādiskandha*), for they understand (*yathābhūtaṃ parijānanti*) completely that that which is imaginary does not exist. *But they reside in the aggregates*: the Buddhas reside in the aggregates of the true nature (*dharmatāskandha*). *These latter ones are not the same as the previous ones nor are they different from them*. It cannot be said that the aggregates of the true nature are different from the imaginary aggregates, for the imaginary aggregates do not exist and,

consequently, are no different from what is. It cannot be said that they are identical, for the imaginary aggregates are afflicted (*saṃkliṣṭa*) and, consequently, are distinct from the aggregates of true nature which have been purified. There is no identity nor difference between dharma and dharmatā. *Not abandoning them, the Buddhas are completely pacified*: by not abandoning these aggregates of true nature, the Buddhas have attained nirvāṇa par excellence.” (U)

“vi) This stanza explains the profundity of ripening action (*paripācanagāmbhūrya*). *The actions of the Buddhas are homogeneous (flow together)*: the activity of the Tathāgatas consists of actions dedicated to the welfare and happiness of beings (*sattvahitasukha*). These actions, which are joined to one another and which together have a single taste (*ekarasa*), are mixed with one another. It is asked what these actions resemble, and the author replies that *they are like the waters of the ocean*: thus, the waters that flow into the reservoir (*vāridhāra*) of the ocean (*samudra*) have one and the same flavor, are mixed together and all maintain the well-being of the fish (*matsya*), etc. *The Buddhas do not worry about serving others, saying: ‘I have done that, I am doing that’ or ‘I will do that’*: without forcing themselves (*cittābhisamskaraṇa*) or thinking (*manasikṛ-*) about the interests of others (*parārtha*), the Buddhas spontaneously (*svarasena*) accomplish the service of others in the three times. In the same way, the precious jewel (*maṇi*) and the celestial musical instrument of Śakra, etc., fulfill their rôle without thinking about it.” (U) - Same examples in Sūtrālāṃkāra, IX, 18-19.

vii) This stanza explains the profundity of appearance (*āviṣkaraṇagāmbhūrya*). The people of the world (*loka*) do not see the Buddha and yet it is said that the body of the Buddha is eternal (*nitya*). If the body of the Buddha is eternal, why cannot it be seen? *It is the fault of beings if he does not appear, like the moon which does not appear in a broken jar*: water does not remain in a broken jar and, since the water does not remain in the jar, the moon cannot be reflected there; the same among beings (*sattvakāya*): the water of tranquility (*śamathajala*) being absent, the moon of Buddha (*buddhacandra*) does not appear. Here, concentration (*samādhi*) is compared to the water, for it is clear (*ārdra*) by nature. *He penetrates the whole world by means of his law, like the sun*. Actually, the Buddha does not show himself in the world, but he penetrates everywhere (*sarvavyāpin*) by his buddha activity (*buddhakriyā*), by preaching the doctrine, sūtra,

geya, etc. Like the light of the sun (*sūryaprabhā*) that penetrates the entire world, he fulfills his buddha activity and ripens (*vipācayati*) beings.” (Bh)

This seventh stanza is very close to Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 16:

yathodabhājane bhinne candrabimbaṃ na dṛśyate /
tathā duṣṭeṣu buddhabimbaṃ na dṛśyate //

“viii) This stanza explains the profundity in the manifestation of enlightenment and nirvāṇa (*abhisambodhinirvāṇasaṃdarśanagāmbhīrya*). *Sometimes the Buddha manifests enlightenment, sometimes he is nirvanized: it is like fire.* Fire in this world blazes (*prajvalati*) at some moments and is extinguished (*nirvāpyate*) at other moments. It is the same for the Buddha: to those whose roots of good are not ripe (*aparipakvakuśalamūla*), he manifests enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*) in order to ripen these beings and lead them quickly to deliverance (*vimukti*); to those whose roots of good are ripe (*paripakvakuśalamūla*) and who are already delivered (*vimukta*), the Buddha manifests parinirvāṇa, for he has nothing further to do. *He is never non-existent, etc.:* the meaning is easy to understand.” (U)

This eighth stanza is very close to Sūtrālamkāra IX, 17:

yathāgnir jvalate 'nyatra punar anyatra śāyati /
buddheṣu api tathā jñeyam saṃdarśanam adarśanam //

“ix) This stanza explains the profundity of abode (*vihāragābhīrya*). *In regard to ordinary dharmas, the Buddha has a superior essence and abode:* in respect to bad dharmas (*akuśaladharmas*), the Buddha has a superior essence and a superior abode [cf. bh: *de dag la yan bdag ñid mchog dan bEugs pa mchog yin te*]. His abode is superior, for it is by abiding in the concentrations on emptiness (*śūnyatā*), wishlessness (*apraṇihita*) and signlessness (*ānimitta*) that he is supported (*ālambate*) on these bad dharmas and abides there. - *In respect to human destinies and bad destinies, he has superior essence and abode:* His abode is superior because it is by abiding in the dhyānas and the concentrations (*samāpatti*) that he knows these destinies and abides there. - *With respect to the dharmas of non-religion, he has a superior essence and superior abode:* His abode is superior because it is by abiding in the brāhmavihāras called the infinite practices

(*apramāṇa*, cf. above, chap. X, § 10) that he knows these dharmas of non-religion and abides there.” (U)

“x) This stanza explains the profundity of the very essence (*ātmabhāvagāmbhīrya*). The very essence, because the eternal dharmadhātu of the Tathāgatas and the qualities (*guṇa*) derived therefrom are designated generally by the expression 'very essence'. *The Buddhas go everywhere*: their subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*, cf. chap. VII) goes everywhere. Where do they go? To diverse objects (*viśaya*), good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*), indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), impure (*sāsrava*), pure (*anāsrava*), conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). etc. *But they do not go everywhere*: their fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (*nīrvikalpakajñāna*) which is without concept (*vikalpa*) does not go out to the diverse objects. *Although they appear everywhere*: although their apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) take birth in all places, *the Buddhas are not perceived by the six senses*, because from the absolute point of view (*paramārthataḥ*), the eternal dharmakāya does not present the possibility of arising (*upapattyāyatana*) and is not grasped by the damned (*nāraka*) or by similar beings (*sabhāgasattva*).” (U).

“xi) This stanza explains the profundity of cutting off the afflictions (*kleśaprahāṇagāmbhīrya*). *In the Buddhas, the afflictions are corrected but not cut off*: in the state of bodhisattva, they have corrected the afflictions without cutting them off. *In the way that a poison is corrected by a spell*: corrected by a magician's spell (*mantra*), a poison (*viṣa*) keeps its nature but is unable to harm. [Cf. Kāśyapaparivarta, § 48, p. 78]. It is the same for the afflictions: the power of mindfulness (*smṛti*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) corrects their eruption, but the traces (*anuśaya*) of the afflictions subsist. Why do the traces of the afflictions persist? Because while suppressing them, the Buddhas fear entering into parinirvāṇa immediately like the śrāvakas. Thus it is thanks to the afflictions that they reach the destruction of the afflictions (*kleśhakṣaya*) and attain omniscience (*sarvajñāna*). A stanza says: When the afflictions are rectified by the power of mindfulness (*smṛti*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), bodhi is attained; similarly, when a poison (*viṣa*) is submitted to the action of a magical spell (*mantra*), its faults (*doṣa*) become qualities (*guṇa*).” (U)

“ By retaining the defilements in the state of traces (*anuśaya*), the Buddhas reach the definitive destruction of the defilements (*ātyantikakleśakṣaya*) and attain the omniscience

of a Buddha, instead of entering into parinirvāṇa at once like the śrāvakas, because omniscience is attained when the afflictions are destroyed.” (Bh)

“xii) This stanza explains the profundity of inconceivability (*acintyagāmbhīrya*). The defilements become auxiliaries of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣya*), and the suffering of saṃsāra is the same as nirvāṇa. Results such as these coming from causes such as these are inconceivable in the world.” (U)

29. When the bodhisattvas recollect the dharmakāya of the Buddhas, by how many recollections (*anusmṛti*) do they recollect it? In brief (*samāsataḥ*), the bodhisattvas practice (*bhāvayanti*) seven methods (*saptadhā*) of recollecting the Buddhas (*buddhānusmṛti*):

i) They recollect them by saying: "The Buddhas enjoy sovereignty over all dharmas (*sarvadharmavibhūta*)", for in all the universes (*lokadhātu*) they have acquired unhindered (*apratigha*) superknowledges (*abhijñā*). Here is a stanza:

The Buddhas do not have sovereignty over the entire world of beings (*sattvadhātu*) who are prevented by obstacles (*sāvaraṇa*), deprived of the cause (*hetuvisaṃyukta*) and bound by the twofold fate (*niyamadvayasamprayukta*).

ii) They recollect them by saying: " The body of the Tathāgatas (*tathāgatakāya*) is eternal (*nitya*)", for the Tathāgatas [acc. to H: tathatā] are [is] always without stain (*malavimukta*).

iii) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathāgatas are absolutely (*atyantam*) blameless (*niravadya*)", for they are free of any obstacle of affliction and any obstacle to knowledge (*sarvakleśajñeyāvaraṇa*).

iv) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathāgatas have no effort to make (*anābhoga*)", for, being free of effort, any activity of the Buddha (*sarvabuddhakriyā*) knows no interruption (*asamucchinna*).

v) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathāgatas have great enjoyment (*mahābhoga*)", for the pure Buddha fields (*parisuddhabuddhakṣetra*) are a great enjoyment.

vi) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathāgatas are free of stains (*anupalipta*)", for they are not stained by any human situation (*lokadharmā*) while appearing in the world.

vii) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathāgatas have great usefulness (*mahārtha*)", for by manifesting (*saṃdarśana*) enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*) and nirvāṇa, they ripen beings who are not yet ripe (*aparipakvasattvān paripācayanti*) and deliver beings who are already ripe (*paripakvasattvān vimocayanti*). Here are some stanzas:

a. The Buddhas possess: (1) the perfection resulting from perfect volition (*svacittādhīnasampad*), (2) the perfection of eternity (*nitya*), (3) the perfection of purity (*śuddha*), (4) the perfection of absence of effort (*anābhoga*), (5) the perfection consisting of communicating the great enjoyments of the Dharma (*mahādharmasambhogānupradāna*).

b. (6) The perfection of independent movement (*anāśritapracāra*), (7) the perfection consisting of wanting the welfare of beings (*bahujanārthakāmatā*). Wise people (*dhīra*) should practice the recollections (*anusmṛti*) with regard to all these Buddhas. [151a10]

29. Comm. Bh 376b2-376c7, bh 225a3-226a5, U 445a27-445c5, u 348b5-349b7.

“This passage explains how the bodhisattvas recollect the qualities (*guṇa*) of the dharmakāya of the Buddhas.

i) *The Buddhas enjoy sovereignty over all dharmas*: as a result of repeated practice (*abhyāsa*), the Tathāgatas have attained sovereignty over all dharmas (*sarvadharmavibhutva*, cf. chap. X, § 1); at their will (*kāntamātreṇa*), the fulfillment of all the qualities (*sarvagūṇapariṇī*) is manifested (*saṃmukhībhavati*) in them.

Objection: If the Tathāgatas in all the immense (*apramāṇa*) and infinite (*ananta*) universes (*lokadhātu*) enjoy the unhindered superknowledges (*apratihatābhijñā*), why do

not all beings reach parinirvāṇa? - Because these beings are prevented by the obstacles (*sāvaraṇa*) and deprived of the cause of nirvāṇa. Having shown that the Buddha enjoys sovereignty over all the dharmas (*sarvadharmavibhutva*) in a general way, then, the author is going to explain in a more specific way why the Buddha does not have sovereignty over beings (*sattvavibhutva*); this is why he says the stanza:

Over the entire world of beings hindered by the obstacles and deprived of the cause. Beings are prevented by the obstacles: obstacles consisting of afflictions (kleśa), action (karman) and retribution (vipāka); for example, the violent emotions (tīvrakleśa, cf. Kośa, IV, p. 202), the sins requiring immediate retribution (ānantaryakarman, cf. Kośa, IV, p. 201), stupidity (jadata), deceit (kaitava), and so on. They are deprived of the cause, because they do not have the cause for nirvāṇa, because they do not have the family (gotra, cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 3). They are bound by the twofold fate (niyamadvayasamprayukta), namely, the fate of karmic action (gurukarmakāraniyama) and the the necessity of suffering the retribution (vipākanubhāvaniyama). The fate of karmic action: a repeated action (abhyāsa) brings about a result of similar cause (sabhāgahetu), necessarily associated with a result that accords with the cause (niṣyandaphala). [Cf. u: yañ dañ yañ du goms pañi phyir skal ba mñam pañi rgyu las mi za rgyu mthun pañi hbras bu hbyuñ bañi phyir te. For the explanation, see Kośa, II, p. 294]. Thus Ajātaśatru, who had killed his father, king Bimbisāra (cf. Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, I, p. 135-137), was in turn killed by his son Udaya or Udāyibhaddha, (cf. Mahāvamsa, IV, 1). The necessity of suffering retribution, for action necessarily always requires retribution; it is necessary to suffer the result of retribution (vipākaphala). Thus the Śākyas necessarily had to be killed by Virūḍhaka (Pāli, Viṣūḍabha, cf. Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā, I, p. 346-349; Kaṭṭhahārijātaka, no. 7, I, p. 133; Bhaddasālajātaka, no. 465, IV, p. 146 seq., 151 seq.). The Buddha has no sovereignty allowing him to introduce the beings in question into nirvāṇa; this is why, after having shown in general that the Tathāgata enjoys sovereignty over all dharmas, the author is forced to say, more specifically, that he does not have sovereignty over beings.

ii) *The Tathāgata's body is eternal* because he has the very pure tathatā (*ativiśuddhatathatā*) as self-nature because it is unalterable (*ananyathāvṛtti*) and immovable (*avikāra*).

iii) *The Tathāgatas are absolutely without reproach*, because they have cut all the erroneous (*sāvadya*) obstacles, the obstacle of defilements and the obstacle to knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*).

iv) *The Tathāgatas do not have to make any effort*: they are like a celestial musical instrument (*tūrya*, cf. chap. VII, § 17). The meaning is easy to understand.

v) The Tathāgatas have great enjoyment, for they enjoy the blooming of the qualities (*guṇavyūha*) of the pure buddhafi elds (*buddhakṣetra*) which are the great enjoyment of the Dharma (*mahādharmabhoga*). [Acc. to Bh: The pure buddhakṣetras of the Tathāgatas are called great enjoyment].

vi) *The Tathāgatas are free of stains*: they are like the blue lotus (*nīlotpala*) which is unstained by the water. (Cf. Kāśyapaparivarta, v. 38, p. 67). The meaning is easy to understand.

vii) *The Tathāgatas are of great use*. By manifesting enlightenment and nirvāṇa, they render the greatest service to beings: according to needs (*yathākalpam*), they ripen them or deliver them.

These are the seven recollections of the Buddhas.

Two stanzas summarize these ideas. The word ‘perfection’ (*sampad*) applies to each member of the stanza:

(1) *The perfection resulting from right volition (svacittādhinasampad)* summarizes the first recollection: sovereignty over all dharmas (*sarvadharmavibhutvalakṣaṇa*).

(2) *The perfection of eternity (nityasampad)* summarizes the second recollection: the eternity of the body (*kāyanityalakṣaṇa*).

(3) *The perfection of purity (śuddhasampad)* summarizes the third recollection: irreproachability (*niravadyalakṣaṇa*).

(4) *The perfection of absence of effort (anābhogasampad)* summarizes the fourth recollection: absence of effort (*anābhogalakṣaṇa*).

(5) *the perfection of communicating the great enjoyments of the Dharma (mahādharmasambhogānupradānasampad)* summarizes the fifth recollection: the great enjoyment of the Dharma (*mahādharmasambhogalakṣaṇa*).

(6) The perfection of independent movement (*anāśritapracārasampad*) summarizes the sixth recollection: the fact of not being stained by any human circumstances (*lokadharmā*).

(7) The perfection consisting of wanting the welfare of many beings (*bahujanārthakāmatāsampad*) summarizes the seventh recollection: being of great use by procuring the welfare and happiness (*hitasukha*) of beings widely.

In regard to all these Buddhas, i.e., towards the perfections (sāmpad) and the qualities (guṇa) of the Tathāgatas, the wise ones, i.e., the bodhisattvas, should practice the recollections: should practice the seven recollections (anusmṛti). This recollection consists of remembering (smaraṇa) the Buddha and recalling (abhilāpa) him without loss of memory (muṣhitasmṛtitā).” (U)

30. How should the pure buddhafield (*parisuddhabuddhakṣetra*) of the Buddhas be understood? - As it is said in the introduction (*prastāvanā*) to the Sūtra in One Hundred Thousand Lines of the bodhisattva-piṭaka (*bodhisattvapiṭakaśatasāhasrikasūtra*; cf. Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, ed. p. 31-32). The Buddha dwells (*viharati*) in a great palace (*mahāvīmāna*):

i) This palace is adorned with seven brilliant jewels (*pradīpasaptaratnaracita*) and emits great light filling immense universes (*aprameyalokadhātuparipūrakamahāraśmyutthāpaka*).

ii) Its immense rooms are well arranged (*suvibhaktā-pramāṇavyavasthāna*).

iii) Its surface is unlimited (*aparicchinnamaṇḍala*) [H adds: and its dimensions immeasurable (*duravagāhapramāṇa*).

iv) Its domain surpasses the threefold world (*traidhātuka-samatikrāntagocara*).

v) It is the result of supramundane and supreme roots of good (*lokottarataduttarakuśalamūlotpanna*).

vi) It has the very efficacious and very pure knowledge (*viśuddavijñaptilakṣaṇa*) as nature.

- vii) It is the residence of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatavihāra*).
- viii) It is the refuge of the great bodhisattvas (*mahābodhisattvapratīsarāṇa*).
- ix) It is the immense promenade (*apramāṇavicaraṇa*) of the devas, nagas, yakṣas, asuras, garuḍas, kiṃnaras, mahoragas, manuṣyas and amanuṣyas.
- x) It is supported by the great joy and great bliss of the taste of the Dharma (*mahādharmarasaprītisukhādhiṣṭita*).
- xi) It is used in the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārtha-kriyopasthita*).
- xii) It excludes all the suffering of the afflictions (*apagatasarvakleśopadrava*).
- xiii) It drives out all the māras (*sarvamāraparityakta*).
- xiv) It surpasses all other manifestations (*sarvavyūhātirikta*), for it is adorned with the miraculous activity of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatādhiṣṭhānaracita*).
- xv) It has great mindfulness, great intellect and great practice (*mahāsmṛtīmatipratipattiniryāṇa*) for paths.
- xvi) It has great tranquility and great insight (*mahāśamathavipaśyanāyāna*) as vehicles.
- xvii) It has the great gates of deliverance: emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness (*śūnyatā-nimittāpraṇihitamahāvīmokṣamukhapraveśa*) as entry-ways.
- xviii) It has one of the priceless king-lotuses adorned with innumerable collections of qualities (*apramāṇaguṇa-saṃcayālaṃkṛtamahāratnapadmarājaniṣṭita*) as base.

In the same way, the following perfections are attributed to the pure buddhafield: (1) perfection of color (*varṇasaṃpad*), (2) perfection of shape (*saṃsthānasaṃpad*), (3) perfection of size (*pramāṇasaṃpad*), (4) perfection of territory (*deśasaṃpad*), (5) perfection of cause (*hetusaṃpad*), (6) perfection of result (*phalasaṃpad*), (7) perfection of ruler (*adhipatisaṃpad*), (8) perfection of assistance (*paḥṣasaṃpad*), (9) perfection of retinue (*parivārasaṃpad*), (10)

perfection of maintenance (*adhiṣṭhānasampad*), (11) perfection of action (*karmasampad*), (12) perfection of auxiliary (*upakārasampad*), (13) perfection of absence of fear (*nirbhayasampad*), (14) perfection of seat (*āspadasampad*), (15) perfection of path (*mārgasampad*), (16) perfection of vehicle (*yānasampad*), (17) perfection of entry (*mukhasampad*), (18) perfection of base (*ādhārasampad*).

The enjoyment (*bhoga*) of this pure buddhafield is absolutely pure (*ekāntaśuddha*), absolutely blissful (*ekāntasukha*), absolutely irreproachable (*ekāntaniravadya*) and absolutely efficacious (*ekāntavibhu*). [151b2]

30. Comm. Bh 376c28-377b6, bh 226a5-227b1, U 445c25-446b27, u 349b7-351b7.

[For the equivalence Bodhisattvapiṭikaśatasāhasrika = Saṃdhinormocana, see Notes].

“This passage concerns the pure buddhafields of the Buddha:

i) *This palace is adorned with seven brilliant jewels.* The buddhakṣetra of the Buddha is brilliant with light and has seven jewels (*ratna*) as ornaments. Or else, it is the seven jewels that are brilliant. These seven jewels are: 1) gold (*suvarṇa*), 2) silver (*rūpya*), 3) lapis-lazuli (*vaidūrya*), 4) cat's-eye (*musāragalva*), 5) emerald (*aśmagarbha*) including indranīla (sapphire), mahānīla, etc., 6) red pearl (*lohitamuktikā*) which is an extract of a red insect (*lohitaprāṇika*), 7) chrysoberyl (*karketana*). (See Notes)

It emits a great light filling immense universes. The seven brilliant jewels (*pradīptasaptaratna*) emit a great light (*mahāraśmi*) which fills infinite universes (*anantalokadhātu*). Or else, the pure buddhakṣetra itself emits a great light which fills infinite universes, for it penetrates (*vyāpnoti*) infinite universes by its nature (*svabhāvataḥ*),

These two phrases which concern the pure buddhakṣetra explain its perfection of color (*varṇasampad*).

ii) *Its immense rooms are well arranged.* The immense rooms (*apramāṇavyavasthāna*) of the pure buddhakṣetra are well arranged (*suvibhakta*): they are distributed (*vyavasthāpita*) and adorned (*maṇḍita*) according to a plan decided upon in advance. This phrase explains the perfection of shape (*saṃsthānasampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

iii) *Its surface is limitless and its dimensions immeasurable.* The dimensions (*pramāṇa*) and the surface (*maṇḍala*) of the pure buddhakṣetra are limitless (*aparicchinna*) and immeasurable (*duravagāha*). Or else, its surface is immeasurable because its dimensions are limitless. This phrase explains the perfection of dimension (*pramāṇasampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

iv) *Its domain surpasses the threefold world.* Its territory (*deśa*) surpasses the domain (*gocara*) of the threefold world (*traidhātuka*) because it is not the object (*gocara*) of the craving belonging to the threefold world (*traidhātukatṛṣṇā*) and because it is not a result of retribution of action (*karmavipākaphala*). This phrase explains the perfection of territory (*deśasampad*) belonging to the buddhakṣetra.

v) *It is the outcome of supramundane and supreme roots of good.* The pure buddhakṣetra arises having the supramundane roots of good (*lokottarakuśalamūla*) and the supreme roots of good previously acquired (*prṣṭhalabdhottarakuśalamūla*) as cause (*hetu*). It does not have a creator (*Īsavara*, etc.) as cause. This phrase explains the perfection of cause (*hetusampad*) of the buddhakṣetra. – [Bh: What is its cause? It is supramundane nonconceptual knowledge (*lokottaranirvikalpakajñāna*) and subsequent knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*); this subsequent knowledge is called *supreme (uttara)* because it is acquired subsequent to the preceding one.]

vi) *For nature it has the very efficacious and very pure mind.* The pure buddhakṣetra has the very efficacious (*ativibhu*) and very pure (*ativiśuddha*) mind (*vijñapti*) as nature (*lakṣaṇa*) for it is nothing but mind (*vijñaptimātra*) and there is no external object (*bāhya*) such as jewels (*ratna*), etc., outside of this mind. But it is this pure mind that is transformed (*pariṇam-*) in this way into jewels, etc. This phrase explains the perfection of result (*phalasangampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

vii) *It is the residence of the Tathāgata.* It has the Buddha and none other as ruler (*adhipati*). This phrase explains the perfection of ruler (*adhipatisangampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

viii) *It is the refuge of the great bodhisattvas.* Only the bodhisattvas already entered into the great bhūmis (*mahābhūmipraviṣṭa*) live there and assist the Tathāgata. There are no śrāvakas, etc., there. This phrase explains the perfection of assistance (*pakṣasangampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

ix) *It is the immense promenade of the devas, nāgas, yakṣas, etc.* The devas, etc. who live there serve him as retinue (*parivāra*). These are magical creations (*nirmāṇa*) without reality. Mahoraga means the great boa constrictors. This phrase explains the perfection of retinue (*parivārasaṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

x) *It is maintained by the great joy and great bliss of the taste of the Dharma.* In this pure buddhakṣetra, joy (*priti*) and bliss (*sukha*), the taste of the Dharma of the great vehicle (*mahāyānadharmarasa*) serve as food (*āhāra*). This phrase explains the perfection of maintenance (*adhiṣṭhānasamṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra, for food (*āhāra*) maintains (*adhiṣṭhāti*) the life of the body.

xi) *It is used to procure the interest of all beings.* After eating this food, it procures the interest of all beings (*sarvasattvārtha*). This phrase explains the perfection of activity (*karmasaṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

xii) *It excludes the torments of the afflictions.* In this pure buddhafield there are no torments (*upadrava*) caused by the afflictions (*kleśa*). This phrase explains the benefaction (*upakārasamṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

xiii) *It drives away the māras.* It expels the four enemies (*caturamitra*), namely, kleśamāra (the afflictions), skandhamāra (the aggregates), mṛtyumāra (death) and devapūtramāra (the Evil One) (cf. Śikṣhāsamuccaya, p. 198; Mahāvastu, III, p. 273, 281; Madh. vṛtti, p. 49; etc.). This phrase explains the perfection of absence of fear (*nirbhayasamṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

xiv) *It surpasses all the other manifestations and is adorned with the miraculous activity of the Tathāgata.* It surpasses the manifestations (*vyūha*) of all the bodhisattvas for it is the seat (*āspada*) of the manifestation of a Tathāgata. This phrase explains the perfection of seat (*āspadasamṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra, for it is far superior (*bahvantaraviśiṣṭa*) to all other seats.

xv) *For roads it has great mindfulness, great intellect and great practice.* Great mindfulness (*mahāsmṛti*) is the wisdom that comes from hearing (read wen so tch'eng houei = *śrutamayīprajñā*). Great intellect (*mahāmāti*) is the wisdom that comes from reflecting (read: sseu so tch'eng houei = *cintamayīprajñā*). Great practice (*mahāpratipatti*) is the wisdom that comes from meditation (*bhāvanāmayīprajñā*). This

phrase explains the perfection of path (*mārgasaṃpad*) of the buddhakṣetra. Here road (*niryāṇa*) is synonymous (*paryāya*) with path (*mārga*).

xvi) *As vehicles, it has the great tranquility and great insight.* Mounted (*ārūḍha*) on tranquility (*hamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*), it travels on the three paths of wisdom (*prajñāmārga*) and goes toward the pleasure-garden of destinies (*gatyārāma*). This tranquility and insight, which surpass the tranquility and insight of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, is called *great*. This phrase explains the perfection of vehicle (*yānasampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

xvii) *For entry-ways, it has the great gates of deliverance: emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness.* It has three gates of deliverance (*vimokṣamukha*, cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 184) as entries. Entry (*praveśa*) is synonymous with door (*dvāra*). These doors are called great for the same reason as above. This phrase explains the perfection of entry (*mukhasampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

xviii) *As base it has a priceless king-lotus adorned with innumerable collections of qualities.* Just as worldly people (*loka*) are ornamented with jewels (*ratna*), collections of jewels ornament this pure buddhafield. It has as support a priceless king-lotus (hong lien hoa translates *śatapattra*, *padma* and *utpala* in Mahāvvyut, 6143-6145) (*mahāratna*) adorned with innumerable collections of qualities. Just as the circle of earth rests on the circle of wind (*vāyumaṇḍala*, cf. Kośa, III, p. 138), so this pure buddhafield is supported by a priceless king-lotus adorned with innumerable collections of qualities. This lotus (*padma*), being far superior (*bahvantaraviśiṣṭa*) to other flowers, is called the priceless king-lotus (*mahāratnapadmarāja*). - Or else, it is the Tathāgata who is called great king (*mahārāja*) because he is the great Dharma king (*mahādharma*) and this lotus is the seat (*ādhāra*) of the Buddha and takes its name from its master. It is the basis of the buddhakṣetra: the pure buddhakṣetra which rests on this king-lotus lasts for a long time without interruption. This phrase explains the perfection of the basis (*ādhārasampad*) of the buddhakṣetra.

The enjoyment of this pure buddhakṣetra is absolutely pure: this kṣetra is without dirt (*aśuci*) because it is free of dung (*mīḍha*). It is *absolutely blissful*, for in it there is no sad feeling (*duḥkhavedanā*) or intermediate feeling (*madhyavedanā*). It is *absolutely irreproachable*, for in it there is no bad element (*akuśala*) or ethically indeterminate

feeling (*avyākṛta*). It is *absolutely efficacious*, for, without depending on any external condition (*bāhyapratyayānapekṣam*), the buddhakṣetra results from a simple production of mind (*cittotpādamātra*).” (U)

31. Moreover, this fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*) of the Buddhas carries out five activities (*karman*) at all times:

i) It protects (*paritārayati*) beings from torments (*upadrava*), for by its view alone (*dṛṣṭamātra*), it protects against the torments of blindness (*andhatā*), deafness (*badhīratā*), madness (*unmāda*), etc.

ii) It protects against bad destinies (*durgatī*), for it makes one abandon bad states (*akuśalāt sthānād vyutthāpayati*) and introduces one into good states (*kuśale sthāne pratiṣṭhāpayati*).

iii) It protects from bad methods (*anupāya*), for by preventing heretics (*tīrthika*) from seeking deliverance (*vimokṣa*) by bad means (*anupāya*), it introduces them (*niveśayati*) into the holy Dharma (*āryadeśanā*) of the Tathāgata.

iv) It protects from *satkāya*, for it provides a path transcending the threefold world (*traidhātukasamatikrāntamārga*).

v) It protects from the lower vehicles, for it introduces (*niveśayati*) bodhisattvas who are attached to other vehicles and śrāvakas, etc., who are of uncertain family (*aniyatagoṭra*) into the practice of the Greater Vehicle (*mahāyānapratipatti*).

All Buddhas have the same (*sama*) activity concerning these five activities of protection. Here is a stanza:

Since the causes (*hetu*), supports (*aśraya*), functions (*kriyā*), intentions (*āśaya*) and modes of operation (*saṃskāra*) differ, in the world differences in activity are assumed. Since these diversifying forces are not present in them, the masters of the world (*lokanāyaka*) do not have different activities. [151b14]

Comm. Bh 377b21-377c11, bh 227b1-228a3, U 446c11-447a17, 351b7-352b6.

“This fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*) of the Buddhas is the dharmakāya. It carries out five activities (*karman*) always:

i) *It protects beings from torments.* Torments (*upadrava*) are the sufferings, illnesses (*vyādhi*), etc., produced by causes (*pratītyasamutpanna*). *Just by seeing it, it protects from the torments of blindness, deafness, madness, etc.* Thus a sūtra says: By the sight of the Buddha, the blind recover their sight, the deaf their hearing and madmen their reasoning, etc. [Cf. Suvarṇaprabhāsa, ed. Hokei Idzumi, p. 8: *jātyandhās ca sattvā rūpāṇi paśyanti sma, badhirās ca sattvāḥ sattvebhyaḥ śabdāni śṛṅvanti, unmattās ca sattvāḥ smṛtiṃ pratilabhante 'vikṣiptacittās ca smṛtimanto babhūvuḥ*].

Objection. You said, in chap. X, § 27, that the dharmadhātu is not perceived by the six senses (*indriya*). Why do you say now that blind people, etc., recover their sight and see the dharmakāya? - Seeing the dharmakāya is to perfect (*paripūri*) the dharmakāya by means of the projecting power (*āvedhabala*) of a previous vow (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*). Then the dharmakāya carries out the activity of an apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) and thus causes blind people, etc., to recover their sight and, by the power of their previous accumulations (*pūrvasambhāra*), to attain (*adhigam-*) the dharmakāya. The dharmakāya carries out its activity spontaneously (*svarasena*) like a mechanical wheel that, at the end, returns to its beginning. Here it is said that one sees the dharmakāya but, in reality, one sees only an appearance (*nirmāṇa*).

ii) *It protects from the bad destinies.* In making one abandon the bad destinies, it introduces one into the good states and this is what is called protection (*paritrāṇa*) for, if the cause no longer exists, the result does not exist either.

iii) *It protects from bad methods.* The meaning is clear.

iv) *It protects from satkāya.* *Kāya* means 'body' or 'accumulation' and *sat* means 'false, erroneous'. This accumulation body, being false, is called *satkāya*. *Satkāyadrṣṭi* arises in relation to it (cf. Kośa, V, p. 16). It concerns the impure dharmas of the threefold world (*traidhātukasāsravadharma*). In regard to them, the Buddha preaches the doctrine of escape (*nairyāṇikadharmā*), and this is what is called protection.

v) *It protects from the lower vehicles.* It causes the bodhisattvas and the śrāvakas of indeterminate family (*aniyatagotra*) to reach great enlightenment (*mahābodhi*) and it establishes them in the complete practice (*samyakcarita*) of the Greater Vehicle.

From the point of view of these five activities, the Buddhas are all the same (*sama*). In order to explain this idea, the author adds a stanza.

In the world (*loka*), when the causes (*hetu*) differ, differences of activity (*karmaprabheda*) are assumed: thus, the divine cause is a peculiar cause; the human cause, the demonic cause, etc. are peculiar causes. This is why the activities are different. Among the Buddhas, this is not the case. The cause being identical (*abhinna*), their activities are not different.

In the world, when the supports (*āśraya*) are different, differences in activity are assumed. By *supports* is meant the individuals. Because they differ, the activities differ. Thus, Devadatta and Yajñadatta, who are different individuals, have different activities. This is not the case for the Buddhas. Since the dharmakāya of all the Buddhas is identical, their activities have no difference. By *functions* here is meant the diverse occupations (*prayojana*) practiced. Because the functions differ, the activities are different. Thus the farmer (*kṛṣībala*) has a peculiar function, the merchant (*vaṇij*) has a peculiar function, and so on. Since their function, i.e., the service to beings, is identical among all of them, their activities are not different.

In the world, when intentions (*āśaya*) differ, differences in activity are assumed. *Intention* means the pursued aim (*abhiprāya*). Thus in the world, the intention directed towards the good (*hitāśaya*) and the intention directed towards happiness (*sukhāśaya*) have different objects (*viśaya*) and the activities corresponding to them are different. This is not the case with the Buddhas. Since their intentions of working for the benefit and happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvahitasukhakriyāśaya*) are identical, their activities are not different.

In the world, when the modes of operation (*saṃskāra*) differ, different activities are assumed. *Mode of operation* means effort (*vyāyāma*). Thus a mediocre effort produces a mediocre activity, a great effort produces a great activity. Because the efforts differ, the activities are different. This is not the case for the Buddhas. Since all their activity (*kriyā*) is carried out without effort (*anābhoga*), their activities are not different.

Since these diversifying forces do not exist among them, the masters of the world do not have different activities: since these five diversifying forces, cause (hetu), etc., do not exist among them, there are no differences in the fivefold activities among the masters of the world (lokanāyaka or Buddha).” (U)

32. If this dharmakāya of the Buddhas, associated with such qualities (guṇa) and such perfections (saṃpad), does not occur (asādhāraṇa) among the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, with what intention (kiṃsaṃdhāya) did the Buddha proclaim a single vehicle (ekayāna)? - Here are some stanzas:

a. [Cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XI, 54]:

*ākarṣaṇārtham ekeṣāṃ anyasaṃdhāraṇāya ca /
deśitāniyatānāṃ hi sambuddhair ekayānatā //*

“In order to attract some and to maintain others, the single vehicle has been preached by the Buddhas to people of indeterminate family.”

b. [Cf Sūtrālaṃkāra, XI, 53]:

*dharmanairātmyamuktīnāṃ tulyatvāt gotrabhedataḥ /
dvyāśayāpteś ca nirmāṇāt paryantād ekayānatā //*

“By virtue of the identity of dharmas, the non-existence of self and deliverance, by virtue of the difference in families, acquisition of two convictions, transformations and preeminence, there is but one single vehicle.” [151b20]

32. Comm. Bh 377c19-378a22, bh 228a3-229a6, U 447a25-447b27, u 352b6-353b5.

“Two stanzas explain the intention of the Buddha in proclaiming a single vehicle:

a. To attract some (ākarṣaṇārtham ekeṣāṃ): he attracts the śrāvakas of indeterminate family (*aniyatagotra*) and arranges it so that they enter into the Greater Vehicle. Why? Because he wants the śrāvakas of indeterminate family to reach parinirvāṇa by means of the Greater Vehicle. *To support others (anyasaṃdhāraṇāya):* he maintains the

bodhisattvas of indeterminate family and arranges it so that they remain in the Greater Vehicle. Why? Because he wants the bodhisattvas of indeterminate family not to leave the Greater Vehicle and not to use the vehicle of the śrāvakas to reach parinirvāṇa. The Buddha proclaims a single vehicle for these reasons.” (Bh)

“*b. By virtue of identity of the Dharma (dharmatulyatvāt)*. By Dharma is meant the true nature (*tathatā*). The vehicles - the vehicle of the śrāvakas, etc., - although they are different, lead alike to *tathatā*, and as this *tathatā* towards which they go is the same (*nirviśiṣṭa*), the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.

By virtue of the identity of the non-existence of self (nairātmyatulyatvāt). In these vehicles, the non-existence of self of the individual (*pudgalanairātmya*) is the same. If there really were different pudgalas, there could be different vehicles, e.g., that of the śrāvakas and that of the bodhisattvas. But as there really are no different pudgalas, the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.

By virtue of the identity of deliverance (muktitulyatvāt). Insofar as they deliver from the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇavimukti*), the three vehicles are identical. As the Buddha said: “There is no difference between deliverance and deliverance.” It is in this sense (*saṃdhā*) that the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.

By virtue of the difference of families (gotrabhedataḥ). Śrāvakas of indeterminate family (*aniyatagotra*) are of different kinds. In the crowds of śrāvakas moving towards enlightenment (*bodhipariṇata*) there are both the family of the śrāvakas (*śhrāvakagotra*) and the family of the Buddhas (*buddhagotra*). For this reason, the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.

By virtue of the acquisition of two convictions (dvyāśayāpteḥ): because a twofold conviction (*āhaya*) has been acquired: 1) The Buddhas acquire the conviction of being the same as all beings (*sarvasattveṣu ātmāśyaṃ prāpnuvanti*); they say: "They are me, and I am them. Since this one (myself) has become Buddha (*abhisambuddha*), those will become Buddha also." That is the first conviction. 2) In the assembly of Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Bhagavat made a prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) to the śrāvakas, such as Śariputra, predicting that they would become Buddha; cf. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 65: *bhaviṣyasi tvaṃ Sariputrānāgate 'dhvani... samyaksambuddhaḥ*. In this way, these śrāvakas acquired the following conviction: "We and the Buddha are the same (*sama*)

without any difference (*advitīya*).” Moreover, in this assembly there are some bodhisattvas who have the same names as these śrāvakas who receive the same prediction. Thus, one and the same word of the Buddha bears a twofold advantage: the śrāvakas acquire the conviction of being the same as the Buddha and the bodhisattvas receive the revelation of it. This is why the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle (see Notes).

By virtue of metamorphoses (nirmāṇāt). In fact, the Buddha said: "O monks, I remember that at one time, at many hundreds of times, I attained parinirvāṇa by means of the vehicle of the śrāvakas" (*anekasatakr̥tvo 'haṃ śrāvakayānena parinirvṛtaḥ*, cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 68). Having already become Buddha, how could he again attain parinirvāṇa by the śrāvaka vehicle? There is a hidden meaning (*saṃdhi*) in this phrase. It is in order to convert beings of the śrāvaka category who are to be converted (*vineyasattva*) that the Buddha created (*nirmā-*) bodies and manifested a parinirvāṇa in accord with the śrāvaka vehicle. Thus, since the śrāvaka vehicle and the pratyekabuddha vehicle are mixed with the Greater Vehicle, there is only one single vehicle.

By virtue of preeminence (prayantāt). Based on the argument of preeminence, the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. Other vehicles are not absent, but there is no other vehicle superior to it. Alone, this single vehicle is far superior (*bahuvantaraviśiṣṭa*). That is why the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.” (U)

33. If the Buddhas have one and the same dharmakāya, how do we know that there are many Buddhas? - Here is a stanza:

Since there are not two Buddhas in one and the same world (*dhātu*), we know that there is one single Buddha. But since innumerable (*aprameya*) beings complete their accumulations (*saṃbhāra*) at the same time and since births (*kramopapatti*) of Buddhas in succession is impossible, the plurality of Buddhas is affirmed. [151b24]

33. Comm. Bh 378a27-378b13, bh 229a6-229b8, U 447c3-10, u 353b5-7.

“Now the author will explain why it must be assumed that the Buddhas are one (*eka*) and many (*saṃbahula*) at the same time, while having all the same dharmakāya.

They are one because their dharmakāya is the same (cf. chap X, § 3, no. 3). The Buddhas have the same dharmakāya for self-nature (*svabhāva*); and as this dharmakāya is unique, there is but one Buddha. Moreover, there is but one Buddha because there are never two Buddhas appearing simultaneously in one and the same universe (cf. below, chap. X, § 36, no. 8). Therefore there is but one Buddha.

In the stanza, it is shown that the Buddhas are one and many at the same time. *In the same world, there are not two Buddhas*: this phrase shows that there is one single Buddha. In the same universe (*lokadhātu*), two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously. This is why it is said that there is but one single Buddha.

The other phrases in the stanza show that the Buddhas are many. *Innumerable beings complete their accumulations at the same time*: innumerable bodhisattvas complete their accumulations (*saṃbhāra*) at the same time. If these bodhisattvas, who have completed their accumulations of merit and wisdom (*punyañānasamhāra*) at the same time, did not become Buddha at the same time, these accumulations would be vain and sterile (*niṣphala*). But as numerous bodhisattvas finish the accumulations at the same time, it must be acknowledged that there are many Buddhas at the same time (cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 3). *The arising of the Buddhas in succession is impossible*: it is not possible {there is a line missing here at the bottom of the xerox page} we know that there is but a single Buddha. But since innumerable (*aprameya*) beings end their accumulations (*saṃbhāra*) at the same time, and since the arising in succession (*kramopapatti*) of the Buddhas is impossible, the plurality of the Buddhas is asserted.” (Bh)

34. How do we know that in the dharmakāya the Buddhas are neither absolutely parinirvanized (*atyantaparinirvṛta*) nor absolutely non-parinirvanized (*atyantāparinirvṛta*)? - Here is a stanza:

Because they are free of all obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇavinirmukta*), because their activity (*kriyā*) has not ended (*pūrṇa*), the Buddhas are absolutely nirvanized (*atyantanirvṛta*) and absolutely non-nirvanized (*atyantānirvṛta*) at one and the same time. [151b28]

34. Comm. 378b18-26, bh 229b8-230a5, U 447c15-20, u 353b7-354a2.

“There are adepts of the Greater Vehicle who say that the Buddhas are absolutely non-parinirvanized; they are referring to the nirvāṇa-without-residue element (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*). Other adepts claim that the Buddhas are absolutely parinirvanized: they are referring to the nirvāṇa-with-residue element (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*). These two opinions are inadmissible (*ayukta*). Those who reason correctly should say that the Buddhas are neither absolutely nirvanized nor absolutely non-nirvanized. Having succeeded in freeing themselves from all the obstacles, the Buddhas are absolutely nirvanized. But since the activity which they practice has not come to a final end (cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 4), the Buddhas are not absolutely nirvanized.”
(U)

35. Why is not the body of enjoyment (*saṃbhogakāya*) the essential body (*svābhāvīkāya*)? - For six reasons:

- i) Because it appears (*avabhāsate*) as a material body (*rūpakāya*).**
- ii) Because it appears differently in numberless Buddha assemblies (*apramāṇabuddhaparṣanmaṇḍala*).**
- iii) Because by manifesting according to the aspirations (*adhimuktī*) of beings, it appears with an indeterminate nature (*aniyatasvabhāva*).**
- iv) Because by manifesting in different ways, it appears with a changing nature (*calasvabhāva*).**
- v) Because it appears mixed (*saṃsṛṣṭa*) with all kinds of assemblies (*parṣat*) of bodhisattvas, of śrāvakas, of devas, etc.**
- vi) Because the two transformations of support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), that of the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and that of the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), not being in accord (*viśama*), therefore the enjoyment body is not the essential body. [151c5]**

35. Comm. Bh 378c5-22, bh 230a5-230b7, U 447c17-448a13, u 354a2-8.

“i) *Because it appears as a material body.* The enjoyment body has a material appearance, whereas the essential body does not have a material appearance. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body.

ii) In innumerable assemblies, the enjoyment body takes on different material appearances, whereas the essential body does not have such differentiations. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body.

iii) The enjoyment body appears in accordance with the aspirations (*adhimukti*) of beings and is not determinate (*niyata*) by nature. One category of spectators sees the Buddha of enjoyment, another category sees a young man (*kumāra*), a third sees a child (*dāraka*), etc. The essential body does not have the indeterminate aspects. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body.

iv) The enjoyment body is changeable (*cala*) by nature and of diverse appearances. The same spectator first sees the enjoyment body in one aspect (*ākṛti*), then he sees it in another aspect. The essential body is unchanging in nature. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body.

v) The enjoyment body is always mixed (*sadāsamsṛṣṭa*) with all kinds of assemblies of bodhisattvas, of śrāvakas, devas, etc., whereas the essential body is not mixed with assemblies of this kind. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body.

vi) We see that the transformations of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) are discordant. Indeed, it is by transforming the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) that the essential body is acquired, and it is by transforming the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) that the enjoyment body is acquired. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body.

In view of these six discordances, the enjoyment body is not the essential body. (U)

36. [Translated according to H]. Why is the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) not the essential body (*svabhāvika-kāya*)? - For eight reasons:

- i) It is impossible (*ayukta*) that the Bodhisattva, who, a long time ago (*cirāt*), acquired imperishable concentrations (*acyutasamādhi*), should take birth among the Tuṣitas and among humans.
- ii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who, for a long time, has had the memory of his former abodes (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*), should not know writing (*lipi*), oral arithmetic (*gaṇanā*), calculation (*saṃkhyā*), carving (*mudrā*), the arts (*śilpa*), the sciences (*śāstra*), as well as the enjoyment (*saṃbhoga*) of desirable objects (*kāmaguṇa*) perfectly.
- iii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who for a long time has known the doctrine, badly (*durbhāṣita*) proclaimed or well (*subhāṣita*) proclaimed, should go to find the heretics (*āṛthika*).
- iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who for a long time has known the right way of the three vehicles (*yānatraya*), should take up the wrong practice of asceticism (*duṣkaracaryā*).
- v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, neglecting hundreds of thousands (*koṭi*) of Jambudvīpas, should be content with one single place to reach enlightenment (*abhisambudh-*) and turn the wheel of Dharma (*dharmacakra*).
- vi) If, without manifesting enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*), the Bodhisattva used only apparitional bodies (*nirmāṅkāya*) to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha (*buddhakriyā*) everywhere else but in Tuṣita, it must be that he would have attained enlightenment only among the Tuṣita gods.
- vii) Why not accept that the Buddhas are born simultaneously in all the Jambudvīpas? There is no scriptural text (*āgama*) or argument (*yukti*) that prevents that assumption.
- viii) Even if there are many simultaneous appearances (*nirmāṇa*) of Buddhas, that does not contradict the sūtra (Aṅguttara, I, p. 27) which affirms that there are not two Buddhas appearing at the same time in one and the same world, because, in speaking of one and the same world (*lokadhātu*), the sūtra means (*saṃgrhṇāti*) one and the same universe-of-four-

continents (*cāturdvīpaka*). In the same way, two cakravartin kings do not appear simultaneously in one and the same world.

Here is a stanza:

Subtle apparitional bodies (*sūkṣmanirmāṇakāya*) of numerous (*saṃbahula*) Buddhas enter into wombs (*kukṣi*) simultaneously and function to illustrate (*saṃdarśana*) omnigenic enlightenment (*sarvākārābhisaṃbodha*).

It is in the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārtha*) that the Buddha made his vows (*praṇidhāna*), devoted his efforts (*yoga*) and attained great enlightenment (*mahābodhi*). His complete parinirvāṇa (*ātyantikaparinirvāṇa*) is therefore impossible (*ayukta*), for then his vows and his efforts would be sterile (*niṣphala*). [151c24]

36. Comm. Bh 379a14-389b18, bh 230b7-231b7, U 448b4-448c10, u 354a8-355a8.

“The author establishes the impossibility of the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) being identical with the essential body (*svabhāvikakāya*) by means of eight reasons (*hetu*),.

i) *It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who has acquired undying concentrations (acyutasamādhi) for a long time and who never regresses (avaivartika), should take birth in the desire realm (kāmadhātu), among the Tuṣita gods and, even more so (prāk), among humans, for it is impossible that, having cultivated for ages (kalpa) the undying concentrations, he should obtain a result (i.e., an existence) in the desire realm. Thus it is proved (siddha) that the apparitional body differs from the essential body.*

ii-iv) *It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, for a long time, has the memory of his previous abodes ... up to ... indulges in ascetic practice. This passage is easy to understand and does not need further explanation.*

v) *It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, neglecting hundreds of koṭis of Jambudvīpas, should utilize only one place in order to reach enlightenment and turn the wheel of the Dharma, because all these places are all the same. For this reason, the apparitional body is not the essential body.*

vi) Someone may object: The Buddha avoids (li) manifesting enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*) in the other Jambudvīpas: only in our Jambudvīpa does he really attain enlightenment; it is by means of the apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) that he accomplishes the deeds of a Buddha (*buddhakriyā*) everywhere else. - Why not assume that he truly attains enlightenment among the Tuṣita gods and that his apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) descend into all the universes-of-four-continent (*cāturdvīpaka*, each containing a Jambudvīpa, acc. to Kośa, III, p. 145) in order to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha?

vii) If you think that attaining enlightenment in one single Jambudvīpa and manifesting an apparitional body elsewhere is not impossible, why was the Buddha unable to attain enlightenment only when he dwelt among the Tuṣita gods and to manifest his apparitional body in all the Jambudvīpas of the universes-of-four-continent (*cāturdvīpaka*)? If reaching enlightenment in all the *cāturdvīpakas* indiscriminately can be denied, there is no scriptural text (*āgama*) or argument (*yukti*) allowing the affirmation that there are Jambudvīpas where the Buddha does not appear.

viii) *Objection.* Is that is not contradictory to the sūtra (*sūtravirodha*)? The sūtra actually says (Aṅguttara, I, p. 27): It is impossible in the present or in the future that two Tathāgatas appear *in one and the same world* without the one preceding and the other following (*aṭṭhānaṃ etaṃ bhikkhave anavakāso yaṃ ekissā lokadhātuyā dve tathāgatā arahanto sammā sambuddhā apubbaṃ acarimaṃ uppajjeyum*, cf. the Sanskrit in Kośa, III, p. 198; commentary in Kośavyākhyā, p. 338). If you agree that *many* Buddhas appear simultaneously in *all* the Jambudvīpas, you are in contradiction to the sūtra.

Answer. To refute this objection (*codyaparihāra*), we say that the simultaneous existence of many apparitional (*nirmāṇa*) Buddhas does not contradict the sūtra according to which two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously in one and the same world. For this sūtra, speaking of one and the same world (*ekissa lokadhātuyā*), means the same unique universe-of-four continents (*cāturdvīpa*), and not a universe-of-a-thousand-continent (*sāhasradvīpaka*, or chiliocosm, containing a thousand *cāturdvīpas*, cf. Kośa, III, p. 170). Indeed, this same sūtra adds (Aṅguttara, I, p. 28) that, likewise, two cakravartin kings are not born simultaneously. If you deny that many Buddhas appear simultaneously in different *cāturdvīpas*, you must also deny that many cakravartins appear simultaneously in different *cāturdvīpas*. But you accept that the impossibility for two cakravartins to

appear simultaneously concerns only one single cāturdvīpaka and does not concern the sāhasradvīpaka. Therefore you must also accept that the impossibility of two Buddhas being born simultaneously concerns only one single cāturdvīpaka and does not concern the sāhasradvīpakas. [See Notes]. Furthermore, the stanza mentions many Buddhas and illustrates omnigeneric enlightenment: *subtle apparitional Buddha bodies*, etc. Just as the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) of the Buddha descends into the womb of his mother (*garbhāvagrānti*) and accomplishes the other deeds of the Buddha, in the same way many fictitious (*nirmita*) śrāvakas, such as Śāriputra, etc., with their distinctive characteristics, descend into the wombs of their mothers simultaneously at the same time. It is in order to illustrate the superiority of this omnigeneric enlightenment (*sarvākārābhisambodha*) that the Buddha created these fictions (*nirmāṇa*).

In order to show that the complete annihilation (*ātyantikaparinirvāṇa*) of the Tathāgata is impossible, the author says: *It is in the service of all beings that the Buddha made his vows, dedicated his efforts and attained great enlightenment.* These vows (*praṇidhāna*) and these efforts (*prayoga*) have in view only the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārtha*). As long as this work is not completed, it is impossible that the Buddha is parinirvanized in complete annihilation (*ātyantikaparinirvāṇa*), for his vows and his efforts would both be sterile (*niṣphala*). Therefore the parinirvanized Buddha is the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakmaya*) and not the essential body (*svābhāvīkākāya*).” (U)

36 - 2. [Translated acc. to P, T 1593, p. 132a25-132b16].

Why is the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) not the essential body (*svābhāvīkākāya*)? - For eight reasons:

- i) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, a long time ago (*cirāt*), has acquired imperishable concentrations (*acyuta-samādhi*), should take birth among the Tuṣita gods and among humans.**
- ii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, for a long time, has the memory of his former abodes (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*), should no longer know writing (*lipi*), oral arithmetic (*gaṇanā*), calculus (*saṃkhyā*), carving (*mudrā*), the arts (*śilpa*), the sciences (*śāstra*), the practice of desirable objects (*kāmaguṇa*) and the enjoyment of desirable objects.**

iii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, a long time ago, has learned to distinguish the wrong doctrine (*asaddharma-deśanā*) from the good doctrine (*saddharmadeśanā*), should go in search of heretics (*tīrthika*) and make them his teachers.

iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, long ago, has penetrated (*prativedha*) the value of the the noble path of the three vehicles (*yānatrayāryamārganaya*), should still search for his path and give himself up to wrong asceticism (*duṣkaracaryā*).

v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, paying no attention one hundred koṭis of Jambudvīpas, should reach supreme enlightenment (*anuttarā bodhiḥ*) and turn the wheel of Dharma (*dharmacakra*) in one single place.

vi) If, abstaining from manifesting upāya and supreme enlightenment (*anuttarā bodhiḥ*), the Bodhisattva used only one apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha (*buddhakriyā*) elsewhere than in our Jambudvīpa, then he would have attained enlightenment among the Tuṣita gods.

vii) If that were not so, if it was not in Tuṣita that he attained enlightenment, why would the Buddha not appear likewise in all the Jambudvīpas? That the Buddha does not appear elsewhere than in our Jambudvīpa is a teaching showing neither scripture (*āgama*) nor reasoning (*yukti*).

viii) Someone may object: In your hypothesis, two Tathāgatas appear simultaneously in the same world (*lokadhātu*). This is not contradictory, if one accepts that there are many apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*), that they make up a plurality.

When we speak of the same world, this concerns one and the same universe-of-four-continent (*cāturdvīpa*). This is why two cakravartin kings cannot be born, either one or the other, simultaneously in the same world. It is the same for the Buddhas.

Here is a stanza:

Subtle apparitional Buddha bodies penetrate many wombs in the same way. In order to manifest omnigeneric enlightenment (*sarvākārābhisaṃbodha*), they manifest in the world.

36 - 2. Comm. Taishō 1595, p. 267c9-268c12.

There are eight reasons proving the difference between the apparitional body and the essential body:

i) From the first bhūmi up to the tenth bhūmi, during thirty-three incalculable periods (*asaṃkhyeya*, chap. V, § 6), the Bodhisattva has acquired five hundred imperishable concentrations (*acyutasamādhi*). Long ago, he has abandoned the threefold world (*traiḍhātuka*) of desire. It is impossible that he should be reborn in a divine destiny and, a fortiori, among humans in the royal family of the Śākya. In order to convert beings, he seems to take on a human body, but there is no reason that this body exists truly in the world. Therefore it is not a body of retribution (*vipākakāya*) nor an essential body (*nirmāṇakāya*): it is an apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*).

ii) From the first bhūmi up to the tenth bhūmi, the Bodhisattva. For a long time, has kept the memory of his former dwellings (*pūrvanivāsa*) and does not lose the memory of innumerable arts (*apramāṇakalā*) that he has previously cultivated: the different writings (*lipi*) current in the sixty-four lands (cf. Lalitavistara, chap. X, p. 125-126); the sixteen mental calculations (*gaṇanā*): addition, subtraction, etc.; beyond the sixteen mental calculations, the science of the exact numbers (*saṃkhyā*) of objects making up a heap, and the science of the exact dimension (*pramāṇa*) of heaps; the art of marking objects with a seal (*mudrā*) in order to distinguish them; the power of increasing or decreasing; the art of guarding or directing (?); the sixty-four arts (*kalā*); the eighteen vidyāsthānas (cf. Mahāvvyut., 4954-4971); the sixty-four royal arts (*kalā*), tactics and stratagems; acquiring that which has not yet been acquired, increasing what has been acquired and distributing what has been increased to honest people. *The practice of desirable objects* refers to the six objects. Thus, the use of singers and dancers, collectors, tailors, apothecaries, etc., is called enjoyment of desirable objects. [On the enumeration of *lipi-gaṇanā-saṃkhyā-mudrā*, etc., cf. Majjhima, I, p. 85; Milinda, p. 78; Mahāvvyut., 4974; Divya, p. 3, 26, etc.; Mahāvastu, II, p. 423; Lalitav., p. 156; Kośa, IV, p. 254] For

innumerable periods (*kalpa*), the Bodhisattva remembers all the arts that he had cultivated in his previous abodes; his memory is unfailing. It is impossible that he should not know or not remember all these arts that he once practiced. In order to convert beings, he declares that people of inferior category can change and become people of higher category; he shows himself as not having these arts and as having to develop them. That is why his body is an apparitional body (*nirmānakāya*) and not an essential body (*svābhāvikakāya*) or a body of enjoyment (*saṃbhogakāya*).

iii) For thirty-three incalculable great periods (*kalpāsaṃkhyeya*), the Bodhisattva cultivated the good practices zealously; his merits (*puṇya*) and his knowledge (*jñāna*) are complete (*paripūrṇa*). It is impossible that, in his subsequent existences, he should not know how to tell the difference between bad and good preaching. If he were lacking this knowledge, what dharma would he know once he became Buddha? It is in order to convert the heretics that he manifests such hesitations in choice of doctrine. This is why his body is an apparitional body and not one or other of the two other types.

iv) For thirty-three incalculable periods, the Bodhisattva sojourned in the ten liberations (*vimokṣa*) and the ten good practices (*caryā*). From the first bhūmi, he has penetrated (*pratividh-*) the value of the noble path of the three vehicles (*yānatrayāryamārganaya*). Having cut through belief in nihilism and eternalism (*ucchedaśāśvatāgrāha*), he does not give himself up to bad painful and pleasureable practices: that is the value of the noble path of the first two vehicles. Rejecting belief in the existence of the conditioned (*saṃskāragrāha*), he cultivates the good practice of knowledge free of concept (*nirvikalpakajñāna*): that is the value of the noble path of the bodhisattvas. The asceticism (*duṣkaracaryā*) of the heretics (*tīrthika*) can destroy the dharmas already obtained (*prāpta*), it cannot acquire dharmas not yet obtained (*aprāpta*). In the two worlds (?), it can only destroy and not increase anything; that is why it is futile. It is impossible that the Bodhisattva should practice it. It is in order to convert beings that he stated the cultivation of asceticism; it is not for retribution that he appears to practice it. That is why his body is an apparitional body and not either of the other two bodies.

v) When the Bodhisattva is cultivating the path throughout 10,000 *koṭis* of Jambudvīpas, he ripens beings of 10.000 *koṭis* of Jambudvīpas. When he attains enlightenment, it must be that he assumes bodies everywhere. But he receives only one single body, a body of retribution (*vipākakāya*) and cannot have many of them. If that were so, why would he

not assume a retribution body separately in a higher place, in all places accomplishing his work of conversion by means of apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakmaya*)? It is impossible that he would give up 10,000 *koṭis* of Jambudvīpas and accomplish enlightenment (*sambodhi*) and the turning of the wheel of Dharma (*dharmacakrapravartana*) only partially in one single Jambudvīpa. It is in order to convert beings and bring them the knowledge that a Buddha has appeared in the world that he manifests all these activities, such as bodhi under the banyan tree, preaching in India, etc. This is why this body of the 'historical' Buddha is an apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) and not one or other of the two other bodies.

vi) If you maintain that he attains supreme enlightenment (*anuttarā bodhiḥ*) in only one single Jambudvīpa and that elsewhere he abstains from such upāyas as entering the womb (*garbhāvakrānti*), etc., and only manifests apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) in order to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha (*buddhakriyā*), why do you not maintain that a Bodhisattva, as you represent him here, attains supreme enlightenment in Tuṣita and not under the banyan tree, in one single Jambudvīpa, and that everywhere else, he is content with manifesting apparitional bodies in order to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha? This body, that of Śākyamuni of our Jambudvīpa, would then not be an apparitional body according to you.

Cf. Taishō 1596, p. 320b5: If you say that he attains enlightenment in only one single place [in our Jambudvīpa], and that everywhere else he is content to manifest apparitional bodies with their entourage (*parivāra*), why would it not have been among the Tuṣitas that he would have attained enlightenment, being content with manifesting apparitional bodies in all the universes-of-four-continents?

[P. Demiéville: Evidently here the author is addressing himself to the school that does accept the doctrine of the *nirmāṇa* body but does not accept that the 'historical' Śākyamuni was one. And the author seeks to win them over by saying: 'Then it should be easy for you to accept that he was already Buddha in Tuṣita', i.e., outside the *dvīpas* and that in India there was but one *nirmāṇa*.]

vii) If it was not in the Tuṣita heaven that he attained enlightenment, then he must attain it everywhere ... There is neither scripture (*āgama*) nor reasoning that can demonstrate the doctrine that he attained it in one single place, i.e., in one single Jambudvīpa.

Therefore this body, i.e., the Śākyamuni of our Jambudvīpa, is an apparitional body and not one or the other of the two other bodies.

[P. Demiéville: It is a fact that the Buddhas are many, as we will establish in the eighth reason. Thus, if you do not accept that these multiple Buddhas are all *nirmāṇas* of a transcendent Buddha who has 'really' attained bodhi, then there is only one possibility: it is that the attaining of bodhi is itself only *nirmāṇa* and is produced everywhere by *nirmāṇa*: which is what we maintain from our side. - We are going to show that it is inadmissible that the Buddha is realized in one single Jambudvīpa, which is in no way established even by tradition; then one of two things: either the Buddha of our single Jambudvīpa was already Buddha in heaven - then he is just one kind of *nirmāṇa* of his antecedent in Tuṣita - and it is from him all the other Buddhas emanate by *nirmāṇa*; or else this Buddha of our Jambudvīpa, like all the others, is quite simply emanated by his other two bodies.]

Dh, Taishō 1596, p. 320a16: Why not accept that the Buddhas appear likewise [acc. to Huiian-tsang: simultaneously] in all the Jambudvīpas? Neither scripture nor reasoning can demonstrate that this is not so. - Comm., p. 320b8: If you say that he did not attain enlightenment in all the universes-of-four-continent (*cāturdvīpa*), that is impossible, for there is neither scripture nor reasoning that are opposed to it.

viii) “In one single sahaloka, two Tathāgatas appear simultaneously.” This scriptural text is not contradictory to our doctrine. Why? Because it is acknowledged that the apparitional bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) consist of a plurality. That these apparitional bodies are many, that there are apparitional bodies everywhere, there is nothing impossible there. That is why this body is an apparitional body and not one or other of the two other bodies. - Thus we are able to prove that you are in contradiction with the sūtra if you say that the Buddha is not seen in a single one of hundreds of koṭis of universes. There are some who say that two Buddhas cannot be born simultaneously in one single great trichiliocosm (*mahātrisāhasralokadhātu*) and that it is the same for the cakravartin kings. But you must interpret this sūtra in the light of the case of the cakravartin kings. Two cakravartin kings cannot be born simultaneously in one and the same universe, but there is nothing preventing them being born in different universes. It is the same for the Tathāgatas.

Explanation of the stanza: The Buddha descends from the Tuṣita heaven in Jambudvīpa in order to be conceived there. At this moment, he creates all his disciples by *nirmāṇa*, Śāriputra, etc., who are conceived. Thanks to this creation, supreme enlightenment (*anuttarā bodhiḥ*) with its signs (*sākārā*) can be manifested: if there were only the two lower vehicles, it would be impossible to show that the Buddha is superior. If there were only the superficial and narrow knowledge of these two vehicles, it would be impossible to show that the wisdom of the Buddha is endowed with all the signs (*sākārā*). The fictive bodies of Śāriputra, etc., appear in the world in order to show that.

37. Since the enjoyment body (*saṃbhogakāya*) and the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) are both transitory (*anitya*), how can the sūtra say the the body of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatakāya*) is eternal (*nitya*)? - Because the resultant body (*niṣyandakāya* = *saṃbhogakāya*) and the apparitional body both depend on the eternal dharmakāya. Since the enjoyment (*saṃbhoga*) is never interrupted (*samucchinna*) and appearances (*nirmāṇa*) are always re-occurring, we know that the body of the Tathāgata is eternal. Compare the phrase: it always experiences happiness (*sadā sukham anubhavati*), and the phrase: it always nourishes (*sadā piṇḍaṃ prayacchati*). [151c29]

37. Comm. Bh 379b24-379c4. bh 231b7-232a5, U 448c15-28, u 355a8-355b7.

“A sūtra says: The body of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatakāya*) is eternal (*nitya*). But the enjoyment body (*saṃbhogakāya*) and the apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) of the Buddha are transitory (*anitya*). Then how can the body of the Tathāgata be eternal? - Although these two bodies in question are transitory, they depend (*niśrita*) on the dharmakāya and, as the dharmakāya is eternal, they also are proclaimed to be eternal. An 'eternal body' is eternal by its nature (*svabhāvanitya*) or eternal by means of its basis (*āśrayanitya*). This shows that the resultant body (*niṣyandakāya* = *saṃbhogakāya*) and the apparitional body are eternal by equivalence (*paryāyeṇa*) and not eternal by nature (*svabhāvataḥ*).

In regard to the enjoyment body, *the enjoyment is never interrupted; compare the phrase: it always experiences happiness*. In a similar way, people (*loka*) say about X: he always experiences happiness (*sadā sukham upabhunakti*). Although the happiness experienced

by X is neither eternal (*nitya*) nor uninterrupted (*asamucchinna*), it is said, nevertheless, that he always experiences happiness. It is the same for the enjoyment body of the Buddha: although it is not eternal, it is sometimes proclaimed to be eternal because, in the various assemblies of bodhisattvas, he experiences (*upabhunakti*) the great bliss of the Dharma (*mahādharmasukha*) uninterruptedly. The apparitional body of the Buddhas appears many times (*abhīkṣṇam*) without ever being interrupted: it is from this special point of view (*tenābhiprāyena*) that it is proclaimed to be eternal. *Compare the phrase: he always gives food.* Here, people say about X: he always gives food (*sadā piṇḍaṃ prayacchati*) even though X does not give food uninterruptedly. However, as he gives many times (*abhīkṣṇam*) and his generous intention persists, it is said that he always gives food. It is the same for the apparitional body of the Buddha. If it is proclaimed to be eternal, it is not that it is without birth (*utpāda*) or destruction (*nirodha*) but because it appears many times for the benefit of beings to be converted (*anivuneyasattvān*) without ever stopping. It is in this sense (*abhiprāya*) that it is proclaimed eternal.” (U)

38. [Translated according to H]. The apparitional body (*nirmāṇakāya*) of the Buddha does not last eternally (*atyantam*) for six reasons (*hetu*):

- i) because its activity (*kriya*) ends (*paripūrṇa*) when he has liberated (*vimuc-*) the beings destined to be ripened (*paripācyasattva*).**
- ii) to prevent (*nirākr-*) the rejecting of nirvāṇa under the pretext of seeking (*paryeṣ-*) the eternal body (*nityakāya*) of the Tathāgata.**
- iii) to prevent one from despising (*avajñā*) the Buddhas and so that one becomes attached to understanding (*avabudh-*) the exposition of the profound Dharma (*gambhīradharmadeśanā*).**
- iv) in order to arouse interest (*autsukya*) with regard to the Buddha. He is afraid that actually those who see him continually might feel disdain (*vimānana*) for him.**
- v) in order to stimulate the individual's energy (*pratyātma-vīrya*) among beings. In this way they know that the teacher of the Dharma (*śāstr*) of the Dharma is difficult (*durlabha*) to find.**

vi) in order that beings ripen (*paripac-*) quickly (*śīgram*) by not giving up the yoke (*dhura*) of their personal energy (*svāvīrya*).

Here are two stanzas:

a. Because his activity (*kriyā*) is complete (*paripūrṇa*), in order to prevent rejection of nirvāṇa, in order to prevent disdain (*avajñā*) for the Buddhas, in order to stimulate interest (*autsukya*) in regard to the Buddha,

b. in order to stimulate the personal energy (*pratyātmavīrya*) of beings and in order to ripen them (*paripac-*) quickly (*śīgram*), the apparitional body of the Buddha is not present definitively (*ātyantikam*). [152a11]

38. Comm. Bh 379c17-18, bh silent, U 449a12-29, u 355b7-356a6.

“i) *Because his activity is complete when he has delivered beings destined to be ripened.* [This reason is not commented on; see § 38-2]

ii) *In order to prevent the rejection of nirvāṇa under the pretext of seeking the eternal body of the Tathāgata.* This explains why the Tathāgata enters into nirvāṇa. It is because the body of the Tathāgata is transitory (*anitya*) that one desires nirvāṇa. If one were looking for (*paryeṣ-*) the eternal body of the Tathāgata, one would turn one's back (*prṣṭhībhū-*) on nirvāṇa. But the Bhagavat seems to be annihilated (*nirudh-*) and manifests a transitory body in order that one may desire an absolute (*ātyantika*) and in order that eternal (*nitya*) nirvāṇa be sought.

iii) *In order to prevent disdain for the Buddhas and in order that one becomes attached to understanding the exposition of the profound Dharma.* If the apparitional body of the Buddha were eternal, beings would not use the means (*upāya*) to understand (*avabudh-*) his exposition of the profound Dharma (*gambhīradharmadeśanā*); they would say: "We don't understand it now, but surely we will understand it later." If the Buddha continually questioned his listeners (*śrāvakas*), they would answer scornfully (*avajñā*) and, being attached to their own views (*drṣṭi*), they would say: "We challenge the question for such and such a reason." But if they knew that that the Buddha was going to leave the world, to what would they direct their scorn? They would agree to say: "We do not know this truth and, when the Buddha will be nirvanized, who else could explain it to us without

error (*viparyāsa*)?" This is why they exert themselves to understand the Dharma that the Buddha proclaims to them before he enters into nirvāṇa.

iv) *In order to arouse interest with regard to the Buddha.* This reason is not explained; see § 38-2.

v) *In order to stimulate personal energy in beings. In this way they know that the Dharma is hard to find.* When they know that the Bhagavat is going to enter into nirvāṇa, they personally (*pratyātmam*) exert their energy (*vīrya*). The Buddha is the master who teaches the Dharma in the world; when he is no longer there, the world is without support. Knowing that, they exert their energy.

vi) *In order that beings ripen quickly by not rejecting the yoke of personal exertion.* In order that they exert their energy and avoid rejecting (*nikṣip-*) the good yoke (*kuśaladhura*) by saying: "Our roots of good (*kuśalamūla*) will ripen inevitably as long as the Bhagavat has not been annihilated (*niruddha*)."

For these six reasons, the apparitional body of the Buddha does not last eternally. In order to summarize the ideas explained above, the author says the stanzas: "Because his activity, etc." (U)

38 - 2. [Translated according to P, T 1593, p. 132b17-29].

There are six reasons why the Buddha Bhagavats do not dwell eternally as nirmāṇakāya:

- i) Because their activity (*kriyā*) is complete (*paripūrṇa*) when they have delivered (*vimuc-*) beings who are already ripened (*paripakvasattva*).**
- ii) When they have obtained deliverance (*vimuktī*), beings seek (*paryeṣante*) parinirvāṇa. But the Buddha wants them to reject the idea of parinirvāṇa and to seek to attain the eternal body of the Buddha (*nityabuddhakāya*).**
- iii) In order to remove any erroneous thought (*avajñācitta*) they may have with regard to the Buddhas and in order to lead them to penetrate (*pratividh-*) the profound (*gambhīra*) tathatādharmā and the subāṣitadharmā.**

iv) In order that these beings experience feelings of interest (*autsukyacitta*) towards the body of the Buddha and not be satisfied (*saṃtuṣṭi*) by seeing him continually .

v) In order that these beings exert their energy (*vīrya*) personally (*pratyātmam*) by knowing that the teacher of the Dharma (*śāstrī*) is going to disappear.

vi) In order that these beings quickly reach the ripened state (*paripākavasthā*) by preventing them from abandoning the energy the yoke of which they bear.

Here are some stanzas: [cf. above, § 38].

38 - 2. Comm. Taishō 1595, p. 268c13-269a17.

“There are six reasons why the Buddha must abandon his *nirmāṇakāya*:

i) When the activity of the *nirmāṇakāya* of the Tathāgata has come to an end, this *nirmāṇakāya* does not exist any longer. Ripening beings and making them obtain deliverance (*vimukti*) is the activity of the *nirmāṇakāya*. When all beings are ripened and delivered, this activity is finished.

ii) When beings are liberated from the obstacle of the afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) they seek *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa*. In order to change this mentality and demonstrate that the *nirmāṇakāya* is without reality (*asadbhūta*), the Buddha abandons his *nirmāṇakāya*. He teaches the distinct existence of an eternal *dharmakāya* which itself is truly existent (*paramārthasat*). In order that beings stop pursuing the idea of the *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa* of the lesser vehicle and in order that they seek the eternal *dharmakāya*, the *nirmāṇakāya* does not last eternally.

iii) When beings take note of the fact that the Buddha, like themselves, is subject to birth (*jāti*), old age (*jarā*), sickness (*vyādhi*) and death (*maraṇa*), they conceive scorn (*avajñā*) for the Tathāgata. But the Buddha wants these beings to recognize the true body (*paramārthakāya*) of the Tathāgata and his false body (*saṃvṛtikāya*). The true body is the body of the Tathāgata and the body of the good preaching (*subhāṣitakāya*). The good body of preaching is the result that accords with the body of the Tathāgata and is called

the subhāṣitakāya. These two bodies are called dharmakāya. This Dharma is very profound (*atigambhīra*) and hard to penetrate (*pratividh-*); it is not graspable by people of lower category. But those who have penetrated it conceive profound respect for the Tathāgata. The false body (*saṃvṛtikāya*) is the nirmāṇakāya. In order to show that this body is imaginary (*parikalpita*) and without true reality (*asadbhūta*), the nirmāṇakāya does not last eternally.

iv) If the Buddha remained always in one single nirmāṇakāya, the beings who would see him for the first time would feel interest (*autsukya*), but then, after a while, they would experience satiety. But if the nirmāṇakāya undergoes all kinds of wondrous transformations (*adbhutapariṇāma*) in its color and shape (*rūpasamsthāna*), the beings who see him continually feel ever a new interest and ignore their satiety. This is why the nirmāṇakāya does not last eternally.

v) If the Buddha always remained as nirmāṇakāya, beings would not bother themselves with him. Also the Tathāgata abandons his nirmāṇakāya in order that, knowing that the Buddha will not be in the world for a long time, beings will make an effort and train themselves without depending on someone else ... This is why the nirmāṇakāya does not last eternally.

vi) We have just shown how beings who have not developed effort are led to develop it. Now it will be shown how those who already have developed effort do not abandon it. By developing the wisdom of concentration (*samādhiprajñā*), perfection is soon reached (*sampad*). This is why the nirmāṇakāya does not last eternally.” (P)

39. [According to H]:

Objection: The dharmakāya of the Buddhas is without beginning (*anādhikālīka*), is homogeneous (*nirviśiṣṭa*) and infinite (*aprameya*); therefore it is not necessary to acquire (*adhigam-*) it to make efforts (*prayatna*).

Answer: Here is a stanza:

If the state of Buddha (*buddhalābha*) which is homogeneous (*nirviśiṣṭa*) and infinite (*aprameya*) caused beings to neglect the efforts necessary to obtain it,

this state of Buddha (*buddhalābha*) would be always acquired without cause. But to remove such a cause is not permissible. [152a15]

The Mahāyānasamgraha, the work of master Āsaṅga, is now completed.

39. Comm. Bh 379c23-380a12, bh 232a5-232b5, U 449b5-16, u 356a6-356b7.

“An objection is raised here: The dharmakāya of the Buddhas is without beginning (*anādhikālika*), is homogeneous (*nirviśiṣṭa*) and infinite (*aprameya*); it is the cause of obtaining (*adhigamahetu*) buddhahood. Why should an effort be made to seek this buddhahood (fo kouo = *buddhatā*)? - There is yet another objection: The dharmakāya is without beginning, is homogeneous and infinite; one single Buddha suffices to assure the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārthaktiyā*); thus it is unnecessary to exert oneself to become Buddha.

In order to refute these objections (*codyaparihāra*), the author says: *If the state of Buddha, etc.:* if the state of Buddha (*buddhādhigama*), without beginning, homogeneous and infinite, caused beings to neglect the efforts necessary to obtain buddhahood (*buddhatā*), this state of Buddha would always be acquired without cause. But since the state of Buddha does not cause beings to neglect the efforts necessary to obtain buddhahood, the objection does not hold. If one could attain buddhahood without effort, all beings would have attained it right from the beginning. This is why it is not permitted to suppress the cause, i.e., the necessity of effort. - Moreover, the dharmadhātu of the Buddhas, without beginning, homogeneous and infinite, was originally the cause for everyone to acquire buddhahood and it led the bodhisattvas, whose minds were full of compassionate resolve (*karuṇāpraṇidhānaparīkṣiptacitta*) to seek buddhahood zealously. These bodhisattvas sought buddhahood and used their efforts to ensure the service of all beings (*sarvasattvārthakriyā*).” (U)

NOTES

The bibliography on the three bodies of the Buddha is immense; a mass of information (sources and works) may be found in Hôbôgirin, under *Busshin*, p. 174-185; Siddhi, Appendix III, p. 762-813.

There are many similarities between the present chapter and the *Abhisamayālamkāraloka*, chap. XXIX.

On the buddhology of the Vijñaptimātra school (Sāramati, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Bandhuprabha) see especially: *Uttaratantra*, p. 240-288; *Sūtrālamkāra*, IX, 60-66; *Samgraha*, chap. X; *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtraśāstra*, T 1510, k. III, p. 792; *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopaśeṣa*, T 1520, p. 18c3 (three bodhis); *Daśabhūmikasūtraśāstra*, T 1522, k. II, p. 130c seq.; *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra*, T 1530, k. VII, p. 325c; *Mādhyantavibhaṅga*, p. 191, Siddhi, p. 693-716.

1. Definition of the three bodies:

Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 191: *prāptyavasthā buddhānāṃ dharmakāya itī sarvāvaranaprahāṇat tatpratipakṣānāsavadharmabījapracayāc cāśrayaparāvṛtīyātmakaḥ sarvadharmavaśavartī ... anye tu niḥśeṣagantukamalāpagamāt suviśuddho dharmadhātur eva dharmatākāyo dharmakāyaiti varṇayanti. Sarasminn api jñeye 'saktāpratihata-pravṛttiviśiṣṭajñānaṃ dharmakāya ity apare. – asnuśamsavasthā sām̐bhogikaḥ kāya itī svābhāviko yasmin vuavasthite 'bhisam̐budhyate. yena kāyena niṣṭhāgatair bodhisattvaiḥ saha parṣanmaāṇḍalo dharmasam̐gītim anubhavati sa sām̐bhogokaḥ kāyaḥ. - kṛtyānusthānāvasthā nairmāṇikaḥ kāya itī svābhāvikaḥ kāyāśritaḥ sattvāśayālocano vineyārthaṃ prakriyāpravṛttāv aanaataprabhedo nairmāṇikaḥ kāyaḥ.*

Abhis. al. āl., p. 914 (10): *prathamō ye smṛtyupasthānādayo jñānātmakā lokottarā dharmadhāqturūpatvād anāsravā malānām āgantukatvena sarvaprakarām viśuddhiṃ prakṛtiviktalakānām prāptās teṣām yā prakṛtiḥ svabhāvo 'nutpādarūpo 'yaṃ muner buddhasya bhagavato lokottareṇa mārgeṇa prāpyate na kriyate ity akṛtimārheṇa māyopamavijñānasarvadharmapratipattiyā 'dhigataḥ svābhāvikaḥ kāyaḥ. – p. 916 (9):*

lokottarān evānastavān dharmān abhyupagamyā teṣāṃ yā prakṛtir anutpādatā tallakṣaṇaḥ svābhāvīkākāyāḥ. sa eva ca dharmatākāyo dharmakāya. – p. 918 (12): tadanu daśabhūmipraviṣṭamahābodhisattvaiḥ saha paramānadyamahāyānadharmasambhogaprītisukhopabhogāt sām̐bhogiko ‘yaṃ kāyo dvātrimāllaṣaṇāśīṭīyanuvyañjanavirājitaḡātro rūpakāyasvabhāvas tṛtīyo buddhasya bhagavato grāhyaḥ. – p. 923 (23): tadanu yena śākyamunitathāgatādirūpeṇ’ ā saṃsāraṃ sarvalokadhātuṣu sattvānāṃ samīhitam arthaṃ samaṃ karoti asau prabandhatayā ‘nuparato nairmāṇiko buddhasyabhagavatsaḥ sarvabālaḡanasādhāraṇāś caturtho ‘vasātavyaḥ. On sarvadharmavaśita, cf. Siddhi, p. 653.

The twelve acts of the Buddha: Lalitavistara, analyzed in Bu-ston, II, p. 7-72; Daśabhūmika, p. 14 (20); Uttarantra, p. 254.

3. The natures of the dharmakāya: Uttarantra, p. 251-253; Trimśikā, st. 29-39, p. 43-45; Siddhi, p. 693, 703-704; 710, 789.

i. Āśrayaparāvṛtti: see notes to chap. I, § 57; IX, v. 1; Trimśikā, p. 44-45.

ii. Śukladharma: Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 4. - The ten vaśitās: definitions in Madh. avatāra, p. 347(11) - 348 (3); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 70 (7).

iii. Advaya: a. *Bhāvābhāvāvādvaya*, second quality of the Buddha. above chap. II, § 33; Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 24-25. - b. *Samskṛtā-samskṛtādvaya*, Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 14. - c. *Nānāttvaikatvādvaya*, below, § 33; Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 26, 77, 82-85; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 103 (19) (*dharmakāyasyābhinnatvam*); Avataṃsaka, T 278, k. V, p. 324 (9), 429b20; Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, T 220, k XXV, p. 972a22.

iv. Nitya: Uttarantra, p. 255; Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 66 (*prakṛtyānityatā svābhāvīkasya svabhāvena nityatvāt*); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 187 (21) (*dharmakāyasyānucchedaḥ*).

v. Acintya: Uttarantra, p. 256; Trimśikā, p. 44 (21): *acintyas tarkāgocaravāt pratyātmavedayatvāt dṛṣṭāntābhāvāc ca*; Siddhi, p. 699.

4. Vajropamasamādhi, *ānantaryamārga* of obtaining the dharmakāya: Kośa, IV, p. 231; VI, p. 190, 228-229, 265, 300; VII, p. 62; VIII, p. 192, 195; Uttarantra, p. 223; Bodh.

bhūmi, p. 405; Sūtrālamkāra, XIV, 45; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 157 (1); Siddhi, p. 3, 162, 667, 685.

5. Vibhūta of the Buddha resulting from various parāvṛttis: Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 38-48; Siddhi, p. 600 (*rūpaskandha-* and *skandhacatuṣkaparāvṛtti*).

Adṛṣṭamūrdhalakṣaṇa, in Tibetan *spyi gtsug bltar mi mthoñ ba*, in Chinese *wou kien ting siang*. The dictionary of Mochizuki restores it, without reference, as *anavalokitamūrdhata*s. This is the *uṣṇīṣa* as it is invisible to the *sattvas* of the *traidhātuka*, or to the *devas* and *manuṣyas*, or to the *bodhisattvas* of the two *yānas* as well. Sometimes it is counted amongst the 32 *lakṣaṇas*, sometimes among the 80 *anuvyañjanas*. For example, in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, T 220, k. 381, p. 968c18, *ting siang wou neng kien* is the 65th *anuvyañjana*, whereas the *uṣṇīṣa* is the 32nd *lakṣaṇa*. In the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā P. P.*, T 223, k. 24, p. 395e28, the *wou kien ting* is the first *anuvyañjana*, while the *uṣṇīṣa* is the 32nd *lakṣaṇa*. The *Yogacārabhūmiśāstra*, T 1579, k. 49, p. 566 seq, counts it as one of the *lakṣaṇas* with the *uṣṇīṣa*. The biography and details are in *Hōbōgirin*, under *Chōsō*. (P. Demiéville)

The four *jñānas*, the knowledge of the mirror, etc., and the revolution of the *vijñānas*: *Mahāvvyut.*, 111-114; *Dharmasaṃgraha*, XCIV; Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 67-76; *Buddhabhūmisūtra*, T 680, p. 721 seq.; *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra*, T 1530, k III, p. 301a; k. IV, p. 306c; k. V, p. 312a; k. VI, p. 316c; Siddhi, p. 681-692.

Dhāraṇī and *samādhimukha*: *Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 272 (12); Sūtrālamkāra, XII, 23; XVIII, 26; *Uttaratantra*, p. 219; Siddhi, p. 613, 618, 633, 659.

6. *Buddhavihāra*; cf. *Bodh. bhūmi*, p. 90 (7): *yat tathāsgatas tribhir niruttaraiḥ apratisamair vihāraiḥ tadbahulavihārī āryeṇa vihāreṇa divyena bhrāmeṇa, iyaṃ asya vihātaparamatety ucyate. tatra śūnyatānimittā-praṇihhitavihārā nirodhasamāpattivihāras cāryavihāra ity ucyate. catvāri dhyānāny ārūpyasamāpattasyaś ca divyo vihāra ity ucyate. catvāry paramāṇāni brāhmo vihāra ity ucyate. tasmāc ca punas trividhād vihārāc catvāraḥ paramā yair vihārais thatāgatās tadbahulavihāriṇo bhavanti. āryād vihārāc śūnyatāvihāro nirodhasamāpattivihāras ca. divyād vihārād*

*āniñjyacaturthyadgyānavihāraḥ, brāhmād viharāti karuṇāvihāro yena thatāgatas
triṣkṛtvo rātrau triṣkṛtvo divase ṣaṭkṛtvo ratriṃdivena buddhacakṣuṣā lokam
vyavalokayati...*

7. Cf. chap. X, § 5

8. Cf. chap. X, § 3c. (*nānātvaiikatvādvayalakṣaṇa*) and chap. X, § 33. - Cf. Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 66: *te ca trayah kāyāḥ sarvabuddhānām yathākramam tribhir nirviśeṣā āśrayeṇa dharmadhātor abhinnatvāt āśayena pṛthag buddhāśayasyābhāvāt. karmaṇā ca sādharmaṇakarmakatvāt . teṣu ca triṣu kāyeṣu yathākramam trividhā notyatā veditavyā yena nityakāyās thatāgatā ucyante. Prakṛtyā nityatā svābhāvikasya svabhāveṇa nityavāt. asraṃsanena sāmbhoghikasya dharmasāmbhogāvicchedāt. prabandhena nairmāṇikasyāntarvyaye puna punar nirmāṇadarśāt. - Cf. chap. II, § 33.*

9. The guṇas of the Buddha. - The present list, drawn from Sūtrālamkāra, XX-XXI, 43-59, is repeated almost word for word in Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1605, k. XIII, p. 690c11; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. XIII, p. 757c18; Abhisamayākārāloka, XXIX, p. 914 (24) - 916 (8). The Uttaratantra, p. 264, lists 64 properties of the Buddha. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 89 (3) enumerates 140 buddhadharmas which it describes in the *lakṣaṇāvyañjanapaṭala*, p. 375-383 and the *pratiṣṭhāpaṭala*, p. 384-410. Here is this list: *tatredam catvāriṃśadauttaram buddhadharmaśatam. dvātriṃśamahāpuruṣalakṣaṇāni aśītir anuvyañjanāni catasraḥ sarvākārāḥ pariśuddhaya daśa balāni catvāri vaiśāradyaṇi trīṇī smṛtyupasthānāni trīṇy. arakṣyāno mahākaruṇā asaṃpramoṣadharmatā vāsanāsamudghātātā sarvākāravarajñānam ca. - Lengthy definitions in Śatasāhāsrikā P.P., chap. IX, p. 1427 seq.*

10. The four apramāṇas (= brahmavihāras).- Defined in Abhis. al āl., p. 914 (25): *apramāṇāni maitryādicaturbrahmavihāraḥ. - Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 196, III, p. 220; Theragāthā, I, st. 649; Jātaka, I, p. 139; II, p. 61; mettā, etc.: Visuddhimagga, I., p. 111, 295; Atthasālinī, p. 192; Divya, p. 224 (28); Kośa, p. 196-203; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. CXLI,*

p. 726c15; Mahāvvyut, 1504-1507; Dharmasaṃgraha, XVI; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 142; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVII, 17-288; XIX, 43; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 241-249; Uttarantra, p. 86, 288. - Also in Yogasūtra, I, 33.

11. The eight vimokṣas.- Defined in Abhis. al āl, p. 914 (25): *adhyātmaṃ rūpyarūpī bahirdhā rūpāṇI paśyatīti dvau, śubhaṃ vimokṣaṃ kāyena sāḅṣatk rtvopasaṃpadya viharatīty ekaḅ, ākāśavijñānā-kimcanyananaivasamjñayatanānīti catvāraḅ samjñaveditanirodha ity eka ity aṣṭau vimokṣāḅ.* - Cf. Dīgha, III, p. 262; Aṅguttara, I, p. 40; IV, p. 306; Vibhaṅga, p. 342; Paṭisaṃbhidā, II, p. 38-40; Atthasālinī, p. 190; Dhammasaṅgaṇi, p. 53; Mahāvvyut., 1511-1518; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXI; Kośa, VIII, p. 203-211; Kośavyākhyā, p. 597 (8), 643 (18); Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 727a1; Avadānaśataka, II, p. 69 (2), 154 (14); Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 29 seq. et passim.

The eight abhibhvāyatanas. - Defined in Abhis. al āl., p. 915 (3): *adhyātmārūpārūpasamjñānau pratyekaṃ parītādhimātrākārābhyāṃ bahirdhā rūpāṇI paśtatas tāny abhibhūya jānīta iti catuṣṭayam. adhyātmārūpasamjñy eva nīlapītalohitāvadātān abhibhūya paśtari catuṣṭayam ity aṣṭavidham abhibhvāyatanam.* - Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 110; III, p. 260, 287; Majjhima, II, p. 13; Aṅguttara, I, p. 40; IV, p. 305, 348; V, p. 61; Dhammasaṅgaṇi, p. 52; Atthasālinī, p. 387; Visuddhimagga, p. 175 seq.; Kośa, VIII, p. 211-213; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 727a11; Mahāvvyut., 1520-1527; Sūtrālaṃkāra, VII, 9; XXI, 44; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691a12; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIII, p. 758c5.

The ten kṛtsnāyatanas.- Definitons in Abhis. al. āl, p. 915 (2): *prthivyaptejovāyunīlapītalohītāvadātavijñānākāśam iti kṛtsnaṃ daśavidham.* - Cf. Dīgha, III, p. 268, 290; Majjhima, II, p. 14; Aṅguttara, V, p. 46 seq., 60; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 89. 112; Paṭisaṃbhidā, I, p. 28; Visuddhimagga, I, p. 110; Kośa, VIII, p. 213-215; Kośavyākhyā, p. 692 97); Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 727a19; Mahāvvyut.. 1529-1540; Sūtrālaṃkāra, VII, 9; XXI, 44; A.S., T1605, K. VII, p. 691a18; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIII, p. 759a21.

12. Araṇā and araṇāvihārin. - Defined in Abhis. al. āl, p. 915 (6): *parasaṃtānagatakleśaraṇaprabandhonmūlanāt samādhir ity asaṇā.* - Nettippakaraṇa, p.

55; Vibhaṅga, p. 19 seq; Avadānaśataka, II, p. 131 (5); Divya, p. 401 (4); Mahāvastu, I, p. 164 (15), 165 (5); 509; II, p. 292 (17); Lalitavistara, p. 358 (2), 361 (20), 423 (22), 437 (21) (*raṇaṃjaha*); Kośa, I, p. 13; IV, p. 121; VII, p. 86-87; Kośavyākhyā, p. 22 (30); Abhis. al., VIII, st. 7; Abhis. al. āl, p. 21 (25), 28 (17), 40 (19), 83 (17), 917 (1); Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 45; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 89 (1); A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691a23; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759b9.

The Abhis. al. āl., p. 917 (2), shows the difference between the araṇā of the śrāvaka and that of the Buddha: *mā 'smaddarśanāt kasyacit kleśopattiḥ syād iti mauśyakleśopapattiparihāritā śrāvakādyaṛaṇā -samādhiḥ. thatāgatānāṃ tu sakalajanakleśaprabandhonmūlanam syād grāmādiṣu. ity asarṇāsamādhiviśeṣaḥ.*

13. Praṇidhijñāna. - Defined in Abhis. al., VIII, st. 8: anābhogam anāsaṅgam avtāghātaṃ sadā sthitam, sarvapaśnāpanud bauddham praṇidhijñanam iṣyate; Abhis. al. āl, p. 915 (7): samyagapagata sarvanimittasan iti praṇidhijñanam. - Cf. Kośa, II, p. 303; VI, p. 172; VII, p. 88-89; Sūtrālamkāra, XVIII, 54; XXI, 46; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 89 (1); A.S., T 1605, K. VII, p. 691a24-26; A.S. V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759b17.

The Abhis. al. āl., p. 917 (9) shows the difference between the praṇidhijñāna of the śrāvaka and that of the bodhisattva: *nirmittatvenasvarasapavrṭtaṃ svasarasapavrṭtaṃ vastvanabhiniveśad rūpādisaṅgavigataṃ savāsanakleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇāt sarvajñeyāvyaḡhātam ā saṃsāram avasthānāt sadā sthitam samyakpratisaṃvillābhāt praśnavisarjanakāri tathāgataṃ praṇidhijñanam iti śrāvakādipraṇidhijñanād viśiṣṭam iṣṭam.*

14. The four pratisaṃvids. - Defined in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 258 (5): *yat sarvadharmāṇāṃ sarvaparyeṣu yāvadbhāvikatayā yathāvadbhāvikatayā ca bhāvnāmaya asaktam avivartyaṃ jñanam iyam eṣāṃ dharmapratisaṃvit. yat punaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ eva sarvalakṣaṇeṣu yāvadbhāvikatayā yathāvad bhāvikatasayā ca bhāvanāmayaṃ asktam avivartyaṃ jñanam iyameṣam arthapratisaṃvit. yat punaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ eva sarvanirvacaeṣu yāvadbhāvikatayā yathāvad bhāvikatayā ca bhāvanāmayaṃ asaktam avivartyaṃ jñanam eṣāṃ niruktiḥ pratisaṃvit. yat punaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ eva sarvaprakārapadaprabhdeṣu yāvadbhāvikataya yathāvadbhāvikatayā ca bhāvanāmayaṃ*

asaktam avivartyaṃ jñanam iyam eṣāṃ pratibhāna-pratisaṃvit. - Cf. Aṅguttara, II, p. 160; III, p. 113, 120; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 88, 119; II, p. 150, 157, 185, 193; Vibhaṅga, p. 293-305; Visuddhimagga, p. 440 seq., Milinda, p. 214; Lalitavistara, p. 2 (13), 35 (16), 287 (10), 343 (4); Avadānaśataka, I, p. 96 (8); Kośa, VII, p. 90-95; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. LXXIX, p. 410 (on the gift of languages); Mahāvvyut., 197-200; Dharmasaṃgraha, LI; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 202, 204; Daśabhūmika, p. 77; Bhadramāyākāra, p. 57; Saṃdhinir., VIII, v. 19-23; Abhis. al., VIII, st. 3; Abhis. al. āl, p. 455 (25); Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVIII, 34-37; XXI, 47; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 258 (4), 353-354 (*pratisaṃvidvihāra*); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 2 (5); 98 (8), 106 (7), 190 (23), 254 (7); Uttarantra, p. 117, 292; Siddhi, p. 652; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691a27; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759b23. - See also Saṃgraha, above, chap. V, § 2.

15. The five and the six abhijñās. - Infinite bibliography: Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 726b22; Kośa, VII, p. 97-126; Mahāvvyut., 202-209; Dharmasaṃgraha, XX; Daśabhūmika, p. 34-37; Madh, avatāra, p. 56; Śikṣāsam., p. 243; Bodhicarāv. pañj., p. 428 (4); Sūtrālaṃkāra, VII, 1; XXI, 48; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 58; Uttarantra, p. 148, 180, 190; A. S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691b6 seq.; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759c17 seq.

16. The thirty-two mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇas. - See Mahāpadānasutta in Digha, II, p. 16-19 and comm. in Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, II, p. 445-452; Lakkhaṇasutta in Digha, III, p. 142-170 and comm. in Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, III, p. 918-840; Lalitavistara, p. 105 (8) - 106 (7); Mahāvvyut., 236-267; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXXXIII; Abhis. al., VIII, st. 13-20; Abhis. al. āl, p. 918 (25) - 919 (20); Bodh. bhūmi, *lakṣaṇānuvyañjanapaṭala*, p. 375-376; Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, T 220, k. CCCLXXXI, p. 967b23 seq., Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, T 223, k. XXIV, p. 395b28; Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, T 1579, k. XLIX, p. 566c11; Uttarantra, p. 263-264; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. CLXXVII, p. 888a6 seq.

The eighty anuvyañjanas. - See Lalitavistara, p. 106 (8) - 107 (17); Mahāvvyut., 269-349; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXXXIV; Abhis. al., VIII, st. 21-32; Abhi. al. āl., p. 920 (21) - 922 (21); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 376-377; Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, t 220, k. CCCLXXXI, p. 968a9 seq.; Pañca-viṃśatisāhasrikā, T 223, k. XXIV, p. 395c27 seq.; Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, T 1579, k. XLIX, p. 567a5 seq.

Marks of the cakravartin and the Buddha, Kośa, III, p. 203; marks of the beginning bodhisattva, Kośa, IV, p. 220; Siddhi, p. 737. Following is the list of lakṣaṇas and anuvyañjanas according to Lalitavistara.

The thirty-two lakṣaṇas:

1. *uṣṇīṣasīrṣaḥ*, his head is crowned by a cranial protuberance;
2. *bhinnāñjanamayūrakalāpābhinīlavallitapradakṣiṇāvartakeśaḥ*, his hairs, curling to the right, are deep black, brilliant like the tail of the peacock or collyrium with moving reflections;
3. *samavipulalālātaḥ*, his forehead is broad and smooth;
4. *ūrṇā bhruvor madhye jātā jimarajataparakāśa*, between his eyebrows he has a circle of hair white like snow or silver;
5. *gopakṣmanetraḥ*, his eyelashes are like those of a heifer;
6. *abhinīlanetraḥ*, his eyes are dark black;
7. *samacatvāriṃśaddantaḥ*, he has forty even teeth;
8. *aviraladantaḥ*, his teeth are close together without any gap;
9. *śukladantaḥ*, his teeth are white;
10. *brahmasvaraḥ*, his voice has the sound of Brahma (or according to others, he has the voice of a passerine bird);
11. *rasarasāgravān*, his sense of taste is excellent;
12. *prabhūtatanujihvaḥ*, his tongue is broad and thin;
13. *siṃhahanuḥ*, he has the jaw of a lion;
14. *susamṛtaskandaḥ*, his shoulders are perfectly rounded;
15. *saptosadaḥ*, the seven parts of his body are well-developed;
16. *citāntarāṃsaḥ*, the space between his shoulders is covered;
17. *sūkṣmasuvarṇavarṇacchaviḥ*, his skin is fine and golden in color;
18. *sthito 'navanatapralambabāhuḥ*, standing upright, his arms come down to his knees;
19. *siṃhapūrvāsadhakāyaḥ*, the front part of his body is like a lion;

20. *nyagrodhaparimaṇḍalaḥ*, his waist is like the trunk of a nyagrodha tree, the Indian fig tree;
21. *ekaikaromā*, his hairs arise one by one;
22. *ūrdhāgrābhipradakṣiṇāvartaromā*, their upper ends curl to the right;
23. *kośopagatavastiguhyah*, his penis is sheathed;
24. *suivartitoruḥ*, his thighs are perfectly rounded;
25. *aiṇeyamṛgarājajaṅghah*, his leg is like that of the king of the gazelles;
26. *dīrghāṅgulih*, the toes of his feet are long;
27. *āyatapārṣṇipādaḥ*, his heel is broad;
28. *utsaṅgapādaḥ*, his instep is high;
29. *mṛdutaruṇahastapmadaḥ*, his feet and hands are soft and delicate;
30. *jālāṅgulihastapādaḥ*, his toes and fingers are marked with a network of lines;
31. *adhaḥ karmatalayoh cakre jāle cotre arcīsmatī prabhāsvare 'site sahasrāre sanemike sanābhike*, the soles of his feet are marked with beautiful wheels luminous, brilliant, white, having a thousand rays held by a felly within a hub;
32. *supraṭiṣṭhitasamaṇpādaḥ*, his feet are close together and well set.

The eighty anuvyañjanas:

1. *tuṅganakhah*, his nails are rounded,
2. *tāmranakhah*, verging on the color of copper,
3. *snigdhanakhah*, smooth;
4. *vṛttāṅgulih*, his fingers are rounded,
5. *citrāṅgulih*, beautiful,
6. *anupūrvacitrāṅgulih*, tapering;
7. *gūḍhaśiraḥ*, his veins are hidden,
8. *gūḍhagulphaḥ*, his ankles are covered,
9. *ghanasamḍhiḥ*, his joints are solid,

10. *aviṣamasamapādaḥ*, his feet are straight,
11. *āyatapādapārṣṇiḥ*, his heel is wide,
12. *snogdhapāṇilekhaḥ*, the lines of his hands are smooth,
13. *tulyapāṇilekhaḥ*, alike,
14. *gaṃbhīrapāṇilekhaḥ*, deep,
15. *ajihmapāṇikekhaḥ*, not twisted,
16. *anupūrvapāṇilekhaḥ*, long;
17. *bimboṣṭhaḥ*, his lips are like the fruit of the bimba tree;
18. *noccvacanaśabdhaḥ*, the sound of his voice is not too high (or according to others, his mouth is not too wide);
19. *mṛdutaruṇatāmrajivaḥ*, his tongue is soft, delicate and the color of copper;
20. *gajagarjitābhistanitameghasvaramadhuramañjughoṣaḥ*, his soft fine voice has the sound of an elephant's cry or a thunder-cloud;
21. *paripūrṇavyaṅjanaḥ*, his sexual organs are perfect;
22. *pralambabāhuḥ*, his arms are long;
23. *śucigātravastusampannaḥ*, his shining limbs are dressed (or according to others, his limbs are shining);
24. *mṛdugātraḥ*, his limbs are soft,
25. *viśalagātraḥ*, wide,
26. *adīnagātraḥ*, show no weaknesses,
27. *anunnatagātraḥ*, show no projections,
28. *susumāhitagātraḥ*, perfectly formed (or according to others, perfectly solid),
29. *svibhaktagātraḥ*, well-proportioned;
30. *prthuvipulasuparipūrṇajānumaṅdalaḥ*, his knee-cap is broad, developed and perfectly plain;
31. *vṛttagātraḥ*, his limbs are rounded.

32. *suparimṛṣṭagātraḥ*, perfectly polished;
33. *ajihmavṛṣabhogātraḥ*, his limbs are like a bull's and even;
34. *gambhīranābhiḥ*, his navel is deep,
35. *ajihmanābhiḥ*, without deformity;
36. *śucyācāraḥ*, his behavior is pure;
37. *rṣabhavatsamantaprāsādikaḥ*, he is always pleasant like the ox;
38. *paramasuviṣuddhavitimirālokasamantaprabhaḥ*, he sheds the brilliance of superior perfectly pure light around himself which dissipates the shadows;
39. *nāgavilambitagatiḥ*, he has the slow walk of the elephant,
40. *siṃhavikrāntagatiḥ*, he has the heroic walk of the lion,
41. *rṣabhavikrāntagatiḥ*, he has the heroic walk of the bull,
42. *haṃsavikrāntagatiḥ*, the walk of the swan;
43. *abhipradakṣiṇāvartagatiḥ*, he walks always turning to the right;
44. *vṛtakukṣiḥ*, his sides are rounded,
45. *mṛṣṭakukṣiḥ*, polished;
46. *ajihmakukṣiḥ*, his sides are not crooked;
47. *cāpodaraḥ*, his belly is the shape of a bow;
49. *vyapagatacchavidōṣanīlakālakādduṣṭaśarīraḥ*, his body is free of anything that could dull the brilliance and is free of all the black stains that could disfigure it;
50. *vṛttadaṃṣṭraḥ*, his canine teeth are rounded,
51. *tīkṣṇadaṃṣṭraḥ*, sharp,
52. *anupūrvadaṃṣṭraḥ*, well-placed;
52. *tuṅganāsaḥ*, his nose is prominent;
53. *śucinayanaḥ*, his eyes are shining;
54. *vimalanayanaḥ*, his eyes are pure,
55. *prahasitanayanaḥ*, smiling,

56. *āyatanayanah*, elongated,
57. *viśalanayanah*, large,
58. *nīlakūvalatanadalasadṛiśhanayanah*, like the petals of a blue lotus;
59. *sahitabhrūh*, his eyebrows are even,
60. *citabhrūh*, beautiful,
61. *saṃgatabhrūh*, joined,
62. *anupūrvabhrūh*, regular,
63. *asitabhrūh*, black (and according to others, long);
64. *pīnagaṇḍah*, his cheeks are full,
65. *aviśamagaṇḍah*, equal,
66. *vyapagatagaṇḍadoṣah*, without imperfection;
67. *anupahatakruṣṭah*, he is protected from harm and from blame (or according to others, he has a faultless organ of hearing);
68. *suviditendriyah*, his organs light up completely;
69. *suparipūrṇendriyah*, his organs are perfectly accomplished;
70. *saṃgatamukhalalāṭah*, his forehead and face are in harmony with each other,
71. *paripūrṇottamāṅgaḥ*, his head is well developed,
72. *asitakeśah*, his hair is black,
73. *sahitakeśah*, equally distributed on his head,
74. *susaṃgatakeśah*, well-arranged,
75. *surabhikeśah*, perfumed,
76. *aparūṣhakeśah*, his hair is not rough,
77. *anākulakeśah*, nor disordered;
78. *anupūrvakeśah*, his hairs are straight,
79. *saṃkuñcitakeśah*, curly,

80. *śrīvatsasvastikanandyāvartavardhamānasamsthānakeśaḥ*, and representing the shapes of śrīvatsa, svastika, nandyāvarta and vardhamāna (or according to others, the palms of his hands and the soles of his feet are marked with these signs).

17. The four sarvākārapariśuddhis. - Defined, Abhi. asl. āl, p. 915 (10); *āśrayālambanacittajñānapariśuddhyaya iti catasraḥ śuddhyah*. - in relation to the four masteries; cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 384; Sūtrālamkāra, XVIII, 68; XXI, 50; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p, 681b20 seq., A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 760a21 seq.

18. The ten balas: Aṅguttara, V, p. 32 seq.; Majjhima, I, p. 69; Cullaniddeśa, p. 466; Milinda, p. 105, 285; Vibhaṅga, p. 335-344; Kathāvatthu, p. 228; Mahāvastu, I, p. 38 (125), 39 (13), 159 (12), 502; Lalitavistara, p. 433 seq.; Kośa, VII, p. 67-72; Kośavyākhyā, p. 641 (10) seq., Dhāraṇīśvaraparipṛicchā in Madh. avatāra, p. 369-395; Abhis. al. āl., p. 455 (15); Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 51; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691b28 seq.; A.S.V., T 1606, K XIV, p. 760b11 seq., Mahāvvyut., 120-129; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXXV; Saṃgraha, above, v. 9, no. 12.

19. The four vaiśāradyas: Majjhima I, p. 71 seq., 380; Dīgha, I, p. 110; Aṅguttara, II, p. 13; III, p. 297 seq.; IV, p. 83, 210, 213; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 194; Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā, I, p. 71; Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, I, p. 278; Mahāvastu, I, p. 38 (15), 39 (13 seq.; II, p. 545; III, p. 386 (14); Divya, p. 126 (13), 264 (30), 627 (15); Lalitavistara, p. 5, 403 (1); Kośa, III, p. 196; IV, p. 221; VII, p. 75; Kośavyākhyā, p. 645 (30); Mahāvvyut., 131-134; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXXVII; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 29 seq., 77 seq., 239; Abhis. al. āl., p. 455 (21); Madh. avatāra, p. 320; Sūtrālamkāra, III, 3; XXI, 53; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 403 (3); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 56 (15), 200 (27); Uttaratantra, p. 118, 360; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691c4 seq.; A.S V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 760c13 seq.; Saṃgraha chap. X, § 9, no. 13.

20. The three arakṣyas (these are *āraḥkṣya*, *āraḥkṣaṇa*, *araḥkṣya*, *araḥkṣaṇa*, *araḥkṣaṇīya*).

Defined, Abhis. al. āl, p. 915 (12): *pariśuddhakāyavānmanaḥsamudācāras hathāghato nāsty asya viparītasamudācāratā yāṃ paraparijñanabhayāt-pracchādayitvyāṃ manyetety arakṣaṇaṃ trividham*. - Cf. Digha, III, p. 217; Kośa, VII, p. 67; Mahāvvyut., 192-195; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 89 (6), 375 (6), 403 (23), 408 (4); A.S., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 761b14; Saṃgraha above, chap. X, v. 9, no, 14.

The three smṛtyupasthānas. - Defined, Abhis. al. āl, p. 915 (14): *dharmadeśanāyāṃ śrotukāmāśrotukāmobhayakāmeṣu yathākramam anunayapratighobhayavivkta evopekṣakaḥ smṛtimān viharatīti smṛtyupasthānaṃ tridhā*. Kośa, VII, p. 76; Kośavyākhyā, p. 646 (34); Sūtrālamkāra, XVIII, 42-44; XXI, 53; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 403; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 166; A.S., T 1605, K. VII, p. 691c15 seq.; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 761a19; Saṃgraha, above, chap. X, v. 9, no. 15.

21. Vāsanāsamudghāta. - defined, Abhis. al. āl. p. 915:

kleśajñeyāvaraṇāniśayarūpabījaprahāṇād vāsanāyāḥ samudgjātaḥ. - Cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 375 (7); A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691c32; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 761b25; Saṃgraha, above X, v. 9, no. 16.

Maudgalyāyana-the-monkey. No story about a monkey is attributed to Maudgalyāyana in the dictionary of proper names of Malalasekera and Akanuma. P. Demiéville has pointed out a similar story referring to Vasumitra who was a bhikṣu bodhisattva; he was human but he behaved like a monkey by way of a karmic atavism which the Buddha explained to king Bimbisāra: 'Vasumitra had been a monkey at the time of Dīpaṃkara and had received refuge and the five precepts from an Arhat ... Actually his voice was like that of a monkey; he climbed in the trees in the company of 84,000 monkeys of golden color, played with bells, etc. ... He will become the Buddha Siṃhacandra who will follow Maitreya.' - This story is told in the Che tseu yue fo pen chen king = Siṃhacandra-buddhajātaka, T 176. - Mahākarmavibhaṅga, XVI, p. 44 cites as example the avadāna of Siṃhajātaka; it is obviously referring to this Simhacandrajātaka and not to the Siṃhajātaka of Pāli collection no. 157 (Guṇajātaka). The same Mahākarmavibhaṅga tells the case of the brahmin Varṣākāra who was condemned to be a monkey for 500 births because of a misdeed of speech.

For the claims of Pūraṇa Kassapa to be omniscient, cf. Aṅguttara, IV, p. 428: *Pūraṇo Kassapo sabbaññu sabbadassāvī aparisesañāṇadassanaṃ paṭijānati* “*carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca satataṃ samitaṃ ñāṇadassanaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ ti.*

22. Asaṃmoṣhadharmatā. - Defined, Abhis. al. āl., p. 915 (15):

sattvārhakriyākālānatikramalakṣaṇety asaṃmoṣadharmatā. - Cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 55; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 375 (7); A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691c19; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 761b21.

23. Mahākaruṇā. - Defined Abhis. al. āl, p. 915 (18): *sakalajanahitāśayatā mahatī*

karuṇā jane. - Cf. Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā, I, p. 89; Dharmasaṃgītisūtra in □ ikṣam., p. 286 seq.; Divya, p. 96, 125 (st. on compassion), 359 (5); Kośa, VII, p. 77-79; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 259; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 247(10); Sūtrālaṃkāra, XVII, 43; XXI, 56; Uttarantra, p. 179; Siddhi, p. 328; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691c23; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 761c1.

24. The āvenika buddhadharmas:

i. List of six āvenikas in Mahānidēsa, p. 143; Cullaniḍḍesa, p. 466.

ii. Vaibhāṣika list of eighteen āvenikas (ten balas, four vaiśāradyas, three smṛtyupasthānas, mahākaruṇā): Divya, 182 (20), 268 (4); Kośa, VII, p. 66; Kośavyākhyā, p. 640 (34).

iii. Another list of eighteen āvenikas (*nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam*, etc.): Kośavakhyā, p. 640 (34) - 541 (8); Mahāvvyut., 136-153; Dharmasaṃgraha, LXXIX; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691c25; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, 761c5; Saṃgraha, chap. X, § 9, no. 19, § 24; Dhāraṇīśvaraparipṛcchā in Madh. avatāra, p. 322 (12) - 337 (3); Uttarantra, p. 261-263. - very similar lists in Pāli sources: Milinda, p. 285; Mahāvastu, I, p. 160(8) and note p. 505.

iv. List of 140 āvenikas: Bodh. bhūmi, p. 88, 375, 405; Yogacārabhūmiśāstra, T 1575, k. LXXIX, p. 738b18.

25. Sarvākārajñatā (also *sarvākārajñāna*, *sarvākāraṅarajñāna*): Sūtrālamkāra, IX, 2; XIV, 26; XVIII, 26; XXI, 58; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 404 (26) - 405 (6): *tatra tatathāgatasayānathopasaṃhiteṣu naivarthopasaṃhitanānarthopasaṃhiteṣu sarvadharmasṣu jñanam, idam tathāgatasya sarvāk arajñanam ity ucyate. tatra yat tathāgatasayārthopasaṃhiteṣu sarvadharmeṣu jñanam, idam tathāgasya varajñanam ity ucyate. tatra yac ca sarvākāraṃ jñanam yac ca varajñanam, tad aikadhyam abhisamkṣīpya sarvākārajñanam ity ucyate.*

28. The profundity of the dharmakāya has been studied at length by the Sūtrālamkāra; *lakṣaṇagāmhīrya*, IX, 22-25; *sthānagāmbhīrya*, IX, 26; *karmagāmbhīrya*, IX, 27-36.

29. Anusmṛti in general: applied to six objects, Dīgha, III, p. 250, 280; Aṅguttara, III, p. 284, 312 seq, 452; V, 329 seq.; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 28; extended to ten objects, Aṅguttara, I, p. 30, 42; Lalitavistara, p. 34; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 225, 231, 232. - Bodh. bhūmi, p. 91 (4) seq. has a section on the tenfold *guṇanusmaraṇatā* of the Tathāgatas.

30. This paragraph is drawn from the Śatasāhasrikasūtra of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, probably a more extended version of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. The latter actually begins, at § 1, p. 31-32, with a description of 'the eighteen fullnesses' of the pure lands.

P. Demiéville makes the following comment on these 'fullnesses': These eighteen categories play a considerable rôle in the scholasticism of the 'pure lands' of which they concisely give a reasonable definition: a 'pure land' is 'fully' perfected only if it possesses these 'fullnesses'. The question is treated at length in Asaṅga's Mahāyanasaṃgraha and in Vasubandhu's and Asvabhāva's commentaries as well as in the Buddhabhūmisūtra (Fo ti king louen, T 1530, I, p. 202b seq) which is attributed to Bandhuprabha (most likely 'Prabhāmitra' or 'Prabhābandhu'), a disciple of Dharmapāla of Nālanda, and finally, in Chinese works (e.g., commentary of Yuan-t'so, Kiai chen mi king chou, suppl. Kyōto, 405b - 311a. The Mahāyanasaṃgarha refers to the Śatasāhasikasūtra for the enumeration of these eighteen fullnesses. Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya in Paramārtha's version explains that

in the Bodhisattvapitaka there is a sūtra (or sūtras) containing 100,000 gāthās - for this reason called the Sūtra of the One Hundred Thousand - the introduction of which elaborates on the lakṣaṇas of the pure lands. The Saṃdhinirmocana may well be classed in the Bodhisattvapitaka; perhaps Asaṅga may have wished to designate this sūtra by this name.

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For the seven jewels, cf. Milinda, p. 267 (23); Mahāvvyut., no. 5943 seq.; Divya, p. 297 (24); Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 151 (1).

For the King-lotus/es, see, e.g., Laṅkāvatāra, p. 70 (1), where it is said that the bodhisattva settled in the tenth bhūmi is seated on a great lotus throne ornamented with many jewels and pearls, in a palace of great price in the form of a lotus (*sa tastyām pratiṣṭhito 'nekaratnamuktopaśobhite mahāpadmarāje padmakṛtau mahāratnavimane ... niṣaṇṇah*).

31. Cf. the ten *tathāgatakr̥tya*, *tathāgatakarāṇīya*, in Bodh. bhūmi, p. 407 (5) seq. We have already mentioned the identity of all the Buddhas from the point of view of their activity in chap. X, § 3, no. 3.

32. The single vehicle: Aṣṭasāhasrīka, p. 3. - Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, p. 3 (5). - Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 430 (3): *buddhaiḥpratyekabuddhaiḥ ca śrāvakaīś ca niṣevitā, mārgas tvam ekā mokṣasya nāsty anya iti niścayaḥ*; Abhis. al. āl., p. 133 (12) - 134 (11); Saṃdhinir., IX, v. 32-33; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 65, 133; Kāśyapaparivarta, v. 80, p. 116; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 41 (15), 46 (11), 143 (4); ibid. for the relationships among the three vehicles, p. 79-82; Madh. vṛtti, XV, 7, p. 269. - Madh. avatāra, p. 22 (8); Śikṣasaṃ., p. 95 915); Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI, 53-59; XII, 23; Uttaratantra, p. 169, 205; Buddhahūmisūtraśāstra, T 1530, k. V, p. 312b seq.; Mahāratnakuṭa, T 310, k. CXIX, p. 676b6-12; Siddhi, p. 673, 724, 725.

For the bodhisattva *niyatas* and *aniyatas*, cf. Siddhi, p. 733 seq.

The predictions of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka are the object of three chapters, VI-VIII, p. 144 seq. - The same argument is used in Abhis. al. āl., p. 133 (23): *evam*

cāryasaddharmapuṇḍarīkasatyakāśatyakīparivartādiṣu p athaḥ sunīto bhavati: bhaviṣyasi tvamŚāripiutrānāgate samyaksambuddhaḥ. - For the Vyākaraṇa, see also Bodh, bhūmi, p. 290 (8); Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 190 (18); Siddhi, p. 732, 736; Sūtrālaṅkāra, V, 5, XIX, 35-37: anyat punar vyākaraṇaṃ yad as tanyāṃ bhūmāv anutpattikadharmakṣāntilābhataḥ, ahaṃ buddho bhaviṣyāmīti mānaprahānataḥ, sarvanimittabhogaprahānatoḥ, sarvabuddhabodhisattvāś ca sārddham ekībhāvopagamanataḥ, tadātmasaṃtanabhedādarśanāt.

33. See also chap. X, § 3, no. 3, and § 8.

36 and 36 - 2. Some commentators (Fujaku and Dharmagupa) subdivide this paragraph differently; see H. Ui, Shōdaijōron Kenkyū, p. 785 b.

"Two Tathāgatas do not appear simultaneously in the same world": this sūtra, often cited (Digha, III, p. 114; Majjhima, III, p. 65; Aṅguttara, I, p. 27; Milinda, p. 236) has caused much ink to flow: see Kośa, III, p. 198-201; Kośavyākhyā, p. 338; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 92; good summary in Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 152 (9) - 153 (2): *tathāgatayoś cakravartinoś caikasmiml lokadhav anutpādād iti. tathāgatayos trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātur abhipretaḥ, cakravartinos tu cāturdvīpaka evety kecit. tathāgatayor api cāturdvīpaka evety apare. buddhā hi bhagavanto dharmakāyādhipatyāt trisāhasramahāsāhasre lokadhātau pratyekam c aturdvīpakeṣu nirmānakāyenābhisambodhiṃ parinirvānaṃ ca darśayanti. tathā hi yad ekasmiñ cāturmahādvīpake tuṣiteṣu manuṣyeṣu ca cyuttijanmaparigraho bodhisattvānāṃ prayojanam. tad itareṣv api cāturdvīpakeṣu samānam. Tasmād akaniṣṭhabhavana evābhisambuddho bhagavānnirmānakāyena trisāharamahāsāhasre lokadhātāv antargateṣu sarvacāturdvīpakeṣu tuṣiteṣuupapattiṃ pracyutiṃ manuṣyeṣu ca janmaparigrahādikaṃ sarvan darśayatīti manyante. tatra ca samasaṃvartanīyakarmāyattatā buddhacakravarttyutpatteḥ sahabhāve pāratantryam.*